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The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 came into operation thirty years 
ago and has remained relatively unchanged since its promulgation. The stated objective 
of the Act is to provide the surviving spouse with a claim for maintenance against the 
estate of the deceased spouse in certain circumstances. This objective is sound, as it is 
evident from an analysis of the history of our law that legislation was needed to address 
the financial position of a survivor following the death of his or her spouse. The practical 
application of the Act is, however, not as robust as it does not always achieve the stated 
objective and often leads to unintended consequences.  
 
This research has a dual objective. The first aim is to analyse the practical considerations 
when an executor applies the Act and to consider the challenges the executor must deal 
with when considering a maintenance claim under the Act. The second aim is to 
investigate possible solutions to these challenges and to consider whether there are 
viable alternative arrangements for the way in which a maintenance claim under the Act 
is handled.  
 
The purpose of the study is to formulate a comprehensive recommendation for 
legislative reform of the Act so that the practical application of the Act achieves a result 
that reflects the objective of the Act. 
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  1 
CHAPTER 1 




It is often said that the only two certainties in life are death and taxes. This sentiment is 
partly echoed in a statement in the foreword to the first edition of Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
erfreg,1 where it was said that knowledge of the law of succession is as essential for any 
balanced jurist as death is inevitable.  
 
When a person dies and leaves assets and/or liabilities, his or her estate must be 
administered. One component of the administration process is the consideration and 
finalisation of claims lodged against the estate. These claims could include maintenance 
claims lodged on behalf of minor children, the surviving spouse2 or partner, or 
dependants of the deceased.  
 
Estate administration is the process through which the deceased person’s liabilities and 
legal obligations to other persons are fulfilled or expunged, and thereafter the balance 
of the available assets of the deceased is transferred to those persons entitled thereto 
in terms of the deceased’s testamentary wishes or by way of intestate division.3 There 
are various statutory provisions in South Africa that govern the different aspects of a 
deceased estate. These provisions are contained in various Acts and regulations, and all 
have varied focuses and address different aspects of a deceased estate. 
 
The principal statute and reference source relating to deceased estates is the 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “Estates Act”), 
 
1  Van der Merwe & Rowland (1990).  
2  For purposes of this thesis, I use the terms “surviving spouse” and “survivor” as synonyms. See fn 26 for 
further details. 




as amended. It is the basic broad legislation governing the legal provisions relating to 
the administration and distribution of deceased estates.4 It deals mainly with the duties 
and powers of the executor, prescribes the processes to be followed in the 
administration of an estate and deals with other incidental matters, such as the 
appointment and role of a tutor and/or curator, minors’ inheritances, the Guardian’s 
Fund and testamentary trusts. It does not, however, give any direct guidelines for the 
determination of the devolution of an estate, and guidance in this regard needs to be 
sought in other pieces of legislation.   
 
The Estates Act provides that when any person dies in the Republic of South Africa, 
leaving any property or any document that is or purports to be a will, his or her estate 
has to be reported to the office of the Master of the High Court (“the Master”) that has 
jurisdiction over the estate.5 The estate of a deceased person cannot be dealt with or 
liquidated until an executor has been appointed by the Master.6 The Estates Act 
provides that no person shall liquidate or distribute the estate of any deceased person, 
unless letters of executorship have been granted to him or her by the Master.7 Once the 
executor is appointed, he or she must administer the estate and follow certain 
processes to deal with the assets and liabilities of the estate. 
 
The executor has certain rights and powers that enable him or her to deal with the 
liquidation and distribution of the estate. He or she also has certain duties to fulfil.8 One 
of these duties is to consider claims lodged by creditors of the estate. Section 29 of the 
Estates Act provides that the executor shall, as soon as possible after letters of 
executorship have been issued to him or her, publish a notice in the Government 
Gazette and in one or more newspapers circulating in the district in which the deceased 
 
4   Botha et al 389.  
5   Section 7 read with section 4. 
6   Meyerowitz D Meyerowitz on estates and their taxation (2010) 8.1. 
7   Section 13. 




ordinarily resided at the time of his or her death.9 The purpose of the notice is to alert 
all persons with claims against the estate to lodge such claims with the executor within 
a period specified in the notice. This process will enable the executor to determine the 
debts for which the estate may be liable, which is an important step in determining the 
solvency of the estate.10 For purposes of this thesis, all references to estates are to 
solvent estates, unless the context indicates differently.  
 
All claims that would have been capable of proof in the event that the estate was 
insolvent, may be lodged in terms of section 29.11 The claims lodged against the estate 
could be in the nature of inter alia a medical bill, an outstanding amount on a mortgage 
bond or instalment sale agreement, outstanding income tax or a claim by a former 
spouse12 or civil union partner13 in terms of a divorce order. Where the deceased had 
minor children, the executor often has to consider a claim for maintenance on behalf of 
such minor children. 
 
As indicated above, the Estates Act deals with the basic principles of the administration 
of a deceased estate. Specific details on the distribution of an estate, and certain other 
aspects, are found in other pieces of legislation. The executor therefore has to be well-
versed in all legislation relevant to the administration of a deceased estate. The legal 
 
9   Subsection (1). 
10  Section 34(1). 
11 In terms of section 44(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, any liquidated claim, the cause of which 
arose before the date of sequestration, may be proved against the insolvent estate. Where a deceased 
estate is found to be insolvent, the creditors of the estate have the option to instruct the executor to 
surrender the estate in terms of the Insolvency Act. If they choose not to do so, the estate will be 
administered in terms of section 34 of the Estates Act and the date of sequestration of the estate will 
be regarded as the day following the last day on which the creditors could instruct the executor to 
surrender the estate. This date is therefore usually relatively shortly after the death of the deceased 
and it follows that only claims that exist at that time are capable of proof.  
12 The term “spouse” includes a party to a customary marriage as contemplated in the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. See further below in this chapter. 
13  Section 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 equates civil marriages and civil unions. Unless the context 
indicates the opposite, any reference in this thesis to a civil marriage and to a husband, wife, or spouse 




provisions relating to the execution of wills are contained in the Wills Act14, as amended. 
This Act consolidates the rules pertaining to the execution of wills and, to some extent, 
deals with the devolution of an estate where the deceased left a valid will. South African 
law acknowledges the principle of freedom of testation, or stated otherwise, it does not 
subscribe to a legal system that provides for a legitimate share or forced heirship.15 
Freedom of testation means that any natural person with testamentary capacity16 may 
make a will and leave his or her assets to whomever he or she wishes.17 The 
administration of a testate estate is therefore dealt with according to the testator’s free 
will, as expressed in his or her valid will.18 This testamentary freedom is however not 
absolute and is subject to certain limitations imposed by common law and statute, as 
interpreted and applied within South Africa’s democratic constitutional framework.19 
Some of these limitations or exclusions apply to the person who wrote out the will and 
the person who acted as witness to the will, and have been legislated and form part of 
the Wills Act.20  
 
The Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the “ISA”) regulates 
the law relating to intestate succession, which is applicable when a person dies without 
leaving a valid will. This Act provides detailed rules for the devolution of an intestate 
estate and forms an integral part of the South African succession system. The rules 
 
14 7 of 1953. 
15  Botha et al 289. 
16 In terms of section 4 of the Wills Act, a person with testamentary capacity is any mentally capable 
person over the age of sixteen years. 
17  Corbett, Hofmeyr & Kahn The law of succession in South Africa (2001) 39-40. 
18  Abrie et al 48.  
19 Du Toit “The impact of social and economic factors on freedom of testation in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law” 1999(10)2 Stell LR 232. On the common law limitations on freedom of testation, see inter alia In re 
Watson (1893) 10 SC 276; Taylor v Pim (1903) 24 NLR 484; Re Estate Barrables 1913 CPD 364; In re 
Estate Maxwell 1949 (4) SA 84 (N); Ex parte Steenkamp and Steenkamp 1952 (1) SA 722 (T); Caldwell v 
Erasmus 1952 (4) SA 43 (T); Ex parte Dineen [1955] 4 All SA 1933 (O); Yassen v Yassen 1965 (1) SA 438 
(N); Casey v The Master 1992 (4) SA 505 (N); Pillay v Nagan 2001 (1) SA 410 (D); Minister of Education v 
Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C); Curators ad litem to Certain Potential Beneficiaries of Emma Smith 
Educational Fund v The University of KwaZulu-Natal 2011 (1) BCLR 40 (SCA); BoE Trust Limited (in their 
capacities as co-trustees of the Jean Pierre de Villiers Trust 5208/2006) 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA). 
20 For example, sections 2B, 2C and 4A, which all provide for particular scenarios where persons 




relating to intestate succession are aimed at protecting the interests of the closest 
family members of the deceased and provide that the estate of a deceased person who 
dies without a will shall devolve first on the surviving spouse and/or children, before 
other (close) family members stand to gain from the estate.21  
 
The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 deals inter alia with the different matrimonial 
property regimes and the consequences of such regimes. One aspect of particular 
interest in the context of deceased estates is the chapter dealing with marriages subject 
to the accrual system.22 The accrual system applies to a marriage out of community of 
property and is broadly aimed at ensuring that the growth in the spouses’ respective 
estates during the marriage is equalised. Where the accrual system applies to a 
marriage, there are specific provisions that apply when the marriage is dissolved, either 
by divorce or by the death of one or both spouses. The spouse (or his or her estate if he 
or she is deceased) whose estate shows no accrual (growth), or a smaller accrual than 
the estate of the other spouse, acquires a claim against the other spouse (or his or her 
estate if he or she is deceased) for an amount equal to half of the difference between 
the accrual of the respective estates of the spouses.23 In essence, the accrual of the 
estate is the amount by which the net value of the estate at the dissolution of the 
marriage exceeds the net value of the estate at the commencement of the marriage.24 
There are specific provisions that allow for certain assets to be excluded from the 
accrual, and also for the adjustment of the commencement value to take account of the 
difference that may exist in the value of money due to inflation.25 These provisions do 
not have any direct bearing on the topic of this thesis and will therefore not be 
discussed. Although this Act does not deal with the devolution of a deceased person’s 
estate, it is of importance to the executor as he or she will have to deal with the accrual 
claim, whether as an asset in the estate of the deceased spouse or as a claim against the 
 
21  Section 1. 
22  Chapter I. 
23  Section 3. 
24  Section 4(1)(a).  




estate. The extent of the claim could therefore have an indirect impact on the 
devolution of the deceased estate, as the executor may be forced to sell assets to 
generate sufficient cash to settle the claim or may be forced to transfer an asset to the 
spouse in settlement of the claim. 
 
The Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “EDA”) as amended, 
provides for the imposition of estate duty on the estate of a deceased person. It 
contains no guidelines on the actual devolution of the estate, but has an indirect impact 
on the devolution, as the executor has to settle the estate duty before he or she can 
distribute the assets of the estate as provided for in the deceased’s will or in terms of 
the rules pertaining to intestate estates. 
 
The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the 
”MSSA”) provides the framework for a survivor26 to lodge a claim for maintenance 
against the estate of the deceased spouse under certain circumstances.27 The MSSA 
provides that the survivor of a marriage dissolved by death after 1 July 199028 has a 
claim for maintenance against the estate of his or her deceased spouse.29 The MSSA 
forms the crux of this research and the problems associated with the application of the 
provisions thereof will be discussed under the next heading. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
In terms of the MSSA, the survivor can lodge a claim for maintenance for the period 
until his or her death or remarriage, but the claim is only allowed to the extent that it is 
 
26 See 4.3.5 for an explanation of the term “survivor”. As indicated in fn 2, I use the terms “survivor” and 
“surviving spouse” interchangeably in this thesis. 
27  See preamble to the MSSA. 
28  This is the date on which the MSSA came into operation. 




for the survivor’s reasonable maintenance needs in so far as he or she is not able to 
provide for those needs from his or her own means and earnings.30  
The MSSA includes a definition of “own means”31 which provides the executor with 
guidelines, but it does not define “maintenance” or what is meant by  
“reasonable maintenance”. It does provide that when determining the survivor’s 
reasonable maintenance needs, the following factors are taken into account: the 
amount available for distribution to heirs in the deceased’s estate; the survivor’s 
existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and obligations; the 
duration of the marriage; the survivor’s standard of living during the subsistence of the 
marriage; the survivor’s age at the time of the deceased’s death, and any other relevant 
factor. 32  
The rationale and objectives of the MSSA33 are valid as they seek to ensure that the 
survivor of a marriage dissolved by death is not left destitute without the means to 
meet his or her reasonable maintenance needs. The problem, however, is that it does 
not provide the executor with the necessary guidelines to consider the claim and to 
determine if the claim is reasonable. It also does not provide the necessary mechanism 
for the effective settlement of the claim once accepted by the executor. Both these 
aspects make the practical implementation of the MSSA problematic. In addition, our 







30  Section 2(1). 
31 See 4.3.4 for a detailed discussion. 
32  Section 3. 




1.2.1 Considering the maintenance claim by the survivor to determine whether it is     
reasonable 
 
One of the invariable consequences of a valid marriage is the reciprocal duty of support 
between spouses.34 When a marriage ends, this duty of support comes to an end.35 If 
the marriage ends in divorce, a new duty of support may arise,36 but only by agreement 
between the parties or by way of the court’s involvement. If the parties agree amongst 
themselves as to maintenance, this creates a contractual duty of support between them 
and the court may make an order in accordance with such agreement.37 If the parties do 
not enter into such an agreement or the court does not deem it fit to make an order in 
accordance with an agreement entered into by them, the court itself may make a 
maintenance order.38 Where the marriage ends in death, the responsibility to make a 
maintenance order is removed from the court and placed on the executor,39 who is not 
as qualified as the court to decide on what could probably be regarded as a legal 
question.  
 
The MSSA provides that certain factors shall be taken into consideration when 
determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor,40 but no guidelines are 
given to the executor as to how to apply these factors, the weighting (if any) to apply to 
them or the order of preference (if any) of such factors. The executor usually has limited 
information on the deceased and his or her lifestyle or standard of living, which makes it 
difficult to determine whether the survivor’s maintenance needs and requirements are 
reasonable.  The Estates Act gives the executor a mechanism to deal with disputed 
 
34  Oberholzer v Oberholzer 1947 (3) SA 294 (O); Crouse v Crouse 1954 (2) SA 642 (O); Reyneke v Reyneke 
1990 (3) SA 927 (E). 
35  Heaton South African family law (2010) 151.  
36  Heaton 151. 
37  Section 7(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
38  Section 7(2) of the Divorce Act.  
39  Section 2 of the MSSA.  




claims41 by allowing for the examination of the claim before the Master or a magistrate. 
It is not clear whether the executor can avail him- or herself of this option while he or 
she is still in the initial process of obtaining adequate information to consider the claim 
in order to accept or dispute it. Even if this remedy is available at that early stage of 
considering the maintenance claim, it appears that this option is rarely exercised. I was 
employed by the Master of the High Court for eleven years and was involved in the 
administration of estates for a further eleven years but, during that time, I did not 
encounter any estate with a maintenance claim by the survivor where the executor 
chose this route or where the Master suggested it as an option. 
 
The executor is legally vested with the administration of the deceased’s estate.42 As 
Meyerowitz43 states, the executor represents neither the heirs, nor the creditors of the 
estate. He or she must therefore at all times act objectively and without favouring one 
party over another. When dealing with a maintenance claim against an estate, the 
executor is expected to make a decision regarding the reasonable maintenance needs of 
the survivor.44 As the maintenance claim will have an impact on the balance of assets 
available in the estate to distribute to the heirs, it is highly probable that the claimant 
and heirs will have opposing interests. It is therefore almost inevitable that one of the 
parties will feel aggrieved by the executor’s decision and bring into question the 
executor’s objectivity. Informal discussions with estates officers and my own 
observations45 indicate that maintenance claims are more often than not brought where 
the residual heirs are the children of the deceased and the survivor is not the biological 
parent of those heirs. It is therefore conceivable that the heirs might be unhappy if the 
executor accepts the survivor’s claim as it reduces the amount available for distribution 
to them. Similarly, if the executor rejects the survivor’s claim for being unreasonable, 
the survivor could be aggrieved. 
 
41  Section 32 of the Estates Act.  
42  Malcomess v Kuhn 1915 CPD 852; Clarkson v Gelb [1981] 1 All SA 93 (W). 
43  12.20. 
44  Section 3 of the MSSA. 




The executor is placed in a position where he or she must decide whether the survivor’s 
needs, as claimed, are in fact reasonable. The reference to “reasonable” needs implies 
that the decision cannot be a purely objective one as reasonableness to some extent 
depends on the viewpoint of the person making the decision. The executor, for 
example, must decide whether expenses for items such as hairdressing, cell phone 
contracts, internet connection, entertainment, sport, domestic workers and food are to 
be regarded as reasonable. It is my submission that few executors are equipped to make 
such decisions. The Law Commission (now the Law Reform Commission) in its review of 
the law of succession46 concluded that any factors necessitating a moral decision should 
be avoided when dealing with the issue of maintenance of the spouse, as the question 
should not be whether the surviving spouse has a moral right to share in the estate of 
the first-dying spouse, but rather whether he or she has a need for support.47 I submit 
that, by placing the executor in a position where he or she has to decide on the 
reasonableness of the survivor’s claim, the executor is to some extent forced to make a 
moral judgement.  
 
Once the executor has determined that the survivor is in need of maintenance, he or 
she must determine whether the amount claimed by the survivor is reasonable. In order 
to correctly calculate the claim taking into account inflation48 and mortality tables,49 the 
survivor usually has to engage the services of an attorney and/or actuary, which can be 
 
46  South African Law Commission Working Paper 13 Review of the law of succession: the introduction of a 
legitimate portion or the granting of a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse Project 22 Pretoria, 
1986.   
47  At 28. 
48  Inflation is defined as “a general increase in prices” (Oxford dictionary of current English 2006) or the 
rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising and, subsequently, purchasing 
power is falling. See also Mohr Economic indicators (2014) 99; Roux Everyone’s guide to the South 
African economy (2014) 68; Pass, Lowe & Davies: Unwin Hyman dictionary of economics (1993) 256-
257; http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inflation.asp (last accessed 17 May 2014).  
49 Mortality tables show the rate of deaths occurring in a defined population during a specific time 
interval, or the survival from birth to any given age. They show the probability of a person’s death 
before his or her next birthday, based on his or her age. They are also commonly referred to as “life 
tables”, “actuarial tables” or “morbidity tables”: see West’s encyclopedia of American law, 2 ed (2008); 
Collins English dictionary – complete and unabridged 12 ed (2014); 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mortality-table.asp (last accessed 17 May 2014); 




costly. Due to the technical nature of the claim, the executor is often not equipped to do 
the necessary calculations or even check whether the calculation is correct, which could 
result in delays in considering the claim or acceptance of an incorrect claim. 
 
1.2.2 Payment of interim maintenance until the claim is accepted 
 
There is no provision in the MSSA for payment of maintenance in the period between 
the spouse’s death and the executor’s acceptance of the maintenance claim. 
Considering the comments in the previous section, it appears that the acceptance of a 
claim usually takes at least a few months, which could potentially mean that the 
survivor is without means during that period.   
 
1.2.3 Settlement of the claim 
 
If the executor accepts the claim as being reasonable, the nature of the assets often 
does not allow for quick and easy settlement of the claim. The following real-life 
example illustrates this: The will of Mr X provides that his immovable property devolves 
on his surviving spouse, Mrs Y, subject to the condition that it will devolve on his 
daughters when Mrs Y dies. (The daughters are not the children of Mrs Y.) Should Mrs Y 
sell the property during her lifetime, the proceeds will devolve on the daughters at the 
time of the sale. The will further provides that the residue of the estate devolves on the 
said daughters. On the face of it, there seems to be no problem. Mrs Y, however, 
institutes a maintenance claim against the estate as she has hardly any assets of her 
own and claims that she cannot maintain the property and herself. The executor accepts 
her claim as being reasonable. The problem arises when the executor has to settle the 
claim. The residue of the estate comprises of some movable assets and very little cash, 
resulting in insufficient cash and/or assets to settle Mrs Y’s maintenance claim. Neither 
the daughters (as residual heirs) nor Mrs Y is willing or able to enter into an agreement 




immovable property, in order to generate sufficient cash to settle the maintenance 
claim. The net proceeds of the property, after payment of the claim, devolves on the 
residual heirs (the daughters). The result is that Mrs Y receives sufficient funds to 
maintain herself, but she no longer has a roof over her head and the daughters’ hope of 
receiving the property after the Mrs Y’s death will no longer materialise. 
 
If the survivor or the residual heir is unhappy with the claim as accepted by the 
executor, their only option is to lodge an objection with the Master.50 This process is 
often unsatisfactory and lengthy, as the Master needs to ensure that all parties are 
given ample opportunity to represent their case.51 The process often takes months, and 
often results in the Master deciding that the matter is a factual dispute on which he or 
she cannot rule.52 The aggrieved party’s only option then is to proceed to court for an 
order setting aside the executor’s decision. The court may then make such order as it 
deems fit.53 By this time, many months may have passed since the death of the 
deceased, with no maintenance having been paid to the survivor in the interim period, 
which will inevitably impact on the survivor’s ability to maintain him- or herself. 
Furthermore, a survivor who truly cannot maintain him- or herself will in all probability 
not have funds to approach the court.  
 
1.2.4 The lack of a mechanism to deal with the remaining funds on the death or 
remarriage of the survivor 
 
Although the MSSA provides that the claim is for reasonable maintenance needs until 
the death or remarriage of the survivor,54 it is in most instances impossible to anticipate 
remarriage and, in practice, the claim is therefore always calculated over the life 
 
50  Section 35(7) of the Estates Act. 
51  Subsections (8) and (9). 
52 Broodryk v Die Meester 1991 (4) SA 365 (O); Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic) 
unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013.  
53  Section 35(10).  




expectancy of the claimant.55 There is no mechanism to address the situation where 
death happens earlier than anticipated or where the survivor remarries. If the survivor 
dies before the date regarded as the end of his or her life expectancy as per the 
mortality tables, the remaining portion of the funds (if any) will form part of his or her 
estate and will devolve on his or her testate or intestate heirs, who might be persons 
other than the heirs of the first-dying spouse. If the survivor remarries, any remaining 
portion of the funds will potentially benefit his or her new spouse. In both instances, the 
heirs of the first-dying spouse are prejudiced as the funds are not utilised as intended by 
the MSSA. 
 
The MSSA gives the executor the power to enter into an agreement with the claimant 
and heirs who have an interest in the agreement, which includes the creation of a 
trust,56 but this power is seldom exercised. My experience shows that the claimant is 
usually not prepared to enter into such an agreement. The MSSA also allows for an 
agreement in terms of which the heirs or legatees of the estate agree to take over the 
obligation to pay maintenance to the survivor, but such an obligation may have 
unfavourable tax consequences for the heirs or legatee.57 In practice therefore, the 
claim is almost always settled by way of a lump sum payment to the survivor or the 
award of an asset in specie with no right of recourse against the survivor in the event of 
remarriage, or against the deceased estate of the survivor in the event of early death. I 
am not convinced that this is in keeping with the objectives of the MSSA and am of the 
opinion that consideration should be given to the claim being addressed by way of 
annuity payments rather than the payment of a lump sum. In Feldman v Oshry58 the 
court referred to the practical difficulty in making periodic payments to the survivor but 
did not indicate any ways to deal with this difficulty. I am of the opinion that the only 
practical way of doing this might be to make the creation of a trust mandatory. 
 
55  Mortality tables are used for this purpose. 
56  Section 2(3)(d). 
57  See 8.3.4 for more details.  




The MSSA does not provide for a reassessment of the claim where there is any 
significant change in the circumstances of the survivor. The residual heirs of the estate 
may well be prejudiced if the survivor receives a maintenance payment based on his or 
her situation at the time of the first-dying spouse’s death, and then receives a windfall 
such as an inheritance or winning the lottery. On the opposite side of the coin, the 
survivor may be prejudiced if he or she lives longer than his or her life expectancy, 
resulting in insufficient funds for his or her maintenance.  
 
1.2.5 The application of the MSSA to different relationships 
 
The MSSA does not define “spouse” or “marriage”, but it does define “survivor”59 as 
being the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death and includes a wife in a 
customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage contracted by her 
customary marriage husband with another woman on or after 1 January 1929 but 
before 2 December 1988.60  
 
Not all intimate relationships and marriages currently enjoy complete recognition in 
South African law. However, some of the relationships and marriages that are not 
completely recognised, do enjoy protection in terms of the MSSA.61 The surviving 
spouse of a monogamous Muslim marriage qualifies as a survivor62 as does the survivor 
of a de facto polygynous Muslim marriage.63 From a legal perspective, there is no 
constitutionally acceptable reason to distinguish between Muslim and Hindu 
 
59 Section 1. 
60 This definition has been effective since 20 September 2010 when section 8 of the Reform of Customary 
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters 11 of 2009 replaced the previous definition of 
“the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death”.  
61  See 5.2 and 5.3 for a detailed discussion.  
62  See Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (C). 




marriages64 and it follows that our courts will in all likelihood afford a Hindu marriage 
the same recognition and protection as it does a Muslim marriage.65 
 
Section 2(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “RCMA”) provides that a customary marriage entered into after the 
commencement date of this Act,66 which complies with the requirements of that Act, is 
for all purposes recognised as a marriage. This means that a surviving spouse in a 
customary marriage can institute a claim for maintenance in terms of the MSSA. As 
indicated above, a “discarded” wife of a customary marriage that is dissolved by the 
later civil marriage of her husband also qualifies for a maintenance claim in terms of the 
MSSA. 
 
As a general rule, a life partnership between same-sex or heterosexual partners does 
not confer the same consequences on the partners as a legally recognised marriage.67 
Before the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “CUA”) came into 
operation, same-sex life partners had no method of legalising their relationship. As a 
result, our courts have in the past generally been willing to extend recognition to same-
sex life partnerships.68 Since the coming into operation of the CUA, same-sex partners 
have the right to enter into a civil union, with the same consequences as a civil 
marriage.69 In addition, the pre-CUA protection afforded to same-sex life partners 
remains available to same-sex life partners who do not enter into a civil union.70 
Heterosexual couples are also at liberty to enter into a civil union in terms of the CUA 
but, in contrast to the position that applies to same-sex couples, our courts have, to 
date, refused to extend all spousal benefits to heterosexual life partners who do not 
 
64  Heaton 237. 
65  See 5.2.4 for further discussion in this regard.   
66  15 November 2000. 
67  Heaton 243. 
68  See, for example, Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC); Du 
Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA); Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs [2005] 1 All SA 
273 (SCA) and Gory v Kolver 2007 (3) BCLR 249 (CC).  
69  Section 13 of the CUA. 




marry or enter into a civil union. In Volks v Robinson,71 the Constitutional Court agreed 
with the contention that the exclusion of heterosexual life partners from the protection 
of the MSSA amounted to discrimination on the basis of marital status, but found that it 
was inappropriate to impose a duty of support on the estate of a deceased person in 
circumstances where the law did not during his or her lifetime place such an obligation 
on him or her. The court therefore refused to extend the protection of the MSSA to 
heterosexual life partners on the basis that such partners have the option to enter into a 
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.72 I will attempt to show that, in contrast with 
some other legislation, the MSSA does not cater for marriage and marriage-like 
relationships in a consistent fashion. 
 
1.3 Purpose of research 
 
This thesis examines the MSSA by engaging in a critical analysis of its provisions and the 
relevant South African literature and case law. While the thesis deals with the 
theoretical background and development of the MSSA, the emphasis is on the practical 
application of the Act and it focuses on the position of the executor and the manner in 
which he or she deals with maintenance claims in terms of the MSSA. 
 
The thesis includes the results of interviews with estates officers73 involved in the 
administration of deceased estates. Ethical clearance was required and obtained for the 
empirical study. The purpose of the interviews was to gauge whether the MSSA provides 
the executor of a deceased estate with the necessary assistance and guidance to 
consider and decide on a maintenance claim lodged against the estate. This thesis 
investigates and analyses the way in which estates officers approach such maintenance 
claims and the practical difficulties (if any) they experience in considering and dealing 
with the claims. It also investigates whether there are potential alternative 
 
71  2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
72  See 5.3.2.2.2 for a detailed discussion of this case. 




arrangements for the handling of a maintenance claim and considers the benefits and 
disadvantages of such alternative arrangements. 
 
This research adds value to the body of knowledge available to executors on this topic 
as it seeks to find alternative arrangements for the handling of a maintenance claim, 
and/or provide practical guidelines for the executor when considering a claim. The 
possibilities of allowing for the claim to be heard by a court of law, or providing for a re-
assessment of the claim in the event that the survivor remarries or dies or there is a 
significant change in his or her circumstances are researched in the thesis. I also 
investigate the possibility of the MSSA allowing only for periodical payments or for the 
imposition of a limited interest over assets in favour of the survivor if all parties agree. 
 
I also research potential problems associated with the above suggestions, for example, 
the cost and time spent to approach the court, and whether each option is feasible.  
 
 
1.4 Scope of research 
 
This study focuses on the MSSA, with specific emphasis on the practical application 
when a survivor of a marriage (or a marriage-like relationship) that ends in death lodges 
a claim in terms thereof. It focuses on the position of the executor and the way in which 




1.5 Research methodology 
 
The research for this thesis was done by way of a combination of a literature study, 





The research revolves mainly around a critical analysis of the MSSA, the relevant South 
African literature and case law about the MSSA. The literature is contained in academic 
textbooks and journal articles.  
 
The thesis further includes comparative research which has the object of determining 
how selected foreign legal systems deal with maintenance claims by surviving spouses in 
order to find parallels with the position in South Africa or solutions to the practical 
problems faced by the South African executor. I limited the comparative research to two 
jurisdictions, namely New Zealand and England. New Zealand was the first common law 
country to give the court the discretion to intervene in the testamentary wishes of a 
deceased person if he or she did not make adequate provision for the maintenance and 
support of his or her spouse or children.74 The country also has a history of traditional 
versus civil law, which offers interesting insights as there are parallels with the South 
African position. Although our law of succession is based more on Roman-Dutch law 
than English law, an investigation of the law in England offers good insight into how a 
first-world country deals with this issue.  
 
I used the website75 of The Society of Estate and Trust Practitioners (STEP), a global 
professional association for practitioners who specialise in family inheritance and 
succession planning, to access their members’ directory for details of individuals in the 
aforementioned jurisdictions who deal with contentious estates, estate planning, family 
law, wills and administration of deceased estates. I also visited the website of the New 
Zealand Law Society76 to obtain details of attorneys and attorney firms who specialise in 
estates and trusts. I also approached the Ministry of Justice as I was advised that they 
might be able to assist with relevant information. After identifying suitable recipients, I 
 
74 Peart “New Zealand report on new developments in succession law” 2010(14)2 Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, http://www.ejcl.org/142/art142-3.pdf (last accessed 3 August 2013).  
75 https://www.step.org (last accessed 6 December 2018). 




sent specific questions to 29 practitioners in New Zealand and 48 practitioners in 
England. 
 
The research for the thesis therefore also includes an empirical element as interviews77 
were conducted with several categories of persons who are involved in the handling of 
surviving spouses’ claims for maintenance. Informal discussions with role players in the 
administration of deceased estates revealed that the handling of a maintenance claim in 
terms of the MSSA is an area of concern and the interviews were done to obtain more 
insight into this aspect. Most of the interviews were done by way of an electronic 
questionnaire, but some were conducted by way of personal face-to-face interviews. I 
identified suitable interviewees by utilising the website of The Fiduciary Institute of 
Southern Africa (FISA)78 to identify individuals who are involved in the administration of 
deceased estates. I selected estates officers, firms of attorneys, other financial services 
companies, and individuals who offer administration of estates as a service. The purpose 
of the interviews with these individuals was to gauge the impact of the MSSA on a 
practical level, to determine how estates officers approach such claims and to 
understand the practical difficulties they experience in dealing with the claims.  
 
A second set of interviews was conducted with selected practitioners who have assisted 
clients with the lodging of a maintenance claim against deceased estates in order to 
ascertain their views on the practical obstacles the spouse faces when lodging the claim 
with the executor of the deceased estate. This information, together with the outcome 
of the interviews with estates officers, gave valuable insight in, and clues to, alternative 
ways to handle these maintenance claims. 
 
I also approached the Acting Chief Master of the High Court to determine whether the 
Master of the High Court keeps records of MSSA claims for statistical purposes.  
 
77 I engaged the services of Dr Liezel Korf, an expert in the field of empirical research and drafting of 
questionnaires to assist me with the questions for the interviews/questionnaires for the interviews. 




1.6 Outline of chapters 
 
This thesis considers the role and duties of the executor and specifically the way in 
which he or she deals with maintenance claims in terms of the MSSA. It investigates the 
manner in which the common law dealt with maintenance of a surviving spouse and the 
position in our law before the MSSA was promulgated. It analyses the MSSA and looks at 
the position in South Africa relating to maintenance claims in terms thereof by 
discussing legislation and court rulings in this regard.  
 
The present introductory chapter is followed by chapter 2, which considers the legal 
position and role of the executor, and the powers and duties of the executor. The 
executor is the principal role player in the process of winding up a deceased estate and 
fulfils his or her duties relating to the administration of the estate under the direction 
and supervision of the Master.79 As one of the key functions of the executor is to 
consider claims against the estate,80 and the maintenance claim is lodged against the 
estate, it is necessary to consider the role and duties of the executor before examining 
the common law treatment of maintenance of the surviving spouse or the maintenance 
claim in terms of the MSSA. The chapter does not aim to be an exhaustive examination 
of the role of the executor and only focuses on the executor’s role, powers and duties as 
far as they are relevant to this topic. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the history of the surviving spouse’s maintenance claim and looks at 
the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. It examines how the concept of 
maintenance of the family evolved in South African law and focuses in particular on the 
treatment of maintenance after the death of the maintenance obligator. It tracks the 
development of this aspect of our law and looks at the background to the introduction 
of the MSSA.  
 
 
79 Abrie et al 2; Meyerowitz 1.7.  




Chapter 4 deals with the MSSA itself and examines its framework, the practical 
implementation thereof and looks at the shortcomings of its provisions. It also looks at 
some relevant case law. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the legal position in South Africa of relationships other than a civil 
marriage or civil union, with specific reference to legislation and the application of such 
legislation by the courts. While the discussion is general, the focus is on the topic under 
discussion and the chapter looks at how our courts have extended the application of the 
MSSA to certain relationships to the exclusion of others. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the applicable legislation in New Zealand and England. It outlines 
the provisions of the relevant legislation and investigates the manner in which the 
courts in those countries deal with surviving spouses’ maintenance claims in the context 
of the relevant legislation.  
 
Chapter 7 deals with the practical implementation of the MSSA by executors in 
consequence of, and as informed by, empirical research. It contains an analysis of 
interviews with estates officers and practitioners to determine the practical difficulties 
faced by these officers when dealing with maintenance claims in terms of the MSSA. It 
specifically deals with practical problems faced by the executor when considering a 
maintenance claim. It also contains interviews with practitioners who have assisted 
surviving spouses with the lodging of a claim against a deceased estate. 
 
The thesis concludes in chapter 8 with a summary and suggested recommendations for 
the executor when dealing with claims in terms of the MSSA. It also contains a proposed 






THE ROLE AND DUTIES OF THE EXECUTOR 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
When a person dies, he or she usually leaves behind assets and/or liabilities. The 
aggregate of such assets and liabilities forms the deceased estate of that person.81 In 
terms of the Estates Act, whenever a person dies in or outside the Republic of South 
Africa (“the Republic”) and leaves either assets or a will or document that purports to be 
a will, his or her death has to be reported to the nearest Master of the High Court.82 The 
purpose of this process is mainly so that an executor can be appointed to administer the 
estate and to deal with the assets and liabilities of the estate. Only the executor can 
execute this process, and the estate remains unrepresented until an executor is 
appointed.83  
 
The word “executor” is defined in the Oxford dictionary of current English84 as “a person 
appointed by someone to carry out the terms of their will”. The Estates Act also 
contains a definition,85 which provides that an executor is “any person who is authorised 
to act under letters of executorship granted or signed by the Master, or under an 
endorsement made under section 15”.86 The term “letters of executorship” is defined87 
as including “any document issued or a copy of any such document duly certified by any 
competent public authority in any State by which any person named or designated 
 
81 CIR v Estate Crewe 1943 AD 656 at 667-668. 
82 Section 7(1). 
83 Section 13. Where there is a likelihood of a delay in the appointment of an executor and some urgent 
action is required as far as estate assets are concerned, the Master may in terms of section 12(1) 
appoint an interim curator to take possession and control of the deceased’s assets: see Meyerowitz 7.6. 
This aspect of dealing with a deceased estate falls outside the scope of this thesis and will not be 
discussed here. 
84 Soanes 2006. 
85 Section 1. 
86 The endorsement under section 15 refers to a scenario where the authorised executor assumes another 
person to act as co-executor. 




therein is authorised to act as the personal representative of any deceased person or as 
executor of the estate of any deceased person”. While the official name of the 
document is “letters of executorship”, I use that name and “letter of executorship” 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
 
The letter of executorship is therefore the official document issued by a competent 
authority that authorises the executor to act on behalf of the deceased estate. In South 
Africa that competent authority is the Master of the High Court.88 The Estates Act 
provides that the Master has jurisdiction over the estates of all deceased persons who 
were ordinarily resident in the Republic at the time of their death and who were not at 
the time of their death resident in the Republic, but owned assets in the Republic.89  
 
The executor is therefore indispensable in the process of dealing with the deceased 
estate, and his or her role requires closer examination. As this thesis deals only with a 
particular part of the executor’s duty, namely dealing with a claim under the MSSA, this 
chapter does not contain a detailed discussion of the executor’s role and is rather 
intended as a brief overview. 
 
2.2  The executor 
 
The role of the executor was aptly summarised in Van der Merwe v Van der Merwe:90  
“The executors of the estate are obliged to comply with the provisions of the Estates Act and in 
particular to gather the assets, liquidate them where necessary, pay the liabilities and distribute the 
estate in the orderly manner set forth therein.”  
 
In South African law there are two types of executors, namely an executor testamentary 
and an executor dative. In Ferguson and Huckell v Langerman and Lorentz91 the court 
 
88 Section 4. 
89 Section 4. 




held that there had always been a distinction between the executor testamentary and 
executor dative: 
“The former was in olden times a person appointed by the testator to see that the heir carried out his 
wishes, whilst the latter was a priest appointed by the bishop to safeguard in particular the interests of 
the Church, and in general those of the legatees. The testamentary executor was chosen by the 
deceased to represent him, whilst the executor dative was an appointee of the Church. ... As executors 
in early days were mostly ecclesiastics, and as the Church was deeply interested in the dispositions of 
the property, because it always got some gift ad pias causas or pro salute animae, it framed rules for 
the guidance of executors. These rules formed part of the Canon law ...The rules of the Canon law 
were framed in order to regulate the acts of the Ordinarius, and they no doubt formed the basis of the 
later Roman-Dutch law, but in Holland at any rate the functions of a testamentary executor developed 
far beyond those of Canon law. The executor of the Canon law could only pay the debts, hand over to 
the Church gifts made pro salute animae, and then place the balance in the hands of the heir for 
distribution. The testamentary executor under the Roman-Dutch law gradually acquired wider powers, 
and during the 18th century amongst other duties he had to liquidate the whole of the estate, to pay 
the debts, to pay out to the legatees what was due to them, and then to hand over the balance to the 
heir.”92  
 
In modern South African law, an executor testamentary is an executor nominated in a 
person’s will. The mere nomination in the will does not however give the executor any 
authority to act on behalf of the estate – he or she has no locus standi until the Master 
has authorised him or her to act as executor by issuing letters of executorship.93 The 
executor therefore receives his or her mandate from the appointment by the Master 
and not from the nomination in the will.94   
An executor dative on the other hand, is appointed by the Master in the absence of a 
nomination by a person in his or her will.95 Such an appointment could be necessitated 
 
91 1903 TH 221. 
92 At 227. 
93 Section 13(1) Estates Act; Brand v Volkskas Bpk 1959 (1) SA 494 (T); Meyerowitz 8.1. 
94 Kempman v Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd 1957 (1) SA 506 (W); Mngadi v Ntuli 1981 (3) SA 478 
(D); Abrie et al 89; Meyerowitz 8.1. 
95 Section 18 Estates Act; Fischer v Liquidators of The Union Bank (1890-1891) 8 SC 52; Goosen v Bosch and 




by the absence of a valid will, a valid will without a clause nominating an executor, or 
where the executor nominated in terms of a valid will is unwilling or incapable of being 
appointed as executor. An executor dative will also be appointed if the appointed (sole) 
executor for any reason ceases to be the executor.96 As the Master makes the 
appointment, it follows that an executor dative also cannot act until the Master has 
authorised him or her to do so. 
 
Although the Master has slightly different requirements and a different procedure for 
the appointment of an executor dative,97 the authority given to the executor dative and 
his or her rights and duties are generally the same as those of the executor 
testamentary, except insofar as the will may have given the executor testamentary 
certain powers. For purposes of this thesis, no distinction is made between the two 
types of executors and any reference to an executor includes both an executor 
testamentary and an executor dative. 
 
2.3 The legal position of the executor 
 
The Estates Act provides98 that “no person shall liquidate or distribute the estate of any 
deceased person, except under letters of executorship granted or signed and sealed 
under this Act, or under an endorsement made under section fifteen, or in pursuance of 
a direction by a Master.” Neither the phrase “liquidate or distribute”, nor the respective 
words “liquidate” and “distribute” are defined in this Act. Consequently, they bear their 
usual grammatical meaning. The Oxford dictionary of current English defines99 
“liquidate” as to “sell something in order to get money” or “close a business and sell 
what it owns in order to pay its debts”. “Distribute” is defined100 as “hand or share out 
 
96  Meyerowitz 9.12. 
97 Meyerowitz 8.1. Sections 18 and 23 of the Estates Act contain the details relating to the different 
requirements and processes, but these details are not relevant for purposes of this thesis. 
98  Section 13. 
99  At 529.  




to a number of people”. In the context of a deceased estate, it has been said101 that 
these words mean that the estate must firstly be put in order by paying the debts of the 
estate and thereby placing it in a position where the assets can be separated into parts 
and divided between the heirs, and secondly by the actual division thereof amongst the 
heirs. In Suid-Afirkaanse Vroue Federasie, Transvaal v Thackwray102 it was said that an 
estate is liquidated when it is made free of debts and other expenses to the extent that 
it is made available for the enjoyment of the heirs. This statement echoes what was 
decided in earlier cases103 and has since been confirmed in Cilliers v Kuhn.104 It therefore 
appears that the general understanding of the term “liquidated” in the context of a 
deceased estate is that the executor has the duty to obtain possession of the estate 
assets and to realise so much of the assets as is necessary to settle the debts of the 
deceased, the taxes and the costs of administering the estate. Once that has been done, 
the executor must settle those debts, taxes and administration costs and distribute the 
remainder of the cash and other assets amongst the heirs.105  
 
The executor is therefore the principal role player in the process of winding up a 
deceased estate. He or she fulfils the duties relating to the administration of the estate 
under the direction and supervision of the Master.106 In Goosen v Bosch107 the court 
held that the executor “holds an office sui generis” and that his or her position is not 
merely that of procurator, but as representative of the estate of the deceased testator, 
and he is obliged to liquidate the estate and deal with in accordance with the provisions 
of the will and the law.108 The executor is legally tasked with the administration of the 
 
101  Cilliers v Kuhn 1975 (3) SA 881 (NCD); Bramwell and Lazar v Laub 1978 (1) SA 380 (W). 
102 1968 (1) SA 168 (T). 
103 The Heirs Hiddingh v De Villiers Denyssen (1887) 5 SC 298 (PC) 308; Buxmann’s Executor v The Master 
1932 CPD 241. 
104 1975 (3) SA 881 (NCD). 
105 The Heirs Hiddingh v De Villiers Denyssen (1887) 5 SC 298 (PC) 308; De Wet v De Wet 1951 (4) SA 212 
(C); Bydawell v Chapman 1953 (3) SA 514 (A); Lockhat’s Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 
Co Ltd 1959 (3) SA 295 (A) 302. 
106 Abrie et al 2,81; Meyerowitz 8.1. 
107 1917 CPD 189 at 193. 




estate109 and is the only person who may deal with the estate assets and liabilities.110 In 
Roman-Dutch law the heir stepped into the shoes of the deceased and inherited both 
the assets and the liabilities, which meant that, where the estate had insufficient assets 
to cover the estate debts, the heir became personally liable to settle the shortfall.111 In 
our law the executor does not have the same duty – he or she is an office bearer and 
neither a universal successor to the deceased nor a representative of the latter’s heirs 
and creditors.112 This point was made clear in Van den Bergh v Coetzee113 where the 
court dealt with the question whether the knowledge of the deceased could be imputed 
by operation of law to the executor of the deceased’s estate. The deceased’s executor 
sold property of the deceased subject to a voetstoots clause. It subsequently appeared 
that the deceased had been aware of irreparable latent defects in the property. The 
purchaser sought to cancel the deed of sale entered into between himself and the 
executor on the basis that the voetstoots clause was ineffective. The court held that the 
executor and the deceased are separate and distinct personae and that the acts of the 
deceased do not by extension become those of the executor. As a result of the 
distinction between the persons of the deceased and the executor, the executor is not 
personally responsible for the debts of the deceased estate and must therefore only 
look to the assets of the estate in order to settle estate debts. This also means that a 
debt owed by the deceased to a creditor cannot be set off by a debt owed by that 
creditor to the executor in his or her personal capacity.114 
 
The executor acts in a representative capacity, but has no principal as he or she 
represents the deceased estate and not the heirs or creditors of the deceased person.115 
However, the absence of a principal does not mean that the executor is free to deal with 
 
109 Malcomess v Kuhn 1915 CPD 852. 
110 CIR v Emary 1961 (2) SA 621 (A); Gross v Pentz 1996 (4) SA 617 (A); Meyerowitz 12.20. 
111 Van der Merwe & Rowland 2; Beinart “Heir and executor” 1960 Acta Juridica 227. 
112 Laubscher v Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1976 (1) SA 908 (E); General Electric Co (Pty) Ltd 
v Sharfman 1981 (1) SA 592 (W) at 597H. 
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the estate assets and liabilities in any way he or she pleases – the executor’s position is 
a fiduciary one116 and he or she must at all times act in good faith and in a way that 
adheres to relevant legislation. The fiduciary position of the executor requires that he or 
she acts with the degree of care and skill required of someone who manages the affairs 
of another117 and that he or she always acts impartially and in an objective manner.118 
Where the deceased left a valid will, the executor must act in terms of the will and his or 
her actions are to a large extent determined by the contents of the will. If the executor 
wants to do anything that is not covered by the will or the Estates Act or falls outside 
the general rule relating to liquidation and administration of an estate as mentioned 
above, he or she has to approach the court for the necessary authority.119   
 
The Estates Act prescribes some of the duties of the executor and contains provisions 
relating to the method of administration of the estate. It subjects the executor to the 
supervision of the Master of the High Court in certain matters.120 Although the Master 
acts in a supervisory capacity, it has been held that the office of the Master is not an 
“upper executor”.121 The Master therefore generally does not interfere with the 
exercise by the executor of his or her discretion, provided he or she acts in a reasonable 
manner, is bona fide and does not do anything that appears to be unreasonable and/or 
unnecessary for the liquidation of the estate. The Master will therefore, as a general 




116 See, for example, Lindenberg v Giess 1957 (3) SA 31 (SWA); De Wet v Attie Badenhorst (Edms) Bpk 1963 
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117 Lindenberg v Giess 1957 (3) SA 31 (SWA). 
118 Reichman v Reichman 2012 (4) SA 423 (GSJ). 
119 L Ferera (Private) Ltd v Vos 1953 (3) SA 450 (A). 
120 See, for example, sections 35, 42, 47, 51 and 54. 
121 Ex parte Olivier 1928 SWA 123. 




Where the actions of the executor lead to maladministration or failure to exercise the 
necessary degree of care and skill required of an executor, and this causes loss to the 
estate, the beneficiaries have an action for damages against him or her.123  
 
Where there is more than one executor, they must exercise their duties jointly and they 
are all equally responsible for the administration of the estate.124 They are therefore 
liable for each other’s acts.125 In Gross v Pentz,126 however, the then Appellate Division 
held that where the estate suffered a loss as a result of the negligence, fraud or theft of 
one or more of the executors, the co-executors would not be liable if they could show 
that they did exercise the necessary degree of skill and care required of them. It was 
also held that where an executor fraudulently concealed knowledge from his or her co-
executors, such knowledge was not imputable to the estate.127 
 
When letters of executorship are issued to a person, that person is authorised to 
administer all the assets of the estate in the Republic. There is nothing in the Estates Act 
that limits the executor’s authority to the liquidation and distribution of the South 
African assets only,128 but in practice the executor will only be able to deal with assets in 
another country if his or her appointment has been recognised in that country.129 In 
Segal v Segal130 the court held that the executor’s authority to collect or recover 
property of the deceased does not emanate from the relevant section of the Estates 
Act131 but rather from his office as executor. The principles of international law apply to 
the executor’s authority and such principles provide that the granting of a “probate 
 
123 The beneficiaries’ right of action to claim what is due to them only arises once the liquidation and 
distribution account has lain for inspection, therefore their right to claim damages against the 
executor can only be exercised once the liquidation and distribution account has lain for inspection: 
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grant of letters testamentary” (in other words, a letter of executorship as we know it) in 
one country gives the appointee the power to collect assets only in that country.  
Therefore, where the deceased left assets in a country other than South Africa, the 
executor has to apply to the relevant authority in that country for formal recognition.132 
As this aspect of the executor’s role has no significant impact on the topic of this thesis, I 
will not discuss it. For purposes of this thesis, any reference to “executor” is therefore to 
an executor who has been formally recognised as such and appointed to administer the 
estate of a deceased person.    
 
If the deceased was married in community of property, the executor of his or her estate 
is entitled to administer the entire joint estate.133 
 
2.4 The powers of the executor 
 
From the discussion above of the role of the executor it is evident that he or she must 
fulfil several functions in order to effectively liquidate and distribute a deceased estate. 
The executor has certain rights and powers during the liquidation and administration 
process that enable him or her to attend to these functions. Most of these rights and 
powers are not legislated, but are general powers found in the common law. There are, 
however, also some powers that are specifically provided for in legislation. 
  
2.4.1  General powers 
 
2.4.1.1 Delegating authority  
As the executor’s entitlement to administer a deceased estate is derived from the 
authority granted to him or her by the Master, the executor is prohibited from 
substituting a third party to act in his or her place,134 but he or she can appoint an agent 
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133 Klerck v Registrar of Deeds 1950 (1) SA 626 (T). 




to act on his or her behalf.135 This is done by way of a revocable power of attorney.136 
The executor would usually appoint an agent if he or she is not personally in a position 
to attend to the administration of the estate. In practice this often happens where the 
executor is a family member of the deceased and has no experience of the 
administration of a deceased estate. The family member executor would then typically 
appoint an agent who is knowledgeable in the administration process and who will do 
the work required to administer the deceased estate. The agent acts on behalf, and on 
instruction, of the executor. 
 
2.4.1.2 Carrying on a business 
If the deceased was carrying on a business at the time of his or her death, the executor 
may under certain circumstances have to step into his or her shoes and continue with 
the business. This is necessary to ensure that the business is preserved in order to 
transfer it to the heirs or, where the will or heirs request this, to realise the business for 
the best possible price. If the deceased in his or her will bequeaths the business to a 
legatee or heir as a going concern or specifically provides that the executor must 
continue with the business, the executor is obliged to deliver it as such to the heir. The 
executor must therefore keep the business going until he or she is in a position to 
deliver it to the heir.137  
 
2.4.1.3 Enforcing contracts 
A contract entered into by a person does not necessarily automatically terminate on his 
or her death. Where the contract relates to the person of the deceased or his or her 
services or skills, for example a contract of employment, the contract obviously comes 
to an end with the deceased’s death. Other contracts such as sale agreements, 
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suretyship and contracts of purchase, however, continue and are binding on the 
executor, who is empowered to enforce them.138  
 
The executor generally does not have the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the 
estate,139 unless the will empowers him or her to do so or it is required as part of the 
liquidation of the estate.140 The executor may therefore enter into an agreement of sale 
in respect of an estate asset if this is required to settle estate liabilities, if the will 
instructs him or her to do so, or if the heirs request the sale of the asset.141 
 
Where the will is silent in this regard and the agreement relates to something that is not 
required as part of the liquidation of the estate, for example a lease agreement, the 
executor may not enter into the agreement and has to approach the court for authority 
to enter into the agreement.142 Such authority will usually be granted if the court is 
satisfied that the agreement is to the benefit of the estate and the heirs.143 If the 
executor enters into an agreement without having been empowered to do so by the will 
or the court, the estate is generally not bound by the contract.   
 
2.4.2  Powers in terms of the Estates Act 
 
2.4.2.1 Taking custody of estate property 
While this aspect of the executor’s role generally forms part of his or her duties, it must 
be noted that the Estates Act gives the executor the power to take the necessary steps 
to obtain possession of estate property and books or documents which are in the 
possession of a third party.144 
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2.4.2.2 Provision for subsistence of the deceased’s family or household 
The executor is usually only in a position to release estate funds to the heirs of the 
deceased estate after expiry of the inspection period of the liquidation and distribution 
account,145 but the Estates Act allows him or her to do so before expiry of such period if 
it is deemed necessary for the subsistence of the deceased’s family or his or her 
household, and if the Master consents thereto.146 This power is particularly pertinent in 
the context of the surviving spouse’s claim for maintenance under the MSSA. As will be 
seen later,147 there is often a delay in the process relating to the determination and 
subsequent acceptance (if applicable) by the executor of the claim. During that period, 
the surviving spouse may be without resources and this power granted to the executor 
to provide for the subsistence of the deceased’s family or household may be the 
survivor’s only assistance. 
 
2.4.2.3 Sale of estate assets 
As mentioned above, the executor has the authority to sell estate assets if the will does 
not prohibit him or her from doing so. This power is, however, subject to the approval of 
the heirs in the estate or, where the heirs cannot agree on the manner and conditions of 
sale, the authority of the Master.148   
 
2.4.2.4 Continuing or instituting legal proceedings 
If the deceased instituted legal proceedings against a third party during his or her 
lifetime, or if such proceedings were instituted against the deceased, the executor has 
to be substituted for the deceased before the proceedings can continue.149 The executor 
also has the power to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the estate.150 
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2.4.2.5 Compromising claims by and against the estate 
The Estates Act provides151 that, where a debt does not exceed R2 000, the executor 
may allow the debtor to pay any reasonable part of such debt in discharge of the total 
debt if the debtor is unable to pay the debt in full. Furthermore, the executor may allow 
the debtor an extension of time (subject to the prescribed time frame relating to the 
framing and lodging of the liquidation and distribution account)152 in which to pay the 
debt. If the debt exceeds R2 000, the executor may only accept part payment of the 
debt in discharge of the entire debt if the will authorises him or her to do so. In the 
absence of such authority in the will, he or she must approach the Master for the 
necessary authority.153  
 
2.5 The duties of the executor 
 
The executor of a deceased estate has many duties to fulfil, but in essence, his or her 
duty is to take possession of the assets of the estate and to clear or settle the estate 
debts so that the estate is left free for enjoyment by the heirs.154 In Lockhat’s Estate v 
North British & Mercantile Insurance Co Ltd155 the Appellate Division stated that the 
executor’s duty is to obtain possession of the deceased’s assets, to realise so much of 
the assets as may be necessary to settle the debts of the deceased, outstanding taxes 
and the costs of administering the estate, and to pay the remaining money and 
distribute the remaining assets to the heirs in terms of the will or the rules of intestacy.   
 




151 Section 48. 
152 See section 35(1). 
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2.5.1  Common law 
2.5.1.1 Preserving estate assets 
The executor is obliged to preserve the estate assets in order to transfer them to the 
heirs in the state that they were in at the time of the deceased’s death, or to realise 
them for the best possible price if so instructed by the will or the heirs.156  
 
There is no clarity as to whether this obligation to preserve the assets extends to 
insurance of the estate assets. As Meyerowitz157 points out, insurance does not preserve 
the assets, but rather acts as indemnity if the assets should be damaged or lost. 
Although there appears to be no duty on the executor to insure the estate assets, the 
executor will in practice be guided in this regard by the heirs to the assets. 
 
2.5.1.2 Recovering assets of the deceased 
As indicated above, only the executor has the power to deal with the estate assets. With 
this power comes the obligation to recover all the estate assets as soon as the executor 
has been appointed by the Master.158 Section 26 provides that the executor shall take 
into his or her custody or under his or her control “all the property, books and 
documents in the estate” immediately after the letters of executorship have been 
issued.159  
 
2.5.1.3 Determining beneficiaries 
One of the duties of an executor is to determine the persons to whom the estate must 
be distributed. This entails determining how the devolution will take place in terms of 
the will or intestate succession law and establishing the identity of persons who claim to 
be beneficiaries of the estate. 
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Meyerowitz160 states that the executor must make enquiries and obtain as much 
information as possible about the beneficiaries. As the law does not impose any duty in 
this regard on the executor, he or she is free to obtain whatever information he or she 
requires in order to determine the beneficiaries, even if it is information that would not 
be legally admissible in a court of law. The executor must examine the information 
available to him or her, using the discretion of a reasonable person in doing so.161 If he 
or she finds as a result of the investigation that the persons who claim to be 
beneficiaries are indeed beneficiaries, he or she can distribute the estate accordingly.162 
If any person is of the opinion that the estate was distributed incorrectly, he or she may 
lodge an objection with the Master. If it is established that the estate was indeed 
distributed incorrectly but that the executor acted properly when making the 
distribution, the executor or the true beneficiary can use the condictio indebiti to 
recover the relevant amounts from the person to whom the incorrect payment was 
made.163 If, however, the executor made the distribution mala fide or negligently, he or 
she is liable to make good the loss to the true beneficiary.164  
 
If the deceased died without a valid will, the executor must take extra care to ensure 
that he or she correctly identifies the beneficiaries. It would be prudent for the executor 
to obtain an affidavit regarding the next-of-kin of the deceased in order to determine 
who the beneficiaries are. The website of the Master of the High Court165 indicates that 
a next of kin affidavit must be completed where the deceased did not leave a valid will. I 
am of the opinion that the executor should also obtain such an affidavit where the will 
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does not clearly identify the beneficiaries, for example they are not mentioned by name, 
but rather as a class. A typical example would be “I bequeath the residue of my estate to 
my brothers and sisters who are alive at the time of my death”.  
 
If an affidavit is not obtained and it later transpires that the distribution was done 
incorrectly, the executor will probably be regarded as having acted negligently and will 
therefore be liable to make good the loss to the true beneficiary.166 It is therefore crucial 
that the executor acts carefully and makes sure that he or she ascertains the identity of 
the beneficiaries.167 It follows that if the executor has any suspicion that the information 
provided in a next of kin affidavit is incomplete or inaccurate, he or she should make 
further enquiries and, where applicable, obtain further affidavits in order to establish 
the identity of the beneficiaries. 
  
If it appears that a beneficiary may be deceased, the executor must obtain a death 
certificate. If a death certificate cannot be obtained, public records must be inspected, 
advertisements must be placed, and/or a tracing agent must be employed in order to 
locate the beneficiary. If all attempts fail and there is no conclusive proof that the 
beneficiary is alive or deceased, the inheritance of the beneficiary must be paid into the 
Guardian’s Fund.168 This also applies if the executor is unable to ascertain the identity or 
whereabouts of beneficiaries.169 
 
2.5.1.4 Advising beneficiaries 
As the executor’s ultimate duty is to deliver the remainder of the estate to the 
beneficiaries in terms of the will or the rules of intestacy, some of the executor’s actions 
are subject to the instruction or consent of the beneficiaries. The executor should 
therefore advise any beneficiary of the estate of his or her status as beneficiary and also 
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of the nature of his or her inheritance.170 Some of the actions of the executor in the 
administration of the estate require the prior consent of the heirs,171 but even where 
this is not required, it is usually advisable for the executor to consult the heirs before 
proceeding, to avoid any potential conflicts. 
  
2.5.2  Estates Act 
 
2.5.2.1 Taking custody of the estate property  
As mentioned above under the discussion of the executor’s powers, it is the duty of the 
executor to take custody of, or bring all estate assets under his or her control, so that 
the assets can be preserved for the benefit of the heirs or legatees.172 This duty, 
however, does not apply in the case of estate assets in the possession of a third party 
who has a right of retention or lien, or who holds the asset under contract or 
attachment.173 
 
2.5.2.2 Making an inventory of the deceased’s assets 
The Estates Act provides for the lodging of an inventory on two different occasions. 
Firstly, the surviving spouse or, if there is no spouse, the nearest relative of a deceased 
person must lodge an inventory of the deceased’s assets with the Master within 
fourteen days of the person’s death.174 The Estates Act empowers the Master to extend 
this period, but in practice the Master does not insist on strict adherence to this time 
period and accepts delay as long as the inventory is lodged within a reasonable time.175 
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The inventory must be made in the prescribed form176 and must be compiled in the 
presence of the heirs of the estate.177 As the inventory is provided shortly after the 
death of the deceased, it is often incomplete and does not reflect all the assets of the 
deceased or the accurate values of such assets. The Master uses this inventory to 
determine the value of the estate in order to make a decision regarding the issuing of 
letters of executorship.178 If an executor is obliged to lodge security for the due 
fulfilment of his or her duties, the Master uses the value of the assets reflected in the 
inventory to determine the extent of the security required.179 
 
If an executor is obliged to lodge security, he or she must lodge a further inventory with 
the Master within 30 days of the issuing of the letters of executorship, or such longer 
period as the Master may allow.180 The purpose of this inventory is to enable the Master 
to determine whether the security already provided by the executor is sufficient. In 
addition, should the executor at any stage during the administration process become 
aware of additional assets that were not reflected in the inventory, he or she must lodge 
an additional inventory within fourteen days of becoming aware of the assets, or such 
longer period as the Master allows.181 Once again, this requirement operates to enable 
the Master to determine whether the security lodged is still sufficient to cover all the 
assets in the estate. 
 
2.5.2.3 Opening a bank account 
As soon as the executor has received R1 000 or more, he or she is obliged to open a 
current account in the name of the estate and to deposit such monies and all further 
 
176 The form can be found in the Regulations issued in terms of the Estates Act. 
177 Section 9(1). 
178 If the value of the estate assets does not exceed R250 000, section 18(3) provides that the Master may 
dispense with the appointment of an executor and may give directions relating to the manner in which 
the estate shall be liquidated and distributed. The amount of R250 000 was set by Regulation 920 in 
Government Gazette 38238, 24 November 2014. 
179 Section 23. 
180 Section 27. 




monies received in the said account.182 The executor also has a limited power to invest 
in a savings account in the name of the estate, any surplus funds that are not 
immediately required to pay any of the estate debts. In addition, the executor may place 
surplus funds not immediately required to settle claims in an interest-bearing deposit 
with a bank.183 Such a step might be required where there is bound to be a lengthy 
delay between receiving estate funds and being able to distribute them, as this will 
allow for the earning of interest on the estate funds for the benefit of the heirs. 
 
2.5.2.4 Advertising for creditors 
As soon as possible after the executor has been authorised to act, he or she must ensure 
that a notice is published in the Government Gazette and one or more newspapers 
circulating in the district in which the deceased ordinarily resided at the time of his or 
her death.184 The purpose of the notice is to alert all persons with claims against the 
estate to lodge such claims with the executor within a period specified in the notice, 
which period may not be less than 30 days or more than three months from the date of 
the last publication of the notice.  
 
Although section 29 only refers to claims against the estate, it is customary for the 
executor in the notice also to call on debtors of the estate to make payment of the 
amounts owing by them to the estate.185 The purpose of including debtors in the notice 
is to enable the executor to determine the debts for which the estate may be liable and 
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2.5.2.5 Determining the solvency of the estate 
Once the advertisement period referred to above has expired, the executor must 
determine whether the estate is solvent,186 that is, whether the assets exceed the 
liabilities. If it does not, a specific procedure has to be followed.187 As referred to in the 
previous chapter, this thesis deals only with solvent estates and the process for 
insolvent estates will therefore not be discussed. 
 
2.5.2.6 Examining claims 
One of the executor’s duties is to consider claims lodged by creditors of the estate. 
Section 29 provides that all claims which would be capable of proof in the case of 
insolvency, may be lodged against the estate.188 This essentially means that any 
liquidated claim may be lodged. The claims that could be lodged against a deceased 
estate cover a wide range but are usually in respect of monies lent, services rendered, 
or goods sold, to the deceased. A claim could therefore be in the nature of inter alia a 
medical bill, an outstanding amount on a mortgage bond or instalment sale agreement, 
a claim by a former spouse in terms of a divorce order, or outstanding income tax. The 
claims mostly relate to an agreement to which the deceased was a party and would 
therefore be for a fixed amount. It is, however, also possible to lodge a claim for 
damages against an estate, provided the amount of the claim has been determined by a 
court order or agreed to in a settlement between the executor and the claimant. Quite 
often, the executor is faced with a claim for maintenance on behalf of the minor 
children of the deceased. It also happens quite frequently that a claim for maintenance 
under the MSSA is lodged by the surviving spouse. 
 
If the executor disputes a claim lodged against the estate, he or she may request the 
claimant to provide an affidavit that sets out all the details of the claim.189 If he or she 
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still feels that there is insufficient information to accept the claim, he or she may 
request the claimant to appear before the Master or a magistrate in order to be 
examined under oath.190 This examination may only be done with the consent of the 
Master.191 As Meyerowitz192  points out, the examination is not a trial and the Master or 
magistrate is not there to judge the facts, but rather to supervise and keep a record of 
the proceedings. 
 
If the executor has examined the claim (either on the basis of the information provided 
or after an examination before the Master or magistrate) and rejects it, he or she must 
immediately inform the claimant and provide reasons for the rejection of the claim.193 
The claimant can then either establish his or her claim by way of court action or object 
to the liquidation and distribution account when it is lodged with the Master.194 If the 
latter route is followed, it is unlikely that the Master will uphold the objection unless it is 
clear that the claim cannot be disputed.195 
 
An executor may face various potential conflicts of interest when considering a claim 
under the MSSA. Neither the Estates Act nor the MSSA has clear rules to deal with this 
issue. 196 In Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk197 it was held that an executor, when dealing with 
claims against the estate, is obliged to assess all the claims’ merits “on a fair 
consideration of all the facts and its legal merits”. The court further held198 that it would 
not be proper for the executor to reject claims against the estate unless he or she had 
some good reason to do so.  It is doubtful whether an executor who has a conflict of 
interest would be able to give fair consideration to a claim.  
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2.5.2.7 Drawing an account of the administration 
Once the executor has ascertained the debts due by the estate, received valuations for 
unrealised assets, and realised sufficient assets to settle the debts and administration 
costs, he or she must prepare a liquidation and distribution account for lodgement with 
the Master.199 The Estates Act prescribes the format of such account.200 The executor is 
obliged to lodge the account with the Master not later than six months after the letters 
of executorship were issued to him or her.201 The Act further contains provisions 
relating to an extension of time to lodge the account, but I will not discuss this as this 
aspect if not directly relevant to this thesis. 
 
2.5.2.8 Allowing the account to lie for inspection 
In terms of the Estates Act, every liquidation and distribution account must be made 
available for inspection by interested parties.202 The executor must place notices 
advising interested parties of such inspection in the Government Gazette and at least 
one local newspaper that circulates in the district in which the deceased ordinarily 
resided at the time of his or her death.203 The account must lie for inspection at the 
relevant Master’s office where it was lodged and at the magistrate’s office in the district 
in which the deceased was ordinarily resident, unless such district has a Master’s office, 
in which case the account lies for inspection only at the Master’s office. The inspection 
period must be not less than 21 days.204 
 
The purpose of the inspection period is to allow any interested party to examine the 
account to enable him or her to object to the account if he or she feels that it is 
incorrect.205 An interested party in an estate could be an heir or creditor. 
 
 
199 Section 35. 
200 Regulation 5 issued in terms of the Estates Act.  
201 Section 35(1). 
202 Section 35(4). 
203 Section 35(5).  
204 Section 35(4). 




2.5.2.9 Dealing with objections to the liquidation and distribution account 
If an interested party lodges an objection to the liquidation and distribution account, the 
Master will provide the executor with a copy of such objection206 but, in practice, the 
objector would usually have sent a copy of the objection directly to the executor. The 
executor must revert to the Master with his or her comments to the objection within 
fourteen days of receiving such objection.207 The Master will then consider the 
executor’s comments and, should he or she feel that the objection is well founded, 
direct the executor to amend the account accordingly.208 Although section 35 does not 
directly refer to the situation where the Master finds the objection to be unfounded, the 
Master’s authority to sustain an objection must clearly also extend to the authority to 
refuse to uphold an objection.209 My experience in dealing with deceased estates 
reflects that, in practice, the Master rarely makes a decision after having considered the 
executor’s comments and usually refers such comments to the objector. When the 
objector responds, the Master would typically refer such response back to the executor 
for further comments. This process could continue until the Master feels that he or she 
has received sufficient information to make a decision. 
 
In practice, the Master does not make a ruling when the objection is based on a factual 
dispute.210 The reason for this is because the Master is a creature of statute and has 
been endowed with neither the proper legislative authority nor the means to determine 
disputed facts and deal with conflicting allegations.211 The Master cannot, for example, 
lead or accept oral evidence. In Fey and Whiteford v Serfontein212 the court held that the 
nature of the Master's office means that it is ill-equipped to determine disputed facts 
 
206 Section 35(7). 
207 Section 35(8). 
208 Section 35(9). 
209 This assertion is borne out by the reference in section 35(10) to the “refusal of the Master to sustain an       
objection”. 
210 Boon v Boon 1947 (1) PH F73; C P Smaller (Pty) Ltd v The Master 1977 (3) SA 159 (T); Broodryk v Die 
Meester 1991 (4) SA 825 (C). 
211 Broodryk v Die Meester 1991 (4) SA 825 (C); Ferreira v Die Meester 2001 (3) SA 365 (O); LAWSA vol 31 
“Wills and succession” 453. 




and that the recognised procedure for settling disputed facts is by trial action in a court. 
In Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic)213 the court held that the 
Master is not a judicial officer and it cannot be expected to consider the facts of the 
matter to adjudicate whether a claim for maintenance should be allowed or rejected. 
 
Where the Master has ruled against an objection or refused to rule because the 
objection is based on a factual dispute, and the objector is aggrieved by the decision (or 
lack thereof), the objector may within 30 days from the date of the ruling or refusal 
apply by notice of motion to the court for an order to set aside the Master’s decision or 
for an order upholding the objection.214 
 
2.5.2.10 Paying creditors and heirs 
Once the inspection period has passed free from objection, the estate becomes 
distributable and the executor must proceed to pay the creditors of the estate and 
distribute the remainder of the estate amongst the heirs in the manner reflected in the 
liquidation and distribution account.215 The same process applies where an objection 
was lodged but subsequently withdrawn,216 an objection was not sustained and no 
further steps were taken by the claimant,217 or an objection was upheld and the account 
redrafted and re-advertised without further objection.218 
 
Once payment and/or transfer of assets has taken place, the executor must provide the 
Master with the necessary proof thereof.219 This could entail the lodging of receipts by 
the creditors and heirs, or an affidavit from the executor confirming that all payments 
and transfers were done. Where immovable property is involved, the executor must 
lodge confirmation by a conveyancing attorney that the transfer to the heir/s was done. 
 
213 Unreported, case number (53514/2012) [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013.  
214 Section 35(10). 
215 Section 35(12)(a). 
216 Section 35(12)(c). 
217 Section 35(12)(c). 
218 Section 35(12). 





If the executor for any reason cannot make payment of monies due to any person, be it 
an heir or creditor of the estate, he or she must pay such monies into the Guardian’s 
Fund within two months after the estate became distributable.220 Such monies will be 
held in the Guardian’s Fund on behalf of the person who is entitled thereto until he or 
she claims it.    
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
The executor has a very specific role and function to fulfil in the administration of an 
estate. A deceased estate cannot be finalised without the involvement of an executor. 
The executor’s powers and duties are governed by the common law, Estates Act and 
other relevant legislation. Although this issue has been touched upon in this chapter, 
the role of the executor will become more evident in the discussion in chapter 4 of the 
maintenance claim of a surviving spouse under the MSSA.  
 









South African common law is based on Roman and Roman-Dutch law and it is 
accordingly necessary to consider how those legal systems dealt with the issue of 
maintenance of family members. The duty of maintenance or support between certain 
relatives was fairly well established in Roman law and even more so in Roman-Dutch 
law.221 What was not so well established though, was whether this duty ended with the 
death of the person responsible for the maintenance or whether it could be transferred 
to his or her estate, or even his or her heirs. The discussion of Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law that follows is intended as a brief overview only and is not an in-depth analysis. 
 




Roman law recognised three potential sources of alimenta (maintenance), namely (a) 
contract, (b) legacy and (c) by operation of law.222 Where legacy or contract was 
involved, the general view was that the support was granted as a result of the intention 
expressed by the testator or person responsible for the support.223 Alimenta as a result 
of the operation of law, however, took no cognisance of the wishes of the person who 
was subject to the duty.224 For purposes of this thesis, I will focus on alimenta by 
operation of law as it has a direct link to the provision of maintenance as legislated in 
 
221  Beinart “Liability of a deceased estate for maintenance” 1958 Acta Juridica 92. 
222 Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 92 refers to sections in the Digest which deal with these sources of 
maintenance, in particular D 34.1 De alimentis vel cibariis legatis. 
223 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 25.3.4 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93. 
224 Voet 25.3.4 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93; Beinart “The forgotten widow: provision by 




the MSSA. As alimenta by legacy or contract refers to a voluntary or agreed award of 
maintenance by the maintenance grantor, I will refer to it only briefly where it is 
relevant to the discussion. 
 
Voet225 states that where a person provided for alimenta for another person in a will or 
contract, it was regarded as a matter of liberality and discretion as no person was 
obliged to bequeath alimenta to another. Such legacies or provisions in a contract 
usually included food, clothing and a place to live.226 If the testator or contracting party 
did not specify an amount to provide for such items, the amount was calculated on the 
basis of the reasonable amount the testator would have given the recipient during his or 
her lifetime.227 The legacy or alimenta would last for the period determined in the will 
or contract and, in the absence of a specified period, for the lifetime of the recipient.228 
It is interesting to note that the legacy or contractual provision would usually end if the 
circumstances of the person to whom it was granted, changed to such an extent that he 
or she could maintain him- or herself.229 This is in stark contrast to our modern day 
provisions.230 
 
The fact that the alimenta would, in the absence of a specific period, last for the lifetime 
of the person receiving it seems to presuppose that the duty would not be extinguished 
upon the death of the person charged with the legacy.231 That would mean that if that 
person had not made sufficient provision for the payment, the duty would devolve on 
his or her heirs,232 unless the will of the testator who had initially imposed the 
obligation, contained a contrary provision.233  
 
225 34.1.3 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93.  
226 Digesta 34.1.1 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93. 
227 Digesta 34.1.22pr as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93.  
228 Digesta 34.1.14pr as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 94.  
229 Digesta 2.15.8.10 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 94-95. 
230 See chapters 4 and 5 for a further discussion on this aspect. 
231 The person charged with the legacy would be the person to whom the testator had left a bequest 
subject to the obligation to pay alimenta to another person. 
232 Digesta 34.1.16pr as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 95 




It appears that the same principle of transmissibility of alimenta by legacy would apply 
to alimenta provided for in a contract.234  
 
3.2.2 Alimenta by operation of law 
 
Voet235 states that there was a big difference between alimenta by way of contract or 
legacy and alimenta by way of operation of law. As indicated, with the first two types of 
alimenta, a measure of liberality and discretion was included and the terms of the 
agreement or the intention of the testator as reflected in the will would determine the 
nature and details of the alimenta. Alimenta by operation of law, in contrast, arose 
regardless of, and sometimes even contrary to, the intention or wishes of the person 
who was subject to the duty.236 
 
The duty of support imposed by law was closely linked to the concept of the Roman 
family. The original concept entailed that the family was a legal unit and the 
paterfamilias was its head237 and the owner of the family property.238 Any property 
acquired by a family member under his control became his property239 and he was the 
only person who had legal authority to act on behalf of the members of the family.240  
The family concept was based on the agnatic relationship and traced exclusively through 
the male line.241  
 
 
234 Digesta 22.3.9 and Voet 25.3.18 as referred to in Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 97. 
235 25.3.4 and 34.1.3. 
236 Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 93. 
237 Gardner Family and familia in Roman law and life 271; Nicholas An introduction to Roman law (2010); 
Skelton & Carnelley (eds) Family law in South Africa (2010) 10; Van Zyl Geskiedenis en beginsels van die 
Romeinse privaatreg (1977) 81; Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 98.  
238 Du Plessis Borkowski’s textbook on Roman law (2010) 110; Gardner 2, 6, 233, 271; Nicholas 65. 
239 Du Plessis 113; Nicholas 66; Van Zyl History and principles of Roman private law (1983) 102. 
240 Gardner 271. 




The fact that the paterfamilias had power over his family meant that he could decide 
how and to what extent he maintained the members of his family.242 The duty of 
support that was imposed on a paterfamilias was regarded as a moral obligation rather 
than a legal one and was therefore not legally enforceable.243 It appears, however, that 
a paterfamilias was expected to provide at least the necessary maintenance to his 
family.244  
 
The legal status of a married woman in the family was determined by the status of her 
marriage. In early Roman law marriage was cum manu (“in the hand”).245  The effect of a 
marriage cum manu was that the wife severed her former agnatic ties and became 
subject to the authority of her husband as if she was his daughter.246 Any property 
owned by the wife at the time of the marriage therefore vested in her husband.247 A 
wife had the same right to succession in her husband’s estate as did the children of her 
husband.248 As a woman was regarded as a child of her husband, she automatically 
shared in his estate together with his children when he died intestate. If a husband 
therefore did not wish for his wife to benefit in such a way, he would have to expressly 
disinherit her in a will.249  
 
In later Roman law, more or less from the time of the late Republic,250 free marriages 
became the norm.251 A free marriage allowed the wife to retain her legal status and she 
remained an agnate of her original family.252 She therefore did not become subject to 
 
242 Nicholas 65; Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 98. 
243 Corbett The Roman law of marriage (1998) 127; Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 98. 
244 Gardner 6. 
245 Du Plessis 122; Gardner 209; Sinclair & Heaton The law of marriage vol I (1996) 183. 
246 Corbett 108; Du Plessis 123; Gardner 209; Nicholas 82; Sinclair & Heaton 184; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 
10; Beinart 1965 Acta Juridica 285. 
247 Corbett 110; Du Plessis 123; Nicholas 87; Sinclair & Heaton 184. 
248 Corbett 111, 112; Du Plessis 207; Gardner 53, 54, 210, 233, 271; Nicholas 238. 
249 Beinart 1965 Acta Juridica 285. 
250 The Republic lasted from 527 to 27 BC. 
251 Du Plessis 123; Gardner 209; Nicholas 87; Sinclair & Heaton 184. 
252 Corbett 122; Du Plessis 124; Gardner 210; Sinclair & Heaton 184; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 10; Van der 




her husband’s authority and she retained ownership of the assets she had at the time of 
the marriage.253 Whatever assets she acquired during the marriage remained hers or 
that of her paterfamilias.254 As the wife was not regarded as part of her husband’s 
family, her right to inherit on intestacy fell away255 and it was therefore conceivable that 
a wife could be left without means of support when the marriage came to an end if she 




Throughout Roman legal history, the dowry was an important element of property 
relations between spouses.256  
 
In early Roman law the granting of a dowry was general practice.257 It was intended as a 
contribution by the wife or her family to assist the husband with the household 
expenses.258 As mentioned, spouses were not legally obliged to maintain each other, but 
there probably was a moral and social obligation to do so259 and the dowry assisted the 
husband in doing this.260 While the wife was under the control of her husband, the 
husband acquired ownership of the dowry.261 The wife could specifically stipulate that 
the dowry had to be returned to her on dissolution of the marriage but, in the absence 
of such stipulation, she had no further right to it.262  
 
 
253 Corbett 113, 114; Du Plessis 124; Nicholas 87. 
254 Du Plessis 123; Nicholas 87; Sinclair & Heaton 184. 
255 Corbett 117; Nicholas 207; Beinart 1965 Acta Juridica 285. 
256 Du Plessis 128. 
257 Van Zyl (1983) 100. 
258 Du Plessis 128; Nicholas 88; Schulz Classical Roman law (1950) 122; Sinclair & Heaton 184; Van Zyl 
(1983) 100; Wessels 463. 
259 Corbett 127; Du Plessis 128. 
260 Corbett 127; Du Plessis 128. 
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It appears that in early Roman law, when cum manu marriages were the order of the 
day, divorce was not common263 and, when it did occur, it was effected by a variation of 
the ceremonies by which the marriage had been contracted, and this would typically 
include provision for the dowry to be returned to the wife.264 The incidence of indigent 
divorced spouses was therefore probably rare. With the increase of divorce in later 
Roman law when free marriages became more prevalent, the dowry came to serve 
another purpose, namely to provide the wife with some protection on the dissolution of 
the marriage.265 This was achieved by providing the wife with an action, the actio rei 
uxoriae (“action for the wife’s property”), allowing her to request the return of the 
dowry in the event of a divorce.266 It appears that this action was also extended to 
instances where the husband predeceased the wife.267 This ensured that the husband, 
although still being the owner of the dowry, could not freely dispose of the assets 
composing the dowry and had to account for his management thereof.268 The husband’s 
position was effectively that of a temporary steward.269 The dowry to be returned was, 
however, often subject to deductions,270 and there was accordingly no guarantee that 
the entire dowry or even a substantial portion thereof would be returned to the wife.271 
 
During the reign of Augustus,272 further reforms were introduced to improve the 
position of the wife.273 The husband and wife could agree how the dowry was to be 
dealt with on dissolution of the marriage and the dowry would have to be dealt with 
 
263 Du Plessis 125; Nicholas 85. 
264 Du Plessis 125; Nicholas 85; Sinclair & Heaton 185. 
265 Digesta 23 3 56 1; Corbett 148; Du Plessis 128; Nicholas 88; Schulz 122; Sinclair & Heaton 184. 
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269 Du Plessis 129. 
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accordingly when the marriage ended.274  In the absence of such an agreement, the 
actio rei uxoriae was still available on divorce, but Augustus formalised the position 
regarding deductions and the recovery of expenses from the dowry. The husband could 
no longer alienate the assets comprising the dowry275 and, where the marriage was 
dissolved under circumstances that gave the woman a right to restitution, the husband 
was obliged to restore the specific thing, unless he had alienated it with the consent of 
the wife.276 Where the husband predeceased the wife, she could recover the dowry 
from her husband’s heirs.277 The restrictions applying to a husband’s power to deal with 
the dowry, together with the duty to return it to the wife, were aimed at giving the wife 
some security on dissolution of the marriage.278  
 
During Justinian’s reign,279 the moral duty of dos developed into a legal duty.280 The 
husband could no longer alienate any assets forming part of the dowry, even if the wife 
consented to it.281 The actio re uxoriae was abolished and the actio ex stipulatu became 
the standard action to recover the dowry. This action applied even in the absence of an 
agreement between the husband and wife regarded the disposal of the dowry.282 The 
husband’s right to retain a portion of the dowry was abolished and his rights were 
reduced to that of usufructuary.283 The whole dowry would accordingly have to be 
returned to the wife when the marriage came to an end.284 The husband no longer had 
a right to make certain deductions from the dowry, but he could lodge a claim for 
expenses associated with it.285 
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The result of these reforms relating to dowry secured some level of financial protection 
for the wife. As Beinart286 points out though, the reality was that the practice of dos was 
only prevalent amongst certain levels of society who owned property, which meant that 
many wives were in fact left destitute when their husbands died.   
 
3.2.4 Donatio propter nuptias 
 
In later Roman law, during the 5th and 6th centuries, the concept of a donatio ante 
nuptias or donatio propter nuptias (donation or gift in anticipation or on account of 
marriage) was introduced.287 This was the converse of the dos and entailed a gift made 
by the husband to the wife in contemplation of their marriage.288 Its purpose was to 
provide for her if the marriage ended with his death or if he divorced her without 
justification.289 During Justinian’s reign it was enacted that the value of the donatio had 
to be equal to the value of the dowry provided by the wife,290 and similar rules as to the 
inalienability of the property comprising the dowry were applied to the donatio.291  
Where the marriage was dissolved by the death of the husband, the donatio fell to the 
woman, unless there were children, in which case it would go to them and she would 
receive a usufruct over the relevant assets comprising the donatio.292 
 
Despite these developments providing women with increased protection, a married 
woman’s financial position was not guaranteed as a husband was still not legally obliged 
to provide for his widow, which meant that she was dependent on his goodwill.293 
Where the husband made a will, it was of course possible that he could make his wife 
his heir (or at least one of his heirs), leave her a legacy or confer a right to maintenance 
 
286 1958 Acta Juridica 101. 
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on her. As in our modern law though, there would always be instances where a husband 
died intestate.294 Will-making appears to have been the norm for the Roman propertied 
classes, but the majority of Roman citizens probably died intestate.295 The wife’s 
position on intestacy depended on the legal nature of the marriage. If it was cum manu, 
the wife was regarded as the husband’s daughter and, together with other family 
members who had been in the husband’s power, became sui iuris on his death.296 These 
persons were the sui heredes of the deceased and succeeded to what was rightfully 
theirs as a result of their relationship with the deceased.297 Where the marriage was not 
cum manu, the wife did not form part of the class of sui heredes and had no claim 
against her husband’s estate.298 Her only remedy therefore lay in the return of the 
dos.299 
 
Beinart states that there was some evidence that the duty of maintenance might have 
applied between husband and wife, but concedes that there was some doubt about 
this. He specifically refers to Jolowicz300 and Sachers301 who doubted whether the duty 
extended to spouses. Justinian did, however, in the Novellae provide for the widow to 
the extent that she would receive a specific portion of her deceased husband’s estate.302 
Novella 53.6 provided that the indigent widow who was married without a dos or 
antenuptial agreement providing for a donation and who received nothing from her 
husband’s estate, would be an heir of her husband’s estate.303 This Novella was later 
amended by Novella 117.5, which amendment had the effect that the widow would be 
entitled to a one quarter share of her predeceased husband’s estate (subject to a limit) 
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where the deceased had no more than three children. If, however, her husband had 
more than three children and they were his children from a previous marriage, she 
would receive a per capita share with them. If the children were born from the marriage 
between her and her husband, she would not receive ownership of her “share” – it 
would vest in the children and she would receive only a usufruct over it.304 It is 
interesting to note that Novella 117.5 provided that where the husband was the 
surviving spouse, he was not entitled to any share of his wife’s estate.305 
 
According to Beinart,306 some writers regarded this widow’s portion as akin to a 
legitimate portion, although Novella 117.5, in which it was contained, did not call it so. 
He concludes, however, that although the widow’s portion shared some common 
characteristics with the legitimate portion, it had other features that brought it more in 
line with provision for alimenta.307 The duty of support in Roman law was dependent on 
the means and earnings of the person on whom it rested, as well as the means and 
earnings of those persons in whose favour the duty operated.308 The arrangement in the 
Novella also provided that the widow would only benefit if she was found to be 
needy.309 As need was not a requirement for the legitimate portion or for that matter, 
for intestate succession, it could therefore be argued that the widow’s portion was 
more in the nature of maintenance (alimenta) than a legitimate portion. Beinart is of 
the view that the widow’s portion went considerably further than the provision of 
alimenta from the deceased estate, and that the unclear character of the widow’s 
portion (being neither a legitimate portion nor alimenta) necessitated some limitation, 
which came in the form of a maximum limit to the amount the widow could receive.310 
He is, however, of the opinion that, despite this problem and others, the widow’s 
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portion in the Novella was designed to introduce the principles of alimenta by operation 
of law in respect of a deceased estate.311 
 
Justinian later changed the rules relating to intestacy and introduced a new system of 
intestate succession in Novellae 118 and 127.312 The surviving spouse was still included 
as an intestate heir, regardless of the nature of the marriage, but he or she only 
inherited after descendants, ascendants, siblings of half-blood and other collaterals.313 I 
would assume that, in practice, this limitation of the spouse’s right to inherit meant that 
the surviving spouse seldom inherited anything substantial on the intestacy of his or her 
spouse. 
 
Beinart314 refers to several writers315 on Roman law who concluded that the duty of 
alimenta was regarded as highly personal in nature and inextricably linked to the person 
owing the duty. It was therefore not regarded as transmissible to the heirs of that 
person and effectively died with him or her.316 One reason for this was that the duty was 
limited to certain classes of relatives and it could never be regarded reasonable to make 
the heirs, who could potentially be non-relatives, liable for maintenance towards people 
who may be strangers to them. As Beinart explains,317 the rule against transmissibility of 
the duty of support became established at a time when the heir was personally liable for 
the debts of the deceased. In addition, the rules of the law of succession provided for 
legitimate portions for certain family members and it was considered unnecessary to 
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Roman law accordingly did not recognise a general principle that the duty of support 
would be transmitted to the estate of the person owing the duty, except in the case of 
extreme need of the person being maintained.319 The term “extreme need” was not 
defined.320 As mentioned before,321 the basis of the duty of support in Roman law was 
that the person was in need and unable to maintain him- or herself and it appears that 
“extreme need” referred to a situation where the person had nobody else who was 
bound and able to support him or her.322  
 




The position in Roman-Dutch law relating to alimenta by legacy or contract was largely 
similar to that in Roman law, and several writers supported this view.323 Beinart324 
quotes Groenewegen325 who stated in his comments on Digesta 34.1.15 “alimentandi 
onus non finitur morte debitoris sed ad haeredes transmittur”, in other words, the duty 
of maintenance does not terminate on the death of the debtor, but transmits to his or 
her heirs on his or her death.326 
 
3.3.2 Alimenta by operation of law 
 
As in Roman law, the duty of support was interlinked with the institution of marriage. In 
early Roman-Dutch law, the wife was still regarded as a minor with her husband as her 
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guardian.327 His powers extended both to her person and her property. The husband 
had the marital power and this allowed him full administration of the assets brought 
into the marriage by the wife.328   
 
Most marriages in Western Europe were entered into in community of property which 
meant that the wife was usually financially dependent on her husband.329 During the 
eleventh century, Roman law regained its importance in Western Europe and lawyers 
regarded Justinian’s handling of succession law in Novellae 53.6 and 117.5 as a special 
sort of intestate succession law. As Jordaan330 points out though, they overlooked the 
fact that the two Novellae were not limited to instances where a deceased died 
intestate, and also applied in the event of testate succession.  
 
During the Middle Ages, Holland’s marriage law was governed by the canons of the 
Church, but after the Reformation, marriage law became secularised.331 By the end of 
the thirteenth century, the default matrimonial property regime was community of 
property and profit and loss.332 The assets of both spouses merged into one joint estate 
and the husband administered it by virtue of his marital power.333 If the marriage was 
dissolved by death, the surviving spouse received one half share of the joint estate and 
the heirs of the deceased spouse received the other half.334 The spouses were free to 
alter this default regime by entering into an antenuptial contract.335  It was therefore 
considered unlikely that a spouse would be left destitute when his or her spouse died as 
he or she would retain the one half share of the joint estate or the assets provided for in 
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the antenuptial contract.336 There was accordingly no need to provide for maintenance 
after the death of the maintenance debtor.337 The default regime of community of 
property did not, however, necessarily mean that the surviving spouse was sufficiently 
provided for – as a result of the husband’s marital power, he was not obliged to account 
to his wife for any dispositions made from the joint estate, although there were some 
limitations on his powers in this regard.338 He could therefore effectively dispose of all 
or most of the joint estate during his lifetime. The law also included a principle that 
where the husband was the first-dying spouse, the wife could free herself from personal 
liability for the joint debts by renouncing her rights to the joint estate.339 This would, 
however, have a negative impact on the wife if she had no assets of her own, which was 
often the case – the only way she would have been able to have assets of her own was if 
her father or grandfather had made gifts to her or left her a testamentary bequest and 
stipulated in the deed of donation or will that the gift or benefit was excluded from the 
joint estate and her husband’s administration.340 
 
The Political Ordinance of the states of Holland (1580) contained the rules relating to 
marriage.341 Parties were given the option of choosing a matrimonial property system 
and could, for example, choose to exclude community of property by way of an 
antenuptial contract.342  
 
Most systems under the common law where the woman did not have independence 
seemed to rely on the principle that a married woman was entitled to some protection 
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when her marriage was dissolved, especially if it was as a result of the husband’s 
death.343 If a married woman did not want to be in a dependent state, she had the 
option of entering into a marriage settlement with her husband at the start of the 
marriage.344 It appears that the dowry provided by the wife or her family to the husband 
had effectively disappeared by this time and the dowry that existed at that time was the 
settlement by the husband on the wife.345 As Beinart points out though,346 most spouses 
typically did not own much property at the time they got married, which meant that 
they were not really in a position to make promises. Entering into a marriage settlement 
at such a time was therefore not necessarily a safeguard for a spouse. Some systems 
provided for the widow (and to some extent, the widower) in all cases, regardless of the 
nature of the marriage. This was usually by way of intestate succession or by way of the 
compulsory dowry.347  
 
It seems that there were differing views on the application of Justinian’s Novellae 53.6 
and 117.5 which provided that the wife would in certain circumstances be entitled to a 
share of her husband’s estate on his death.348 Beinart mentions that some writers such 
as Groenewegen349 and Van Leeuwen350 took the view that the system of community of 
property superseded the provisions of the Novellae and gave sufficient protection to the 
surviving spouse.351 They therefore regarded the provisions of these Novellae as 
unnecessary in intestate succession and deemed them to have been tacitly revoked.352 
Some jurists such as Van der Keessel353 were of the opinion that the Novellae had 
become obsolete. However, as Beinart points out, this ignored the reality that not all 
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marriages were in community of property and that some were governed by antenuptial 
contract.354  
 
Some writers355 took a practical approach and argued that the Novellae should continue 
to be applied because they provided for something akin to alimenta for the spouse 
where the marriage was not in community of property and one spouse was in need of 
maintenance after the death of the other spouse. Voet,356 for example, suggested that 
there was no legal obligation on a husband to provide for his widow in his will as the 
provisions of the Novellae protected her. Other writers357 were of the opinion that the 
widow had a claim for maintenance against her husband’s estate, because his obligation 
during his lifetime to maintain her would pass to his heirs on his death.  
 
According to Beinart,358 most of the Roman-Dutch writers359 dealt extensively with 
alimenta, but did not discuss what happened when the person owing the duty died. The 
only writer who seemed to have a clear opinion on the transmissibility of the 
maintenance obligation was Voet who stated that the duty generally did not pass to the 
heirs of the person.360 Despite this lack of certainty as to the transmissibility of the 
maintenance obligation, there seems to have been some instances where a near relative 
of a deceased person who received no inheritance or legacy from such deceased person, 
and who was not able to maintain him- or herself, could claim from the heirs of that 
deceased person. Beinart concludes that, despite the varied opinions, it could be 
accepted that Novellae 53.6 and 117.5 provided the basis for a more comprehensive 
maintenance claim against a deceased person’s estate by some of his needy 
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dependants, including his widow.361 He expressed the view that such instances were 
regarded as “stop gaps” only to cover certain situations and were not indicative of any 
general principle regarding the liability of the heir of a person to maintain those persons 
for whose maintenance the deceased had been liable.362  
 
A maintenance claim, as we understand it today, against the estate of a first-dying 
spouse therefore did not exist in Roman-Dutch law. 
 




The general position relating to maintenance obligations by way of legacy or contract 
was the same as in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, except that a deceased estate was 
represented by the executor and not the heir.363 The executor of the estate of a 
maintenance debtor would have to ensure that sufficient assets or funds were set aside 
in the estate to settle the legacy or maintenance commitment.364 The estate itself, and 
not the heir, would be liable to settle the maintenance. If the heir of the estate died, no 
part of the maintenance obligation of the deceased testator would pass to the heir’s 
estate. A testator could, however, bequeath property in his or her will to an heir or a 
legatee subject to the condition that the heir or legatee was obliged to provide 
maintenance to another party, in which case the maintenance obligation would transmit 
to the estate of the deceased heir, unless the will expressly indicated differently.365  
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The same would apply where a person had agreed by way of contract to maintain 
another person – on the death of the person who undertook the maintenance 
obligation, the obligation would transmit to his or her estate unless the contract in 
terms of which the obligation was undertaken, indicated differently.366  
 
In Vaughan v SA National Trust and Assurance Co Limited367 the court confirmed this 
view and held that where a person supports or pays maintenance to another of his or 
her own accord and out of pure liberality, the duty to pay maintenance would not pass 
to his or her heirs, unless this was clearly his or her intention.368 In both instances, the 
debt would be treated as an ordinary debt in the estate of the person paying 
maintenance and rank equally with all other debts.369 
 
3.4.2 Maintenance by operation of law  
 
As in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, maintenance by operation of law in South Africa 
has always been closely interlinked with the legislation relating to marriages.  
 
3.4.2.1  Marriage 
With the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 and the establishment of the first European 
settlement in the Cape of Good Hope, the Roman-Dutch law of marriage and divorce 
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came to South Africa370 and the Political Ordinance of 1580 therefore formed the basis 
of the South African law of marriage.371 In the period till 1910 when the Union of South 
Africa was established, the respective provinces applied their own marriage laws. With 
the establishment of the Union, these laws continued to stay in force.372  The details of 
these laws are not relevant for purposes of this thesis and will therefore not be 
discussed. There were several legislative changes after 1910, but only the ones 
pertaining to this thesis will be discussed. 
 
The first relevant piece of legislation for purposes of this thesis, the Matrimonial Affairs 
Act,373 was introduced in 1953. It retained the default regime of community of property 
and profit and loss, but the wife was granted some independent legal capacity and the 
husband’s marital power was restricted.374 This Act, as amended by the General Law 
Further Amendment Act,375 the Maintenance Act376 and the Matrimonial Affairs 
Amendment Act,377 provided that a husband could not alienate any immovable property 
brought into the marriage by his wife, or acquired by her during the marriage by gift or 
inheritance or out of her own earnings. The Matrimonial Affairs Act also gave the wife 
control over her own earnings and savings as she could open and operate an account 
with a banking institution without her husband’s interference.378  
 
The biggest change to the matrimonial property laws was undoubtedly the introduction 
in 1984 of the Matrimonial Property Act.379 This Act abolished the common law rule 
affording the husband marital power over the person and property of his wife.380 The 
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abolition of the husband’s marital power meant that husband and wife in a marriage in 
community of property now had equal powers in respect of the administration of their 
joint estate.381 The Matrimonial Property Act did, however, not apply to all marriages in 
South Africa. Marriages between black persons were still governed by the Black 
Administration Act,382 which provided in section 22(6) that the civil marriage of black 
persons was automatically out of community of property and profit and loss and the 
husband retained the marital power.383 The Matrimonial Property Act also specifically 
provided384 that the abolition of the husband’s marital power did not apply to marriages 
governed by the Black Administration Act. According to Sinclair and Heaton,385 this 
different treatment of marriages between black persons existed because the Roman-
Dutch system of complete community of property was regarded as an alien concept for 
black persons. The Law Commission’s investigations386 in the mid-1980’s, however, 
revealed that community of property was more popular amongst black persons, and on 
2 December 1988 the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act387 came 
into operation. This Act repealed section 22(6) of the Black Administration Act and 
extended the provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act to civil marriages entered into 
by black persons. This meant that the same proprietary consequences would apply to all 
civil marriages entered into after the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act, regardless of the race of the parties involved.388 
 
The Matrimonial Property Act also introduced a new matrimonial property regime, 
namely out of community with the accrual system,389 which effectively provided a form 
of deferred community of gains390 in the sense that the spouses share equally in the 
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growth of their respective estates on dissolution of the marriage, even though there 
was no joint estate during the subsistence of the marriage.391 The introduction of the 
accrual system was clearly intended to provide a mechanism whereby spouses could 
enjoy some proprietary protection when the marriage was dissolved, even though the 
marriage was not in community of property. The Law Commission392 explained that the 
premise of the legislation was the idea that where one spouse financially and otherwise 
contributed to the growth of the other spouses’ estate, he or she should be entitled to a 
share in the other spouse’s estate when the marriage ended. In the majority of 
marriages at that time, the husband was the breadwinner and the wife contributed by 
taking care of the household and the family. While the accrual system no doubt plays 
some role to compensate the spouse who contributed to the marriage without 
necessarily gaining a financial benefit, the mere fact that the accrual system applies to a 
marriage does not guarantee that there will not be a maintenance need after the death 
of one of the spouses. Using the scenario of the husband as breadwinner, there could be 
instances where his estate shows little growth, which would render any claim for accrual 
by his wife meaningless. There surely would also be instances where the husband’s 
estate is insolvent at the dissolution of the marriage or where he had before the 
marriage placed assets in a trust, thereby effectively removing them from the 
application of the accrual system. Statistics provided by the Department of Justice393  in 
the first few years after the introduction of the accrual system showed that there was a 
steady increase of instances where parties had entered into marriages with an 
antenuptial contract that excluded the accrual system. This meant that many spouses 
were still in marriages with complete separation of property, which meant that the 
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surviving spouse on death would potentially not enjoy any protection if the deceased 
spouse did not include him or her in the will.   
 
3.4.2.2 The duty of support 
Having considered the background of our marriage laws, we now have to look at the 
consequences of marriage, focusing on the duty of support.  
 
In terms of our law, a marriage is an agreement between two parties, based on 
consensus394 and resulting in certain obligations. One such obligation is the reciprocal 
duty of support in terms of which both parties to a marriage are obliged to support each 
other.395 The extent of this duty is based on each party’s ability to provide the other 
party with the support required by him or her.396 In the past, the duty of support 
between spouses came to an end with the death of one of the spouses.397 The issue of 
maintenance of the spouse was initially not addressed directly in our law and the 
surviving spouse therefore did not have any claim for maintenance against the deceased 
spouse’s estate.398 Although our law recognised the principle of a legitimate portion, it 
did not extend to the surviving spouse, because the spouse was not regarded as an 
intestate heir of his or her deceased spouse.399 In practice, therefore, I have to assume 
that many spouses found themselves in unfavourable financial circumstances when the 
marriage was dissolved by death. 
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The growing demand for freedom of testation and a move away from the legitimate 
portion resulted in the introduction of a Bill in the Cape Legislative Assembly in 1862.400 
The Bill aimed to allow a testator to disinherit any member of his or her family, to 
abolish the legitimate portion in favour of persons other than children or ascendants 
and to allow the testator to bequeath his or her entire estate to his or her spouse.401 
Although this Bill was not passed, it did lead to the House of Assembly appointing a Law 
of Inheritance Commission for the Cape to investigate the law of inheritance.402 The 
Commission for the Western Districts of the Cape403 felt that the legitimate portion 
should be retained as it was essential to provide support for dependants,404 while the 
Commission for the Eastern Districts felt that there should be a permissive law which 
would enable all persons to dispose of their property as they deem fit without being 
obliged to leave certain portions to certain family members.405 The majority report of 
the Law of Inheritance Commission, however, recommended that the legitimate portion 
of children be retained, but that the portion of parents be abolished.406 
 
Despite this partial support for the retention of the legitimate portion, Natal was the 
first province to abolish the legitimate portion by means of section 3A of Act 22 of 1863, 
read with section 1 of Act 7 of 1885. Freedom of testation was brought about in the 
Cape by the Law of Inheritance Amendment Act 26 of 1873 and the Succession Act 23 of 
1874. According to Hahlo,407 the latter Act was passed under the influence of economic 
liberalism which was popular in England at the time. The effect of the Succession Act 
was to completely abolish the legitimate portion and establish complete freedom of 
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testation.408 It is interesting to note that this Act did not mention the surviving spouse or 
widow and their claims and it was therefore not clear to what extent the Novellae that 
applied in Roman law, continued to apply in our law.409 The uncertainty that applied in 
Roman-Dutch law regarding this issue therefore continued in South African law. 
Certainty was achieved with the judgment in Glazer v Glazer410 where the court held 
that there was nothing to indicate that the provisions of the Novellae had ever been 
observed in our law and that the practice and “conception of our law” had been 
inconsistent with the contents of these provisions.411 It held further that the 
enforcement of the widow’s rights was in any event not in line with the practices or 
tendencies prevailing at the time the legislation was passed. As a result, the court held 
that the Novellae were not part of our law.412 The court added that, even it if were 
assumed that the Novellae had indeed formed part of Roman–Dutch law, they had been 
abrogated by disuse.413 
 
After the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902, the new colonies also adopted the Cape law 
by way of Proclamation 28 of 1902 in Transvaal and Vrystaatse Wetboek 1892 and 
Ordinance 18 of 1905 in the Free State. Hahlo414 made the interesting point that, 
although the legislation was enacted under the influence of economic liberalism which 
was prevalent in England, the influence of English law was not strong enough to 
persuade South Africa to follow suit when England later adopted the Inheritance 
(Family) Provision Act in 1938.415  
The abolition of the legitimate portion meant that the testator now had complete 
freedom to do with his or her assets as he or she pleased, even if it meant disinheriting 
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his or her immediate family.416 As confirmed in several judgments,417 the court had to 
give effect to any clear, unambiguous testamentary provisions in a valid will, regardless 
of how unreasonable the testator may have been. A surviving spouse no longer had an 
inherent entitlement to any of the assets of the deceased spouse’s estate unless 
nominated as beneficiary in the will, and there was no legislation that allowed a spouse 
to lodge a claim for maintenance if the will did not provide for him or her, did not 
provide sufficiently, or if there was no will. This had the effect of removing any financial 
protection a spouse enjoyed after the death of his or her spouse, which could of course 
lead to inequitable results. 
In 1934 the Succession Act418 was passed, which provided that the spouse of a person 
who died intestate (whether fully or partially) was an intestate heir of the deceased 
person419 and entitled to a certain portion of the intestate estate of his or her spouse. 
This Act provided for different scenarios, with the quantum of the spouse’s entitlement 
depending on the composition of the deceased’s family. If, for example, the deceased 
left descendants, the spouse was entitled to a child’s portion.420 If the deceased left only 
ascendants or collateral relations, the spouse was entitled to a half share of the 
estate,421 and if the deceased left no relatives, the spouse would take the entire 
estate.422 These provisions must certainly have helped to secure some protection for a 
surviving spouse whose spouse died without a will.  
The question of the transmissibility of the general duty of support to family members 
first came to the fore in the context of children born of unmarried parents (then, so-
called “illegitimate” children). In Kramer v Findlay’s Executors423 the court allowed 
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monthly payments out of the estate of the deceased to the mother of the deceased’s 
“illegitimate” child but gave no reasons to explain the order. In Ex parte Leevengeld: In 
re Foot424 the court did not make a direct ruling in this regard but expressed doubt as to 
whether the duty should be transmitted to the estate of the person who is obliged to 
pay maintenance. The seminal case dealing with maintenance of “illegitimate” children 
is Carelse v De Vries,425 which dealt with a claim brought by Ms Carelse for maintenance 
of her minor “illegitimate” children against their father’s estate. The court referred to 
the fact that the authorities were apparently not in agreement as to the question 
whether the obligation of a father to support his children passed to his heirs. It cited 
Voet,426 who maintained that the duty ceased on the death of the parent. It also 
referred to Groenewegen427 who maintained the opposite view.428 The court held that 
where the estate of the deceased was sufficient to pay for the maintenance of 
“legitimate” children (that is, children born of married parents), it would be competent 
to award maintenance from the estate to the “illegitimate” children.429  
 
Beinart430 points out that the court’s conclusion in Carelse was based on an erroneous 
reliance on a statement by Groenewegen that alimenta due by a debtor is transmitted 
to his heirs.431 He suggests that Groenewegen’s use of the word “debitor” seemed to 
indicate that this statement was intended to relate only to a duty of support by contract 
or legacy and not to the maintenance obligation that arose by operation of law.432 
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Beinart refers to several other decisions433 that dealt with the issue of maintenance and 
the transmission thereof to the debtor’s estate. Some of these decisions also relied on 
this incorrect application of Groenewegen’s statement. In Spies’ Executors v Beyers,434 
for example, the court referred to “the clear categorical statement of Groenewegen that 
the heir is liable for the maintenance of the children of the deceased”.435 In Ritchken’s 
Executor v Ritchken,436 the court referred to Groenewegen’s statement when holding 
that the deceased did not have the power “to absolve his estate from its legal obligation 
to educate and maintain his minor offspring after his death”.437 In Ex parte Jacobs,438 a 
case that was decided several years after Beinart’s comments were made, the court, 
however, held that, while there is no question that a parent remains liable to maintain 
his or her major child where the child is not capable of maintaining him- or herself, this 
liability ceases when the parent dies, because the estate must at some stage be finalised 
and cannot remain open in case a child becomes needy at a later stage.439 
 
Beinart expresses the opinion440 that, although the cases referred to by him were clearly 
based on wrong authority, their outcomes were desirable and correct in view of the 
then prevailing legal and social considerations. One such consideration was that the law 
of that time had abolished the legitimate portion applicable in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law and other protection against disinheritance, which meant that it was possible that 
the close relatives of a deceased person could be left destitute on his or her death.441 
The decision to extend or transmit the maintenance claim to the estate of the debtor 
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therefore offered some protection to the person who depended on the maintenance.  In 
an article on freedom of testation, Hahlo442 stated that “the balance of social realities” 
favoured a system of maintenance provision for family members over the legitimate 
portion. The latter system interfered with the will (where applicable) and the estate of a 
deceased person, as it permanently diminished the estate. Maintenance, however, 
usually does not impact on the estate, as the estate’s income, and not capital, is used to 
fund the maintenance,443 except where the parties agree that a lump sum be awarded 
to settle the maintenance obligations. His view444 was that there was no need for the re-
introduction of a legitimate portion for a spouse married in community of property, as 
the surviving spouse would in any event be entitled to half of the estate. He did, 
however, feel that provision should be made for the maintenance of the surviving 
spouse from the other half of the estate if necessary.445 Where the marriage is out of 
community of property, his view was that the parties had selected this matrimonial 
property regime and therefore had only themselves to blame if they found themselves 
in need of maintenance when the marriage ended. He did, however, concede that this 
was an instance where the courts should be given the power to award maintenance to 
the surviving spouse out of the estate of the deceased spouse.446 Beinart447 also favours 
the family provision scheme as he was of the opinion that it was based mainly on the 
needs of the dependants and the size of the estate, rather than on the moral right of 
any person to share in the deceased person’s estate. 
 
According to Beinart,448 the fact that, in South African law, the heir was no longer 
personally liable for the debts of the deceased person, as was the position in Roman 
law, was another reason for the courts holding that the maintenance obligation passed 
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to the estate of the deceased.449 The deceased estate was administered by an executor 
and it was he or she, in that capacity, and not the heir, who was liable to settle the 
deceased’s debts out of the estate. The estate would therefore continue the duty of 
support on behalf of the deceased.450 Beinart refers to some cases451 where the courts 
held that an innocent divorced spouse could claim maintenance from the guilty spouse 
until the death or remarriage of the innocent spouse and argued that this reinforced the 
view that the maintenance obligation would be transferred to the estate of the person 
who was obliged to pay maintenance.452 He suggested453 that, as in Roman law, the 
maintenance should be based on the means of the deceased and the means and needs 
of the person claiming support.454 The obligation would cease when the person who 
claimed support became able to support him- or herself from own resources or where 
another person took on the obligation to maintain him or her.455 The maintenance claim 
would rank after that of other creditors.456 He mentioned that this principle was decided 
in several cases,457 although no reason for the decision was given in any of these cases. I 
am of the opinion that the reason for this principle was probably the fact that the claim 
was regarded as being in respect of future maintenance (that is, maintenance that only 
becomes due and payable after the death of the maintenance debtor) and therefore 
could not compete against claims for monies already owing to creditors at the time of 
the debtor’s death. 
 
The issue of maintenance was not restricted to spouses and children. In Lloyd v 
Menzies458 the court was asked to decide on a grandfather’s obligation to provide 
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maintenance to a grandchild. The court dealt held “that it would be illogical not to 
maintain the liability upon the estate of anyone who, if living, is under the duty to 
provide support”.459 It accordingly held that the estate of the grandfather must provide 
maintenance for his grandchild. Not all court decisions however came to the same 
conclusion – in Barnard v Miller,460 for example, the court held that a grandparent’s 
deceased estate was not liable for the maintenance of his grandchildren.  
 
Despite the fact that our courts were by the early 1960s considering the extension of 
the duty of support to other family relationships, the question whether the estate of a 
deceased spouse would be liable to maintain the surviving spouse had still not been 
answered. Beinart is of the view that the fact that the Matrimonial Affairs Act of 1953 
permitted maintenance orders on divorce “for a fixed period or until the death or 
remarriage” of the spouse to be maintained,461 suggests that the same principle should 
apply on the death of a spouse, so that the estate of the spouse who was liable for 
maintenance would continue to be liable.462 He argues that it would hardly be 
reasonable to allow a divorced spouse to claim maintenance from the former spouse’s 
estate, but deny the surviving spouse a similar claim. He therefore advocates that our 
law should protect a surviving spouse from disinherison by allowing for a debtor 
spouse’s estate to be liable for maintenance if the surviving spouse could not maintain 
him- or herself or had no one else to support him or her, and that this obligation should 
endure for the duration of the surviving spouse’s life or until remarriage.463   
 
The issue of maintenance between spouses and the handling thereof after the death of 
one of the spouses was eventually addressed by the Appellate Division in Glazer v 
Glazer.464 The applicant was the widow of Samuel Glazer who died testate and left 
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nothing to his widow in his will (which had been executed almost five years prior to the 
conclusion of their marriage). The spouses had been married out of community of 
property and the marriage had lasted about fourteen months. Mrs Glazer brought an 
application for the payment of an amount of R500 per month for maintenance, but the 
Witwatersrand Local Division ruled against her.465 The matter was then taken on appeal. 
The Appellate Division compared the position of the needy widow to that of the wife 
whose husband’s actions had led to a divorce. It held that the recognition of the guilty 
husband’s obligation to maintain his innocent wife in a divorce scenario did not lead to 
the conclusion that a deceased husband’s estate should be liable for maintenance of his 
needy widow “merely because she is indigent and without regard to other 
circumstances which may have influenced him in deliberately making no provision for 
her”.466   
 
The court referred to several cases in which it was held that a child was entitled to 
maintenance out of the estate of the deceased parent467 and expressed the view that, 
although these cases were founded on a mistaken reading of Groenewegen,468 it would 
assume that the decisions had become settled law. The court found that there was a 
fundamental difference between the relationship between spouses and the one 
between parent and child. The latter relationship was an “immutable natural 
relationship”, whereas the relationship between spouses could be severed at any time, 
regardless of how close it was. Acceptance of a child’s claim for maintenance therefore 
did not imply that the spouse’s claim for maintenance should also be accepted, and the 
court held that denial of the spouse’s claim was not an anomaly in our law.469 The court 
therefore refused to uphold the appeal. 
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This decision left the surviving spouse with no legal remedy if the deceased spouse 
chose to disinherit him or her or leave him or her no other benefits (for example 
proceeds from a pension fund or insurance policy). Beinart470 criticises the distinction 
drawn in the judgment between the position of the divorced spouse and that of the 
surviving spouse of a marriage ended by death, on the basis that divorce was to some 
extent a voluntary action during which the parties could plan to such an extent that 
future maintenance was provided for. He quotes with agreement from a Report issued 
in 1930 in the State of New York that stated:  
“There is a glaring inconsistency in … law which compels a man to support his wife during his lifetime 
and permits him to leave her practically penniless at his death.”471  
 
It is useful to note here that the Matrimonial Affairs Act provided for maintenance 
orders on divorce for a fixed period or until the death or remarriage of the spouse to be 
maintained.472 This effectively placed the divorced spouse in a stronger position than 
the surviving spouse whose spouse had died, which clearly was unreasonable. Beinart 
suggests that it was time for legal reform of the position of the widow regarding 
maintenance. He refers to the growing independence of women which had led to a 
dilution of women’s succession rights, but argued that the law did not always translate 
into economic and social independence and many women were therefore still 
dependent on maintenance from their husbands.473 He, however, expresses his 
opposition to the reintroduction of a legitimate portion on the basis that it took little 
notice of the wealth of the deceased or the needs of the dependants or the 
beneficiaries in terms of the will.474 Hahlo475 also expresses his preference for 
maintenance over a legitimate portion. He quotes Laufer476 who had remarked that the 
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legitimate portion system assumes a “fictitious ‘average’ surviving spouse” when 
applying a mathematical rule, which means that all spouses are treated alike, regardless 
of their circumstances. 
 
3.4.3 Legislative reform 
 
In 1965 there was finally some legislative progress with the publication of the Family 
Provision Bill.477 This Bill largely followed the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 
introduced in England in 1938.478 The preamble positioned the purpose of the Bill as “to 
make provision for the maintenance out of the estate of a deceased person of certain 
members of his family…”.  
 
The salient aspects of the Bill were as follows: 
• Where a person died after the commencement of the Act (assuming the Bill 
translated into an Act) and left an estate in the Republic and a dependant who 
was ordinarily resident in the Republic, the court could, on application by such 
dependant, order that such reasonable provision as the court deemed fit would 
be made out of the deceased estate for the maintenance of that dependant.479  
• Such order could be made if the court was satisfied that the dependant needed 
maintenance and after considering the needs of other dependants.480 As 
Beinart481 points out, this underlying principle that the person claiming 
maintenance had to be incapable of supporting him- or herself was in line with 
established South African common law principles. 
• The court could make the order subject to such conditions as it deemed 
necessary.482  
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• The respective dependants were defined in a list and included the surviving wife 
or husband.483  
• Maintenance would be by way of periodical payments484 at an annual rate that 
did not exceed the annual income of the net estate,485 but where the annual 
income of the estate was insufficient to provide for the reasonable maintenance 
of the dependant/s of the estate, the court could order that maintenance would 
be by way of a lump sum.486 In addition, the court could make an order for 
maintenance by way of a lump sum if the dependant/s and the person with a 
financial interest in the estate agreed.487 
• The order would be terminated on the death of the dependant or, in the case of 
a surviving spouse, on his or her remarriage.488 As Beinart points out,489 this was 
in line with common law principles that maintenance would be terminated 
when the person being maintained acquired sufficient means of his or her own. 
• An interesting aspect of the Bill is that it provided that maintenance by way of 
periodical payments would be paid by someone other than the executor. In 
clause 2(4) it provided that the court would direct who was to make the 
periodical payments “and the person so directed shall not be the executor of the 
estate in his capacity as such”. A list of possible payers was given and included 
the administrator appointed by the testator to administer a trust created in the 
will,490 a trustee appointed by the court to administer an amount it ordered to 
be set aside for this purpose,491 or the Master of the Supreme Court (now the 
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Master of the High Court) in respect of an amount ordered by the court to be 
paid into the Guardian’s Fund for the maintenance of a minor child.492  
• The Bill provided a list of factors which the court should consider when 
determining an application for maintenance,493 namely: 
o the nature of the property in the net estate of the deceased and whether it 
would be undesirable for the dependant/s and/or any person/s who would 
be entitled to a particular property, if such property was realized;494 
o the past, present or future capital or income from any source of the 
dependant who brought the application;495 
o the conduct of the dependant in relation to the deceased496 – according to 
Beinart497 this would, for example, allow the court to take into account 
whether the applicant made any attempts toward maintaining him- or 
herself; 
o any other factor which the court deemed relevant or material to the 
application;498 and 
o the deceased’s reasons for making the dispositions in his or her will, or for 
not making dispositions in his or her will, or for not making provision or 
sufficient provision for a dependant, as far as such reasons could be 
ascertained.499 
• The court could at any time, on application, vary, suspend or rescind any order 
for maintenance if a substantial change had taken place in the circumstances of 
the dependant or the person beneficially interested in the estate, or if any 
material fact was not disclosed to the court at the time of the application.500  
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Beinart mentions that one disadvantage of the family provision scheme is that the 
scheme outlined in the Bill did not include an automatic formula for the determination 
of maintenance, which made it necessary for claimants to approach the (then) Supreme 
Court. This could lead to expenses on their behalf, as well as expenses for the estate, 
which would reduce the estate funds.501 His suggestion was rather to let the claim be 
considered by the Master of the Supreme Court in consultation with the executor, 
subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision by the Master. He 
suggested that the factors provided for in the Bill would give sufficient guidance to the 
Master to consider the claim. The Master was often the first port of call for any 
questions under the Estates Act and there was no reason to treat the issue of 
maintenance differently. If necessary, the Master could be given the power to rule that 
the matter had to be referred to the Supreme Court if the Master could not make a 
decision.502  
 
The Bill as presented was never accepted and the position relating to the maintenance 
of the spouse remained unchanged. A comment by Beinart,503 namely that lawyers had, 
through the ages, largely unsuccessfully struggled to secure rights for dependants, in 
particular minors, to benefit in the deceased estate of their next of kin, seems to sum up 
the prevailing approach (at the time of Beinart’s writing) to the position of the surviving 
spouse. Our legislature, however, continued its efforts to intervene and in 1969 the 
Parliamentary Select Committee presented the Family Maintenance Bill.504 The purpose 
of the Bill was identical to that of the Family Provision Bill and was reflected in the 
preamble as “to make provision for the maintenance, out of the estate of a deceased 
person, of certain members of his family”.  
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The Bill largely followed the structure of the Family Provision Bill and provided as 
follows:  
• Where a person died after the commencement of the Act (assuming the Bill 
translated into an Act) and left an estate in the Republic (which included the 
then South-West Africa (now Namibia)),505 a dependant of the deceased could 
apply to the executor of the estate for the payment of maintenance out of such 
estate.506 The executor could refuse the application or agree to payment if 
satisfied that the dependant required assistance to provide for his or her own 
maintenance, and that it would be just and equitable to pay maintenance to the 
applicant. The executor could also attach conditions to the payment if it was 
deemed necessary.507  
• In considering the claim, the executor would have regard to: 
o the nature of the property in the net estate;508 
o whether realisation of the property would be undesirable for the dependants 
who may claim maintenance and/or any other persons with a financial 
interest in the estate;509 
o the past, present or future capital or income of the dependant from any 
source.510 
• The payment of maintenance in the case of a spouse would terminate on his or 
her remarriage.511 
• The maintenance would be by way of periodical payments512 and the total 
amount payable in any given year would not exceed the annual income of the 
net estate, subject to one exception513 – where in any particular case the annual 
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income was insufficient to make reasonable provision for maintenance or where 
the dependant(s) and the persons with a financial interest in the estate agreed, 
maintenance could in whole or in part be by way of a lump sum payment.514 
• The dependant(s) and persons financially interested in the estate could agree by 
whom the maintenance was payable but, if they failed to do so, the Master 
would decide by whom it would be paid.515 The executor could, however, not be 
the liable party.516 
• The dependant or any other person with a financial interest in the estate who 
felt aggrieved by the decision of the executor could object to the Master in 
writing.517 The Master would then consider the matter and confirm, vary or set 
aside the executor’s decision. If the objector was aggrieved by the decision of 
the Master, he or she could appeal the decision by way of application on notice 
of motion to a judge in chambers.518 The judge would then, like the Master, 
confirm or vary the Master’s decision or set aside the decision and give the 
decision that the court feels should have been given by the Master.519  
• The Master could vary, suspend or rescind any agreement or decision or order 
relating to the payment of maintenance on application by the person who was 
paying the maintenance or by any person with a financial interest in the estate, 
on the basis that a material fact was not disclosed when the initial application 
was made, or that a substantial change had occurred in the circumstances of the 
dependant or the person with a financial interest in the estate.520 The Master 
had the power to direct a dependant to refund any amount of maintenance 
which he was of the opinion should not have been paid.521 Should the 
dependant fail to refund the amount, the person paying maintenance could file 
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a copy of the Master’s direction with a court, which would have the effect of a 
civil judgment by that court.522 
 
The Bill was referred by the House of Assembly to a Select Committee of Parliament for 
consideration on 8 May 1969. The Select Committee delivered their Report523  in terms 
of which they rejected the Bill. The following reasons were given for the rejection: 
• The legislation would result in “a serious inroad being made into the well-
established principle of freedom of testation” and the committee felt that it 
would not be in the public interest to enact legislation merely to provide for 
what the committee felt was the exceptional case where protection was 
required by a dependant; 
• The liquidation and distribution process of deceased estates affected by the 
provisions of the proposed legislation might be inordinately delayed; and 
• It would not be equitable “for a dependant in all cases to be paid maintenance 
out of an estate”. 
 
Hahlo524 observes that at the time when the committee rejected the Bill, there were 
only two countries in the world that had neither a fixed legitimate portion nor some 
kind of maintenance legislation, and South Africa was one such country.525 I am of the 
opinion that this fact alone indicated the dire need for reform in South Africa. Hahlo 
makes the following comments on the Committee’s reasons for rejecting the Bill: 
• The fact that the instances of a man disinheriting his wife or children were the 
exception, did not provide a ground for rejecting remedial legislation intended to 
deal with such exceptional cases.526 The majority of men did not have to be 
admonished to make them carry out their natural duty to support their children, 
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yet there was elaborate maintenance legislation to deal with those instances 
where fathers did not fulfil their duties in this regard. 527 It therefore did not 
make sense to reject legislation that would similarly allow for exceptional cases 
where widows were left destitute by their husbands. Hahlo states further528 that 
the reference by the committee to the principles of freedom of testation was 
unnecessary as the committee was not asked whether freedom of testation 
should be abolished or curtailed, but rather whether the courts should in 
exceptional cases have the discretionary power to award maintenance to a 
surviving spouse (or adult children) out of the estate of the deceased spouse if 
the first-dying spouse (or parent) did not provide for the survivor in his or her 
will. He quotes Professor Joseph Laufer who had once said529 that the purpose of 
maintenance legislation was “to correct … flagrant moral abuses”. Hahlo 
surmises530 that the Select Committee’s response indicated that they were 
convinced that such abuses did not occur in South Africa and that all cases of 
disinherison had adequate justifying reasons. 
• There was some merit in the comment that a maintenance claim would lead to a 
delay in the liquidation and administration of the estate. However, after 
considering the position in England, New Zealand and Australia, Hahlo 
concludes531 that such delays would not give rise to serious difficulties. He bases 
this view on the fact that, at that stage, it had been settled law in South Africa 
for almost a century that a court could award maintenance to a minor child out 
of the estate of his or her deceased parent, and there had been hardly any 
complaints about delays caused by this.532 There should therefore be no specific 
reason why any delay occasioned by a claim by the surviving spouse would be 
problematic. 
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• Hahlo533 rejects the committee’s statement that “it will not be equitable for a 
dependant in all cases to be paid maintenance out of an estate”. As he points 
out, it was clear from the contents of the Bill that the award of maintenance 
would not operate in all cases, but would only apply if the executor was satisfied 
that the dependant was in need of assistance adequately to provide for his or 
her maintenance, and that such award of maintenance would not encroach on 
the interest of the heirs of the estate.534 The award of maintenance to a 
dependant would therefore always be an exceptional occurrence, rather than a 
matter of course. 
 
Hahlo535 points out that the committee could have used another more valid argument 
against a provision for maintenance in favour of the spouse, namely that the surviving 
spouse of a marriage in community of property would by law be entitled to a half share 
of the joint estate. He concedes536 though that while many marriages in South Africa at 
that time were still in community of property, most people of means or prospects 
excluded this matrimonial property system by way of an antenuptial contract. He 
concludes537 that the answer to the question whether legislation dealing with family 
maintenance was desirable, would depend on one’s personal philosophy towards 
unrestricted freedom of testation and whether it conformed to the social norms of the 
time. His view is that some form of provision had to be in place, at least to bring South 
Africa in line with the rest of the world.538 Several other writers539 also criticised the 
decision of the Select Committee and suggested that our law should move away from a 
discussion around the legitimate portion and rather focus on the maintenance needs of 
the spouse.  
 
533 1971(88)2 SALJ 203. 
534 1971(88)2 SALJ 204.  
535 1971(88)2 SALJ 204. 
536 1971(88)2 SALJ 204. 
537 1971(88)2 SALJ 204. 
538 1971(88)2 SALJ 204. 
539 Rowland 1970(2) Codicillus 4, 1972(75)4 Codicillus 48; Rowland “Aspects of the law governing 
contingencies for which the testator has not provided” 1972(75)4 THRHR 315, 1973(36)1 THRHR 63, 





In September 1970 a neighbour of South Africa, Botswana, published the Succession 
(Rights of the Surviving Spouse and Inheritance Family Provision) Bill.540 The country’s 
common law system was based on Roman-Dutch law which had been imported by 
means of a reception statute541 from the Cape of Good Hope colony, and it applied the 
principle of complete freedom of testation.542 The two main purposes of the Bill were to 
introduce the power for the court to order payment for the benefit of the surviving 
spouse or dependent child out of the estate of a deceased person, and to increase the 
provision made for surviving spouses on intestacy.543 The Bill was accompanied by a 
memorandum by the Acting Minister of State in which the reasons for the Bill were 
explained. As Himsworth544 pointed out, the memorandum was as forthright in asserting 
the values of the Bill as the South African Select Committee was in rejecting the 1969 
Family Maintenance Bill. It provided in section 4 that a person married out of 
community of property was able in his or her will to leave all his or her assets to anyone 
of his or her choice, which could lead to a situation where the widow and/or children 
were left destitute. The Acting Minister of State who signed the memorandum noted 
that this was “manifestly wrong” and stated that the Bill sought to remedy the situation 
by enabling a surviving spouse or the children of a deceased person to apply to the court 
for adequate provision to be made for them out of the estate of the deceased.545 The 
Bill was accepted and introduced as an Act in Botswana in December 1971. 
Himsworth546 commented that by adopting the legislation, Botswana took the lead in 
the “Roman-Dutch countries” of Southern Africa to join the rest of the Western world 
who already had some level of provision for the families of deceased persons. 
 
 
540 51 of 1970. 
541 The General Law Proclamation of 1909. 
542 Himsworth “A new Family Provision Act” 1972(89)1 SALJ 128–134. 
543 Himsworth 1972(89)1 SALJ 128. 
544 1972(89)1 SALJ 128. 
545 Para 4 of Memorandum. 




In 1984 a further attempt was made in South Africa to regulate the maintenance of the 
surviving spouse after the death of the other spouse. The Second Bill on Matrimonial 
Property 1984, which was the culmination of the acceptance by the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Matrimonial Property Law547 of the new matrimonial property 
regime, contained some provisions in this regard. Clause 4 of the Bill provided for a 
procedure whereby the court, on request of the former spouse of a marriage that was 
dissolved by divorce or the death of one spouse, could “make over” a reasonable 
portion of the deceased or divorced spouse’s estate to the claimant. The term 
“reasonable portion” was defined in clause 4(7) to be limited to the larger of a child’s 
share or a one quarter share of the estate.  
 
According to Sonnekus548 this provision mirrored the provision for “reasonable financial 
provision” contained in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 
in England. He also comments549 that the provisions of the Bill, if accepted, would be 
contrary to the principle of freedom of testation and that it looked like a badly 
concealed attempt to resurrect the legitimate portion. He is of the opinion550 that the 
reasons put forward for the rejection of the Family Maintenance Bill in 1969 are still 
valid and argues that there is no reason why any person should have a legally 
recognised entitlement to a fixed portion of a deceased person’s estate merely because 
of the family relationship between the person and the deceased. As far as the position 
of the spouse was concerned, he reconfirms551 the principle that the reciprocal duty of 
support between spouses comes to an end when the marriage terminated and 
concludes552 that there is no legally conclusive reason why a healthy adult who could 
maintain him- or herself by working, could lay claim to maintenance from another 
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person or his or her estate. He suggests553 that the underlying principle of most 
comparable legal systems is that every healthy adult should be responsible for his or her 
own maintenance needs and should not look to another person for this merely because 
there was some relationship between them. The extended maintenance claim is 
contrary to this principle and the surviving spouse should therefore be required to 
become self-sufficient on the death of the other spouse.554  
 
While there clearly is some merit in Sonnekus’ argument, the reality is that the 
traditional family concept in South Africa at that time was that the husband was the 
breadwinner and the wife looked after the children and the household. This surely 
placed certain limitations on the wife’s ability to be responsible for her own 
maintenance needs and to become self-sufficient after the death of her husband. Even 
the then Appellate Division in Beaumont v Beaumont555 referred to the wife’s “common 
law duty” of care of the family when it held556 that, where the wife did not contribute 
financially to the marriage but took care of the family, this was sufficient to allow her to 
lay claim to a portion of her husband’s estate. Sonnekus557 does, however, concede that 
in the case of spouses who enjoyed a long marriage, the surviving spouse may on the 
death of the other spouse have an immediate need for accommodation and furniture. 
His suggestion558 is that this need be met by providing the spouse with a usufruct or 
right of habitatio over the erstwhile matrimonial home. Although the heirs to the estate 
would have to wait until the death of the surviving spouse before receiving full 
ownership, they at least had naked ownership in the meantime, and would ultimately 
receive full ownership.559 As Sonnekus560 points out, neither the legitimate portion nor 
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the allocation of assets to the surviving spouse would achieve this result. He argues561 
that the vague reference in the Memorandum to social norms that dictate against the 
surviving spouse being disinherited, does not provide sufficient justification for going 
against the principle of freedom of testation and the principle of healthy adults being 
responsible for their own maintenance requirements. 
 
He states further562 that the information provided simply did not support an argument 
that there was a statistically proven need to accommodate surviving spouses who were 
left destitute on the deaths of their spouses. He argues563 that there was probably more 
justification for a maintenance claim before 1984 as spouses had only the option to be 
married in or out of community of property. Where a marriage was in community of 
property, the surviving spouse would retain half of the joint estate, which would give 
him or her some protection on the dissolution of the marriage. A marriage out of 
community of property would not extend the same protection. Sonnekus concedes564 
that many spouses might have chosen marriage out of community of property without 
fully understanding the consequences, which could mean that a surviving spouse was 
unintentionally left without protection,565 but this could be remedied as the parties had 
the right to change their matrimonial property regime by making the accrual system 
applicable to their marriage.566 Since the introduction of the accrual system in 1984, a 
marriage out of community of property would automatically be subject to the accrual 
system unless the spouses consciously chose to exclude it. The accrual system to a large 
extent removed the clear distinction between marriages in community of property and 
marriages out of community of property, as the surviving spouse of a marriage subject 
to the accrual system would in any event share in the accrual of the first-dying spouse’s 
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estate.567 It could therefore be argued that, where the spouses had made the choice to 
exclude the accrual system, and one spouse disinherited the other, an extended 
maintenance obligation on the death of the one spouse could not be justified as it 
would go against the expression of their free will.568 Sonnekus suggests569 that if, in a 
particular case, it was deemed that a claimant was entitled to maintenance from the 
estate of the deceased spouse, such a conclusion could only be reached after 
comprehensive evaluation of all applicable circumstances.  
 
Sonnekus concludes570 that the need for legislative interference was doubtful as the 
destitute widow (“onversorgde weduwee”) scenario was not sufficiently prevalent to 
require legislative intervention. There would, at most, be some instances where 
legislative interference was required, and a general, legal entitlement to maintenance 
could therefore not be justified.571 Acceptance of the proposal of a “reasonable portion” 
would be better aligned to a legitimate portion than to a genuine attempt to provide for 
the maintenance requirements of the spouse, as the reasonable portion principle would 
amount to payment of a once-off settlement, which would not take into account any 
changes in the maintenance needs of the spouse. He prefers the position in some 
European countries572 where the move was away from a simplistic legitimate portion to 
a maintenance claim by a person who was not merely needy (“behoeftig”) but was 
justifiably entitled to maintenance from the estate of the particular deceased.573 That 
being said though, he points out574 that the ideal of periodical payment of maintenance 
out of the estate would lead to an unacceptable delay in the finalisation of the deceased 
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estate and would therefore impact negatively on the vested rights of the heirs to the 
estate. His suggestion575 is that, should a statutory entitlement to maintenance be 
granted, it should be for a limited period only and the amount should be calculated 
actuarially. The resultant amount should be placed in a special guardian’s fund, with 
monthly payments made to the claimant. This would ensure that the balance of the 
funds would remain available to the deceased’s heirs should the claimant’s maintenance 
requirements be reduced for whatever reason, or should he or she remarry or die 
before all the funds were utilised.576 I agree with this suggestion, although my 
contention is that a trust would be a better solution, despite the costs associated with 
the setting up and administering of a trust. The use of a trust is discussed further in 
chapter 8. 
 
The provisions regarding maintenance in the Second Bill on Matrimonial Property were 
never enacted by our legislature, but it was evident that reform was necessary. This was 
especially clear when considering that, quite often, a divorced spouse was in a better 
financial position after the death of his or her former spouse than the spouse who was 
still married at the time of death of the other spouse. If maintenance was made part of 
a divorce order, the right thereto did not automatically end with the death of the payee 
spouse, but where the marriage still subsisted at the time of death of one of the 
spouses, the right to maintenance did come to an end.577  
 
The legislature continued with attempts to provide for the surviving spouse. In 1984, 
during the parliamentary debate on the Matrimonial Property Bill,578 the Minister of 
Justice announced that the South African Law Commission had been tasked to 
investigate the introduction of a legitimate portion or the granting of a right to 
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maintenance to the surviving spouse as part of their review of the law of succession.579 
This research resulted in a Report by the Law Commission.580  
 
The Report looked briefly at the background to the South African legal position and 
proceeded to examine the reasons dictating reform. The points raised as support for 
reform were: 
• The default matrimonial property regime in South Africa for non-black persons 
was in community of property. While the surviving spouse would receive his or 
her half share of the estate by virtue of the marriage, there was no guarantee 
that this share would be adequate to provide for his or her support;581 
• The default matrimonial property regime for black persons was out of 
community of property and of profit and loss582 and the possibility of a 
disinherited spouse being left indigent was therefore quite prevalent;583 
• Where the marriage was out of community of property, the parties could include 
a marriage settlement in the antenuptial contract which could meet their needs 
– they could, for example, provide for income for each other after the 
dissolution of the marriage. There was, however, no guarantee that such a 
settlement would be adequate at the time of dissolution as it would be difficult 
to agree before the marriage on a realistic marriage settlement that would only 
apply in the future;584 
• The popularity of marriages out of community of property585 (pre-1984) and the 
fact that the default matrimonial property regime for black persons was out of 
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community of property, meant that there was a greater possibility of 
disinherited surviving spouses;586 
• Where the marriage was out of community of property and entered into after 
1984, the parties had the option of applying the accrual system (which would 
apply unless they expressly excluded it). Although this left the spouse whose 
estate had the smaller accrual with a claim against the estate of the other 
spouse, it did not follow that settlement of the claim would necessarily provide 
adequate support for the survivor;587 
• The statistics provided by the Department of Justice indicated that the accrual 
system applied in roughly 61% of antenuptial contracts registered in the period 
December 1984 to December 1985.588 This left a significant number of marriages 
where community of property was excluded and where the surviving spouse 
could accordingly be left destitute if his or her first-dying spouse did not provide 
for him or her in terms of a will; 
• Where the deceased died intestate, the amount the surviving spouse inherited 
was dependent on the matrimonial property regime applicable to the marriage 
and on the other intestate heirs who survived the deceased.589 The minimum 
amount the spouse was entitled to (taking the above factors into consideration 
and assuming the estate was large enough) had, however, always been relatively 
small;590 
• In some instances, although a spouse was disinherited, he or she may still be 
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The Report then looked at data on the number of instances where surviving spouses 
were left indigent by reason of their spouse disinheriting them and found that such data 
was rather sparse.592 The available information reflected that, out of a sample of 1 000 
estates reported to the Master of the Supreme Court, Pretoria, during the period 1 
January 1979 to 15 October 1979,593 there were only 71 cases where the surviving 
spouse was not the sole heir. Of those 71 estates, there were only ten where the 
surviving spouse inherited nothing and also received nothing in terms of matrimonial 
property law. In seven of those ten cases, the survivor was the husband. As it was 
assumed that the men probably had an income of their own and it was therefore 
unlikely that they were indigent, the focus moved to the remaining three estates. In one 
of these estates it appeared that the widow had been provided for from other sources. 
This left two estates, but the information at hand was insufficient to determine whether 
the widows had indeed been left indigent.  
 
The Commission concluded,594 based on comparative analysis of the position in England, 
Canada and the United States of America, that this very limited sample indicated that 
disinheritance of the spouse was theoretically possible but was the exception rather 
than the rule. This conclusion was also partly based on the comments received by the 
Commission on Working Paper 13, issued as part of the project. As an example, the 
Association of Law Societies, representing attorneys, commented that there might be 
good reason for a surviving spouse being disinherited.595 It is interesting to note that the 
Masters of the Supreme Court commented that there were certain instances where it 
would in fact be preferable to accommodate the surviving spouse.596 One such instance 
was where the first-dying spouse had omitted to change his or her will after getting 
married. I suggest that a counter-response to this could be that the first-dying spouse 
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might have actively elected not to change his or her will to provide for the spouse and 
that this apparent omission did not automatically translate into a need to accommodate 
the surviving spouse. The Masters also referred to the scenario where the first-dying 
spouse, from an objective perspective, had no reason to disinherit his or her spouse. My 
counter-response would be that the first-dying spouse’s reasons for disinheriting the 
surviving spouse might be very valid, despite there being no apparent objective 
explanation for it. The Commission mentioned597 that they had considered analysing a 
more comprehensive sample of estates but decided against it for financial reasons. It is, 
however, apparent that they were happy to accept the Masters’ contribution that there 
were indeed instances of unjustifiable disherison of surviving spouses.598 
 
Despite the conclusion that disherison was the exception to the rule, the Commission 
felt that legal reform, albeit on a limited basis, was necessary.599 Before looking at the 
different options to achieve this, they looked at the arguments against reform. The main 
objectors to the legal reform were the Association of Law Societies, the Association of 
Trust Companies and the Clearing Bankers Association of South Africa. The main 
arguments presented against legal reform were:600 
• Legislation providing for a disinherited spouse would encroach on the principle 
of freedom of testation. The Commission, however, suggested that absolute 
freedom of testation might well be undesirable because the social controls that 
ensure that most living persons conform to the social norms of society are 
absent when dealing with something that would only happen after a person’s 
death.601 It suggested further that this argument for absolute freedom of 
testation would only work if the public sentiment was in favour of absolute 
freedom of testation – the comments it had received on the Working Paper, 
however, made it clear that public sentiment was generally in favour of 
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protection for the disinherited spouse.602  They therefore concluded that society 
would readily accept attempts to moderate freedom of testation in order to 
provide some protection for the surviving spouse. 
• Legislation was undesirable as the disinherited spouse was the exception and the 
legislature should not enact legislation for exceptional cases. The committee’s 
view was that the public sentiment referred to above made it clear that there 
was a social norm that dictated against surviving spouses being disinherited.603 
This norm was also confirmed by the fact that disherison rarely occurred. As the 
law often supported a social norm by compelling those who do not conform to 
the norm to do so, there was no reason why the legislature could not intervene 
to accommodate the disinherited spouse.604 
• Spouses are free to choose the matrimonial property regime that applies to their 
marriage and they therefore have only themselves to blame if their choice is 
prejudicial to them. The fact that the accrual system applies automatically 
unless excluded indicates that the law regards it as the preferable matrimonial 
regime. Therefore, if the parties choose to exclude it, they cannot blame anyone 
other than themselves if the result is prejudicial to them. The Commission 
suggested605 that this was a valid argument from a purely judicial point of view, 
but it was probably unreasonable in the South African context where the 
negative view of marriage in community of property (relating to the restriction 
of the woman’s contractual capacity) might have misled young couples into 
believing that a marriage out of community of property was necessarily the best 
choice for them.606 Furthermore, from a practical point of view, even if the 
accrual system was to apply, it did not provide any safeguard that the surviving 
spouse would be adequately protected. This would hold true whether the choice 
of the accrual system was proven to have been wrong from the outset or 
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whether changing circumstances made it wrong at a later stage during the 
marriage. 
 
The Commission concluded607 that the fact that disinheritance was the exception, did 
not result in legal intervention being unnecessary, but indicated that it was required in 
order to accommodate such exceptions. It was illogical to disallow the continuation of a 
duty of support that existed during a marriage, after the death of one party in 
circumstances where the survivor could not support him- or herself and where the 
estate of the first-dying spouse was capable of caring for the surviving spouse.608 
 
The Commission proceeded to look at the two possible methods to protect the surviving 
spouse, namely a claim for maintenance and a legitimate portion of the estate.609 It 
considered the following factors in favour of a claim for maintenance:610 
• The legitimate portion would be the most appropriate solution if the intention 
was to protect the surviving spouse’s moral right to share in the estate of his or 
her deceased spouse. This approach of looking at the moral right to share in the 
estate could perhaps be based on the view that both parties contribute to the 
income of the marriage.611 The Commission, however, felt that this should not 
be the basis for legal reform as a moral right to share in the estate would negate 
the freedom of choice prospective parties to a marriage had regarding their 
matrimonial property regime;612 
• If the intention was to enforce the deceased’s moral duty to provide for the 
surviving spouse, the claim for maintenance would be more appropriate;613 
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• A legitimate portion would benefit all surviving spouses, regardless of whether 
they actually needed such benefit – this would fly in the face of the conclusion 
that the destitute surviving spouse was the exception rather than the rule;614 
• The “legitimate portion” concept is not flexible as it takes no cognisance of the 
actual needs of the surviving spouse.615 The surviving spouse would 
automatically be entitled to a portion of the first-dying spouse’s estate, despite 
the financial position of the survivor. The claim for maintenance, in contrast, can 
be tailored according to the spouse’s financial position and needs and can take 
into consideration any other benefits that the survivor received during the 
marriage;616 
• The legitimate portion is usually a fixed percentage or part of an estate, and 
there is no guarantee for the surviving spouse that such portion will achieve its 
aim of providing him or her with sufficient means.617 The Commission felt that 
the imposition of a prescribed minimum amount to circumvent this objection 
would be an unjustifiable interference with freedom of testation;618  
• Any attempt to introduce the legitimate portion would have to be made by way 
of complicated legislation.619  
 
The Commission also considered the criticism against a claim for maintenance. One 
objection was that most of the family maintenance systems considered by the 
Commission required the claimant to go to court. The Commission felt this could be 
costly and time-consuming, would place an additional workload on the courts, would 
involve the embarrassment for the spouse of a public court case and could delay the 
administration of the estate.620 However, most of these issues could be overcome by 
making the court the last resort and requiring it to become involved only in the event of 
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a dispute, which would address the issues relating to time, cost and workload.621 
Another alternative was to give the lower courts the necessary authority to decide on 
maintenance matters as this would also address the issues relating to time and cost.622 
The Commission did not judge the possible embarrassment of a court case as sufficient 
reason to reject a claim for maintenance as a solution and felt623 that delays in the 
administration of the estate could occur even if the claimant was not required to go to 
court to prove his or her claim. It was further of the opinion624 that the possibility of 
delays in the administration of estates was merely something to bear in mind when 
drafting legislation and did not justify choosing the legitimate portion as a solution. 
 
The Commission reported that, out of the 23 commentators, some generally supported 
the Commission’s tentative proposal of a claim for maintenance and five commentators 
explicitly favoured a claim for maintenance. One commentator suggested a claim for 
maintenance in addition to a legitimate portion,625 and one commentator favoured a 
legitimate portion for reasons of simplicity and costs.626 The Commission considered 
another alternative way of dealing with this matter, namely empowering the courts to 
order a redistribution of the estate in order to give the surviving spouse an equitable 
share of the estate.627 It could, however, find no support for this option, as a 
redistribution order was based on the idea that a spouse has a moral right to share in 
the estate, which it had already indicated should not be the basis for reform.628 
Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the portion of the estate that was regarded 
as an equitable share would in fact be sufficient to meet the surviving spouse’s needs.629 
 
 
621 Par 5.6. 
622 Par 5.6. 
623 Par 5.6. 
624 Par 5.6. 
625 Par 5.9. 
626 Par 5.10. 
627 Par 5.11. 
628 Par 5.13. 




The Commission therefore concluded630 that a duty of support in favour of the surviving 
spouse should by law be placed on the estate of a deceased person. It proposed a 
maintenance claim on the following basis: 
• The basis for such a claim would be a proven need for support as that was in line 
with the approach of the South African law regarding maintenance;631 
• The claim would be available regardless of the matrimonial property regime 
applicable to the marriage;632 
• The claim would apply regardless of whether the deceased died testate, 
intestate or partly intestate;633 
• As the basis for the claim would be the surviving spouse’s inability to support 
him- or herself, everything falling into the estate of such surviving spouse should 
be taken into account when calculating need.634 This would include amounts due 
to him or her as a result of the matrimonial property regime, bequests, a 
usufruct over the deceased’s property, life assurance, pensions and any 
settlements made by the deceased during his or her lifetime;635  
• The legislation should make it clear that the survivor’s “own means” included 
everything received by the surviving spouse under the matrimonial property 
regime, law of succession or as a result of the death of the first-dying spouse;636 
• The claim would be available only to the surviving spouse of a marriage and not 
also to divorced spouses who received maintenance from a former spouse in 
terms of a court order;637 
• The claim would rank after those of ordinary creditors, but before legacies and 
bequests;638  
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• The claim would rank equally with the claim for maintenance by a minor child as 
both claims were based on the principle of need;639 
• The claim for maintenance would be allowed only if the surviving spouse could 
prove that he or she was unable to provide for his or her own reasonable 
maintenance needs;640  
• “Reasonable need” would depend on the circumstances of each case and would 
be determined by taking several factors into consideration.641 The Commission 
considered a suggestion that those factors should correspond to the factors that 
are taken into account when a marriage is dissolved by divorce. The Divorce Act 
lists the following factors: 
a. The existing or prospective means of each party; 
b. The parties’ respective earning capacities; 
c. The parties’ financial needs and obligations; 
d. The age of each party; 
e. An order regarding the transfer of assets from one party to the other; 
f. The duration of the marriage; 
g. The parties’ conduct in so far as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the 
marriage; 
h. Any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into 
account. 
The Commission felt that factors a. to e. related to the need for support and 
whether the person who was obliged to support was able to do so, making these 
factors important.642 It is interesting to note that the Commission indicated that, 
as far as those factors were not expressly included in clauses 1(1) and (2) of the 
Bill, they were included by implication. It further held that factor f. should be 
considered only in so far as it did not introduce a moral judgement into the 
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decision.643 The Commission held that factor g. required a moral judgement 
which was contrary to the idea of reasonable need as basis for the claim. The 
survivor’s conduct and statements made by the first-dying spouse on the reasons 
for disinheriting the survivor should therefore not be taken into account;644 
• A surviving spouse should not be forced to approach the court to prove his or 
her claim – as with any other claim, the provisions of the Estates Act would 
apply. Any interested party who was dissatisfied with the executor’s acceptance 
or rejection of a claim would be able to lodge an objection with the Master of 
the Supreme Court and await his or her ruling. If the Master’s decision was 
unacceptable to an interested party, he or she could approach the court, which 
meant that legal costs and a delay in the administration of the estate would only 
arise in such instances.645 The Commission mentioned646 the practice in the 
offices of the Masters of the Supreme Court to not adjudicate factual disputes, 
but was nevertheless of the view that the instances of there being an indigent 
spouse as a result of disherison was the exception; deserving claims would 
therefore be rare. It also did not see the need to impose any duties on the 
Master to adjudicate matters where the parties did not agree;647 
• The Commission also considered648 whether any time limits should be imposed 
on the contemplated claim. It compared the survivor’s claim to that of a minor 
child, who could, even after the estate had been distributed, use the condictio 
indebiti to claim maintenance from an heir or legatee to whom payment of 
estate assets had been made in terms of a valid distribution of the estate.649 It 
felt that this was a drastic measure that could be prejudicial to an heir or 
legatee, but was justifiable in the context of a needy minor.650 It could, however, 
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not find the same justification for its application in the case of a needy surviving 
spouse, and accordingly concluded that where the surviving spouse 
unreasonably delayed the lodging of a claim, he or she probably did not have a 
serious need for support and should not be able to claim from the heirs or 
legatees.651 Even where the need for support might arise only after the death of 
the first-dying spouse, principles of legal certainty and equity meant that the 
survivor should not be able to claim from the heirs or legatees to whom a valid 
distribution had been made. The Commission therefore suggested that 
legislation should provide that the surviving spouse had no right of recourse 
against anyone to whom estate assets were given in terms of a valid distribution 
of the estate;652 
• The question of discharge of the claim was also considered.653 Some 
commentators had suggested that it be settled by a capital amount – the 
advantage of this was that it would eliminate administrative problems and 
delays. Other commentators suggested periodical payments – the advantage 
was that payments could be adjusted as the survivor’s maintenance needs 
changed. The Commission was of the opinion654 that the legislature should not 
prescribe any particular way to settle the claim and should leave a wide 
discretion so that the parties could negotiate the settlement method. 
 
The Report included a draft Bill setting out the above considerations. It was however 
only in 1990 that a Bill on the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses655 was presented to 
Parliament. After the Bill was amended,656 it was tabled in Parliament and assented to 
on 23 March 1990. With the exception of two amendments made in 1992 and 2009 
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respectively,657 the MSSA Act as we know it today is still the same as the version that 
was assented to. It was promulgated in Government Gazette 12390 of 4 April 1990 and 




The provision of maintenance for a surviving spouse after the death of his or her spouse 
was something that the Roman and Roman-Dutch legal systems grappled with, and this 
lack of certainty spilled over into South African law. The legislative process to address 
this started as far back as 1965, but several attempts to introduce legislation stalled.  My 
research shows that the main reason for the resistance to the introduction of a duty of 
maintenance was the view that spouses were free to choose a matrimonial property 
regime that was not prejudicial to them and that disinheritance of the surviving spouse 
was the exception to the rule. Introducing legislation to address such exceptions would 
encroach on the established principle of freedom of testation and was therefore not 
desirable. It was only when it became clear that legislation should focus on the duty of 
maintenance that the legislative process gained some momentum.  In the next chapter I 
will consider the provisions of the MSSA to determine to what extent it achieves what 
the Law Commission had in mind when considering the basis for a maintenance claim.  
 





THE MAINTENANCE OF SURVIVING SPOUSES ACT 27 OF 1990 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The MSSA came into operation on 1 July 1990 and applies to marriages that end in 
death after that date.658 It is not entirely clear from the Parliamentary debates659 why it 
took so long for Parliament to adopt the legislation. On the one hand it appears that 
there initially was a general view that such legislation was not necessary. Many 
marriages were in community of property, and it was considered that the introduction 
of the accrual regime in 1984 would provide spouses in a marriage out of community of 
property with protection on dissolution of the marriage. It was therefore anticipated 
that the incidence of destitute spouses would become less and less. On the other hand, 
there was a growing acknowledgment that spouses who had entered into a marriage 
out of community of property before 1984 might need protection on the death of one 
of the spouses, especially considering that protection was extended to spouses on 
divorce. It is also evident that there was a growing understanding of the need for 
constitutional and social reform that could be of benefit to the community at large. 
 
Since its operational date, only two amendments have been made. In 1992 the Estate 
Affairs Amendment Act660 effected a change to section 2(3)(d)661 and in 2009 the 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 
(hereinafter referred to as the “RCLSA”) effected a change to the definition of 
“survivor”.662 Apart from these two amendments, the MSSA is still in the same form as it 
was when it was first promulgated approximately 30 years ago. 
 
 
658 Proclamation R110, 1990 dated 29 June 1990. 
659 Debates of Parliament, Second session, Ninth Parliament 8 March 1990. 
660 1 of 1992. 
661 See 4.4.3 for more details. 




The preamble to the MSSA states that its object is to provide the surviving spouse with a 
claim for maintenance against the estate of the deceased spouse in certain 
circumstances, and to provide for incidental matters. As explained in the Memorandum 
on the objects of the Bill,663 the “norms of society demand that a surviving spouse 
should not be left destitute if the estate of the deceased spouse is able to provide 
maintenance”. Costa664 expresses the view that the principle of providing for the 
reasonable maintenance needs of the surviving spouse as far as he or she is unable to 
provide for those needs from own means and earnings, is “reformative and equitable”, 
as it is illogical to disallow the continuance of a duty of support that existed during the 
marriage after the death of one of the spouses, in circumstances where the survivor 
needs support and where the estate of the deceased is in a position to provide such 
support. He quotes665 William Porter, the Attorney-General of the Cape in 1859, who 
stated: “I desire that a husband whose dinner is not cooked to his liking shall not be at 
liberty, leaving a large fortune, to leave his wife nothing”.  
 
As mentioned before,666 the common law provided that the duty of support owed by 
spouses to each other came to an end when the relationship terminated.667 In the 
previous chapter I discussed the legislative process to address this, culminating in the 
MSSA. In Kruger v Goss668 the court confirmed669 that the MSSA amounts to limited 
intervention in this common law rule and alters it only to the extent provided in the 
MSSA. It has been said670 that, while it may be legally possible to disinherit a spouse, it is 
 
663 B 86-88 and B2-90. 
664 “Commentary on Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (‘The Act’)” 1990(272) De Rebus 
533. 
665 1990(272) De Rebus 533. 
666 See 3.4.2.2. 
667 Ex parte Standard Bank Ltd 1978 (3) SA 323 (R); Kruger v Goss 2010 (2) SA 507 (SCA); Sonnekus 2010-3 
TSAR 632.  
668 2010 (2) SA 507 (SCA). 
669 At par 11. 
670 Curlewis “Rehabilitative maintenance” 2010(495) De Rebus 26; Roux “Freedom of testation: can a 




debatable whether it is morally acceptable. In order to consider this further, it is 
necessary to consider the provisions of the MSSA. 
 
4.2 The MSSA 
 
The MSSA is short and consists of only four sections. The three sections of relevance671 
deal with definitions,672 details of the maintenance claim, how it is to be dealt with,673 
and guidelines to the executor on how to determine reasonable maintenance needs.674  
 
The relevant sections read as follows: 
1.   Definitions —In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates— 
“court” means a court as defined in section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 
1965); 
“executor” means an executor as defined in section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965, or any 
person who liquidates and distributes an estate on the instructions of the Master; 
“Master” means a Master as defined in section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965; 
“own means” includes any money or property or other financial benefit accruing to the survivor in 
terms of the matrimonial property law or the law of succession or otherwise at the death of the 
deceased spouse; 
“survivor” means the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death, and includes a spouse of a 
customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage contracted by her husband in the 
customary marriage to another woman on or after 1 January 1929 (the date of commencement of 
sections 22 and 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927)), but before 2 December 
1988 (the date of commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, 
1988 (Act No. 3 of 1988)). 
 
2.   Claim for maintenance against estate of deceased spouse 
 
     (1)  If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act the survivor shall have a 
claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable maintenance 
needs until his death or remarriage in so far as he is not able to provide therefor from his own 
means and earnings. 
 
671 Section 4 merely deals with the title and the operational date of the MSSA and will therefore not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
672 Section 1. 
673 Section 2. 




     (2)  The survivor shall, in respect of a claim for maintenance, not have a right of recourse against any 
person to whom money or property has been paid, delivered or transferred in terms of section 34 
(11) or 35 (12) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), or pursuant to an 
instruction of the Master in terms of section 18 (3) or 25 (1) (a) (ii) of that Act. 
     (3)  (a)  The proof and disposal of a claim for maintenance of the survivor shall, subject to paragraphs 
(b), (c) and (d), be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Administration of Estates 
Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965). 
                    (b)  The claim for maintenance of the survivor shall have the same order of preference in respect of 
other claims against the estate of the deceased spouse as a claim for maintenance of a 
dependent child of the deceased spouse has or would have against the estate if there were 
such a claim, and, if the claim of the survivor and that of a dependent child compete with each 
other, those claims shall, if necessary, be reduced proportionately. 
            (c)  In the event of a conflict between the interests of the survivor in his capacity as claimant 
against the estate of the deceased spouse and the interests in his capacity as guardian of a 
minor dependent child of the deceased spouse, the Master may defer the claim for 
maintenance until such time as the court has decided on the claim. 
            (d)  The executor of the estate of a deceased spouse shall have the power to enter into an 
agreement with the survivor and the heirs and legatees having an interest in the agreement, 
including the creation of a trust, and in terms of the agreement to transfer assets of the 
deceased estate, or a right in the assets, to the survivor or the trust, or to impose an obligation 
on an heir or legatee, in settlement of the claim of the survivor or part thereof. 
 
3.   Determination of reasonable maintenance needs 
 
In the determination of the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor, the following factors shall be 
taken into account in addition to any other factor which should be taken into account: 
      (a) the amount in the estate of the deceased spouse available for distribution to heirs and legatees; 
      (b) the existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and obligations of the survivor 
and the subsistence of the marriage; and 
      (c) the standard of living of the survivor during the subsistence of the marriage and his age at the 









The definition refers to a court as defined in section 1 of the Estates Act.  The latter Act 




section 4 of that Act, the High Court of the area in which a deceased ordinarily resided 
at the time of his or her death, shall have jurisdiction over his or her estate.  
 
The only reference in the MSSA to a court is in section 2(3)(c) which deals with the 
conflict between the interests of the survivor in his or her capacity as claimant against 
the estate and as guardian of a minor dependent child of the deceased. This aspect is 
discussed in 4.4.8 below.  
 
4.3.2  “Executor”  
 
This is defined as meaning an executor as defined in section 1 of the Estates Act, or any 
person who liquidates and distributes an estate on the instruction of the Master.675 The 
Estates Act defines an executor as “any person authorised to act under letters of 
executorship granted or signed and sealed by a Master or under an endorsement made 
under section 15”.676  
 
Where an estate does not exceed R250 000, the Master has the discretion to dispense 
with the appointment of an executor and to give directions to any person regarding the 
manner in which the estate shall be liquidated and distributed.677 The wording of the 
definition of executor in the MSSA makes it clear that, should such an instance arise, the 
person who was authorised by the Master to liquidate and distribute the estate, is 
empowered to deal with a maintenance claim in terms of the MSSA as he or she 
receives the instruction for the liquidation and distribution of the estate from the 
Master.    
 
 
675 The position and role of the executor are discussed in detail in 2.2 to 2.5. 
676 The reference to “signed and sealed” refers to the process whereby letters of executorship granted in 
another country are processed by the Master so that the executor is deemed to be an executor to 
whom letters of executorship were granted by the Master. The reference to section 15 is to a scenario 
where the Master endorses the appointment of an assumed executor on the letters of executorship. 







Section 1 provides that the Master is as defined in section 1 of the Estates Act. The 
latter Act provides that the Master “in relation to any matter, property or estate, means 
the Master, Deputy Master or Assistant Master of a High Court appointed under section 
2, who has jurisdiction in respect of that matter, property or estate and who is subject 
to the control, direction and supervision of the Chief Master”.  The only references in 
the MSSA to the Master are in section 2(2)678 and 2(3)(c).679 
 
4.3.4 “Own means” 
 
This is defined as “[including] any money or property or other financial benefit accruing 
to the survivor in terms of the matrimonial property law or the law of succession or 
otherwise from the death of the deceased spouse.”  
 
The reference to matrimonial property law means that the survivor’s undivided half 
share of a joint estate where the marriage was in community of property, or the 
survivor’s share of the accrual of the deceased spouse’s estate where the marriage was 
subject to the accrual system, is included in his or her own means.680 Any inheritance 
from the deceased spouse’s estate also qualifies as the survivor’s own means. The 
definition is wide enough to also encompass benefits that flow to the survivor outside of 
the estate, for example pension benefits, the proceeds of a retirement annuity or the 
proceeds of life insurance that is paid to the spouse as beneficiary in terms of a 
nomination by the deceased spouse.681  
 
 
678 See 4.3.2. 
679 See 4.3.1 and 4.4.6. 
680 Heaton & Kruger South African family law (2015) 117.  




In Feldman v Oshry682 the court had to consider whether voluntary contributions by a 
third party to the surviving spouse constituted own means. Lionel Feldman died on 3 
May 2005. He had been married to his wife, Marjorie, for approximately eighteen years 
and the marriage was out of community. In his will he bequeathed R150 000 to Marjorie 
and the residue of his estate to his children from a previous marriage. His daughter and 
son-in-law were appointed as executors of his estate. Mrs Feldman averred that she 
derived her maintenance support from the late Mr Feldman and lodged a claim for 
maintenance of approximately R670 000 in terms of the MSSA against his estate. When 
the executors rejected the claim, Mrs Feldman approached the court for assistance. The 
High Court started by looking683 at the definition of “own means”. It held that the 
reference to “include” in the definition means that any other means possessed by the 
claimant should also be taken into account. The court also considered the term “means” 
and referred to The new shorter Oxford English dictionary which defines684 “means” as  
“includes an instrument, agency, method or course of action by which some object is or may 
be attained, or some result may be brought about. Also, the resources available for effecting 
some object, especially financial resources in relation to the requirements of expenditure 
and includes money and wealth”.  
 
The court also referred to The standard dictionary of the English language Vol II which 
includes685 money or property “as a procuring medium, available resources, a measure 
and a plan, method or procedure”, amongst the meanings of “means”.686 The judge 
summarised687 that “means” would also refer to the ability to achieve an object such as 
reasonable maintenance. The court concluded688 that a consideration of the applicant’s 
assets indicated that she would be unable to maintain a lifestyle similar to that which 
 
682 [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD). 
683 At 11. 
684 (1993) at 1724. 
685 (1901) at 1094. 
686 I find the definition in the Oxford dictionary of current English much clearer – it defines “means” at 561 
as “a thing or method for achieving a result”, “money” or “wealth”. 
687 At 12. 




she enjoyed during her marriage, and that the only reason for her managing to maintain 
herself was because her sons in America contributed to her monthly maintenance.  
 
The question therefore arose whether the sons’ voluntary contributions to their 
mother’s maintenance should be taken into account when calculating her means. In 
terms of our common law, parents and children have a reciprocal duty of support.689 
However, the child’s duty of support is subject to the rule that the parent must first 
claim support from his or her nearest relatives, including his or her spouse.690 Our law 
furthermore provides that the child’s duty of support can only arise if the parent is 
indigent and the child is able to support the parent.691 The Oxford dictionary of current 
English692 defines693 “indigent” as “very poor”. In Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co 
Ltd it was held694 that to be indigent means to be in extreme need or want of the basic 
necessities of life. In Fosi v Road Accident Fund695 it was held696 that the deciding 
principle is whether a person can prove that he or she is dependent on a third party’s 
contributions for the “necessities of life”. The latter concept in turn depends on the 
person’s station in life. The judge in Feldman v Oshry697 was of the opinion698 that the 
reference in sections 2(1) and 3 of the MSSA to “reasonable” maintenance needs 
indicates a more restrictive or conservative approach, as this would be consistent with 
the legislature’s intention of limiting the encroachment on the common law position 
that the maintenance obligation between spouses comes to an end when the marriage 
 
689 Heaton & Kruger 310; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 348; Heaton “Family law” 2010(1) Annual Survey of 
South African Law 459; LAWSA vol 16(2) “Marriage” 209. 
690 Ex parte Pienaar 1964 (1) SA 600 (T); Manuel v African Guarantee & Indemnity Co Ltd 1967 (2) SA 417 
(R); Barnes v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 502 (E); Tyali v University of 
Transkei [2002] 2 All SA 47 (Tk); Heaton & Kruger 310; LAWSA vol 16(2) “Marriage” 213. 
691 Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322; Caldwell v Erasmus 1952 (4) SA 43 (T); Singh v Santam Insurance Co 
1974 (4) SA 196 (D); Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1998 (4) SA 626 (C); Heaton & Kruger 
310; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 355; Heaton 2010(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 459; LAWSA 
vol 16(2) “Marriage” 209. 
692 Soanes 2006. 
693 At 463. 
694 At 632. 
695 2008 (3) SA 560 (C). 
696 At par 13. 
697 [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD). 




dissolves.699 The executors contended that the deceased had during the marriage 
indicated that Mrs Feldman’s sons should assume responsibility for her after his death 
and that this effectively meant that she could rely on their contributions. The judge 
held700 that this did not absolve the estate from a lawful liability imposed on it by the 
MSSA, provided of course that Mrs Feldman did qualify for such assistance. Despite 
calling for a restrictive approach, the court nevertheless held701 that the voluntary 
contribution by Mrs Feldman’s sons should not be included as her own means as it could 
come to an end at any time. The judge’s finding is in line with the common law rule 
referred to above, as Mrs Feldman’s children would only be obliged to support her if her 
nearest relative, in this case her spouse (and, after his death, his estate,) was not in a 
position to do so. 
 
The executors in the estate did not accept the court’s decision and took the matter on 
appeal.702 They claimed that Mrs Feldman had not established a need for maintenance 
as the maintenance paid by her sons meant that she was not in need. They also 
contended that the sons were likely to continue contributing to their mother’s 
maintenance needs. The Supreme Court of Appeal reconfirmed703 that the reciprocal 
duty of support between spouses is one of the invariable consequences of marriage and 
that, where one of the spouses is indigent and the other spouse does not have the 
means to meet such duty of support, the indigent spouse may look to a child for 
support. The court referred704 to Oosthuizen v Stanley705 where it was held that the 
question whether a spouse does not have the means to support the other spouse is a 
question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case. The court further 
referred to Manuel v African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd706 where it was held that, 
 
699 At 17. 
700 At 18. 
701 At 17. 
702 Oshry v Feldman [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
703 At 130. 
704 At 130. 
705 1938 AD 322. 




where a husband has the means to support his wife, she can only expect support from 
her child if she can convince the court that she has taken all reasonable steps to enforce 
her rights against her husband. The court held707 that Mr Feldman would not during his 
life have been able to insist that Mrs Feldman’s sons maintain her if he himself had the 
means to do so, and this principle would extend to his estate. It held708 that the 
principles underlying the MSSA were in line with constitutional values and norms, 
specifically the ones aimed at protecting the dignity of the individual, as the MSSA was 
intended to ensure that the primary obligation of a spouse who owed a duty of support 
to his or her spouse, would continue after his or her death. It held further709 that if the 
provisions of the MSSA were interpreted in such a way that the surviving spouse had to 
depend on the “largesse” or generosity of others, it would defeat the purpose of the 
MSSA. The court accordingly confirmed710 that the contribution made by Mrs Feldman’s 
sons could not be regarded as her own existing and prospective means. 
 
Another question that arises is the extent to which a surviving spouse’s capital assets 
should be considered when determining his or her means. Working Paper 13711 issued 
by the Law Commission as part of its project to address the surviving spouse’s need for 
maintenance stated712 that the capital of the survivor should be exhausted before it 
could be said that a need for support exists. If this was to be the case, it could mean that 
the executor could compel the survivor to sell his or her non-income generating assets 
in order to utilise the proceeds either for his or her maintenance needs or to re-invest it 
so as to generate income to cover such needs. The Report713 issued by the Law 
Commission, however, did not include exhaustion of the surviving spouse’s capital 
 
707 At 134. 
708 At 134. 
709 At 134. 
710 At 134. 
711 South African Law Commission Working Paper 13 Review of the law of succession: the introduction of a 
legitimate portion or the granting of a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse Project 22 Pretoria, 
1986.  
712 Par 6.5 at page 24. 
713 South African Law Commission Report Review of the law of succession: the introduction of a legitimate 




assets as a requirement and merely stated714 that the capital of the surviving spouse 
should be taken into account when establishing whether he or she needed support. In 
Feldman v Oshry715 the High Court held716 that forcing Mrs Feldman to liquidate assets 
such as the immovable property she owned or her car, in order to generate funds for 
living expenses, would expose her to risk and insecurity. As the judge pointed out,717 
even if she did sell those assets, the proceeds would in any event be insufficient to 
maintain her for the expected duration of her life. The court in Seidel v Lipschitz718 also 
suggested719 that the survivor’s means include his or her capital assets. 
 
In Oshry v Feldman720 the Supreme Court of Appeal did not discuss this aspect at all. 
Sonnekus,721 in his discussion of the case, is of the opinion that the survivor cannot 
claim to be in need of maintenance merely because his or her capital no longer 
produces sufficient income. He suggests that the legislature could not have intended 
that the survivor’s capital or immovable property should remain intact. He suggests722 
that the court should have taken into account Mrs Feldman’s immovable property when 
considering her means and that the court failed to give reasons for not doing so.723  He 
argues724 that the court’s reference to the provisions of the MSSA having to be 
“construed in accordance with constitutional norms and values” does not mean that the 
express provisions of the MSSA can be negated. At first glance it appears that Sonnekus 
is implying that the survivor should be forced to sell his or her assets in order to obtain 
funds which could be used for maintenance or could generate income. I do not agree 
that this would necessarily be feasible, as it could well be that the costs of maintaining 
 
714 Par 6.5 at page 27. 
715 [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD). 
716 At 20. 
717 At 20. 
718 Unreported, case number 24960/11 [2103] ZAWCHC 158, judgment delivered on 24 October 2013.   
719 At par 26. 
720 [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
721 “Verlengde onderhoudsaanspraak vir langslewende gade geen onbedagte meevaller vir erfgename van 
aanspraakmaker nie” 2010-4 TSAR 810. 
722 2010-4 TSAR 817. 
723 2010-4 TSAR 819. 




the immovable property would be less than if the property was sold with the survivor 
using the proceeds of the sale to pay rent elsewhere.725 Sonnekus726 however clarifies727 
that he is not advocating a forced sale of assets, but suggests that it could not be said 
that someone who owns unencumbered immovable property is in need of maintenance, 
as the property has intrinsic value that should be considered. He suggests728 that the 
survivor in such a scenario could encumber his or her property with a mortgage bond 
issued by a bank in order to borrow enough money to provide for his or her 
maintenance needs. The bond could be issued on the basis that the interest rolls up so 
that the capital amount of the loan and interest only becomes repayable on the death of 
the lender (the survivor) and the lender therefore does not have to repay the bond on a 
monthly basis. The benefit of such an arrangement is that the bank will have a preferred 
claim against the estate of the deceased lender. Sonnekus suggests729 that this means 
that the lack of income of the surviving spouse will not be an impediment for the bank 
when granting the bond. The transaction can also not be regarded as reckless lending730 
in conflict with the provisions of the National Credit Act.731 He suggests732 that this 
proposed construction offers a good alternative to forcing the survivor to sell his or her 
asset, and it is strange that there is no indication that the court even considered this as 
an option.  
 
While I agree with Sonnekus’ view that the immovable property cannot merely be 
disregarded when determining the survivor’s needs, it appears unlikely that a retail bank 
will grant a mortgage bond to the surviving spouse. In my discussions with 
 
725 See also the court’s comments in Feldman v Oshry [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD) at 20 in this regard. 
726 2010-4 TSAR 817. 
727 2010-4 TSAR 818. 
728 2010-4 TSAR 818. 
729 2010-4 TSAR 818. 
730 National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Limited [2009] 4 All SA 505 (GNP). 
731 34 of 2005. 




mortgage/home loan divisions at the four major banks,733 I have been advised that 
banks consider two aspects when considering an application for a mortgage bond: 
• the amount of the loan compared to the value of the property; and 
• whether the applicant has the means to service the bond. 
All four banks indicated that, although the value of the property is an important factor, 
the overriding consideration is whether the applicant has the ability to meet the 
obligations under the requested mortgage bond. It is my contention that a surviving 
spouse who does not have the means to provide for his or her own maintenance needs 
is unlikely to be able to service a bond, or for that matter, maintain the property. I 
therefore fail to see the likelihood of a bank granting a mortgage bond to a person 
whose only asset of significance is a house and who does not have sufficient income to 
service the bond. The discussions have also revealed that banks are not keen to grant 
bonds where the interest is rolled up and only becomes payable when settlement of the 
bond falls due, as suggested by Sonnekus. The main reason advanced for this is the fact 
that there is significant risk for the bank in such a scenario – the property could 
deteriorate due to a lack of maintenance (as a result of a lack of income), which could 
lead to a situation where the mortgagee owes more on the bond than the property is 
worth. In addition, the credit situation of the mortgagee may be such that he or she 
obtains other forms of credit and this could result in an insolvent estate on death, which 
leaves the bank exposed to risk. 
 
While I therefore do not support Sonnekus’ suggestion of a mortgage bond over the 
surviving spouse’s property, I agree with his comments that the property cannot simply 
be disregarded. It is my submission that the income generating potential and/or credit 
worthiness of the survivor’s assets must be considered when determining his or her own 








4.3.5  “Survivor” 
 
This is defined as meaning “the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death and 
includes a spouse of a customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage 
contracted by her husband in the customary marriage to another woman on or after 1 
January 1929…, but before 2 December 1988 …”.  
 
When the MSSA was promulgated it simply provided for a spouse in a marriage 
dissolved by death.  As any reference to “marriage” in our law traditionally was to a civil 
marriage solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act,734 this definition excluded customary 
marriages.735 Our courts did, however, as far back as 2007 hold that this discriminated 
against parties in a customary marriage and in Kambule v Master of the High Court736 
the court held that, as there was no room for a discriminatory interpretation, a surviving 
partner to a valid customary marriage which is recognised in terms of the RCMA as a 
marriage “for all purposes” must be recognised as a spouse for purposes of section 2(1) 
of the MSSA. 
 
In 2009 the RCLSA was promulgated. The memorandum on the objects of this Act stated 
that its purpose was “to abolish the customary rule of primogeniture in as far as it 
applies to the law of succession in order to bring it in line with the Constitution; and to 
give effect to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the case of Bhe v The 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha CCT 49/03, Shibi v Sithole CCT 69/03, which declared the 
principle of male primogeniture incompatible with the Bill of Rights”. While this Act 
deals mainly with succession law and property rights in relation to customary marriages, 
section 8 provides for the amendment of certain laws, one of which is the MSSA. The 
definition of “survivor” in section 1 of the MSSA was accordingly amended to include “a 
spouse of a customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage contracted by 
 
734 25 of 1961. 
735 See 5.1 for a more detailed discussion. 




her husband in the customary marriage to another woman on or after 1 January 1929 
(the date of commencement of sections 22 and 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 
(Act 38 of 1927)), but before 2 December 1988 (the date of commencement of the 
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, 1988 (Act 3 of 1988))”. As Du 
Toit points out,737 the amendment confirms the protection given to the so-called 
“discarded spouse” by section 1(f) of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law 
Amendment Act.738 The latter section provides that where a husband in a customary 
union, after the commencement of the Black Administration Act, but before the 
commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, enters 
into a marriage with any woman other than his partner in the customary union, such 
marriage would not affect the material rights of the partner in the customary union or 
any children born from that union. In addition, the widow and children of the marriage 
would have no greater rights in respect of the deceased spouse’s estates than she would 
have had if the marriage had been a customary union. This measure therefore protects 
the partner in the customary union and the amendment to the MSSA means that it now 
gives the same protection to the partner in the customary union. 
 
The enhanced definition of “survivor” in section 1 of the MSSA has been effective since 
20 September 2010. The effect of the amendment is that a surviving spouse in a 
customary marriage can lodge a claim for reasonable maintenance needs against the 
estate of a deceased spouse. If the deceased was a party to multiple customary 
marriages at the time of his death, the presence of several wives would be relevant 
when determining each wife’s reasonable maintenance needs. If the estate does not 
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The definition of “survivor” in the MSSA has created many problems when dealing with 
the different types of family relationships that exist in South Africa, especially those 
relationships that are not recognised in our law as valid marriages or relationships that 
are worthy of protection. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
4.4 The claim   
 
4.4.1 Determining whether a claim exists 
 
In Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic)740 the court held that there is 
a two-legged approach to the maintenance claim. The first question is whether the 
claimant is legally entitled to claim for maintenance against the estate.741 The court 
held742 that this question would be answered in the affirmative if the claimant was 
married to the deceased and the marriage subsisted at the time of the deceased’s 
death.743 This means that even where the spouses were separated but not divorced, the 
surviving spouse would be legally entitled to claim for maintenance. The second 
question is whether the claimant in the circumstances is factually entitled to claim 
maintenance.744 This question would require applying the factors listed in section 3 of 
the MSSA to the relevant facts of each case.745  
 
It is important to note that the maintenance claim arises irrespective of the matrimonial 
property regime that applied to the spouses’ marriage.746 The Law Commission initially 
 
740 Unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013. 
741 At par 11. 
742 At par 11. 
743 As referred to above in 4.3.5, the meaning of “married” and “marriage” often causes problems when 
dealing with relationships that are akin to marriage, but not recognised as such in our law, for example 
marriages in terms of Muslim or Hindu rites, same-sex partners who are in a marital type relationship 
and heterosexual partners in a marital type relationship. This issue will be discussed in detail in 5.2 and 
5.3. 
744 At par 12. 
745 At par 13. 




identified747 a need for legal intervention only in instances where parties were married 
out of community of property with no community of profit of loss or application of the 
accrual system, and the surviving spouse was disinherited by the first-dying spouse. 
However, it noted748 in its Report that it was desirable to allow a claim for maintenance 
regardless of the matrimonial property regime that applies to the marriage. The MSSA 
accordingly applies to all marriages regardless of the applicable matrimonial property 
regime749 and it also does not require the spouse being disinherited – the important 
requirement is that the survivor is not capable of providing for his or her maintenance 
needs from own means and earnings.750 The absence of a requirement of disinheritance 
therefore means that the MSSA applies to both testate and intestate estates.751 
 
The nature of the matrimonial property regime will of course have an impact on the 
existence or not and the quantum of a maintenance claim. Where the spouses were 
married in community of property, their assets form part of a joint estate and the 
spouses are co-owners in indivisible half shares of all the assets and liabilities they 
acquire during the marriage.752 At the death of the first-dying spouse, the liabilities are 
settled from the joint estate and half of the balance of the joint estate retained by the 
surviving spouse.753 This right to an undivided half share would therefore form part of 
the surviving spouse’s own means and could result in the spouse having sufficient 
means to provide for his or her own needs. Even if he or she does not have sufficient 
means despite retaining the undivided half share, the share that he or she retains will 
have an impact on the quantum of the claim for maintenance needs.  
 
 
747 Sonnekus 1990-3 TSAR 501. 
748 Par 6.3. 
749 Heaton & Kruger 117. 
750 Section 2(1). 
751 Heaton & Kruger 117. 
752 Estate Sayle v CIR 1945 AD 88; De Wet v Jurgens 1970 (3) SA 38 (A); Du Plessis v Pienaar 2003 (1) SA 
671 (SCA); Corporate Liquidators (Pty) Ltd v Wiggill 2007 (2) SA 520 (T); Zulu v Zulu 2008 (4) SA 12 (D); 
Mazibuko v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (6) SA 479 (SCA); Heaton & Kruger 62. 




Where the spouses were married out of community of property with the accrual 
system, the spouse with the smaller accrual on dissolution of the marriage acquires a 
claim against the other spouse for an amount equal to half of the difference between 
the accrual in the spouses’ respective estates.754 Where the marriage is dissolved by 
death, the survivor might, depending on the circumstances, be entitled to an accrual 
claim against the estate of the deceased spouse. Such accrual claim will be relevant 
when determining the survivor’s own means. The circumstances could, however, be 
such that the survivor is the spouse whose estate had the bigger accrual, which would 
expose his or her estate to an accrual claim by the estate of the deceased spouse and 
this would also have an effect (albeit negatively) on the survivor’s own means. It is 
theoretically possible that the accrual claim by the deceased estate could have such an 
impact on the survivor’s estate that, after settling it, he or she does not have the means 
to maintain him- or herself, which could result in a maintenance claim against the 
deceased estate. 
 
As mentioned above, the maintenance claim arises irrespective of whether the 
deceased made provision for an inheritance for the surviving spouse.755 As seen in 4.2, 
section 2(1) of the MSSA provides that the survivor shall have a claim if he or she cannot 
provide for his or her own reasonable maintenance needs from his or her own means 
(my emphasis). No reference is made to disinheritance being the basis for the claim. In 
the Report of the Law Commission it was mentioned756 that a need for support mostly 
occurs where the deceased did not provide for the surviving spouse in a will and the 
parties were married out of community of property without the accrual system. It was, 
however, noted757 that there could still be a need for support where the parties were 
married in terms of another matrimonial property regime, albeit in exceptional cases 
only. The use of the word “mostly” and the reference to “exceptional cases” indicate to 
 
754 Section 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
755 Heaton & Kruger 117; Sonnekus 1990-3 TSAR 501; Sonnekus 2010-4 TSAR 808. 
756 Par 6.3. 




me that the Commission was mindful of the fact that there could be other scenarios 
where the surviving spouse is not disinherited but is still unable to maintain him- or 
herself. Having dealt with the administration of deceased estates, I am of the view that 
such instances are not that exceptional, as the nature of the parties’ respective estates 
and the assets comprising any inheritance may still have an impact on the claim. A 
practical example of such a scenario would be where B and C are married out of 
community of property without the accrual system. B dies, leaving an estate of R2 
million, consisting of the family home valued at R1.5 million, some shares, furniture and 
investments. In his will he leaves the family home to C and the residue of his estate to 
his children. C has no significant assets of her own. While she inherits the major part of 
B’s estate, it is evident that the inheritance will not place her in a position where she can 
maintain herself and the property. The fact that she inherits the property therefore 
does not necessarily mean that she now has sufficient means to fund her own 
maintenance needs. 
 
A marriage out of community of property subject to the accrual system is also not a 
guarantee that the survivor will be able to maintain him- or herself. This can be 
illustrated by using the same facts as above but changing the marriage to one out of 
community of property subject to the accrual system. The starting value of B’s estate 
was R1.5 million and that of C’s estate was R100 000. B’s estate at the time of B’s death 
is R800 000. C’s estate therefore had the greater accrual during the marriage and B’s 
estate, despite being the larger in value, will therefore have an accrual claim against C. 
Based on their respective estate values though, C clearly is in a weaker financial position 
and may still have maintenance needs she cannot meet from her own means (and even 
less so if she has to settle the accrual claim by B’s estate from her assets). While the 
accrual system is designed to give the spouses protection, it does not in this scenario 





Where the survivor does inherit from the deceased spouse, the quantum of the 
inheritance will have an impact on the survivor’s means and will therefore be relevant in 
determining whether he or she has a maintenance claim and, if so, the quantum of the 
claim.  
 
Clause 2(1) of the Bill on Maintenance of Surviving Spouses758 provided that the survivor 
obtained a claim for an amount sufficient to cover his or her reasonable maintenance 
needs. This wording meant that the claim had to be settled by way of payment of 
money. This could lead to a situation where the executor would be forced to sell assets 
of the deceased estate if the estate did not have sufficient cash to settle the claim. The 
MSSA as promulgated, however, simply refers to a claim against the deceased estate 
and the executor can therefore, in consultation with the survivor, heirs and legatees, 
determine how the claim will be settled.759 As Sonnekus indicates,760 this adapted 
wording addresses some of the objections against the Bill. If the claim was for an 
amount, it would in all probability have had to be a lump sum, which would not take 
into consideration any changes in the circumstance of the surviving spouse, such as his 
or her remarriage.761 
 
4.4.2 Determining reasonable maintenance needs 
 
The emphasis in the MSSA is on reasonable maintenance needs (my emphasis). It 
should be clear from this wording that the test is to some extent subjective – what is 
regarded as reasonable by one person is not necessarily regarded as such by another. I 
could not find any indication in the Parliamentary debates that Parliament had any 
specific intention as to the meaning of “reasonable maintenance”. The South African 
 
758 W2-90 (AS). 
759 Sonnekus 1990-3 TSAR 502. 
760 1990-3 TSAR 503. 




Law Commission762 had emphasised that the issue was not the survivor’s right to share 
in the deceased’s estate, but his or her need for support. I would suggest that this 
explains or supports why Parliament chose to refer to “maintenance” as opposed to, for 
example, “provision”. During the Parliamentary debate, one member noted that the 
provision in the proposed legislation was for “maintenance proper” rather than just a 
transfer of capital which, should the survivor remarry or die shortly after the capital was 
received, would perhaps be akin to an inheritance rather than maintenance.  
  
The MSSA provides some assistance in this regard – section 3 provides that certain 
factors shall be considered when determining the surviving spouse’s reasonable 
maintenance needs, namely:  
• The amount available for distribution in the deceased spouse’s estate; 
• The survivor’s existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs 
and obligations; 
• The duration (subsistence) of the marriage; 
• The survivor’s standard of living during the subsistence of the marriage; 
• The survivor’s age at the time of the deceased’s death; 
• Any other relevant factor.  
These factors were referred to in general during the Parliamentary debates, but there 
was no detailed discussion, other than to mention that section 3 provided no system of 
precedence as there is in a court, which means the decision making power is left to the 
discretion of the executor. I am of the view that the reference to “reasonable 
maintenance” signifies something more than pure financial need, which is objectively 
determinable. The reference to “reasonable” indicates a subjective test that requires 
discretion and interpretation on the part of the person determining reasonableness, 
which ties in with the comment by Parliament that the executor must use discretion 
when considering the factors to decide whether the claim is reasonable.  
 





Most of the factors in section 3 appear logical in determining the survivor’s objective 
need for maintenance and the estate’s capacity to provide maintenance. As the duty of 
support relates also to the other party’s ability to provide support, it is clear that the 
amount available for distribution in the deceased’s estate is a key element in 
determining reasonable maintenance needs. This factor by itself could, however, be 
problematic. The deceased spouse could for example have created significant liabilities 
in his or her estate, which would have an impact on the amount available for 
distribution. It is not inconceivable that a testator could knowingly do this in an attempt 
to frustrate any potential claim for maintenance by his or her surviving spouse. It is also 
possible that the deceased spouse could have transferred assets from his or her estate 
to a trust, ostensibly as an estate planning exercise, but actually as a means to frustrate 
the surviving spouse’s claim for maintenance. Costa763 suggests that the MSSA should be 
amended to provide that, where the deceased spouse’ estate had been substantially 
reduced during his or her lifetime as a result of steps to protect his or her estate against 
creditors or to save estate duty, the survivor’s claim for maintenance should, in addition 
to his or her estate, lie also against any family trust and/or family company to which the 
deceased may have transferred assets as part of the “scheme”.  
 
In our law a trust is acknowledged as a separate entity and the assets and liabilities vest 
in the trustees.764 In Braun v Botha765 it was referred to as “a legal institution sui 
generis”. Despite this, there have been a few recent cases in respect of divorce 
proceedings where the court was asked to consider trust assets when making a 
redistribution order in terms of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act or when determining the 
 
763 1990(272) De Rebus 534. 
764 CIR v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A); Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA) at par 10. In the case of a so-called bewind trust, the trust property (or estate) is in fact 
owned by the trust beneficiaries, subject to the administration and control of the trustees – see 
paragraph (b) of the definition of “trust” in section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 




accrual of a spouse’s estate. In Badenhorst v Badenhorst766 the wife asked the court to 
include the asset value of an inter vivos trust in the personal estate of her husband, as 
she alleged that the trust was his alter ego. The court found,767 on the facts, that the 
trust was indeed the husband’s alter ego as he was in full control of the trust and used it 
as a vehicle for his business activities. It held768 that, but for the trust, ownership in all 
the trust assets would have vested in the husband and therefore ruled769 that the value 
of the trust assets should be added to the value of the husband’s estate when 
determining the redistribution of assets. In BC v CC770 the wife also alleged that the trust 
was the alter ego of her husband and she asked as part of divorce proceedings that the 
value of the trust assets be considered when determining the accrual in her husband’s 
estate. The husband argued that, although it might be appropriate to consider trust 
assets for purposes of a redistribution order, it was not appropriate to do so for 
purposes of calculating the accrual in terms of the Matrimonial Property Act, as the 
latter Act did not give the court any discretion to do so. The court held771 that the 
determination of accrual is not the exercise of a discretion but a factual inquiry into the 
spouse’s financial position and that it can therefore include trust assets. It held that in 
cases dealing with the lifting of the trust veil it is unnecessary for a party to expressly 
claim that all or some of the property owned by the trustees of the trust is to be 
deemed as property in the personal estate of a trustee – if it is proved that a transaction 
is simulated and that a trust asset is in fact an asset in the personal estate of the trustee, 
the court is entitled to treat such asset as an asset in the personal estate of the trustee 
for purposes of considering the accrual.772 In MM v JM773 a similar situation occurred, 
but with a different result. The court held that a redistribution order in terms of the 
Divorce Act is based on what the court deems just. The accrual claim, however, simply 
 
766 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
767 At 367. 
768 At 368. 
769 At 368. 
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requires the application of a mathematical formula and the trust assets therefore 
cannot be included in one of the parties’ personal estate. In RP v DP774 the court, 
however, agreed with BC v CC and held that “piercing the trust veil” is a common law 
power and not linked to any general discretion a court may have. In WT v KT775 the 
parties were married in community of property. The wife alleged that the trust was the 
alter ego of her husband and asked that the trust assets constitute assets of the 
communal estate. The court held that it could not include the assets in the communal 
estate as a court has no discretion when determining proprietary consequences of a 
marriage in community of property. The court also held that a spouse who is neither a 
trust beneficiary nor a third party who has transacted with the trust does not have 
standing to challenge the management of a trust by the other spouse.776  In YB v SB777 
the parties were married out of community of property with the accrual system. The 
wife alleged that certain transactions relating to assets acquired and held by a trust 
were simulated and that the assets should be added to her husband’s estate for 
purposes of calculating the accrual claim. The court agreed with the finding in RP v DP 
that a court can “pierce the trust’s veil” if a trustee (or founder) treats the trust as his 
alter ego. It accordingly found that, as the husband had treated the trust as his alter 
ego, certain trust assets were in fact assets of the husband and those assets were taken 
into account for purposes of calculating the accrual in the husband’s estate. In Van Zyl v 
Van Zyl,778 the court confirmed779 that trusts are “well recognised as permissible 
vehicles for estate and financial planning”. It also held780 that a court has no general 
discretion to disregard the existence of a separate legal entity just because it considers 
it just or convenient to do so. A court may, however, in exceptional circumstances “lift” 
or “pierce” the “corporate veil” of the trust and deem the assets of the trust to be those 
of the individual. One such instance would be where the trust is the alter ego of the 
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controlling person. The court in this case deemed781 the trust assets to be those of the 
husband for all purposes, including a redistribution order.  
 
The issue of taking trust assets into account on divorce has been settled by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in REM v VM.782 The court in that matter held that trust 
assets could be taken into account, but there had to be proof that the spouse 
transferred personal assets into the trust and then dealt with them as if they were his or 
her own assets with the “fraudulent or dishonest purpose” of avoiding the obligation to 
properly account for the accrual in his or her estate, so as to evade payment to the 
other spouse of what was due in terms of the accrual claim.783 I am of the view that, just 
as section 7(5) of the Divorce Act allows the court to consider “any other factor which 
should in the opinion of the court be taken into account” when dealing with a 
redistribution order, the reference in section 3 of the MSSA to “any other factor” would 
empower the executor to consider trust assets in certain circumstances. As seen in the 
aforementioned cases though, this can only be done if there is a clear indication that the 
other spouse used the trust as his or her alter ego with the intent to avoid his or her 
financial obligations in respect of the marriage (or its termination), and such an 
investigation is not within the power of the executor. Only a court can pierce the trust 
veneer, therefore I do not believe that Costa’s suggestion is viable. 
 
Some writers784 express the opinion that two of the factors in section 3, namely the 
duration of the marriage and the standard of living during the marriage, do not 
immediately strike one as being logical. The Bill included in the Law Commission’s 
Working Paper and Report did not contain any factors that should be considered. The 
Bills presented to Parliament, however, did contain factors,785 but neither Bill included 
the duration of the marriage as a factor. In its Working Paper the Law Commission 
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looked at the factors listed in section 7(2) of the Divorce Act which the court must have 
regard to when making an order for the payment of maintenance and investigated786 
whether these factors should also be applied when considering a need for maintenance 
on the death of one of the spouses. One of these factors is the duration of the marriage. 
The Commission referred787 to this factor as introducing a moral judgement into the 
decision regarding the payment of maintenance. As the underlying principle of the 
MSSA is to provide for the surviving spouse if he or she has lost his or her source of 
support, and not to address the survivor’s right to share in the estate of the first-dying 
spouse, factors that necessitate a moral judgement should be avoided and the duration 
of the marriage should therefore not be taken into account.788 In its Report, it also 
referred to the factors in the Divorce Act and reiterated789 that the duration of the 
marriage should only play a role in so far as it does not introduce a moral judgement 
into the decision about the survivor’s entitlement to maintenance. Sonnekus has a 
similar view – according to him,790 the duration of the marriage relates to the past, 
whereas the need for maintenance is based on the future. He argues that any strong 
emphasis on this factor may imply that the survivor is being “compensated” for the 
years spent in the marriage, which is akin to the provisions of the Divorce Act791 which 
allow for compensation to the divorced spouse when a redistribution of the marital 
assets is contemplated. Any such approach in the context of maintenance is, however, 
misguided, as the intention behind the MSSA was to provide for proven maintenance 
needs and not for a redistribution of an equitable portion of the deceased’s assets.792 
Sonnekus suggests793 that, should we accept that the estate would only be liable if the 
need of the spouse was directly linked to the marriage, it was unlikely that the survivor 
would be in need of maintenance simply because the marriage was of short duration. 
 
786 Par 6.11. 
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He emphasises though that this does not mean that there will in all cases be a 
mathematical link between the duration of the marriage and the extent of the estate’s 
maintenance obligation and that the duration of the marriage is therefore merely one 
factor to be considered. He therefore suggests794 that, although the duration of the 
marriage would play a role, it should only be considered in determining the 
maintenance obligation of the estate and should have no bearing on the need of the 
surviving spouse. Costa795 also questions the inclusion of the duration of the marriage as 
a factor and asks whether this means that a survivor whose marriage was of short 
duration would be entitled to less maintenance, despite his or her reasonable 
maintenance needs indicating the opposite.  
 
I respectfully submit that Sonnekus’ comments are correct, as they tie in with the Law 
Commission’s comment796 that the basis of the determination of the maintenance claim 
is the social norm that requires that a surviving spouse shall not be left without 
provision, and not the moral right to share in the estate of the first-dying spouse. It is, 
however, not clear to me how a claim can be assessed without any moral judgement – 
why would the legislature have included the duration of the marriage as a factor at all if 
no moral judgement should be made? I would assume that the inclusion thereof as a 
factor means that more weight will be given to a longer marriage, but if that is the case, 
does this factor not automatically introduce a moral judgement? It is therefore my view 
that the duration of the marriage should be taken into consideration as one of the 
factors mentioned in section 3 and only to the extent that it has a bearing on the 
maintenance needs of the survivor. It could be argued that the legislature included the 
duration of the marriage to address those instances where a younger person was 
married to a rich, older person for a short time so that, when the older spouse died, the 
survivor did not become entitled to a large amount for maintenance needs purely as a 
result of the standard of living during the marriage. This would be a valid approach, but 
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my view remains that the proven maintenance needs should remain the key focus and 
the standard of living during, and the duration of, the marriage should be relevant only 
as far as these factors relate to the spouse’s maintenance needs. There is nothing in the 
Parliamentary debate that explains why the duration of the marriage should be included 
as a factor or how it should be applied when determining the claim. 
 
The Bill contained in the Law Commission’s Working Paper included a reference797 to 
the standard of living of the spouses before the dissolution of the marriage. The Bill 
contained in the Report, however, did not contain such a reference. In dealing with the 
criteria for determining the amount of maintenance, the Report798 confirmed that the 
maintenance that a party to a marriage can claim during the marriage will depend on 
the standard of living of the family and a court, when dealing with maintenance in the 
event of a divorce, should therefore consider the standard of living of the parties prior 
to the divorce. The Commission, however, agreed799 with views800 that suggested that 
the standard of living during the marriage could not be used when determining 
maintenance on death, as the breadwinner had passed away.801 The Report 
concluded802 that a survivor would have a claim for maintenance only if he or she was 
unable to provide for his or her own reasonable maintenance needs. It provided803 that 
the factors referred to in section 7(2) of the Divorce Act were important in this 
consideration and had to be included by implication in so far as they were not expressly 
included in clause 1(1) and (2) of the Bill. The Report, however, made no specific 
reference to the standard of living of the spouses during the marriage. 
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The Bills presented to Parliament did provide for the standard of living of the survivor 
during the subsistence of the marriage,804 and this was included as a factor in the 
MSSA.805 Sonnekus806 argues that, as with the duration of the marriage, this factor has 
no bearing on the future maintenance needs of the survivor. He does, however, agree 
that the circumstances of each individual case should determine whether any weight 
must be placed on the standard of living during the marriage. As with the duration of 
the marriage, there is no indication in the Parliamentary debates as to how this factor 
should be applied when determining reasonable maintenance. 
 
The standard of living as a factor was referred to by the court in Oshry v Feldman807 
when determining the quantum of the claim. The court noted that the standard the 
spouses enjoyed during the latter part of their marriage was considerably less lavish 
than the one they had enjoyed in the initial years of their marriage. This would 
accordingly make it difficult to apply the standard of living as a factor in assessing Mrs 
Feldman’s need for maintenance. In a rather scathing criticism of the judgment in Oshry 
v Feldman,808 Sonnekus809 suggests that the court erred in finding that Mrs Feldman had 
proven a need for maintenance. He suggests that the MSSA requires a consideration of 
the sum of all proprietary rights in order to consider the reasonableness of the alleged 
need for maintenance. The legislature therefore did not intend that the claimant’s 
capital or immovable assets should remain intact for the benefit of his or her creditor 
and heirs and that only the income thereof be used. The court had, after all, mentioned 
that the extended maintenance claim was an exception to the common law principles, 
and Sonnekus810 suggests that legislation dealing with exceptions should be interpreted 
restrictively. As Mrs Feldman had certain capital assets, the court should have 
considered them when determining her reasonable maintenance needs. 
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Sonnekus further suggests811 that Mrs Feldman proved that for most of their marriage, 
her independent income determined the standard of living she and Mr Feldman 
enjoyed. It is common cause that this standard of living dropped significantly in the last 
three years before Mr Feldman’s death, after she had retired. As it was accepted by the 
court that she would not have been able to maintain herself if not for the voluntary 
contributions of her sons, it follows that she could not look to the relatively small estate 
of Mr Feldman to fund the standard of living that she enjoyed in the period during 
which she contributed to their needs.812 He suggests that the appeal judges should have 
taken this into account.813 
 
The issue of reasonable maintenance needs was also discussed in Oosterbroek v 
Grobler.814 The court held815 that a determination of needs depends on the 
interpretation and application of the MSSA. It mentioned that it could not find any cases 
specifically dealing with the issue of reasonable maintenance as referred to in the MSSA, 
despite a diligent search,816 nor could counsel refer to any cases. Due to the absence of 
such cases, the court, while referring to the factors mentioned in section 3, looked to 
the provisions of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act for assistance.817 While I appreciate that 
there are relatively few cases about the MSSA, I fail to see why the judge felt it 
necessary to consider the provisions of section 7(2). The MSSA lists the factors to be 
considered when determining needs and I see no reason why these factors should be 
ignored and the factors in the Divorce Act should be considered. Section 7(2) of the 
Divorce Act provides for similar factors as in section 3 of the MSSA, but also includes the 
conduct of the parties in so far as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage. 
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The judge in Oosterbroek v Grobler818 noted819 that the courts820 had recognised that 
this section in the Divorce Act confers a wide discretion on a trial court when 
determining the question relating to maintenance requirements. The judge exercised 
what he referred to as “the wide discretion which I have as enunciated in the cases I 
have referred to above”821 and found that a letter written by the executor to Mrs 
Oosterbroek reflected her reasonable monthly expenses that she could claim from the 
deceased estate. The MSSA gives no guidance for the application of the factors and the 
question therefore arises whether the executor, in determining the reasonable 
maintenance needs of the surviving spouse, also has a wide discretion. I am of the 
opinion that the lack of guidance as to the application of the factors points to a wide 
discretion on the part of the executor. The section, for example, refers to the duration 
of the marriage, but gives no indication whether a shorter marriage would equate to 
less need or a lesser obligation. The executor therefore has to decide to what extent he 
or she will consider this factor. Similarly, the executor must consider whether the 
survivor’s claimed needs are reasonable. This raises the question whether the average 
executor is capable of exercising this discretion. Sonnekus822 is of the opinion that the 
wide discretion given to executors in the consideration of the claims would require clear 
guidance from the Master’s office to limit interference with the expression of free will 
by testators and I agree with him. 
 
The MSSA provides for “any other factor which should be taken into account”. This term 
is rather vague and non-specific and could include just about any other factor. As 
Keyser823 points out, the word “should” raises the question whether matrimonial 
misconduct on the part of the surviving spouse should be taken into consideration when 
determining his or her maintenance needs, as is the case when maintenance is 
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determined in terms of the Divorce Act. The Law Commission had stated in its Report824 
that the conduct of the parties to a marriage should not be taken into account in order 
to refute a claim for maintenance. This aspect was debated when the Bill was before 
Parliament. One of the members, De Jager, specifically suggested825 that the same 
approach should be adopted as on divorce and that “fixed norms” should be applied 
when determining whether a survivor is entitled to maintenance on the death of the 
other spouse. According to this view, a survivor who was living with another person in 
adultery at the time of his or her spouse’s death, should therefore be denied 
maintenance from the estate of the deceased spouse. De Jager also mentioned826 that, 
despite clause 3 of the Bill providing for the factors that should be considered, there was 
no system of precedent as there was in court. Every executor therefore has to decide 
the question of reasonable maintenance in his own discretion. 
 
Keyser suggests827 that, in view of the Commission’s finding828 that disinheritance was 
the exception to the rule, it could perhaps be argued that where a testator did in fact 
disinherit his or her spouse, he or she might have done so for good reason and the 
testator’s motives should therefore be scrutinised as the disinherison could be based on 
spousal misconduct. She concedes829 though that a counter argument could be that the 
basis of the claim is the survivor’s need for maintenance and not his or her right to share 
in the estate of the first-dying spouse, which means that misconduct should not be 
considered.  This was also the view taken by the Law Commission – it stated830 that the 
issue is merely that of reasonable maintenance for someone in need. For this reason, 
the conduct of the surviving spouse, including a situation such as that the spouses had 
 
824 Par 6.17. 
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been separated, and any statements by the first-dying spouse as to the reasons for 
disinheriting the survivor, should not be taken into account.831 
 
Sonnekus,832 however, does not agree with this. He uses the example of a testator who 
mentions in his will that he is disinheriting his wife because of her continuous extra-
marital affairs. He concludes833 that, in such an instance, such a fact should indeed be 
taken into account when determining maintenance needs, as it could be argued that the 
principles of morals and decency (“fatsoen”) are the underlying principles of the 
maintenance claim for the surviving spouse.  It is of course difficult to determine when a 
factor is of a moral nature. Morality is subjective and what one person views as a moral 
issue might not be viewed as such by another. Let us assume, for example, that the 
surviving spouse has a proven record of profligacy – would this lack of the ability to deal 
with money or assets be a fact to consider or does its consideration bring a moral slant 
to the consideration? Similarly, assume that the marriage between the survivor and the 
first-dying spouse was not a happy one to the extent that they no longer shared a home, 
but remained married – should the unhappy state of their marriage be taken into 
account or will it result in a moral judgement if it is considered? Would the position be 
different if the first-dying spouse had already instituted divorce proceedings but, at the 
time of death, the marriage still subsisted? Another consideration is the fact that certain 
acts of misconduct could be regarded as more serious than others. In a discussion of 
unworthiness to inherit in the context of family killings,834 Schoeman-Malan835 mentions 
that, although the MSSA is the basis of a claim for maintenance by a spouse, the 
common law rule of unworthiness should still apply. This rule provides that a person 
cannot benefit from his or her own punishable act – in the context of a family killing, it 
would mean that the person who committed the killing would not be able to inherit 
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from the deceased person or claim maintenance against the deceased estate. Corbett, 
Hofmeyr and Kahn836 mention the instance where a spouse murdered his or her spouse. 
They also refer to the comment in the Law Commission’s Report837 that the conduct of 
the spouses during the marriage should not be taken into account when determining 
maintenance needs. They argue838 that, although the issue is whether the surviving 
spouse is in need of maintenance and not whether the spouse has a right to share in the 
estate of the first-dying spouse, the legislature probably did not intend for a surviving 
spouse’s misconduct to always be regarded as irrelevant. Their suggestion839 is that, if 
misconduct is indeed to be considered, public policy should perhaps be the criterion 
when determining whether or not to consider a particular instance of misconduct, so 
that it will only be in extreme cases, such as a spouse murdering his or her spouse, 
where the misconduct will lead to a maintenance claim not being met. I support this 
approach and do not believe that “misconduct” in general should be a factor when 
considering the need for maintenance. Factors such as a bad relationship between the 
spouses or the fact that they have separated should not have a bearing on whether or 
not the surviving spouse is in need of maintenance. The emphasis is after all on the 
survivor’s need for reasonable maintenance and not his or her right to share in the 
estate of the first-dying spouse. In addition, while the marriage endures, the parties 
have a reciprocal duty of support, regardless of the circumstances. Why then should the 
nature of the survivor’s relationship have a bearing on the determination of need? 
Where, however, the misconduct results in the surviving spouse being regarded as 
unworthy to inherit from the deceased spouse, I see no reason why such misconduct 
should not be considered when determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the 
surviving spouse. It could, after all, be argued that the maintenance needs only arose as 
a result of the death of the first-dying spouse and, if the surviving spouse was 
responsible for such death, this is definitely a factor that should be considered. 
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In Feldman v Oshry840 the judge considered841 Mrs Feldman’s circumstances when 
applying the factors to determine whether she indeed qualified for assistance from the 
estate. In short, the marriage had lasted approximately eighteen years; Mrs Feldman 
was 78 years at the time of Mr Feldman’s death and it was clear from the evidence that 
her needs exceeded her means.842 Selling her assets to generate funds for living 
expenses would not only be insufficient to maintain her for the rest of her life, but 
would also expose her to risk and insecurity.843 The judge therefore concluded844 that 
she had proved that she qualified for assistance. It is interesting to note that the judge 
clearly distinguished the application of section 7(2) of the Divorce Act from that of 
section 2(1) of the MSSA, in that the misconduct referred to in section 7(2) does not 
extend to the MSSA.  
 
I submit that it is clear from the above that there is a very fine line between a relevant 
factor and a factor that requires a moral judgement, and this makes the executor’s role 
more difficult. 
 
Costa845 comments that the MSSA sets out the specific factors that must be considered 
when determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor but omits to 
provide that the overriding factor should be that the claim must be just and equitable. 
He gives no explanation for this statement and it is not clear exactly what he means. I 
submit that there is no need to state this in the MSSA, as it is clear from the wording of 
section 2(1) that this is in any event the case – if the survivor cannot provide for his or 
her reasonable needs out of his or her own means and earnings, application of the 
factors will lead to a just and equitable outcome for any claim that follows.  
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The inclusion of “any other factors” in section 3 makes it clear that the specific factors 
listed are not an exclusive and exhaustive list but should rather be seen as examples of 
the type of factors to be taken into account when determining the maintenance needs 
of the survivor and the extent of the estate’s obligation. If we consider the list of factors 
included, the question arises as to what other factors may be regarded as relevant. This 
will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case. In Mann v Leach846  the 
surviving spouse claimed ongoing medical expenses and a new motor vehicle as part of 
her maintenance claim. A dispute arose between her and the executors of the estate as 
to her state of health, capacity to drive and her eyesight. She claimed that she was able 
to drive, despite her advanced age, but had specific requirements for the motor vehicle 
in order to accommodate her age. The executor expected her to undergo certain 
medical examinations so that he could determine if she was indeed still fit to drive, but 
she refused. The court held847 that her state of health, eyesight and ability and capacity 
to drive a vehicle were indeed relevant factors, as they had a direct effect on the basis 
of her claim. It accordingly ordered her to submit to the required examinations.  
The decision in Oshry v Feldman848 should be welcomed as it gives the executor some 
guidance on how to determine reasonable needs and settles the question whether a 
lump sum award is in order. The judgment is however not entirely unproblematic. The 
court was especially critical of the executors’ conduct in this matter. It referred849 to 
their “intractable and obstructive attitude” and suggested that they had acted not in the 
interest of the estate, but out of selfish personal interest, as one of the executors was a 
residual heir to the estate. Their unwillingness to attempt to reach an agreement with 
the survivor led to litigation and the depletion of an already limited estate.850 The court 
felt851 that the executors knew that they bore no risk, as the litigation from their side 
would be funded by the estate and they could accordingly continue their opposition to 
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the claim. It accordingly ordered852 costs against the executors in their personal 
capacity, both in respect of the appeal and the cross-appeal. Sonnekus853 is strongly of 
the view that the executors in this case fulfilled their statutory duty by considering the 
claim and by defending their decision when it was challenged in a court of law. I would 
suggest that, while the executors may have thought or assumed that they bore no risk in 
their personal capacity, it is unlikely that they would have allowed the costs of the 
litigation to deplete the estate simply because they wanted to be obstructive. That 
would, after all, have a direct impact on the amount available for distribution to the 
heirs, one of whom was a co-executor. I do, however, agree with the remark854 by the 
court that the protracted litigation led to the parties being poorer, “materially as well as 
in human currency” and that an agreement between the parties at the outset could 
have avoided the litigation. While the executor has no power to force an agreement, 
common sense suggests that this should at least have been suggested to the survivor 
and the heirs. No evidence was led as to whether the executor had suggested an 
agreement, therefore I have to assume that this was not done, and, to that extent, I 
agree with the court’s comments.  
 
Sonnekus855 suggests that the cost order made against the executors in Oshry v 
Feldman856 should serve as a dire warning to all executors – if they fulfil their statutory 
duty by critically examining the reasonableness of a maintenance claim lodged by a 
surviving spouse, they face possible personal liability for legal costs. If they do not 
examine the claim and simply accept it without more investigation, they face the 
sanction of the Estates Act and an action by the heirs for not fulfilling their duties and 
for not preserving the assets of the estate. While this warning is valid, I would hope that 
our courts will be more understanding of the executor’s role. I am heartened by the 
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court’s comments in Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk857 where it held858 that an executor may 
indeed resist a claim, especially if the executor concludes, after examining the claim, 
that there are grounds to dispute the claim.  
 
The question can be asked whether the meaning of “reasonable” as referred to in the 
MSSA, and the application thereof in practice, give effect to Parliament’s intent. As 
indicated earlier in this section, there is no specific reference in the debates as to 
Parliament’s intention about the meaning of “reasonable maintenance”. There is also no 
reference as to why the MSSA refers to “reasonable maintenance needs” as opposed to 
“maintenance needs”. On the one hand it could be argued that the inclusion of 
“reasonable” means that it refers to something more than pure financial need. This 
argument could perhaps also be supported by the reference to the duration of the 
marriage and the lifestyle the spouses had enjoyed as factors to consider. I submit that 
the lack of clarity as to the intention behind the inclusion of “reasonable” maintenance 
needs, together with the findings of the Law Commission, indicate Parliament’s 
acknowledgement that the circumstances of each case would determine how a claim is 
assessed. This would perhaps also explain why section 3 is drafted the way it is without 
giving any guidance as to how, or the reason why, the stated factors should be 
considered when determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor. The 
wording of section 3 perhaps explains why the court in Oosterbroek v Grobler,859 one of 
the few cases dealing with the meaning of reasonable maintenance needs, felt it 
necessary to refer to the factors listed in the Divorce Act. As indicated earlier in this 
section, I do not agree with this approach, but it supports my contention that the 
responsibility placed on the executor to determine if the claim is for reasonable 
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4.4.3  Settling the claim 
 
Once a need for maintenance has been determined and the executor has agreed to the 
reasonableness of the claim, the manner of settlement of the claim must be considered. 
The only guidance in the MSSA in this regard is section 2(3)(d) which provides that the 
executor shall have the power to enter into an agreement with the survivor and the 
heirs and legatees who have an interest in the agreement for the settlement of the 
survivor’s maintenance claim and in terms of the agreement, to transfer assets of the 
deceased estate to the survivor. It is clear from the wording that the section empowers 
the executor without placing an obligation on him or her.860 Wunsh861 is of the view that 
it is “unfortunate” that this provision requires agreement between the executor, 
survivor, heirs and legatees, and suggests that it would have been preferable if the court 
was given the power to order such a provision, even in the absence of agreement 
between the parties. I do not agree with Wunsh, simply because the court in any event 
has this power. If the parties cannot agree on the way to settle the maintenance claim, 
the executor will have to decide how to settle it. If any party is unhappy with the 
executor’s decision, he or she can follow the process to object, which includes going to 
court if necessary. In such an instance, the court can give an order as to settlement of 
the claim.  As Sonnekus862 points out, the power to enter into an agreement relates only 
to settlement of the claim and not to the determination or consideration of the claim – 
this responsibility still rests solely on the executor.  
 
Sonnekus863 makes the interesting point that, should an agreement be entered into, it 
will probably be treated in a similar fashion to a redistribution agreement. The latter 
agreement is sometimes used in order to make the distribution of an estate more 
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practical.864 The basis of the agreement is that heirs or legatees who have vested 
interests can agree to redistribute their inheritances among themselves.865 A 
redistribution agreement is most often used when the division of assets is not 
practical.866 The following example should illustrate the principle behind it: in terms of a 
will B, C and D inherit the residue of an estate. The residue consists of an immovable 
property and cash. B indicates that he does not wish to own a one third share of the 
immovable property and prefers to receive cash. The heirs can agree that B will receive 
only cash and C and D will each receive fifty percent of the immovable property and so 
much of the cash as is necessary to make up the balance of the value of their respective 
one third shares of the estate.867 It is not clear exactly what Sonnekus means with his 
comment that the agreement in terms of section 2(3)(d) would probably be treated in 
the same way as a redistribution agreement. I assume that he is referring to the fact 
that the basis of the redistribution agreement is to give each heir assets to the same 
value as he or she would have received in terms of the will or intestacy, but by 
reshuffling the assets.868 The agreement in terms of section 2(3)(d) is to agree how the 
maintenance claim will be settled, which could result in a reshuffling of assets to the 
extent that the parties agree that assets, rather than cash, be used to settle the 
maintenance claim.  
 
The agreement in terms of section 2(3)(d) could include the creation of a trust and a 
subsequent transfer of assets of the estate, or a right in the assets, to the trust. It could 
also include provisions for the transfer of assets of the estate, or a right in assets, to the 
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surviving spouse. It is also possible to impose an obligation on an heir or legatee in 
terms of the agreement. Clause 2(3)(d) of the Bill on Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
B86-88 and B2-90 provided that the executor had “the power to create a trust for the 
benefit of the survivor in terms of an agreement with the survivor and to transfer assets 
from the deceased estate to the trust, in settlement of the claim of the survivor or part 
thereof”. The MSSA as promulgated, however, provides for an agreement with the 
survivor and the heirs and legatees having an interest in the agreement, including the 
creation of a trust. In terms of the agreement, assets of the deceased estate or a right in 
assets may be transferred to the survivor or the trust, or an obligation may be imposed 
on an heir or legatee, in settlement of the claim of the survivor or part thereof. While it 
could be argued that the wording in the Bill gave the executor more power as he or she 
merely needed the survivor to agree to the creation of a trust, the wording in the MSSA 
presents the parties with more options and its inclusion should be welcomed as it adds 
an element of practicality. The spouse and heirs could, for example, agree that the heirs 
“inherit” the spouse’s claim for maintenance, thereby releasing the estate from any 
obligation and making the heirs liable to continue with the maintenance of the spouse.  
 
Sonnekus869 suggests that the power of the executor to impose an obligation on an heir 
or legatee must be welcomed as it complies with the underlying principles that the 
maintenance must be settled out of estate income rather than from estate assets. 
Meyerowitz,870 however, points out that such an obligation on the heir or legatee would 
have negative tax consequences for both the heir or legatee and the survivor. The heir 
or legatee would not be able to deduct the payment in the calculation of his or her 
income tax obligation as it is not an expense incurred in the production of income.871 
The survivor on the other hand will be taxed on the payment, as it is an annuity that 
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forms part of the gross income in his or her hands.872 The term “annuity” is not defined 
in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962873 (hereinafter referred to as the “ITA”), but the courts 
have dealt with its meaning. In KBI v Hogan874 the court held that an annuity had two 
essential characteristics, namely that it is an annual or periodical payment, and that the 
beneficiary has the right to receive more than one payment. It has been stated875 that 
although one of the characteristics is that an annuity must be a fixed amount, it does 
not mean that the amount can never change. In SIR v Watermeyer876 the court held that 
an annuity has the element of recurrence in the sense of annual payments, even if the 
payments are made at intervals shorter than a year, and the element of annual 
occurrence can only be present if the beneficiary has a right to receive more than one 
instalment. Based on these “definitions” I submit that an obligation by an heir or legatee 
to pay maintenance to the surviving spouse will be regarded as an annuity in the hands 
of the surviving spouse, with the relevant tax consequences for the spouse. It has to be 
noted that the ITA provides877 that an amount received in terms of an order of divorce 
by way of alimony or allowance or maintenance is included in the gross income of the 
recipient, but it also provides878 that such amounts are exempt from tax. I see no reason 
why the ITA cannot be amended to include amounts received as maintenance in terms 
of a claim under the MSSA under such exemption – this will ensure that the surviving 
spouse is treated the same as a divorced spouse in respect of tax on the maintenance 
payments.  
 
Sonnekus879 suggests that if a trust is established and income paid to the survivor, there 
is no danger that the capital of the estate will fall into the survivor’s estate. He, 
however, points out that, despite the reference to a trust in section 2(3)(d), no provision 
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is made for dealing with the unused assets of the trust when the survivor’s maintenance 
needs cease. I do not perceive this as a problem as the MSSA merely provides for a trust 
being an option available to deal with the claim – the MSSA need not include details 
pertaining to the trust, as this is something that the parties thereto will have to agree on 
and include in the trust deed. Sonnekus880 argues that the reference to “a right in the 
assets” appears to be meaningless, as the phrase “assets of the deceased” means the 
sum of the deceased’s patrimonial rights. He suggests881 that the legislature used the 
words “a right in the assets” to refer to limited real rights such as usufruct or rights of 
use or occupation in assets of the estate, as opposed to rights of ownership. He further 
suggests882 that in most cases the survivor’s main need would be for a roof over his or 
her head and suggests that this could easily be addressed by giving the survivor a 
usufruct or right of use or occupation over the assets rather than transferring assets or 
paying an amount to the survivor.883 While it is true that the survivor would probably in 
most instances require accommodation, I do not agree that it could simply be assumed 
that this would always be his or her main need. Quite often the survivor might already 
own property or inherit a property from the first-dying spouse. His or her main need 
might then be income to use towards his or her maintenance needs, which will include 
expenses related to the property. Giving the survivor a usufruct over a property will not 
necessarily address this need. In addition, the granting of a usufruct could add strain on 
what is probably already a strained relationship between the spouse and the heirs, as 
the heirs will be the owners of the property in which the spouse lives.  
 
Sonnekus884 suggests that, where the granting of a usufruct or right of use or occupation 
is impossible, the Master should instruct the executor to pay an amount into a trust so 
that monthly maintenance could be paid to the survivor. If the survivor’s circumstances 
change, the amount could be readjusted, and any surplus or unused amounts could be 
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distributed to the heirs. I suggest that this is a much better alternative as it protects the 
interests of both the survivor and the heirs to the estate.885 
 
As mentioned above,886 section 2(3)(d) was amended by the Estate Affairs Amendment 
Act.887 Before the amendment the section provided that the executor shall have the 
power to enter into an agreement with “the survivor, heirs and legatees…”. The 
amendment merely added the words “having an interest in the agreement” after the 
reference to heirs and legatees. The question arises as to why a legatee would have an 
interest in the agreement. The liabilities of an estate are settled from the residue of the 
estate, in other words from assets that are not specially bequeathed to legatees, unless 
the testator provides in his or her will that a specific liability (or indeed, all liabilities) be 
settled from the special bequests.888 The survivor’s maintenance claim will therefore, in 
the absence of a contrary provision in the will, be settled from the residue of the estate 
and it will not have an impact on the special bequests and legatees. Where the residue 
is insufficient to settle the debts of the estate, the executor will, however, have recourse 
to the special bequests to settle the outstanding debts.889 If a legatee wishes to retain 
the asset bequeathed to him or her, he or she will have to pay the amount necessary to 
settle his or her share of the debts into the estate.890 In such a case, there will be no 
residue and the estate will devolve on the legatee. It is in such a scenario that a legatee 
would be a party who has an interest in the agreement and the inclusion of the words 
“holding an interest in the agreement” should be seen in this context. 
 
Costa891 suggests that the MSSA should provide that the survivor’s claim arises at the 
death of the deceased spouse so that it allows for interim maintenance for the survivor 
until his or her claim has been accepted by the executor of the deceased estate. This is 
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important in view of the fact that it often takes months, if not years, before the 
maintenance claim is settled.892  The surviving spouse and dependent children of the 
deceased will usually only receive payments or benefits from the deceased estate once 
the liquidation and distribution account has lain open for inspection.893 The Estates Act, 
however, provides894 that the executor may, before the account has lain open for 
inspection, release such monies and property out of the estate as the executor deems fit 
to provide for the subsistence of the deceased’s family or household. This can, however, 
only be done with the consent of the Master. Uniform Rule 43 of the High Court and 
Rule 58 of the Magistrate’s Court provide that where a spouse seeks relief from the 
court in respect of maintenance pending divorce proceedings, the court may, after 
hearing such evidence it considers necessary, dismiss the application or make such 
order it deems fit to ensure a just and expeditious decision. Section 26 probably 
achieves the same goal in the context of a maintenance claim against a deceased estate, 
except that the executor must consider the application and the Master must consent to 
any payments. The court in Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk referred895 to this when 
addressing the executor’s response to a request by the surviving spouse’s attorney that 
maintenance be paid to her every month. It mentioned896 that a proper exercise of the 
power in terms of section 26(1A) of the Estates Act would lead to the executor paying 
maintenance to the surviving spouse while dealing with the maintenance claim. The 
court in Banjatwa v Maintenance Officer for the district of Butterworth897 also 
referred898 to the executor’s powers in section 26(1A). In a subsequent case dealing with 
the maintenance claim by a minor child against the estate of her deceased father, the 
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court in D v T899 held that the executor stepped into the shoes of the deceased and, 
while the estate is intact, the child’s claim lies against the executor. The court agreed 
with the remark in Banjatwa v Maintenance Officer for the district of Butterworth that 
section 26(1A) was specially designed to alleviate family hardship during the liquidation 
process. I do believe though that Costa’s suggestion for a specific provision for interim 
maintenance is valid, as it will provide clarity and guidance to the executor. 
 
A question that arises is whether the claim must be settled by way of a lump sum or by 
way of regular (for example, monthly) payments. The MSSA gives no direct guidance in 
this regard, but I am of the opinion that the wording of section 2(3)(d) does give some 
guidance. It provides that the agreement the executor is empowered to enter into with 
the survivor, heirs and legatees could include the transfer of assets to the survivor. I 
submit that this indicates that, although the focus of the MSSA is to provide for 
maintenance of the survivor, the executor does have the option to make a lump sum 
payment should it be more appropriate n the circumstances.  Sonnekus900 mentions that 
maintenance claims traditionally are periodical as they are supposed to only cover the 
claimant for the period for which they are given. In his discussion of Kruger v Goss901 he 
states902  that he is uncomfortable with a principle that future maintenance needs be 
settled by way of a lump sum. He refers to the Maintenance Act which defines903 a 
maintenance order as “any order for the payment, including the periodical payment, of 
sums of money towards the maintenance of any person …” and suggests904 that 
maintenance payments should always be periodical as the success of the claim would 
depend on the continuing need of the claimant and the continuing ability of the person 
paying maintenance.  
 
 
899 2016 (4) SA 571 (WCC).  
900 2010-4 TSAR 819. 
901 2010 (2) SA 507 (SCA). 
902 2010-3 TSAR 629. 
903 Section 16(2)(a). 




The nature of the maintenance claim was a key point in Feldman v Oshry.905 Mrs 
Feldman had claimed a lump sum award, as she argued that this was the most practical 
way of dealing with her claim. The executor, however, argued that a lump sum award 
was not competent. The judge in the High Court remarked906 that there were no 
reported decisions on the form a maintenance order in terms of the MSSA should take, 
but that the ordinary grammatical meaning of “maintain” includes the habitual practise 
of an action or the continuation of something. This means that there are elements of 
continuity and repetition. The judge therefore concluded907 that maintenance in terms 
of the MSSA should be by way of periodic payments and not a lump sum, unless the 
parties agreed to the latter. He also referred908 to policy concerns advocating against a 
lump sum – the estate could be exposed to risk as the spouse might die earlier than 
expected according to the mortality tables,909 or he or she might remarry despite 
assumptions to the contrary.910 In all such cases, the estate, and specifically the heirs, 
would be prejudiced. Conversely, the spouse might live longer than his her predicted life 
expectancy or inflation or the cost of living might increase unexpectedly, which in turn 
would leave him or her destitute as the capital amount of the maintenance award 
would be exhausted.911 This result would be in direct opposition to the provisions of the 
MSSA, which were specifically designed to avoid the surviving spouse being destitute.912 
All of these factors therefore justified periodical payments rather than a lump sum. The 
judge was however mindful that periodical payments would delay the finalisation of the 
estate and create uncertainty on the part of the executor as to the amount of the estate 
to be retained in order to fund the ongoing maintenance.913 He suggested914 that, rather 
than settling the claim with a lump sum, the solution was a negotiated agreement in 
 
905 [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD). 
906 At 20. 
907 At 22. 
908 At 23. 
909 At 23. 
910 At 24. 
911 At 24. 
912 At 24. 
913 At 24. 




terms of section 2(d) (sic)915 between all the parties in terms of which they settled on an 
amount. Based on the circumstances of the case, the judge held916 that the claim by Mrs 
Feldman for a lump sum was misconceived and neither competent nor called for. A 
monthly maintenance award was therefore made in Mrs Feldman’s favour until her 
death or remarriage, or until the order was otherwise varied, suspended, or discharged 
according to law.917  
 
Heaton918 criticises this finding that a lump sum award was not competent, as an award 
for periodic maintenance delays the finalisation of a deceased estate, especially in the 
event of a polygynous marriage where several surviving spouses lodge maintenance 
claims against the estate of their deceased husband. She suggests919 that the MSSA be 
amended to specifically empower the court to make a lump sum maintenance award. 
 
This issue of the nature of the settlement of the claim has since been settled by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. In the appeal920 against Feldman v Oshry,921 Mrs Feldman 
submitted that the High Court’s ruling of a monthly maintenance award, rather than a 
lump sum, was wrong. In assessing her submission, the Supreme Court took a two-
legged approach to the issue of a lump sum:  
• Was the lump sum award competent; and 
• If so, was the lump sum award appropriate? 
On the issue of competence, the court held922 that the policy concerns referred to by 
the High Court did not prove an insurmountable obstacle. While not disputing the 
potential existence of such difficulties, the court held923 that the reference to “any other 
 
915 The reference to section 2(d) is incorrect as there is no such section – the correct section is 2(3)(d). 
916 At 33. 
917 At 35. 
918 “Family law” 2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 485. 
919 2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 485. 
920 Oshry v Feldman [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
921 [2009] JOL 23442 (KZD). See also 4.3.4. 
922 At 138. 




factor” in section 3 of the MSSA means that a court must consider all the circumstances 
of a matter to arrive at a just result. The additional administrative burden on the 
executor and the extra costs associated with a periodical payment would be other 
factors to consider.924 It referred925 to the report of the Master lodged with the High 
Court application, in which the Master stated that practicality dictated a once-off 
payment as the preferred settlement option, as periodical payments would delay the 
finalisation of the estate, which would prejudice the creditors and heirs. While I agree 
that the heirs would be prejudiced if the finalisation of the estate is delayed, I do not 
agree that periodical payments would necessarily prejudice the creditors – as provided 
for in section 2(3)(b) and discussed above, the maintenance claim does not rank equal 
to that of the creditors, so their claims would be settled before the maintenance claim is 
settled. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal accordingly held926 that the High Court had erred in 
finding that a lump sum was not competent. It referred927 to the provisions in section 
2(3)(d) of the MSSA that provide for an agreement between the interested (“affected”) 
parties and indicated that such settlement should be the order of the day, but 
suggested928 that such agreements were unlikely to happen as common sense is often 
lacking in disputed matters. I fully agree with this statement based on my experience in 
administration of estates and discussions with estates officers929 and suggest that in 
most cases an agreement between the interested parties would be unlikely. I am of the 
view that it is more likely that the heirs, rather than the spouse, would consent to an 
agreement in terms of which an amount is placed in trust for the funding of the 
survivor’s maintenance, as this could mean that there would be some surplus available 
for them when the survivor’s maintenance needs ceased. It is probably unlikely that the 
 
924 At 139. 
925 In fn 11. 
926 At 140. 
927 At 139. 
928 At 139. 




survivor would agree, as such an agreement would not allow him or her to receive a 
lump sum. While placing an obligation on the heirs may sound more viable, I would 
suggest that the heirs would probably wish to sever financial ties with the survivor, and 
they (and probably also the survivor) would be unlikely to agree to obligations being 
placed on them.930  
 
On the issue of appropriateness of a lump sum award, the court referred931 to the 
executors’ claim that a lump sum award was not appropriate in light of Mrs Feldman’s 
advanced age and the relatively modest estate of Mr Feldman. It held932 that by the 
time of the High Court judgment, four years had passed since Mr Feldman’s death and 
Mrs Feldman had not received any maintenance during that period. A further year had 
passed since the High Court judgment. If not for the contributions by her sons, Mrs 
Feldman would not have been able to maintain herself. Mr Feldman’s heirs on the other 
hand appeared to be persons of means.933 The court held934 that these observations, 
together with Mrs Feldman’s age and the limited size of the estate, did not justify 
periodical maintenance payments, as the arrear maintenance for the period since death 
would wipe out the entire estate. The court accordingly awarded a lump sum equal to 
the net value of the estate, after payment of liabilities and administration costs, to Mrs 
Feldman.935 
 
Sonnekus argues936 that the factors that led the court to decide that a lump sum was 
competent and appropriate, namely Mrs Feldman’s advanced age, the long period 
during which she received no maintenance and the limited extent of the estate, dictate 
against a lump sum. Mrs Feldman’s advanced age, for example, meant that there was a 
much bigger probability of death, in which case the balance of the lump sum would fall 
 
930 On the possible problems with the granting of a usufruct to the survivor, see also 8.3.4. 
931 At 139. 
932 At 139. 
933 At 140. 
934 At 140. 
935 At 143. 




into her estate and be available for the benefit of her heirs, which clearly was not the 
intention of the legislature.937 He suggests938 that a trust or limited interest such as a 
usufruct of right of occupation would be more appropriate in the case of an aged 
claimant.939 In an earlier article he suggests940 that the court should direct that the 
maintenance claim be paid into a trust from where the trustees must make periodic 
payments to the surviving spouse. In this way, the estate can be finalised, the lump sum 
maintenance will be protected from the creditors of the surviving spouse, and any 
residue that might still be available when the surviving spouse’s maintenance needs 
come to an end, will fall back into the estate of the person paying maintenance for 
distribution to his or her heirs. While I agree with the suggestion of a trust, I submit that 
Sonnekus’ reference to the residue falling back into the estate of the person paying 
maintenance is incorrect, especially in view of the comment that the estate should be 
finalised. I submit that the correct way of handling this would be to determine that the 
residual heirs of the deceased estate are the capital beneficiaries of the trust, who 
would on termination receive the remaining capital of the trust. The capital will 
therefore devolve directly on the beneficiaries without first having to fall back into the 
estate to be dealt with by the executor. I note though that Sonnekus in his later 
article941 discussing Oshry v Feldman942 indeed refers to a trust where the heirs of the 
first-dying spouse are named as capital beneficiaries after the demise of the surviving 
spouse. 
  
4.4.4 Duration of the claim 
 
Section 2(1)(a) provides that, where a marriage is dissolved by death, the survivor shall 
have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his or her 
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938 2010-4 TSAR 820. 
939 2010-4 TSAR 820. 
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reasonable maintenance needs until his or her death or remarriage (my emphasis), to 
the extent that he or she is not able to provide for such maintenance needs from own 
means and earnings.  
 
Corbett, Hofmeyr and Kahn suggest943 that the words “until his death” are unnecessary 
as the spouse can never be in need of maintenance after his or her death. Sonnekus944 
echoes this and states that this provision appears to be unnecessary, as it is obvious that 
maintenance cannot be paid for a person who is deceased. He suggests945 that the 
inclusion of these words is rather meant to reinforce the principle that the maintenance 
payment is intended to provide for the surviving spouse’s needs during his or her 
lifetime and should therefore last only for his or her lifetime. On the death of the 
survivor, there should, in theory, not be any unused funds left which will form part of his 
or her estate. He suggests946 that the legislation should include provisos to cater for a 
situation where a lump sum payment is made and an unused portion is left at the death 
of the surviving spouse, to ensure that such amount reverts to the first-dying spouse’s 
estate or his or her heirs. 
 
As indicated at the outset of this thesis,947 I agree that it would be equitable that the 
claim for maintenance should be reconsidered if the surviving spouse obtains another 
source of income and may no longer be in need as required, but the MSSA does not 
provide a mechanism to allow for reassessment of the claim where the liquidation and 
distribution account has already been accepted and assets have been transferred to the 
survivor in settlement of his or her maintenance claim.948 The situation could, however, 
be different if, instead of assets being transferred to the survivor, a right to assets is 
given to the survivor or an obligation is imposed on an heir or legatee in terms of an 
 
943 45 fn 98. 
944 1990-3 TSAR 503. 
945 1990-3 TSAR 503. 
946 1990-3 TSAR 503. 
947 See 1.2.4. 




agreement between the executor, survivor, heirs and legatees in terms of section 
2(3)(d). Sonnekus949 suggests that in such a scenario it should be possible for the claim 
to be reconsidered. I agree that this would be possible, because the assets would either 
still be part of the deceased estate and under the control of the executor, or the assets 
would have been transferred to the heirs of the estate, subject to some intervening 
right on behalf of the spouse or some other obligation placed on the heirs. If, for 
example, the spouse’s need is mainly for accommodation and the executor grants him 
or her a right of occupation in respect of an immovable property, this right could be re-
assessed if the spouse should, for example, inherit money which allows him or her to 
acquire alternative accommodation. It is essential that the agreement entered into 
provides the necessary mechanism to re-assess the claim if the surviving spouses’ 
circumstances should change. If the agreement is for the setting up of a trust, the trust 
deed should give the trustee/s the power (or discretion) to assess the survivor’s needs 
on an ongoing basis to ensure that no more is paid to him or her than required to cover 
his or her maintenance needs. Where the agreement is to transfer assets to the heirs or 
legatees with a limited interest to the surviving spouse, or to place the obligation of 
maintenance on the heirs or legatees, the agreement will have to provide for the right 
to reassess the claim, so that this can be registered as a condition against the title deeds 
of any immovable property.  
 
Sonnekus950 suggests that the Chief Master should consider issuing the following 
guidelines to executors: 
• No amounts should be paid to the survivor if it is possible to provide for his or 
her maintenance needs by some other means, for example a usufruct or right of 
occupation or use over the marital assets; 
• Should the abovementioned not be possible and the only option is to settle the 
maintenance claim by way of a transfer of assets to the survivor, the payment 
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should ideally be made to a trust established for that purpose. The monthly 
requirements of the survivor could be met from the trust and, on the survivor’s 
death or remarriage or the cessation of his or her maintenance needs for 
whatever other reason, the unused portion of the trust assets would fall back 
into the estate of the first-dying spouse and become available to his or her heirs.  
 
While I support the principle behind the suggestion of a trust and discuss this in more 
detail in chapter 8, I foresee a practical problem with the assets falling back into the 
estate of the first-dying spouse where the surviving spouse’s maintenance needs cease 
long after the deceased estate was finalised, especially if the executor has already been 
discharged from office.951 I would therefore rather suggest that the trust be set up in 
such a way that, on the survivor’s death or remarriage, or cessation of his or her 
maintenance needs, the trust shall terminate and the unused funds shall automatically 
devolve on the heirs of the first-dying spouse, whether testate or intestate.952 
 
A question that comes to mind when reading section 2(1) is whether the words “until 
his death or remarriage” mean that maintenance cannot be awarded for a shorter 
period. Costa953 comments that the use of these words seems to indicate that the 
legislature did not intend giving the executor the discretion to assess the surviving 
spouse’s circumstances and, where appropriate, to pay maintenance to him or her for a 
limited period of time only. This is in stark contrast with the Divorce Act which 
provides954 that maintenance can be paid “for any period until the death or remarriage 
of the party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event may first occur”.955 I 
would suggest that the reason why the MSSA does not give the executor the power to 
pay maintenance for a limited period only, is because the nature of a maintenance claim 
on death is different from a maintenance claim on divorce. In the event of a divorce, the 
 
951 In terms of section 56 of the Estates Act. 
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maintenance-paying former spouse is still alive, and the recipient spouse can approach 
the court for a revised maintenance order if his or her circumstances change after the 
limited period for which maintenance was granted.956 The same cannot happen in the 
event of death as the assets from which the maintenance claim could be met will have 
been transferred to the heirs of the estate and it would not be just and equitable to 
allow the surviving spouse to claim against the heirs if his or her circumstances should 
change after the limited period for which maintenance was granted. That being said, I 
agree with Costa’s view that maintenance for a limited period should be possible, and 
that there should be a practical way of dealing with this so that a lump sum calculated 
till the death of the survivor is not paid to the survivor. I submit that the words “until his 
death or remarriage” are not intended to convey a prescribed period, but rather to 
reflect the maximum period for which maintenance could apply. It should therefore be 
possible for the executor and the surviving spouse to agree to maintenance for a shorter 
period. 
 
As Costa957 rightly points out, the changed circumstances would not only relate to a 
scenario where the surviving spouse is in a better financial position, for example where 
he or she receives a substantial inheritance. It could also include a scenario where the 
spouse is negatively affected by changed circumstances, for example where inflation 
rates increase to such an extent that the original amount claimed by him or her 
becomes inadequate. The Divorce Act958 empowers a court to “rescind, vary or 
suspend” a maintenance order if it finds sufficient reason to do so. Costa suggests that 
the MSSA be amended to provide that the executor and surviving spouse are given the 
power to rescind or vary any periodic maintenance order. He also suggests that the 
Maintenance Act959 be amended to specifically provide for orders in terms of the MSSA.  
 
 
956 See section 8(1) of the Divorce Act. 
957 1990(272) De Rebus 534. 
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Sonnekus960 suggests that the Master’s offices should have a mechanism whereby the 
heirs could advise the Master of a change in the circumstances of the survivor so that 
the Master could instruct the executor to distribute the unused maintenance amongst 
the heirs. This would in all probability require the executor to claim the amount from 
the survivor in terms of the condictio indebiti.  I again foresee a practical problem if such 
a situation should occur long after the deceased estate was finalised, especially if the 
executor has already been discharged from office. It also cannot be accepted that the 
mere change in the survivor’s circumstances would necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that the claim must be adjusted. Somebody would have to investigate the changed 
circumstances and the impact they have on the claim and it is not clear where this 
responsibility would lie if the estate has already been finalised. 
 
Section 2(3)(d) provides that the agreement entered into between the interested parties 
could include the imposition of an obligation on an heir or legatee in settlement of the 
claim of the survivor. I assume that such an obligation would be similar to a scenario 
where the deceased spouse in his or her will bequeaths the estate (or part thereof) to 
an heir or legatee, subject to a condition that the heir or legatee must provide for the 
maintenance needs of the surviving spouse. This option would mean that the 
administration of the estate could be finalised without undue delay, with a reduced risk 
of the capital amount being paid to the spouse whose circumstances might change in his 
or her favour, but I am not convinced that it would be the most practical way to deal 
with the maintenance issue. What would, for example, happen if the heir does not fulfil 
the obligation to maintain the surviving spouse? If this happens after the estate has 
been finalised, the spouse would have to resort to legal action to enforce the obligation, 
which does not appear practical if we consider that the reason behind the imposition of 
the obligation is that the spouse does not have the means to fund his or her own 
maintenance needs. A person who cannot maintain him- or herself will surely not have 
the means to institute legal action. 
 




4.4.5 Dealing with the claim 
 
Section 2(3)(a) of the MSSA provides that the proof and disposal of the maintenance 
claim shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Estates Act.961 This 
means that the executor has to consider the claim and decide whether or not to allow it 
within the framework of the provisions962 of the Estates Act. I find it interesting that the 
court in Oshry v Feldman963 states964 that section 3 sets out the factors that a court (my 
emphasis) should consider in determining a surviving spouse’s reasonable maintenance 
needs as it is clear from the wording of section 2(3)(a) that the responsibility of 
assessing the claim is placed on the shoulders of the executor.965 
  
The surviving spouse must lodge his or her claim with the executor within the time 
frame provided in section 29 of the Estates Act966 and the executor must deal with the 
claim. As with every other creditor’s claim, the executor must carefully examine the 
claim to decide whether or not to accept it.967 Where deemed necessary, he or she may 
call on the surviving spouse to provide the necessary proof of the claim. In view of the 
fact that the MSSA provides that the claim is available if the surviving spouse’s own 
means and earnings do not cover his or her reasonable maintenance needs, it follows 
that the executor would need details of the spouse’s needs and proof of his or her own 
means and earnings. It would probably be prudent to ask for an affidavit from the 
surviving spouse in this regard, as well as substantiation of the spouse’s means and 
expenses. In terms of section 32(1) of the Estates Act, the executor may, if he or she 
disputes a claim, request the claimant to provide an affidavit in support of the claim. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English968 defines969 “dispute” as “to argue about” or 
 
961 See 2.5.2.6 for more details. 
962 Sections 32 and 33. 
963 [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
964 At 132. 
965 See also Sonnekus 2010-4 TSAR 813–814. 
966 See 2.5.2.4 for details of the time frame. 
967 Wood v Estate Thompson 1949 (1) SA 607 (D). 




“question the proof or validity of”, and it is my submission that the application of 
section 32(1) is not limited to a situation where the executor argues about the claim, 
but also applies to a situation where the executor needs more information about the 
claim in order to determine whether or not to accept it. In practice970 the claim is usually 
calculated by an actuary who takes into account the effects of inflation to ensure that 
the amount of the claim is sufficient to maintain the survivor for the duration of his or 
her life expectancy.971 Section 32(1) also provides that the executor may, with the 
consent of the Master, require the claimant or any other person who the Master feels 
may be in a position to give material information in respect of the claim, to appear 
before the Master or any magistrate or other Master nominated by the Master to be 
examined under oath in connection with the claim.972  
 
Once the executor has made a decision regarding the claim, any person who is not 
happy with the decision can lodge an objection with the Master.973 The Master has the 
power to decide on the objection974 – if the Master feels that the objection is well-
founded, he or she may direct the executor to amend the liquidation and distribution 
account or may give such other direction in connection with the account as he or she 
deems fit.975 If the objecting party is dissatisfied with the Master’s decision, he or she 
may apply to court for an order to set aside the Master’s decision.976 As stated in 
chapter 2,977 the Master cannot resolve a factual dispute between the surviving spouse 
and the heirs,978 and the objecting party may apply to court for an order where the 
Master has decided that it is a factual dispute that he or she cannot rule on.  
 
969 At 257. 
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The question must be asked whether the average executor has the necessary skill and 
expertise to consider whether the survivor’s maintenance claim is reasonable. 
Sonnekus979  points out (correctly in my opinion) that the guidelines in the MSSA are not 
very helpful and the executor to a large extent must use his or her own judgement when 
considering the claim. As decisions of executors do not form precedents and have no 
binding authority, legal certainty would only exist where individual cases came before a 
court for decision or where the Chief Master issues a general guideline to assist the 
executor.980 All other cases will be left to the discretion of the executor in the specific 
estate. Sonnekus981 suggests that this places an additional burden on the executor, as he 
or she would have to consider the survivor’s actuarial claim. The approach followed by 
the court in Seidel v Lipschitz982 indicates the extent to which an executor must go to 
assess a claim. Having been involved with the administration of deceased estates, I can 
attest to the fact that an actuarial claim is of a technical nature and difficult to assess 
and requires a certain level of knowledge that I do not believe the average executor 
possesses.983 In my discussions with estates officers,984 it also appears that maintenance 
claims are often lodged without sufficient supporting documentation, which makes it 
even more difficult for the executor to assess the reasonableness of the claim. 
 
In Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic)985 the executor had accepted 
a claim by the surviving spouse for maintenance in terms of the MSSA. One of the heirs 
lodged an objection against the liquidation and distribution account. The Master, after 
some delay, advised that it did not fall within his area of expertise to determine whether 
the spouse qualified for maintenance and, if so, what an appropriate amount would be. 
He ruled that the objecting party should follow the process provided for in section 35(9) 
 
979 1990-3 TSAR 504. 
980 Sonnekus 1990-3 TSAR 504.  
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and (10) of the Estates Act. The objecting party approached the court for assistance. The 
court held986 that the information presented to it to determine if the surviving spouse 
was in need of maintenance, was incomplete, as a proper actuarial claim was not 
included. It held that such a calculation is of cardinal importance as it would enable the 
court to determine and quantify the spouse’s needs. The court therefore held987 that 
the attack on the survivor’s claim was understandable as it “lacked a proper calculation 
and computation”. The court held988 that it would serve no purpose to refer the matter 
back to the Master in view of these circumstances and found that it should be referred 
to evidence as the matter could not be decided on the basis of the papers presented to 
court. 
 
Costa989 is especially critical of the fact that the MSSA allows for the maintenance claim 
to be dealt with in terms of the Estates Act, as he suggests that the Master’s office is not 
equipped to deal with claims of this nature. He argues990 that a rejection by the 
executor of a claim by a surviving spouse could lead to litigation, which would delay the 
settlement of the claim and the liquidation and distribution of the deceased estate. I 
agree with Costa. A quick analysis of the cases referred to in this chapter reveals 
significant delays in the consideration and settling (or not) of the maintenance claims. In 
Oosterbroek v Grobler991 the date of death was 18 May 2002. The judgment confirming 
that the surviving spouse was entitled to maintenance was given on 20 September 2004. 
In Oshry v Feldman992 the date of death was 3 May 2005. The High Court hearing was on 
6 December 2007 and the judgment given on 14 April 2009. The judgment in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was given on 19 August 2010.  In Jewaskewitz v Master of the 
High Court Polekwane (sic)993 judgment was given on 16 May 2013, three years and 
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eight months after the death of the first-dying spouse. In Friedrich v Smit994 the date of 
death was 17 September 2006, and the judgment was only given on 13 October 2015. 
The only instance in which judgment was given relatively soon after the date of death 
was Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk,995 where a period of only one year elapsed between the 
date of death and the judgment. Despite this relatively short period, one year is an 
unacceptably long period from the perspective of a surviving spouse who does not have 
the means to maintain him- or herself. 
 
Costa996 is of the view that there is a solution for this – he suggests that Uniform Rule 43 
of the Supreme Court (now the High Court) relating to interim maintenance applications 
pending divorce proceedings997 should be applied until the maintenance claim under the 
MSSA can be settled by a maintenance officer in terms of the Maintenance Act. He 
acknowledges that this could lead to practical issues such as insufficient staffing and 
time delays, but suggests998 that it makes more sense to staff the maintenance courts, 
as they are better equipped to deal with maintenance claims than the Master’s office. I 
believe there is merit in Costa’s view, but submit that it should be unnecessary to report 
to a court if the MSSA provides a better mechanism to deal with settlement of the claim. 
This aspect is discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
 
The maintenance claim will have an impact on the balance of assets available in the 
estate to distribute to the heirs, so it is at least theoretically possible that the claimant 
and heirs will have opposing interests. One of the parties (if not both) may feel 
aggrieved by the executor’s decision and may bring into question the executor’s 
objectivity. If the executor accepts the survivor’s claim, it is possible that the heirs may 
feel prejudiced. Similarly, if the executor rejects the survivor’s claim, or accepts it at a 
 
994 [2015] 4 All SA 805 (GP). 
995 [2011] 2 All SA 635 (KZP). 
996 1990(272) De Rebus 534. 
997 This rule provides spouses with a mechanism that can be used during the interim period until a divorce 
is finalised. It relates inter alia to interim maintenance for the spouse and/or children. Rule 58 of the 
Magistrate’s court contains a similar provision. 




reduced amount, he or she might feel aggrieved. The executor is placed in a position 
where he or she effectively has to make a judgement on whether items claimed by the 
survivor as expenses, for example entertainment, clothing accounts, cosmetics, pet 
food, gifts, newspapers and magazines, cell phone contracts, and the wages or salaries 
of domestic workers and gardeners999 can be regarded as reasonable. It is my 
submission that few executors are equipped to make such decisions.  
 
Where the executor is also an heir or creditor in the estate, the issue of objectivity and 
impartiality plays a pivotal role. In Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk1000 the court dealt with an 
application to have the executor of a deceased estate removed from her office in terms 
of section 54(1)(a)(v) of the Estates Act. The executor was the former wife of the 
deceased and also the sole heir of his estate. The executor resisted the maintenance 
claim lodged by the surviving spouse against the deceased estate. The court held1001 
that an executor is obliged to exercise the powers granted in sections 32 and 33 of the 
Estates Act and to assess the merits of all claims “on a fair consideration of all the facts 
and its legal merits”. It held1002 that it would not be proper for the executor to reject 
claims against the estate unless he or she had some good reason to do so. If however, 
after a fair consideration of the claim, the executor found that there were grounds to 
dispute the claim, it would be proper for the executor to resist the claim.1003 The court 
also held1004 that the mere fact that an executor resists a claim, “even on fairly flimsy 
reasons”, will not be grounds to suggest that he or she is not properly fulfilling the 
duties as executor. It is only where it is clear from the executor’s conduct that he or she 
is using the office of executor to resist claims, regardless of their merits and without any 
“fair-minded” consideration, that the executor’s removal in terms of section 54(1)(a)(v) 
 
999 These expenses were referred to in Oosterbroek v Grobler [2005] JOL 14792 (W). 
1000 [2011] 2 All SA 635 (KZP). 
1001 At 640. 
1002 At 640. 
1003 At 640. 




of the Estates Act will be considered.1005 The judge mentioned that this will particularly 
be the case where it appears that the executor’s motive for his or her conduct is to 
obtain a financial benefit in his or her capacity as heir.1006 The court ordered that the 
executor be removed from office as her conduct had demonstrated that she was 
incapable of exercising the required level of impartiality and treating the MSSA claim 
fairly.  
 
In Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic)1007 the court considered 
whether the Master’s conclusion that he could not decide whether the surviving spouse 
qualified for maintenance as provided for by the MSSA, as the determination of the 
amount was not within his area of expertise, was a competent direction in terms of the 
provisions of section 35(9) of the Estates Act.1008 It commented1009 that the Master is 
not a judicial officer and could not on the basis of the facts be expected to adjudicate 
whether a maintenance claim should be allowed or rejected, as this would not be fair or 
in the interests of justice.1010 The court accordingly held1011 that the Master was entitled 
to refer the matter to a court for adjudication. The court then considered the factors in 
section 3 of the MSSA and held that the only way it would be in a position to consider 
the survivor’s claim was if an actuarial calculation was provided to enable it to 
determine and quantify the needs of the survivor.1012 Such a calculation had not been 
made available and the court held1013  that, rather than referring it back to the Master 
for a decision, the matter should be referred to evidence “to ensure a just and 
expeditious decision”. Based on my personal experience in the administration of 
 
1005 At 640. 
1006 At 640. See also De Waal “The law of succession (including the administration of estates) and trusts” 
2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 1054. 
1007 Unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013. 
1008 See 2.5.2.9 for a detailed discussion of this section.  
1009 Par 8. 
1010 See also Broodryk v Die Meester 1991 (4) SA 825 (C); Ferreira v Die Meester 2001 (3) SA 365 (O); 
LAWSA vol 31 “Wills and succession” 453. 
1011 Par 9. 
1012 Par 14. 




estates, informal discussions with estates officers, the views of Costa and the views 
expressed in Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic),1014  it is my 
submission that the average executor does not have the required skill and expertise to 
assess whether a claim for maintenance is reasonable. 
 
4.4.6  No right of recourse 
 
The MSSA provides1015 that the survivor has no right of recourse against any person to 
whom money or property was paid, delivered or transferred in terms of section 
34(11)1016 or 35(12)1017 of the Estates Act or pursuant to an instruction of the Master in 
terms of section 18(3)1018 or 25(1)(a)(ii)1019 of the said Act. This means that, where the 
survivor’s maintenance claim is not lodged before the estate falls open for distribution, 
or if it is lodged but not accepted and he or she fails to take any further steps in this 
regard, he or she has no recourse once the estate has been distributed in terms of any 
of the aforementioned sections.1020 In a solvent deceased estate, the estate falls open 
for distribution once the liquidation and distribution account has lain open for 
inspection by interested parties.1021 Once the executor has distributed any asset of the 
deceased estate in accordance with the liquidation and distribution account, the 
survivor cannot use the condictio indebiti as it does not apply against an heir or 
legatee.1022 The reason for this was explained in the Law Commission Report, where it 
 
1014 Unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAHPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013. 
1015 Section 2(2). 
1016 This section applies to payments to creditors and distributions to heirs in an insolvent deceased 
estate. 
1017 This section applies to payments to creditors and distributions to heirs in a solvent deceased estate. 
1018 This section applies where the value of the estate does not exceed R250 000: see 4.3.2.  
1019 This section applies where the deceased is not resident in South Africa at the time of his or her death 
and owns no property other than movable property in South Africa. The Master may, subject to 
certain provisions that are not relevant for this discussion, appoint an executor to liquidate and 
distribute the estate and give directions as to the manner in which it shall be done. 
1020 Heaton & Kruger 118. 
1021 See 2.5.2.7 and 2.5.2.8 for more details of the time frame within which the account should be lodged 
and the inspection period. 




was noted1023 that the provision that a minor child who has a claim for maintenance can 
claim maintenance from an heir or legatee to whom payment was made from the 
estate, even after the estate has been distributed in terms of the liquidation and 
distribution account,1024 is a drastic rule which can prejudice an heir or legatee. In the 
case of a minor child this rule could be justified, but the Commission felt1025 that a 
surviving spouse who unreasonably delays lodging a claim for maintenance against the 
estate probably does not have a serious need for support, and a right of recourse would 
therefore not be justified. It also felt that, where the need for maintenance only arose 
after the death of the other spouse, legal certainty and equity dictated that the 
surviving spouse should not be able to claim from the heirs or legatees to whom a valid 
distribution had been made.1026 It therefore felt that a provision in the MSSA precluding 
a right of recourse against anyone to whom a valid distribution had been made should 
be sufficient. As Keyser1027 points out, although the MSSA does not prescribe a time 
limit within which the claim must be lodged, the lack of a right of recourse will serve as 
an incentive for the surviving spouse to lodge the claim as soon as reasonably possible 
after the spouse’s death. 
 
As noted above,1028 the MSSA does not provide a mechanism whereby the maintenance 
claim can be re-assessed if the circumstances of the survivor change to such an extent 
that it impacts on the quantum of the maintenance claim. If the survivor’s claim is 
therefore accepted by the executor and the distribution of the deceased estate is 
effected accordingly, the survivor cannot at a later stage act against a creditor or heir of 
the estate if his or her circumstances change to such an extent that the amount or 
assets received in settlement of his or her claim is insufficient.   
 
 
1023 Par 6.23. 
1024 Bank v Sussman 1968 (2) SA 15 (O); Couper v Flynn 1975 (1) SA 778 (R). 
1025 Par 6.23. 
1026 Par 6.24. 
1027 “Maintenance of surviving spouses” 1990(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 5. 




4.4.7 Order of preference of the claim 
 
A claim by the surviving spouse in terms of the MSSA ranks in the same order of 
preference in relation to other claims against the estate as the claim for maintenance of 
a dependent child.1029 A claim of a dependent child is subordinate to the claims of the 
creditors of the estate1030 and it therefore follows that the claim by the surviving spouse 
is also subordinate to the claims of creditors. The claims of the creditors must therefore 
be settled before any claim for maintenance by a dependent child or the surviving 
spouse can be settled. This order of preference is based on the fact that claims by 
creditors are generally in respect of monies already owing to them at the time of death, 
whereas the minor child or surviving spouse’s claim is in respect of maintenance 
requirements that only originate after the death of the deceased parent or spouse.1031 
As a result of the same order of preference, the claims of the minor child or children and 
the surviving spouse must be reduced proportionately if there are insufficient assets to 
settle the claims in full.1032 As Corbett, Hofmeyr and Kahn1033 mention, this provision is 
in accordance with established practice where there is competition between the claim 
for maintenance of a dependent child and the claim for maintenance of a former spouse 
under a divorce order that continues because the order does not expressly provide that 
it comes to an end on the death of the maintenance debtor.  
 
In view of the fact that the definition of “survivor” includes a spouse of a customary 
marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage entered into by the husband to 
another woman, and the fact that the RCMA confers full legal recognition on de facto 
 
1029 Section 2(3)(b); Oosterbroek v Grobler [2005] JOL 14792 (W). 
1030 Shearer v Shearer 1911 CPD at 819; Ex parte PittKennedy’s Estate 1946 NPD 776; In re Estate Visser 
1948 (3) SA 1129 (C); Ex parte Insel 1952 (1) SA 71 (T); Ex parte Zietsman: In re Estate Bastard 1952 
(2) SA 16 (C); Lloyd v Menzies 1956 (2) SA 97 (N); Christie v Estate Christie 1956 (3) SA 659 (N); Oshry v 
Feldman [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA); Abrie et al 113. 
1031 Carelse v Estate de Vries (1906) SC 532; In re Estate Visser 1948 (3) SA 1129 (K); Glazer v Glazer 1963 
(4) SA 694 (A) 706–707; Beinart 1958 Acta Juridica 106–110; Sonnekus 1990-3 TSAR 504. 
1032 Section 2(3)(b); Oosterbroek v Grobler [2005] JOL 14792 (W) at 12; LAWSA vol 16 “Marriage” 108; vol 
31 “Wills and succession” 452. 




polygynous customary marriages, there is of course the possibility that there could be 
more than one spouse who claims maintenance from the estate.1034 Should this happen 
and there are insufficient assets in the estate to settle the claims of all the spouses, the 
claims will be reduced proportionately. The same will apply if there are competing 
claims by a minor child or children and multiple spouses. Roux1035 makes a brief 
reference to a question about the constitutionality of this order of preference when a 
spouse (or spouses) and a minor child have claims but does not discuss it any further. 
This is an interesting question but falls outside the scope of this thesis and will therefore 
not be discussed. 
 
4.4.8 Conflict of interest 
 
Where the surviving spouse is in need of maintenance and is also the parent of a minor 
child of the deceased, it is quite conceivable that his or her position as spouse could be 
in conflict with his or her position as guardian of the minor child. The SA Law 
Commission Report1036 noted that a question had been raised as to whether provision 
should be made for the appointment of a curator ad litem to represent the minor 
children’s interests in such cases. The Commission felt that the surviving spouse in such 
a case would in any event be liable for the support of the minor children and his or her 
interests and those of the children would therefore coincide. It accordingly 
concluded1037 that there was no need to make specific arrangements in this regard. 
 
Although the MSSA contains no specific reference to the appointment of a curator ad 
litem to protect a minor child’s interest, it does contain a provision that applies to such a 
scenario. Section 2(3)(c) provides that, in the event of a conflict between the interest of 
the survivor in his or her capacity as claimant and his or her capacity as guardian of a 
 
1034 See 5.1-5.3 for a detailed discussion of “spouse” and “survivor”. 
1035 2013(536) De Rebus 228. 
1036 Par 6.8. 




minor dependent child, the Master may defer the survivor’s claim for maintenance until 
the court has decided on the claim. It is not clear exactly what is envisaged by a 
deferment of the claim, but it appears evident from the reference to “the court” that 
the claim shall in such an instance be determined by a court of law. It is, however, not 
clear whether the Master should refer the claim to the court, or whether the executor 
should do so.  Costa1038 mentions that deferment of the claim may cause severe 
hardship, which is contrary to the intention of the legislature. I assume that this 
comment should be seen in light of his earlier reference1039 to the Master’s office not 
being equipped to deal with maintenance claims – if this is indeed the case, it could 
probably be expected that the Master would refer most such instances for a decision by 
the court, which would add significant delays to the process and have significant cost 
implications. I am not aware of any instance where the Master has done this and it 
appears that the Master in practice seldom follows this route.1040  
 
The MSSA fails to recognise other potential conflicts of interest that the executor may 
face or to provide guidance for dealing with such conflicts. An executor who is also the 
surviving spouse of the deceased would have a conflict of interest if he or she instituted 
a claim under the MSSA. A conflict would also arise if the executor was a beneficiary 
under the deceased’s will or in terms of the intestacy rules, or if the executor was a 
relative of the surviving spouse or a beneficiary.  In Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk1041 the 
executor was the sole heir of the estate. The court, in an application to have the 
executor removed from her office, found that she had demonstrated that she was 
incapable of exercising the required level of impartiality and treating the MSSA claim by 
the surviving spouse fairly. The court accordingly ordered that the executrix be removed 
from her office.  
 
 
1038 1990(272) De Rebus 534. 
1039 See 4.4.5. 
1040 See 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 for a detailed discussion of interviews with estates officers and practitioners.  






The MSSA places an onerous responsibility on the executor. He or she must not only 
examine the maintenance claim to determine its validity but must also decide whether 
the survivor’s needs as claimed, are reasonable. There is no indication in the 
Parliamentary debates why Parliament chose to place the responsibility on the 
executor, but the Law Commission discussed this point in some detail.1042 It concluded 
that the Estates Act contained an established procedure for dealing with claims and 
there was no reason to provide for a special procedure to deal with maintenance claims 
by the surviving spouse. In terms of this procedure, the survivor would still have the 
option to approach a court of law if he or she was dissatisfied with the way in which the 
executor dealt with the claim. By having a court of law as a last resort in the event of a 
dispute only, unnecessary costs and a delay in the winding up of the deceased estate 
could be avoided. This was regarded as a practical approach, especially as the Law 
Commission viewed the incidence of surviving spouses being left indigent as the 
exception and therefore did not anticipate many such claims.1043   
 
As already indicated, I am of the opinion that the average executor does not have the 
skills or mechanisms to decide whether a maintenance claim is reasonable. As referred 
to in Oosterbroek v Grobler,1044 there are very few court cases that deal with the 
maintenance claim in terms of the MSSA and most of the decided cases deal with the 
status of relationships other than marriage.1045 The cases mentioned in this chapter are 
the only ones I could find on the actual maintenance claim and there is accordingly very 
little guidance in case law for the executor. If, as the court found in Jewaskewitz v 
 
1042 South African Law Commission Review of the law of succession: the introduction of a legitimate 
portion or the granting of a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse Project 22, par 6.18-6.22. 
1043 Par 6.20. 
1044 [2005] JOL 14792 (W). 




Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic),1046 the Master is not a judicial officer and 
cannot be expected to determine whether a claim for maintenance should, on 
consideration of the facts and the law, be allowed or rejected, I have to question on 
what basis the average executor is expected to make such a determination. The 
approach of the Master and the court to a claim under the MSSA was highlighted in 
Friedrich v Smit.1047 The surviving spouse lodged a claim against the estate of her 
deceased spouse. The heirs nominated in the deceased’s will were of the view that her 
claim, amounting to approximately 64 percent of the estate value, was disproportionate 
to the amount payable to them as heirs, and that the amount claimed could not be 
justified. They accordingly lodged an objection against the liquidation and distribution 
account in which the claim was reflected. The Master sustained the objection but 
indicated that the objection lacked sufficient information to determine the quantum of 
the claim and that it had to be agreed on by the parties or by a relevant court. The heirs 
approached the High Court in terms of section 35(10) of the Estates Act for an order 
setting aside the Master’s finding, substituting it with an order sustaining the objection 
and an order that the liquidation and distribution account be amended to remove the 
claim by the surviving spouse.  The court1048 stated that there was no evidence on which 
it could find the reasonable maintenance to which the surviving spouse would be 
entitled, yet it held that the surviving spouse was entitled to reasonable maintenance. It 
did, however, hold that it could not determine the amount of the claim as there was 
insufficient information at its disposal. The heirs appealed to the Full Court,1049 which 
agreed with the trial court that the surviving spouse was at least entitled to some level 
of maintenance from the deceased estate, even though she had not proven that she 
was entitled to maintenance. In a surprising ruling, it set aside the order of the trial 
court and substituted it with an order that the Master’s decision be reviewed and set 
aside, and the matter remitted to the Master to determine the quantum of the claim.  It 
 
1046 Unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013 at 
par 8. 
1047 [2015] 4 All SA 805 (GP). 
1048 [A1056/2013] ZAGPPHC 1006. 




is not clear why the court was of the view that the Master should determine the 
quantum, especially in light of the fact that the Master had initially indicated that there 
was insufficient information for it to determine the amount. The matter was taken on 
appeal1050 and the court held that both the trial court and the Full Court erred in their 
approach to the matter – as both found that the surviving spouse had not provided 
evidence that she was entitled to reasonable maintenance, there was no basis for the 
orders granted by them.  
 
This case is a good indication of the difficult position an executor is in when having to 
assess a claim under the MSSA and I believe it supports my suggestion that the average 
executor should not be expected to be able to assess such claims. The MSSA also does 
not give sufficient guidance to executors, and the lack of court cases on this matter 
means that there is relatively little legal certainty. In addition, judgments such as Oshry v 
Feldman1051 make it even more difficult for the executor to properly execute the duties 
attached to his or her office. Sonnekus1052 is of the opinion that the reason for the 
relative lack of reported judgments on the MSSA may be that section 3(a) provides that 
the proof and disposal of a maintenance claim are to be dealt with in terms of the 
Estates Act. The executor has to decide whether a claim is valid and the lack of reported 
judgments indicates that claims are being dealt with satisfactorily by the executors.1053 I 
have a contrary view. Having dealt with the administration of deceased estates, I am 
inclined to think that the lack of judgments has more to do with financial reality than 
general satisfaction with the way in which claims are handled by the executor. It is in all 
likelihood rather a result of dissatisfied parties choosing not to fight a decision by the 
executor in a court of law, than of satisfaction by the way in which the maintenance 
claim is being dealt with. A survivor who truly does not have the means to maintain him- 
or herself is unlikely to have the means to litigate if the executor denies his or her claim 
 
1050 Van Rooyen Friedrich v Louw Smit 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA). 
1051 [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
1052 2010-4 TSAR 813. 




or accepts it at a reduced amount. The lack of litigation is therefore in itself not absolute 
proof that executors are dealing with the claims in a satisfactory manner. These issues 
are explored in more detail in chapter 7. 
 
As indicated in chapter 1, the practical application of the MSSA is not without problems. 
It is evident from the discussion in this chapter, that there are certain key aspects of the 
MSSA that could lead to issues, namely the meaning of reasonable maintenance, the 
perceived uncertainty as to whether the claim can be settled by way of a lump sum 
payment, the lack of a mechanism to recover unutilised funds on the death or 
remarriage of the survivor, the role of the executor in assessing and determining the 
claim, especially if he or she has a conflict of interest, and the inconsistent approach by 
the courts when dealing with different relationships. I will consider these aspects in 
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The MSSA affords a maintenance claim to a “survivor”, which is defined in terms of 
marriage and it is therefore important to determine which relationships qualify as 
marriages in our law and which do not. The previous chapter dealt with relationships 
that qualify as marriages and in this chapter, I discuss relationships that are not fully 
recognised as marriages. Some of these relationships have been brought into the ambit 
of the MSSA, although these relationships are not fully recognised marriages. I will 
explain in this chapter which of the unrecognised marital relationships and non-marital 
relationships fall within the ambit of the MSSA and discuss how this state of affairs came 
about. 
 
The family as a unit has traditionally been regarded as the cornerstone of society.1054 
Family law recognises the importance of the family as a social unit worthy of protection. 
The concept of family has, however, evolved from the so-called “nuclear” family of 
married parents with children to several other forms of family.1055 Although the family 
as an institution is not protected in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
19961056 (hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”), the Constitutional Court has 
recognised it as a vital and important social institution that comes in many different 
shapes and sizes. In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home 
 
1054 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 4. 
1055 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 4; De Waal “The social and economic foundations of the law of succession” 
1997(8)2 Stell LR 164. 
1056 108 of 1996; Robinson “An overview of the provisions of the South African Bill of Rights with specific 





Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs, (“Dawood”)1057 the court indicated that one 
form of family may not be entrenched at the expense of other forms, when it stated:1058 
“Marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance. … Such relationships are of 
profound significance to the individuals concerned. But such relationships have more than 
personal significance at least in part because human beings are social beings whose humanity is 
expressed through their relationships with others. Entering into marriage therefore is to enter 
into a relationship that has public significance as well. The institutions of marriage and the family 
are important social institutions that provide for the security, support and companionship of 
members of our society and bear an important role in the rearing of children. The celebration of 
a marriage gives rise to moral and legal obligations, particularly the reciprocal duty of support 
placed upon spouses and their joint responsibility for supporting and raising children born of the 
marriage. These legal obligations perform an important social function. This importance is 
symbolically acknowledged in part by the fact that marriage is celebrated generally in a public 
ceremony, often before family and close friends. The importance of the family unit for society is 
recognised in the international human rights instruments referred to above when they state that 
the family is the ‘natural’ and ‘fundamental’ unit of our society. However, families come in many 
shapes and sizes. The definition of the family also changes as social practices and traditions 
change. In recognising the importance of the family, we must take care not to entrench particular 
forms of family at the expense of other forms.” 
 
Before 1994 South African law defined1059 “family” as a man and woman in a valid civil 
marriage, together with their children. Civil marriage had two key elements – it was a 
monogamous union between two persons of the opposite sex1060 and it was concluded 
in terms of the Marriage Act.1061 The Marriage Act has been in operation since 1 January 
1962 but has never defined the concept of “marriage”.1062 Our courts have therefore 
been forced to refer to the common law to define a marriage when confronted with a 
situation where doubt exists as to the validity in our law of a union between two 
 
1057 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
1058 At 858. 
1059 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) 36; Du 
Plessis v The Road Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) 12; Heaton & Kruger 3; Skelton & Carnelley 
(eds) 5, 167; Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 463. 
1060  Ex parte Soobiah: In re Estate Pillay [1948] 2 All SA 76 (N); Heaton & Kruger 3. 
1061  25 of 1961. 




persons.1063 An example of this can be seen in Ismail v Ismail1064 where the court held 
that a “marriage” solemnised in accordance with Islamic rites is not a valid marriage as it 
was not solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act. The court also stated that “…under 
our law, a marriage is the legally recognised voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others whilst it lasts …”.1065 Although the Marriage Act 
does not contain a definition for “marriage”, section 30 of the Act prescribes that the 
marriage officer must pose to each of the prospective spouses the default question 
whether they take each other “as lawful wife” or “as lawful husband” (as the case may 
be).  
 
If consideration is given to the definition developed by the courts and the prescribed 
question to be asked by the marriage officer, it indicates that some relationships that 
fall outside the definition developed by the court were not traditionally regarded as 
marriages. These relationships are: 
• A customary marriage concluded in terms of culture-based “customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South 
Africa”.1066 A customary marriage is potentially polygynous1067 as it allows the 
man to be married to more than one woman simultaneously.1068 As such a 
marriage does not comply with the common law understanding of marriage as a 
monogamous union between one man and one woman, South African law 
historically did not recognise it as a valid marriage, except for certain limited 
purposes, which are not relevant for purposes of this thesis. Our law has, 
however, changed in this regard as the RCMA now extends full legal recognition 
 
1063 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 168. 
1064 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
1065 At 1019 (H). See also Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302. 
1066 This is the definition of “customary marriage” and “customary law” in section 1 of the RCMA. 
1067 The term “polygyny” refers to the practice in terms of which a husband is allowed to take more than 
one wife. See Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 470 fn 48. 




to customary marriages, whether monogamous or polygynous, and whether 
entered into before or after the RCMA;1069  
• Marriages in terms of religious rites that permit polygyny – the most common 
instances in South Africa are Muslim marriages and Hindu marriages;  
• Same-sex partnerships – the reference to “one man and one woman” clearly 
excludes same-sex couples; 
• Heterosexual partnerships between couples who choose to live together as 
husband and wife without entering into a marriage – although complying with 
the “one man and one woman” part of the marriage “definition”, these 
relationships were also excluded from the consequences of marriage as they 
were not solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act.  
 
When the Interim Constitution1070 with its Bill of Rights1071 and later also the 
Constitution came into operation, it brought far-reaching implications for family law.1072 
The Bill of Rights applies to all law and the executive and judicial organs of state are 
bound by it.1073 The operation of the Bill of Rights between the state and its subjects is 
referred to as vertical application. Section 8(2) of the Constitution, however, provides 
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights also operate horizontally, in that they bind a 
juristic or natural person if, and to the extent that, they are applicable. At least some of 
the rights that are guaranteed in the Bill of Rights enjoy horizontal application.1074  
 
For purposes of this thesis the most important constitutionally guaranteed rights are: 
• The right to equality entrenched in section 9. This section states that everyone is 
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
 
1069 Botha et al 70; Heaton & Kruger 217; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 180; Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 473; 
Maithufi “MM v MN 2010 (4) SA 286 (GNP)” 2012(45)2 De Jure 405. 
1070 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (“the Interim Constitution”). 
1071 The first Bill of Rights was contained in chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution and the current Bill of 
Rights is contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1072 Sinclair & Heaton 206. 
1073 Section 8(1). 




law. Section 9(3) expressly prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of inter 
alia marital status, sexual orientation, religion and culture; 
• The right to human dignity entrenched in section 10; 
• The right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion entrenched in section 15. 
 
These rights, although guaranteed, are not absolute – in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution they may be limited if the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. As pointed out 
by the South African Law Reform Commission1075 in its Discussion Paper on domestic 
partnerships, the need to harmonise family law with the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
and the constitutional values of equality and dignity requires a balancing act.  
 
With the introduction of the Bill of Rights our law had to redefine the concept of 
“family”, and the so-called “constitutional family” became part of the judicial and 
legislative landscape.1076 Our courts have had to consider this concept both in the 
context of family law and the law of succession.1077 The growing acceptance of different 
forms of family life can be seen in the legal recognition that has to date, both by 
legislation and the courts, been afforded to relationships that are not based on a civil 
marriage.1078 Although the Bill of Rights does not provide for a fundamental right to 
marry, the inclusion of a right to equality and a prohibition against discrimination based 
on certain grounds have led to several judgments that extend the rights and privileges 
of spouses in civil marriages to partners in other types of relationships. There have also 
been changes to several pieces of legislation. These developments, however, happened 
piecemeal.1079 What follows is a discussion of some of those relationships that are not 
recognised, or are only partially recognised, in our law and an analysis of how the 
 
1075 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 Domestic partnerships Project 118 
Pretoria, 2003. 
1076 Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 463. 
1077 Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 46. 
1078 Krüger “Appearance and reality: constitutional protection of the institutions of marriage and the 
family” 2003(66)2 THRHR 287. 




legislature and our courts have dealt with these relationships in the context of 
inheritance, maintenance or support in general, and the MSSA specifically. 
 
5.2  Religious marriages 
 
5.2.1  General 
 
The most common unrecognised religious marriages in South Africa are Muslim and 
Hindu marriages. As was the case with customary marriages, our law traditionally did 
not recognise marriages in terms of religious custom as legal marriages because they are 
not solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act and are potentially polygynous.1080 
Polygyny was regarded as being against public policy.1081 It appears that this approach 
to Muslim marriages can be traced back as far as 1860 when the court in Brown v Fritz 
Brown’s Executors1082 described Islamic marriages as “recognised concubinage”.1083 It 
should be noted that the term “polygamy” is often used in the context of Muslim 
marriages – Moosa1084 explains that this is because it is a gender neutral and generic 
term that covers both polygyny and polyandry.1085 Muslim law, however, permits only 
polygyny and a reference to “polygamy” in terms of Muslim law is therefore incorrect.  
 
The non-recognition of religious marriages was confirmed in several court cases, 
including Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal),1086 Vitamin Distributors v 
 
1080 Momeen v Bassa 1976 (4) SA 338 (D); Davids v The Master 1983 (1) SA 458 (C); Heaton & Kruger 241; 
Moosa in Heaton (ed) The law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa (2015) 
284; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 194. 
1081 Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 194. 
1082 1860 3 Searle 313. 
1083 South African Law Reform Commission Report on Islamic marriages and related matters Project 59 
Pretoria, 2000 fn 9 on 5. 
1084 “Polygynous Muslim marriages in South Africa: their potential impact on the incidence of HIV/AIDS” 
2009(12)3 PER/PELJ 65 fn 2. 
1085 A plurality of husbands. 
1086 1917 AD 302. In this case reference was made to the fact that a Muslim marriage was not regarded as 




Chungebryen,1087 Ex parte Soobiah: In re Estate Pillay,1088 Moola v Aulsebrook,1089 Ismail 
v Ismail,1090 S v Johardien,1091 Solomons v Abrams,1092 Kalla v The Master.1093 
 
5.2.2 Legislative development 
 
Several Acts have been amended to include a provision that they apply to religious 
marriages,1094 for example the Births and Deaths Registration Act,1095 the definition of 
“domestic relationship” in the Domestic Violence Act,1096 and the definition of 
 
1087 1931 WLD 55. In this case the court regarded a woman married by Hindu rites as an unmarried 
woman. 
1088 [1948] 2 All SA 76 (N). The court in this case confirmed that a marriage was a union of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others. It further held that a valid marriage had to be 
preceded by, and performed with certain formalities, such as being entered into in front of a 
recognised official and that a religious marriage does not comply with these formalities. 
1089 1983 (1) SA 687 (N). The court held that Muslim marriages could qualify as putative marriages. This 
does not mean that the marriage is legal, but it does at least mean that some of the effects of a valid 
marriage apply to it. See also Sinclair 1981(98)4 SALJ 406. 
1090 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). The court held that a Muslim marriage and the contractual obligations that 
flowed from it could not be recognised and that there was no justification for deviating from the 
many decisions in which our courts refused to recognise polygamous unions or to give effect to the 
consequences of such unions. The court held further that the mere fact that a union is potentially 
polygamous renders it against public policy. It is interesting that, as mentioned by the court, at that 
time, less than two percent of the male Muslim population had more than one wife, which indicated 
that most Muslim marriages were in fact monogamous, and this means that a potentially polygynous 
union was therefore simply equated with a de jure polygynous union and not recognised as is 
evidenced by the decisions in Seedat’s Executors. See also Moosa 2009(12)3 PER/PELJ 71 in this 
regard. 
1091 1990 (1) SA 1026 (C). The court held that a Muslim marriage did not have all the attributes of a 
registered marriage as it was potentially polygamous. 
1092 1991 (4) SA 437 (W). In this case the court, contrary to Moola v Aulsebrook, held that a Muslim 
marriage could not qualify as a putative marriage. This was because a putative marriage could not 
come into existence unless the parties took part in a marriage ceremony performed by a marriage 
officer as defined in the Marriage Act and, prior to 2014, most Imams (Muslim religious leaders) did 
not apply to be appointed as marriage officers in terms of the Marriage Act. It should be noted that 
more than 100 Imams were officially appointed as marriage officers in terms of the Marriage Act on 
30 April 2014 after completing a course about the Marriage Act and writing an exam. The 
accreditation in terms of the Marriage Act enables Imams to officiate over marriage unions, which 
means that a monogamous Muslim marriage solemnised by an Imam duly registered as such in terms 
of the Marriage Act is therefore recognised as a valid civil marriage.  
1093 1995 (1) SA 261 (T). The court held at 266A-D that a Muslim marriage was invalid at common law 
because it was potentially polygamous and therefore offended the boni mores. 
1094 Heaton & Kruger 242; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 194. 
1095 51 of 1992 (section 1(2)). 




“marriage” in the Children’s Act.1097 Some Acts also contain sections that provide for 
their application to religious marriages, for example: 
• Section 9(1)(f) read with section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act1098 exempts 
immovable property inherited by a spouse in a religious marriage from the other 
spouse from transfer duty; 
• The EDA includes in the definition1099 of “spouse” a person in a union recognised 
as a marriage in terms of the tenets of any religion; 
• The ITA includes in the definition1100 of “spouse” a partner in a union recognised 
as a marriage in accordance with the tenets of a religion; 
• Section 3 of the Marriage Act allows the appointment of religious marriage 
officers to solemnise civil marriages according to certain religious rites, including 
“Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion”; 
• Section 5A of the Divorce Act provides that a court may refuse to grant an order 
of divorce if it is clear that one or both spouses will be unable to remarry unless 
the civil marriage is also dissolved according to the rules of the spouses’ religious 
law. 
 
5.2.3 Judicial development 
 
5.2.3.1 Monogamous Muslim marriages 
Since the introduction of the Bill of Rights, our courts have been forced to move away 
from the strict non-recognition of religious marriages.1101 The first such example was 
Ryland v Edros1102 where the court approached the matter by asking1103 whether, since 
the enactment of a post-democracy Constitution, a contract by parties in a factually 
 
1097 38 of 2005. 
1098 40 of 1949. 
1099 Section 1. 
1100 Section 1. 
1101 Moosa in Heaton (ed) 287; Breslaw “Muslim spouses: are they ‘equally’ married?” 2013(537) De Rebus 
246. 
1102 [1996] 4 All SA 557 (C). 




monogamous marriage relationship entered into by them in terms of the rites of their 
religion, can still be held to be contrary to the accepted norms and usages which are 
regarded as morally binding on all members of our society. It held1104 that it could not 
and that courts should only label a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive 
to the values shared by the larger community and not just by one part of the 
community. It held1105 that the meaning of common law concepts such as boni mores 
and public policy should be informed by basic constitutional values such as freedom and 
equality. The court accordingly held1106 that the judgment in Ismail v Ismail was based 
on the views of only one group of South African society, which was unacceptable.1107 It 
held further1108 that the values of equality, tolerance of diversity and recognition of the 
plural nature of our society underlie the Constitution and “radiate” the concepts of 
public policy and boni mores that our courts have to apply. It therefore concluded1109 
that the contractual obligations flowing from a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage 
can be recognised and enforced, despite the fact that the marriage is potentially 
polygynous, and that the Ismail decision did not preclude it from enforcing a claim that 
emanates from a marriage contract between Muslim spouses. This case was seen as a 
landmark decision as it rejected the judgment in Ismail v Ismail1110 and opened the door 
for the extension of benefits to marriages in terms of religious rites. 
 
In Amod (born Peer) v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for 
Gender Equality Intervening)1111 the Supreme Court of Appeal considered an action for 
loss of support brought by a widow married according to Islamic law after the death of 
her husband in a motor vehicle accident. The court a quo had dismissed the claim on the 
basis that the marriage did not qualify as a civil marriage and that there accordingly was 
 
1104 At 572. 
1105 At 573. 
1106 At 574. 
1107 Heaton & Kruger 231. 
1108 At 573. 
1109 At 576. 
1110 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 196. 




no legal duty of support between the parties. The Supreme Court of Appeal found1112 
that Roman-Dutch law required a legally enforceable duty of support for an action for 
loss of support, and that the boni mores of society determine whether there is such a 
legally enforceable duty. The court noted1113 that the question is whether the legal right 
of the widow in this matter to support from her husband during the marriage is a right 
which deserves recognition and protection by the law. It held1114 that, as the marriage 
was a de facto monogamous marriage contracted according to the tenets of a major 
religion, the right to support had to be protected, as denying it would be inconsistent 
with “the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religion freedom”. The court referred to 
the shift in the identifiable boni mores of the community and held1115 that it “must 
manifest itself in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of application in 
this area”. It referred to a quote from Du Plessis v De Klerk1116 where it was stated1117 
that “the common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past”. The court 
accordingly held1118 that the common law constantly evolves to accommodate changing 
values and new needs. It should be noted that the court in Amod specifically 
mentioned1119 that, although it placed emphasis on the de facto monogamous nature of 
the Muslim marriage in question, it did not mean that a claim for support by a widow in 
a polygynous marriage would necessarily fail, and left this question open for another 
court to decide.  
 
Quite a few cases about maintenance of a spouse in a religious marriage after the 
dissolution of the marriage and the application of Rule 431120 of the Uniform Rules of 
 
1112 At 427. 
1113 At 428. 
1114 At 428. 
1115 At 430. 
1116 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC). 
1117 At par 86. 
1118 At 430. 
1119 At 430. 
1120 This rule provides spouses with a mechanism that can be used during the interim period until a 
divorce is finalised. It relates inter alia to interim maintenance for the spouse and/or children. Rule 58 
of the Magistrate’s Court Rules contains a similar provision. The interim relief is applicable only to 




the Supreme Court (now the High Court) have been decided over the past decade and a 
half. A few examples are: 
•  In Jamalodeen v Moola1121 the applicant (inter alia) sought interim maintenance 
in terms of Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules pending finalisation of the main 
proceedings. The court held that interim maintenance had to be paid (albeit 
subject to certain conditions) despite the absence of a marriage in terms of the 
Marriage Act; 
• In Cassim v Cassim (Part A)1122 the court held that there was a duty on a husband 
in a Muslim marriage to maintain his wife in accordance with a general standard 
of living and that relief in terms of Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules was therefore 
available, even in a case where the main application was for an order directing 
that the Marriage Act was unconstitutional because of its failure to include 
Islamic marriages; 
• In AM v RM1123 the applicant sought an order in terms of Rule 43 of the Uniform 
Rules for maintenance for herself and her minor child pending divorce 
proceedings. She and the respondent were married in terms of Islamic law and 
the respondent averred that Rule 43 did not apply because the marriage was not 
a marriage in terms of the Marriage Act. The court explained1124 that the rule 
applies whenever a spouse seeks relief from the court in respect of a pending 
matrimonial action. The question was therefore whether the present case could 
be regarded as a “pending matrimonial action”. The court referred1125 to several 
cases1126 where the courts had shown an increased tendency to enforce 
maintenance and other rights for spouses married in terms of Islamic law. It also 
 
1121 Unreported, case number 1835/06 (NPD), date unknown. 
1122 Unreported, case number 3954/06 (TPD), judgment delivered on 15 December 2006. 
1123 2010 (2) SA 223 (ECP). 
1124 At par 4. 
1125 At par 5. 
1126 Amod (born Peer) v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commissioner for Gender Equality 





referred1127 to Rule 43 cases1128 which recognised the duty of a husband to 
support and maintain a wife pending a divorce action where the legality of the 
marriage was challenged. The court accordingly held1129 that the Muslim 
marriage did not preclude the applicant from obtaining relief in terms of Rule 43; 
• In Hoosein v Dangor1130 the court held1131 that a right of access to court is a 
fundamental right in terms of the Bill of Rights. Any rule, law or regulation which 
regulates such access should therefore be interpreted in a way that protects and 
promotes a right in the Bill of Rights. That meant that the word “spouse”, where 
used in Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules, included a spouse in a marriage that was 
concluded in terms of the tenets of Islamic personal law and such a spouse could 
therefore apply for maintenance pending the litigation; 
• In Rose v Rose1132 the court dealt with the provisions of section 7(2) and (8) of 
the Divorce Act and specifically the question whether a wife in a Muslim 
marriage can invoke those sections to claim post-divorce maintenance and a 
share of her husband’s pension interest. The court relied on the reasoning in 
Daniels v Campbell1133 and Hassam v Jacobs1134 and held that the central 
question was whether the protection offered by a particular Act should be 
withheld from certain types of relationships. It held that it would be anomalous 
to hold that a party to a Muslim marriage qualifies as a spouse for purposes of 
the ISA and MSSA,1135 but not for the Divorce Act (which does not define 
“spouse”). This judgment has been described1136 as “ground breaking” as the 
applicant had married her husband under Islamic law when he was already 
 
1127 At par 7. 
1128 For example, Cassim v Cassim (Part A) Unreported, case number 3954/06 (TPD), judgment delivered 
on 15 December 2006; Jamalodeen v Moola Unreported, case number 1835/06 (NPD), date unknown. 
1129 At par 13. 
1130 2010 (4) BCLR 362 (WCC). 
1131 At 370. 
1132 [2015] 2 All SA 352 (WCC). 
1133 [2003] 3 All SA 139 (C). 
1134 [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C). 
1135 See the discussion below of Daniels v Campbell and Hassam v Jacobs for more details regarding the 
recognition of parties to a Muslim marriage as a spouse for purposes of these Acts.  




legally married to another woman. This would of course mean that the Muslim 
marriage was in fact void and not just unrecognised,1137 and this would render 
the judgment incorrect. I submit, however, that the court’s ruling was still of 
significant importance as it would have been correct and in line with other 
judgments had the Muslim marriage been valid; 
• In TM v ZJ1138 the court held that the entitlement to maintenance stemmed from 
the general duty of a husband to support his wife and children. The wife could 
therefore bring an application for maintenance even though the husband alleged 
that he had pronounced Talãq1139 (divorce).  
 
The first case that dealt specifically with the MSSA in the context of a Muslim marriage 
was Daniels v Campbell.1140 The applicant, Mrs Daniels, had been married to her 
husband in terms of Muslim rites since 1977. The marriage was at all times 
monogamous. Her husband passed away in 1994 without a will and the main asset in his 
deceased estate was a house in which the couple had lived. The applicant applied to the 
High Court for an order declaring that she was the spouse of her husband for purposes 
of the ISA and the MSSA. In the alternative, she asked that the omission in section 1(4) 
of the ISA and section 1 of the MSSA to provide for a husband or wife married in terms 
of Muslim rites in a de facto monogamous union is unconstitutional and invalid and that 
in both sections “spouse” and “survivor” should be read as if they included the surviving 
husband or wife of a de facto monogamous union in terms of Muslim rites. 
 
Mrs Daniels contended that the ordinary meaning of “spouse” is clearly capable of 
including the surviving husband or wife of a de facto monogamous union in terms of 
 
1137 See Heaton & Kruger 246 for a detailed explanation – the details are not relevant for this thesis. 
1138 2016 (1) SA 71 (KZD). 
1139 There are different spellings for this term, but this spelling will be used in this thesis.  




Muslim rites and that the “cultural chauvinism” shown in cases1141 which refused to 
recognise Muslim marriages as valid marriages, or to recognise such parties as spouses, 
was incompatible with the boni mores of contemporary South Africa.1142 She relied inter 
alia on the judgments in Ryland v Edros and Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) as evidence of the 
changing approach by South African courts to marriages in terms of Muslim rites. She 
also relied on the various enacted or amended statutes which expressly recognised 
Muslim and other religious marriages for the purposes of conferring certain rights on 
parties, for example the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act,1143 the Criminal Procedure 
Act,1144 the Government Employees Pension Law,1145 and the Transfer Duty Act.1146 She 
argued that these legislative enactments and amendments, seen together with the 
change in South African public policy as evidenced in Ryland and Amod, indicated that 
there was no longer any legal basis to strain the ordinary meaning of “spouse” in the ISA 
and “survivor” in the MSSA to exclude Muslim spouses. 
 
The court a quo held1147 that the judgment in Ryland, although “enlightened, 
progressive and constitutionally sensitive” could not be regarded as authority for a 
suggestion that a monogamous marriage by Muslim rites is a valid marriage or that the 
parties to such a union are to be recognised as spouses. I submit that this finding is 
correct in view of the court’s emphasis1148 in Ryland that its views were confined to 
contractual terms agreed to by parties in a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage. The 
court further held1149 that neither Ryland nor Amod dealt with the meaning to be 
 
1141 For example, Bronn v Fritz Bronn’s Executors (also referred to as Brown v Fritz Bronn’s Executors) 
(1860) 3 Searle 313; Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Davids v The Master 1983 
(1) SA 458 (C); Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A); S v Johardien 1990 (1) SA 1026 (C). 
1142 At 152. 
1143 25 of 1965. 
1144 51 of 1977. 
1145 21 of 1996. 
1146 40 of 1949. 
1147 At 152. 
1148 At 709D. 




applied to the word “spouse” in South African legislation, that the legislative 
enactments and amendments have created explicit exceptions to the general rule that 
only marriages in terms of the Marriage Act have legal consequences, and that this 
reinforces the view that any reference to “spouse” in legislation must have its 
“traditional, limited meaning”, unless there is a deeming or interpretative provision in 
the statute. 1150 It accordingly held1151 that the word “spouse” in the ISA and “survivor” 
in the MSSA could not be interpreted as applying to a husband or wife in a de facto 
monogamous Muslim marriage. 
 
Mrs Daniels’ alternative contention was that the failure of the ISA and MSSA to provide 
for Muslim spouses is unconstitutional and invalid as it violates the equality clause in the 
Constitution, and specifically the provision that no person shall be unfairly discriminated 
against on any one or more of the several stated grounds. In this case, her contention 
was that spouses in de facto monogamous religious marriages were being discriminated 
against on the basis of religion and culture and this was presumed to be unfair 
discrimination. The court referred1152 with approval to the decision in Harksen v Lane1153 
where the Constitutional Court explained the stages of enquiry that should be followed 
in any case involving the alleged violation of the right to equality, namely: 
• Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people?  
If it does, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
government purpose? If not, there is a violation of the right to equality and 
equal protection of the law. If it does bear a rational connection, it might 
nevertheless amount to discrimination; 
• Does the differentiation amount to discrimination?  
If the differentiation is founded on one of the specified grounds, there is 
discrimination. If it is not founded on one of the specified grounds, an objective 
 
1150 At 157. 
1151 At 159. 
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test is applied to determine whether it is founded on a ground that is based on 
attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them 
adversely in a comparably serious manner; 
• If the differentiation amounts to discrimination, is the discrimination unfair?  
If it is on one of the specified grounds, unfairness is presumed. If it is on a ground 
that is not specified, the complainant will have to establish the unfairness – the 
test will focus on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others 
in his or her situation; 
• If the discrimination is unfair, can it be justified under the provisions of the 
limitations clause of the Constitution?1154 
 
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court held:1155 
• By interpreting “spouse” to mean only a party to a marriage recognised in South 
African law as having been solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act did indeed 
differentiate between a de facto monogamous marriage in accordance with 
Muslim rites and a marriage in terms of Christian or Jewish rites; 
• The failure of South African law to accommodate Mrs Daniels’ religious beliefs 
and the cultural practices of her community placed her in a different position; 
• As religion, culture and beliefs are prohibited grounds of discrimination in terms 
of section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution and 8(4) of the Constitution, such 
differentiation is presumed to be unfair discrimination, unless the contrary is 
established; 
• The unfair discrimination leads to parties such as Mrs Daniels being economically 
impoverished in an unfair way and there does not seem to be any justification 
for such unfair discrimination.1156 
 
1154 At the time of the judgment, section 33 of the Interim Constitution dealt with limitations. Now, 
limitations are governed by section 36 of the Constitution. 
1155 At 164. 




The court accordingly held1157 that the omission of “and includes the surviving husband 
or wife of a de facto monogamous union solemnised in accordance with Muslim rites” 
from “spouse” in the ISA and “survivor” in the MSSA was unconstitutional and invalid 
and that both definitions had to be read as if they included such words. 
 
Mrs Daniels then applied to the Constitutional Court1158 for confirmation of the order. In 
the alternative (in case the court did not confirm the declaration of constitutional 
invalidity), she appealed against the order and argued that “spouse” should be 
interpreted to include a party to a monogamous Muslim marriage. Despite the two-
legged approach, her counsel primarily argued1159 that a literal meaning of the word 
“spouse” included parties in a monogamous Muslim marriage and that a purposive 
interpretation of the ISA and the MSSA also supported such a view. The respondents 
contended1160 that the correct interpretation of these Acts was that “spouse” did not 
cover parties to a Muslim marriage. They further contended that this interpretation did 
not render the provisions unconstitutional as Mrs Daniels and her husband had the 
choice to conclude a marriage that was recognised under South African law and they 
chose to not do so.  
 
A majority of eight judges set aside the High Court order, with two judges dissenting. 
The majority judgment was written by Sachs J. The court stated1161 that the old 
interpretation of “spouse”, in terms of which a party to a Muslim marriage was 
excluded, did not flow from a situation where the courts gave the word its ordinary 
meaning, but rather “emanated from a linguistically strained use of the word flowing 
from a culturally and racially hegemonic appropriation of it”. It suggested1162 that the 
interpretation of “spouse” to exclude Muslim spouses was attributable to the 
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undemocratic discriminatory approach that had been taken towards such marriages in 
the apartheid era and that such discriminatory interpretations were no longer 
sustainable in light of the Constitution. It further suggested1163 that the issue was not 
whether to impose a strain on the language of the Acts to achieve a constitutionally 
acceptable result, but whether to remove the strain that previous discriminatory 
interpretations had imposed on it, thereby applying its ordinary meaning. 
 
The majority held1164 that the objectives of the ISA and MSSA are to provide relief to 
widows as a particularly vulnerable section of the population. They considered the 
constitutional values of equality, tolerance and respect for diversity against these 
objectives. They conceded that the Acts are gender-neutral, but suggested that South 
Africa’s patriarchal culture in the past, which still operated at the time of the judgment, 
meant that it was easier for men to receive income and acquire property than it was for 
women. Referring to the common law position where a woman who had not been 
provided for in her husband’s will or in terms of any other arrangement had no 
protection, they held1165 that there is no reason why the equitable principles behind the 
Acts should not apply to Muslim widows in the same way as they do to widows whose 
marriages were solemnised under the Marriage Act. They held1166 that the purposes of 
both the ISA and MSSA would be frustrated if surviving spouses to monogamous Muslim 
marriages were not included as spouses for purposes of the Acts, and that the central 
question was not whether Mrs Daniels was legally married but whether the protection 
which the ISA and MSSA intended widows (sic) to enjoy should be withheld from her 
relationship.1167 Sinclair and Bonthuys1168 question the majority’s reference to “widow” 
and ask whether this implies that the Acts may be construed differently if the applicant 
was a man. I am of the view that the reference to “widow” is probably an error and used 
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only as a result of the context of the case with the applicant being a woman. I doubt 
that the judge intentionally used this word to differentiate between males and females 
as such differentiation would not make sense. The majority held1169 that an 
interpretation consistent with the ordinary meaning of “spouse”, that is in line with the 
spirit of the Constitution and furthers the objectives of the Acts, was to be preferred. 
They stated1170 specifically that the many recent (at that time) statutes that expressly 
included parties to a Muslim union when dealing with married persons, were indicative 
of a new approach consistent with constitutional values, rather than being indicative of 
a view that the absence of similar provisions in other Acts had any special significance. 
Both the ISA and MSSA were last amended long before the advent of the constitutional 
era and the lack of protection in those Acts should not be interpreted in such a way that 
Muslim parties were excluded from them.1171 
 
The majority then referred to the reasoning applied by the High Court when it found 
that it was bound by the decisions in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs1172 and Satchwell v President of Republic of South Africa.1173 
They suggested1174 that a proper reading of those cases did not lead to the conclusion 
that the term “spouse” could not encompass partners in a Muslim marriage. Both cases 
dealt with partners in a same-sex relationship, who at that time did not have the ability 
to enter into a marriage and therefore could not ordinarily be regarded as “married”, 
“husbands” or “wives”.1175 People married by Muslim rites however were married to 
each other, albeit it not under the Marriage Act. The majority held1176 that the crucial 
distinction was between married and unmarried persons and not, as suggested by the 
High Court, between persons married under the Marriage Act and those not so married.  
 
1169 At 746. 
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The majority accordingly ordered1177 that the order of the High Court be set aside and 
that “spouse” in the ISA and “survivor” in the MSSA be read to include the surviving 
partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage. It should be noted that the court 
emphasised1178 that its judgment applied only to spouses in a monogamous Muslim 
marriage as it was not asked to deal with “the complex range of questions” concerning 
polygamous Muslim marriages.1179 It also stated1180 that it was not necessary for 
purposes of the case to consider the possible retroactive effect of upholding the appeal, 
and suggested that problems arising as a result of the judgment would have to be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Ngcobo J delivered a separate judgment, agreeing with the order proposed by Sachs J, 
but for different reasons. He reiterated1181 that courts are obliged to interpret 
legislation in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights 
and furthers its fundamental values. There are of course limits to this obligation as the 
interpretation should not be unduly strained.1182 He held1183 that the interpretation of 
legislation must recognise the context in which we find ourselves and the constitutional 
values. He therefore held that a construction of the words “spouse” and “survivor” to 
include parties to a Muslim marriage was consistent with the object of the ISA and 
MSSA. He also held1184 that the decisions in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs1185 and Satchwell v President of the Republic of South 
Africa1186 were distinguishable from this case and that they did not preclude a 
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construction of “spouse” to include parties to a Muslim marriage. He accordingly 
agreed1187 with the judgment and the order of Sachs J. 
 
The minority judgment written by Moseneke J held that the order of constitutional 
invalidity by the High Court should be confirmed and the appeal dismissed. The minority 
held1188 that a reading of “spouse” which includes the parties to a Muslim marriage “is 
unduly strained, not reasonably available and distorts the text”. The reasons for this 
view were as follows: 
• The minority did not accept that the ordinary meaning of “spouse” refers to 
anyone other than a partner in a legally enforceable marriage; 
• Prior to the Constitution our courts did not recognise Islamic marriages as valid 
marriages; 
• Previous judgments by the Constitutional Court had given “marriage” and 
“spouse” a meaning at odds with the meaning advanced by the majority 
judgment; 
• A significant number of post-Constitution statutes include the narrow meaning 
of “spouse” but “overcomes the omission of Muslim wives and husbands 
through interpretative aids”;1189 
• The principle of separation of powers suggested that the omission had to be 
remedied by legislative rather than interpretive intervention. 
 
The minority suggested1190 that the statutes and several Constitutional Court 
judgments1191 that expressly recognise Muslim marriages reflected the changing norms 
in our society about family and marriage. They, however, did not agree with the 
submission that these statutes indicate that “spouse” is capable of a meaning that 
 
1187 At 757. 
1188 At 758. 
1189 The reference to the statutes using interpretative aids is not correct as it is the courts that use these 
aids to interpret statutes. 
1190 At 761. 
1191 For example, Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian and Gay Equality 




includes Muslim spouses. In their view,1192 the deeming provisions of extensions of the 
definitions actually indicate that the ordinary meaning is restricted to common law 
spousal relationships and that this meaning would apply in the absence of an expanded 
definition.1193 They referred1194 to the obligation placed on the courts to construe 
legislation to promote the spirit, purport and objective of the Bill of Rights, but held1195 
that this duty is subject to the requirement that the interpretation “must not be fanciful 
or far-fetched” and must be reasonably capable of such compliant meaning. They 
quoted1196 the admonition by Kentridge AJ in S v Zuma1197 that “if the language used by 
the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to ‘values’, the result is not 
interpretation but divination”.  
 
Moseneke J indicated1198 that he could not agree with the approach of the majority to 
the interpretation of the ISA and MSSA as it failed to distinguish properly between the 
interpretation of legislation under section 39(2) of the Constitution and the remedial 
measures provided in section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, and because he could not 
agree that the ordinary meaning of “spouse” extended to persons in a relationship that 
is not recognised by our law as a marriage. He further held1199 that there was no basis 
for departing from the analysis used by the court in the National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs1200 and Satchwell v President of the Republic 
of South Africa1201 cases. He agreed1202 that the ISA and MSSA differentiate between 
different types of spouses and certain grounds and that the discrimination was unfair as 
these Acts withhold the economic protection extended to socially vulnerable widows of 
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Christian, Jewish and secular civil marriages and customary unions from those unions 
that fall outside the ambit of these Acts. These Acts are therefore a breach of Mrs 
Daniels’ right to equality on specific grounds and there is no justification for such a 
breach.1203 The judge was, however, of the view that the matter was better suited for 
legislative intervention and that a “reading-in” remedy was more appropriate than a 
reinterpretation of the statutes. He accordingly agreed1204 with the High Court that the 
Acts must be declared inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid as they do not 
include spouses in a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage. An order reading in the 
necessary words would therefore best deal with the applicant’s right to dignity.1205 As 
far as the issue of retroactivity was concerned, the judge also held1206 that problems 
relating to retroactivity should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Cooke1207 suggests that South Africa’s historical background explains why it was easy for 
the majority to find that it was not a linguistic strain to find that Muslim spouses are 
included as spouses for the ISA. Du Plessis & Penfold1208 summarise this case by saying 
that the majority and minority essentially reached the same conclusion, but through 
different routes. They suggest that this shows that judges may well disagree on whether 
a statutory provision may reasonably bear a certain meaning but warn that the court 
should take care not to unduly strain the meaning of legislation by using the 
interpretative tool given to courts by section 39(2) of the Constitution. They 
nevertheless agree with the majority judgment. 
 
I agree with Sinclair and Bonthuys1209 that the minority judgment is to be preferred to 
that of the majority as I do not agree that excluding a Muslim spouse from the word 
“spouse” arises from a linguistic straining of the word as typically understood and 
 
1203 At 771. 
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employed in pre-democratic South Africa. I agree with Moseneke J that it cannot be 
accepted that the ordinary meaning of “spouse” relates to anybody other than a partner 
in a legally recognised marriage. As a Muslim marriage is not legally recognised, a 
spouse in such a marriage cannot be included as a “spouse” in terms of the MSSA, 
however fair and equitable this might be. I therefore agree with the minority judgment’s 
view that the words “a husband or wife married in accordance with Muslim rites in a de 
facto monogamous union” were to be read into the impugned legislation, for the 
reasons as quoted by Kentridge AJ in S v Zuma.   
 
Keightley1210 mentions that the court’s failure to deal with the issue of retroactivity was 
a concern as far as it related to the administration of estates – both in relation to 
estates that had already been “wound up”1211 and to those where the process was still 
ongoing. While the High Court had at least ordered1212 (correctly or not) that estates 
that had at the time of the judgment been finally wound up were not impacted by the 
order in respect of the ISA, the Constitutional Court simply declared1213 that it was not 
necessary to deal with the possible retroactive effect of upholding the appeal and that 
any issues would have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. As Keightley1214 points 
out, this means that there will only be clarity on the impact of the judgment on estates 
when affected parties approach the courts for relief on a case-by-case basis, or when 
the legislature deals with this aspect of the judgment. As far as estates not yet finally 
liquidated and distributed at the time of the judgment are concerned, Keightley1215 
points out that the order would be binding on executors and they would have to redraft 
the liquidation and distribution account to reflect “the awarding of a portion to the 
surviving spouse in terms of the Acts, which may lead to increased administrative 
burdens for executors and inevitable delays in finalising affected estates”. While I agree 
 
1210 “Law of succession” 2004(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 476. 
1211 This refers to where the liquidation and distribution process has been finalised. 
1212 At 175. 
1213 At par 38. 
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that this judgment does have a significant practical impact, I cannot agree that in all 
instances the liquidation and distribution account would have to be redrafted. The 
judgment in respect of the ISA will only apply to intestate estates. The MSSA requires 
the surviving spouse to lodge a claim for maintenance and to prove his or her need for 
such maintenance. It therefore does not follow that all liquidation and distribution 
accounts of Muslim spouses will necessarily have to be redrafted. It might well be, for 
whatever reason, that the surviving spouse does not lodge a claim for maintenance, 
which means there would be no need to redraft the liquidation and distribution 
account. What is, however, clear is that the judgment will lead to uncertainty until it is 
clear that no maintenance claim will be lodged, and this will inevitably add to the delay 
in finalising the estate.  
 
Almost ten years after Daniels v Campbell the court had to deal with a similar matter. In 
Faro v Bingham1216 Ms Faro and Mr Ely were married in terms of Islamic rites in 2008. In 
August 2009 Mr Ely obtained a Talãq which dissolved the marriage. The Talãq was, 
however, revocable during the so-called ‘Iddah period. As Ms Faro was pregnant at that 
time, the ‘Iddah period would only expire when she gave birth to the child. Ms Faro 
averred that she and Mr Ely resumed intimacy shortly after August 2009 and that no 
further Talãq was pronounced before Mr Ely died in March 2010. With the help of the 
Women’s Legal Centre (“WLC”) she lodged a claim in terms of the MSSA against the 
estate of Mr Ely, but the executrix rejected the claim and lodged a liquidation and 
distribution account that contained no reference to Ms Faro. Ms Faro objected to the 
account on several grounds, one of which was that she should be treated as the spouse 
of Mr Ely and accordingly be a beneficiary of the estate in terms of the ISA and should 
be treated as his spouse in terms of the MSSA. The executrix maintained that the 
marriage had been dissolved before Mr Ely’s death and the Master accordingly rejected 
Ms Faro’s objection. Ms Faro approached the court for an order, inter alia, that the 
marriage subsisted at the time of Mr Ely’s death and that she was accordingly a spouse 
 




for purposes of the ISA and survivor for purposes of the MSSA. She also asked that the 
Master’s decision to reject her objection to the liquidation and distribution account in 
Mr Ely’s estate be set aside.  
 
The court stated1217 that the main issue in this matter was whether or not the Talāq was 
valid as this would determine whether Ms Faro and Mr Ely were still married in terms of 
Islamic law at the time of his death. It found sufficient evidence to substantiate a finding 
that they were indeed still married at the time of Mr Ely’s death. The court accordingly 
set aside1218 the Master’s decision to disallow the objection and directed the executrix 
to amend the liquidation and distribution account to recognise Ms Faro’s status as the 
spouse. Ms Faro had also asked the court to order that marriages solemnised according 
to Islamic law be deemed valid marriages in terms of the Marriage Act and, 
alternatively, that the common law definition of marriage be extended to include 
Muslim marriages. The court did not rule on these issues and postponed these matters 
for a hearing in another division of the court at a later date.1219  
 
5.2.3.2 Polygynous Muslim marriages 
The first case dealing with maintenance in the context of a polygynous Muslim marriage 
which was decided after the inception of the 1996 Constitution was heard in 2005. The 
(then) Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court heard the case of Khan v Khan.1220 
This case was an appeal against a ruling by the Nelspruit Maintenance Court where the 
husband was ordered to pay maintenance to the wife in terms of the Maintenance 
Act.1221 The parties were married in terms of Islamic law and it appeared from the facts 
that the marriage was polygynous. The court1222 pointed out that polygynous marriages 
are accepted by the tenets of Islam, which is a major religion in South Africa, and that 
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spouses in a Muslim marriage should therefore be protected by family law. It specifically 
mentioned1223 that the purposes of the Maintenance Act would be frustrated if spouses 
in a polygynous marriage were excluded from the protection offered by the Act, just 
because the legal form of their relationship is inconsistent with the Marriage Act. It 
would be blatant discrimination not to recognise the duty of support arising from 
polygynous Muslim marriages while recognising it in terms of a monogamous Muslim 
marriage.1224 The court accordingly held that spouses in a de facto polygynous Muslim 
marriage may invoke the provisions of the Maintenance Act. 
 
The question of whether a surviving spouse to a polygynous Muslim marriage could 
claim maintenance in terms of the MSSA came before the court in 2008 in Hassam v 
Jacobs.1225 Mrs Hassam and her husband were married in terms of Muslim rites in 1972. 
In 2000 her husband married another woman in terms of Muslim rites. He died in 2001, 
without leaving a valid will. Mrs Hassam submitted claims against his estate in terms of 
the ISA and the MSSA, but the executor refused to accept the claims on the basis that 
the marriage had been polygynous, and Mrs Hassam could accordingly not be treated as 
a spouse or survivor for purposes of the Acts. She approached the court for an order 
declaring that she was the spouse of her deceased husband and that the ISA and MSSA 
must be interpreted in such a way that surviving spouses of polygynous Muslim 
marriages are given the same benefits as those extended to surviving spouses of de 
facto monogamous Muslim marriages. In the alternative, she asked that the provisions 
of the ISA and MSSA be declared unconstitutional. 
 
The legal position relating to polygynous marriages was summed up succinctly by the 
court.1226 Before the advent of the new constitutional era, our courts had refused to 
recognise and give effect to polygynous marriages because they were considered to be 
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contra bonos mores from a public policy point of view. This view was, according to the 
court, attributable to the fact that polygyny was viewed “through the prism of the 
common law and the mores of a politically dominant but minority section of our 
society.”1227 
 
It should be noted that the issue was raised whether or not Mrs Hassam was indeed the 
spouse of the deceased as she admitted that she had obtained a faskh, which would 
have terminated the marriage on completion of a separation period of three months. 
She, however, averred that she and her husband had reconciled during the three 
months and the separation period had therefore not been completed. The court was 
satisfied that she had succeeded in proving that the marriage did indeed exist at the 
time of her husband’s death.1228 In dealing with the question relating to the position of 
surviving spouses of a polygynous marriage, it referred1229 to section 39(2) of the 
Constitution which provides that, when a court interprets legislation and develops the 
common law or customary law, it must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights in a manner that gives effect to the fundamental values in the Bill of Rights, 
where possible. It also referred to the recognised principle of constitutional 
interpretation that, if it is reasonably possible to interpret an Act in a way that avoids 
inconsistency with the Constitution, such interpretation must be preferred. It held that 
if widows of polygynous Muslim marriages were to be excluded from the concepts of 
“spouse” and “survivor”, they would be discriminated against solely because of the fact 
that their husbands had exercised the right given by their faith to marry more than one 
woman. This discrimination would amount to violation of the women’s right to equality 
based on their religion, marital status and culture and would also violate their right to 
dignity.1230 The court felt1231 that the considerations that were applied in Daniels v 
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Campbell applied equally to widows in a polygynous Muslim marriage. It also 
referred1232 to a shift in legislative and judicial policy that had resulted in increasing 
recognition for polygyny practised in African customary law as well as in Muslim 
religious law. It accordingly held1233 that the continued exclusion of polygynous 
marriages from the benefits of the ISA and the MSSA would amount to unfair 
discrimination against the spouses, which would be in conflict with section 9 of the 
Constitution. 
 
The court considered the fact that every reference to “survivor” in the MSSA is preceded 
by the word “the”, which typically indicates the singular, but held1234 that it had to take 
cognisance of section 6 of the Interpretation Act,1235 which provides in subsection (b) 
that, in every law, words in the singular include the plural and vice versa, unless a 
contrary indication appears in the law. The court accordingly held1236 that the 
mechanisms provided in section 2(3)(b) of the MSSA to determine how competing 
claims of the spouse and minor children must be dealt with, as well as section 3 which 
provides the factors to be considered when assessing the claim, are capable of being 
applied to polygynous marriages without unduly straining the language of the MSSA. It 
found1237 support for its view in the fact that our courts had already found in Kambule v 
Master of the High Court1238 that the provisions of the MSSA could be applied in the 
context of polygynous customary law marriages. 
 
The court accordingly ordered1239 that the word “survivor” in the MSSA includes the 
surviving partner to a polygamous Muslim marriage and that both Mrs Hassam and the 
other wife were, for purposes of the MSSA, survivors of the deceased. It is interesting 
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that the court, although referring throughout the judgment to “polygynous”, referred to 
a polygamous marriage when making the order.1240 Du Toit suggests1241 that, although 
the High Court’s reliance on section 6 of the Interpretation Act appears sound, it is not 
inconceivable that another court may in future rule that the words “or survivors” should 
be read in wherever the word “survivor” appears in the MSSA.  
 
The High Court also had to deal with the application of the ISA and found that, except 
for section 1(4)(f), the provisions of the ISA could also be applied to spouses in a de 
facto polygynous marriage. It held that section 1(4)(f) was inconsistent with the 
Constitution as the section only provided for one spouse in a Muslim marriage to be an 
intestate heir of the deceased. The court accordingly held that the section was to be 
read as if the whole subsection was substituted by a subsection that provides for more 
than one spouse.  
 
The Constitution provides1242 that an order of constitutional invalidity regarding an Act 
has no force until it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court, and the order of the High 
Court re section 1(4)(f) of the ISA therefore had to be referred to the Constitutional 
Court.1243 The referral was limited to the order in respect of the ISA as that was the only 
finding of unconstitutionality in the High Court and the Constitutional Court1244 
therefore did not deal with the issue of the High Court’s interpretation of the MSSA. It 
would therefore appear that MSSA claims by spouses in a de facto polygynous marriage 
is permitted in terms of the High Court decision, although it should be noted that the 
latter is only binding on that jurisdiction1245 and there is accordingly some uncertainty 
whether such claims will in fact be permitted. 
 
 
1240 See also De Waal 2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 1038 at 1044; Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 
470 fn 48. 
1241 2009(126)3 SALJ 472 fn 55. 
1242 Section 172(2)(a). 
1243 Heaton 2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 486. 
1244 Hassam v Jacobs 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC). 




5.2.3.3 Hindu marriages 
Hindu marriages are in the same legal position as Muslim marriages – they do not enjoy 
full legal recognition1246 and only have the protection that is afforded to them by certain 
Acts and judgments.1247 It appears that although traditional Hindu law permits polygyny, 
it rarely occurs in practice and monogamy has become the approved norm.1248 The main 
reason therefore for not giving such marriages full recognition under our law is because 
they are not solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act.1249  
 
There are few cases dealing with Hindu marriages. The most notable one is Govender v 
Ragavayah,1250 in which the applicant was the widow of a monogamous Hindu marriage 
which had not been registered in terms of the Marriage Act. The husband died without a 
valid will and the executor of his estate framed the liquidation and distribution account 
without any reference to the widow. She approached the court for an order declaring 
that “spouse” in terms of section 1 of the ISA includes the surviving party to a 
monogamous Hindu marriage. The court referred inter alia to the decision in Daniels v 
Campbell and held that that judgment and other court decisions provided judicial 
support for the proposition that a monogamous Hindu marriage had all the essentials of 
a valid marriage in terms of our law, as it is a voluntary union for life, between one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others. The court accordingly held that “spouse” 
in section 1 of the ISA includes the surviving partner of a monogamous Hindu marriage.  
 
 
1246 In Vitamin Distributors v Chungebryen 1931 WLD 55, for example, a woman married by Hindu rites 
was regarded as unmarried. See also Rampatha v Chundervathee 1957 (4) SA 483 (N); Pillai v Pillai 
1963 (1) SA 542 (D). More recently in Singh v Ramparsad 2007 (3) SA 445 (D) the court refused to 
recognise the validity of a Hindu marriage for purposes of the Divorce Act. See also Rautenbach in 
Heaton (ed) 360. 
1247 The Acts or sections of Acts that afford recognition to Muslim marriages also apply to Hindu 
marriages. 
1248 Heaton & Kruger 249. 
1249 Heaton & Kruger 249. 




As Heaton and Kruger1251 point out, this judgment did not come as a surprise in view of 
the recognition already extended to Muslim marriages and the fact that there is no 
constitutionally acceptable reason to give judicial recognition to Muslim marriages for 
specific purposes but not to Hindu marriages for those same purposes. If we accept the 
apparent outcome reached in 5.2.3.2 regarding the application of the MSSA to spouses 
in a de facto polygynous marriage, it  follows that spouses in a Hindu marriage should be 
able to claim maintenance in terms of the MSSA on the same basis as spouses in a 
Muslim marriage may.1252 It should of course be noted that, although courts can 
recognise certain aspects of a Hindu marriage for certain purposes, they do not have the 
power to declare a Hindu marriage valid or to convert it into a civil marriage or civil 
union.1253 
 
5.2.4 Pending legislative development 
 
The advent of the new constitutional dispensation has clearly had a significant impact 
on the way in which religious marriages are regarded. Section 15(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the 
Constitution provides the foundation for the recognition and application of religious 
family law systems but does not give any religious group the right to have their system 
of family law recognised by the state. As a result, religious groups still have to lobby for 
legal recognition.1254  Although progress has been made by the judiciary to develop and 
protect the rights of Muslim persons, especially women, this piecemeal approach is 
clearly not sufficient and legislative certainty is required.1255 
 
Under the new constitutional dispensation, numerous calls have been made for the full 
legal recognition of Muslim marriages. While litigation has made huge inroads towards 
 
1251 South African family law 249. 
1252 See also Heaton 2009(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 482 and the discussion that follows in 
5.2.4. 
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the recognition of the consequences of Muslim marriages,1256 court judgments have 
limited applicability and the need remains for legislation to govern Muslim marriages. 
The continuing calls led to the establishment of a Project Committee of the South 
African Law Reform Commission.1257 The committee was tasked “to investigate Islamic 
marriages and related matters with effect from 1 March 1999 for the duration of the 
investigation”.  The committee published a document1258 with tentative proposals in 
May 2000 and it was circulated for public comment in July 2000. Various interested 
parties responded, and the result was the publication in December 2001 of a Discussion 
Paper,1259 including a draft Bill.  The closing date for comments was 31 January 2002. As 
a result of the responses received, the South African Law Reform Commission submitted 
a Report1260 on Islamic Marriages with a draft Bill to the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development in July 2003. In a media statement1261 the Commission 
explained that the Bill draws a clear distinction between an Islamic marriage and a civil 
marriage. The Bill only applies to Islamic marriages, but provision is made for Muslims 
who are married in terms of a civil marriage to elect to have the provisions of the Bill 
apply to them.  
 
 
1256 Abrahams-Fayker “Women’s Legal Centre” 41, 
http://www.cci.uct.ac.za/usr/cci/news/big/Muslim_Marriages_Papers.pdf (last accessed 8 April 
2016). 
1257 Shabodien “Making haste slowly: legislating Muslim marriages in South Africa” 31,   
        http://www.cci.uct.ac.za/usr/cci/news/big/Muslim_Marriages_Papers.pdf (last accessed 8 April 
2016). 
1258 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 15 Islamic marriages and related matters Project 59 
Pretoria, 2000. 
1259 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 101 Islamic marriages and related matters Project 59 
Pretoria, 2001. 
1260  South African Law Reform Commission Report on Islamic marriages and related matters Project 106 
Pretoria, 2003. 
1261 Media statement by the South African Law Reform Commission concerning its investigation into 
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The Bill was subject to a great deal of criticism1262 and an amended version1263 was 
published for public comment in January 2011. In the invitation to comment, the Law 
Reform Commission explained that the background of the Bill was to provide statutory 
recognition to Muslim marriages “in order to redress inequities and hardships arising 
from the non-recognition of these marriages”. The amended Bill provides1264 that it will 
apply to marriages entered into after its commencement where the parties elect to be 
bound by it. If parties married before its commencement, it will apply unless the parties, 
within a period of 36 months or longer as prescribed, jointly elect not to be bound by 
it.1265 Clause 8 provides that Muslim marriages to which the envisaged Act applies will 
be deemed to be out of community of property without accrual.  
 
The Bill provides1266 that a Muslim marriage to which the Bill applies and in respect of 
which all the requirements of the Bill are met is for all purposes recognised as a valid 
marriage.  It specifically envisages1267 that certain Acts be amended to include Islamic 
marriages. It inter alia provides that the definition of “spouse” in the ISA and “survivor” 
in the MSSA be amended to include spouse(s) in an Islamic marriage. 
 
The amended Bill also led to severe criticism and division in the Muslim community.1268  
The main criticism seems to be that, although Islamic personal law and marriage are 
highly complex, the Bill makes no provision for the involvement of Muslim judges, 
scholars, jurists or duly qualified theologians when dealing with these issues.1269 
Another area of concern seems to be that the amended Bill provides that it applies to all 
 
1262 See Amien “Overcoming the conflict between the rights to freedom of religion and women’s right to 
equality: A South African case study of Muslim marriages” 2006(28)3 Human Rights Quarterly 729, 
746. 
1263 Muslim Marriages Bill 2010 General Notice 37 Government Gazette 33946, 21 January 2011.  
1264 Clause 2(1). 
1265 Clause 2(2). 
1266 Clause 2(5). 
1267 Clause 17. 
1268 Heaton “Family law” 2011(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 417 at 418. 
1269 Moosa in Heaton (ed) 288; Sader “The Muslim Marriages Bill” 2001(405) De Rebus 50; Heaton 2011(1) 




individuals, unless they specifically indicate that it does not – there is a view1270 that it 
should be the other way round, ie the Bill should only apply if an individual expressly 
selects application. I cannot agree with this reasoning – where legislation provides for its 
optional application, it usually provides that it applies unless parties select non-
application.1271 In addition, Sader’s comment that the Bill applies “to all individuals” is 
not correct, as clause 2(1) clearly indicates that it will only apply to marriages entered 
into after the commencement of the Act if the parties select application.1272 
 
In addition, some Muslim bodies and individuals suggest that Shari’ah law should 
outweigh constitutional equality claims and that adjudication of Muslim disputes should 
remain in the hands of Muslims.1273 This argument is flawed, as the right to equality in 
section 9 of the Constitution outweighs the right to religious freedom, which means 
that, should Muslim marriages be legally recognised, they will be subject to the Bill of 
Rights in the same way that other marriages are.1274 As Heaton1275 points out, the 
suggestion that a system of religious law should prevail over the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights is completely without merit in view of the provision in section 8(1) of the 
Constitution that the Bill of Rights applies to all law. 
 
In 2009 the Women’s Legal Centre Trust applied1276 for direct access to the 
Constitutional Court to seek an order that compelled the President and Parliament to 
enact legislation that recognises Muslim marriages. The court ruled that the application 
was “misconceived” as the obligation to enact legislation to fulfil constitutional rights 
 
1270 For example, Sader 2001(405) De Rebus 50. 
1271 One example in the context of marriage is the Matrimonial Property Act which provides that the 
accrual system applies to marriages out of community of property unless the parties expressly 
exclude it. 
1272 Neels “Constitutional aspects of the Muslim Marriages Bill” 2012-3 TSAR 488. 
1273 Heaton 2011(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 418; Schroeder F “Legal bid on Muslim marriages” 
Independent online 3 March 2011, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/legal-bid-on-Muslim-
marriages-1.1035844 (last accessed 15 April 2013). 
1274 Moosa 2009(12)3 PER/PELJ 71. 
1275 2011(1) Annual Survey of South African Law 418. 




rests in the first instance on the state and not only on the President and Parliament. It 
accordingly denied direct access to the Constitutional Court. During July 2011 the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development advised the Women’s Legal 
Centre that they were evaluating comments and intended to obtain Cabinet approval of 
the legislation by late 2011. On 6 November 2012 the Women’s Legal Centre asked the 
Department for a copy of the revised Bill, but the Department responded that there was 
no revised Bill yet as they were still considering the comments.1277 The court in Faro v 
Bingham1278 had ordered the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development to file 
an affidavit setting out the progress that had been made with the enactment of the 
Muslim Marriages Bill and/or similar legislation. The Minister was given a deadline of 15 
July 2014, but the deadline lapsed without an affidavit having been filed. The Women’s 
Legal Centre indicated1279 in February 2015 that they would launch litigation in the High 
Court that compels the State to enact legislation that recognises Muslim marriages. The 
litigation was eventually launched 19 months after the Women’s Legal Centre first 
indicated their intention to do so. The case was a consolidation of three applications, 
one of which was by the survivor in Faro v Bingham. The case was supposed to be heard 
in the Western Cape High Court on 13 September 2016,1280 but it was postponed to 20 
March 2017.1281 It was eventually heard and judgment was given in August 2018.1282 
 
The Western Cape High Court outlined the historical treatment of Muslim marriages in 
South Africa and looked at the judicial development in this regard. It found1283 that the 
applicant had shown that the treatment of Muslim marriages amounted to 
discrimination, that the discrimination is presumed to be unfair as it is on a listed 
 
1277 Faro v Bingham [2013] ZAWCHC 159 (25 October 2013) at par 42. 
1278 [2013] ZAWCHC 159 (25 October 2013). 
1279 “WLC turns to courts on Muslim Marriages Bill”, http://www.vocfm.co.za/wlc-turns-to-courts-on-
muslim-marriage-bill/ (last accessed 18 July 2016).   
1280 As per e-mail dated 6 September 2016 from Hoodah Abrahams-Fayker, senior attorney at the 
Women’s Legal Centre. 
1281 Die Burger 21 September 2016. 
1282 Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa 2018 (6) SA 598 (WCC). 




ground,1284 and that the state had not shown any legitimate governmental purpose for 
the unfair discrimination.1285 The continued non-recognition of marriages solemnised in 
terms of Islamic rites and beliefs infringe on the constitutional rights of equality and 
dignity.1286 The court held1287 that the state must fulfil its duty in terms of section 7(2) of 
the Constitution to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights” 
and the only reasonable way to do this in the context of this case is to enact legislation. 
It accordingly ordered1288 the state to bring into operation legislation to recognise 
Muslim marriages as valid and to regulate the consequences of such recognition. The 
state was given a period of 24 months from the date of the order to do so, provided 
that, should the proposed legislation be referred to the Constitutional Court as provided 
for in the Constitution,1289 the 24 months period would be extended until final 
determination by the Constitutional Court. Should the legislation not be enacted, a 
union validly concluded in terms of Sharia law (ie a Muslim marriage) may be dissolved 
in terms of the Divorce Act. 
 
Rautenbach1290 points out that, until legislation as proposed in the draft Bill is enacted, 
it will remain necessary to approach the courts for assistance. To date, the legislative 
intervention required by the High Court judgment has not been forthcoming and an 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was subsequently lodged.1291  
 
As far as Hindu marriages are concerned, there has been no similar development.1292 As 
far back as 2006, the South African Law Reform Commission approved the inclusion of 
 
1284 At par 135. 
1285 At par 135. 
1286 At par 179. 
1287 At par 181. 
1288 At par 252. 
1289 Sections 79 and 80. 
1290 “Some comments of the current (and future) status of Muslim personal law in South Africa” 2004(7)2 
PER/PELJ 101. 
1291 The appeal was placed on the roll for 25 August 2020, but no judgment has yet been handed down. 
See http://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/court-roll (last accessed 4 December 2020). 




an investigation into the recognition of such marriages in its program.1293 To date, 
however, no progress has been made. It is anticipated that when the proposed 
legislation regarding the recognition of Muslim marriages is passed, it should lead to 
developments whereby other religious personal law systems such as Hindu law, can 
benefit and that there will then be similar progress towards the recognition of Hindu 
marriages. The court in Women’s Legal Centre v President of the Republic of South Africa 
did mention1294 that there appears to be an investigation by the Law Reform 
Commission with a view to develop a paper on a consolidated Marriage Act and that 
there had been talks about the formal recognition of Hindu marriages, but no details 
were given in this regard. The Law Reform Commission has since published an Issue 
Paper1295 in this regard, calling for comments by 31 August 2019. 
 
5.3  Life partners/cohabitants 
 
5.3.1 General  
 
The terms “life partners” and “cohabitants” refer to couples who live together without 
having entered into a legally valid marriage. Hahlo1296 refers to “the relationship of a 
man and a woman who live together ostensibly as man and wife, without having gone 
through a legal ceremony of marriage”. “Life partners” or “cohabitants” could, however, 
also refer to couples who live together after having entered into a “marriage” that is not 
regarded as valid in our law. For purposes of this part of the chapter, any reference to 
“life partners” is limited to couples who live together without having entered into a 
marriage,1297 civil union or religious marriage, and the relationship of such couples will 
be referred to as a life partnership. 
 
 
1293 South African Law Reform Commission Thirty fifth annual report 2007/2008 30. 
1294 At par 26. 
1295 Issue Paper 35 Single Marriage Statute Project 144 Pretoria, 2019. 
1296 The South African law of husband and wife (1985) 36. 




A life partnership can exist between heterosexual or same-sex partners and has some of 
the characteristics of a marriage.1298 As mentioned, prior to 1994, South African law 
recognised only civil marriages solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act between two 
persons of the opposite sex, as valid marriages.1299 Other “marriages” were not 
recognised and life partnerships even less so. A statement made as far back as 1984 by 
Thomas1300 summed up the position – he said that South African family law for all 
intents and purposes chose largely to ignore relationships outside of civil marriage, with 
hardly any provision to regulate them either during their subsistence or after their 
termination.1301  The advent of the Bill of Rights, however, changed this – not because 
the Bill of Rights provides for a fundamental right to marry, but because the other rights 
contained therein, such as the right to human dignity, equality, freedom of religion, 
belief and opinion, provide a strong drive to move away from the traditional view that 
focused only on marriages as described above.1302 In Dawood1303 the Constitutional 
Court emphasised1304 that the right to human dignity encompasses and protects an 
individual’s right to have permanent intimate relationships, which means that the right 
to family life is protected by the right to dignity.  
 
5.3.2 Legal consequences of life partnerships 
 
The general rule in our law has traditionally been that a life partnership does not give 
rise to any particular legal consequences1305 and this is borne out by the fact that, to 
date, there is still no comprehensive legislation pertaining to life partnerships in our 
 
1298 Botha et al 70; Heaton & Kruger 255.  
1299 See 5.1 above. 
1300 “Konkubinaat” 1984(47)4 THRHR 455. 
1301  At 456. 
1302 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 206; Du Toit 2009(126)3 SALJ 487; Smith “The development of South African 
matrimonial law with specific reference to the need for and application of a domestic partnership 
rubric?” Unpublished LLD thesis, University of the Free State (2009) 192. 
1303 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
1304 At par 36. 
1305 Butters v Mncora 2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA) par 11; Sinclair & Heaton 274; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 208; 
Smith in Heaton (ed) 395; Smith “Unmarried same-sex couples more favourable legal position than 




law.1306 Our courts have on occasion referred1307 to the current legal position relating to 
life partnerships as “a patchwork of laws that does not express a coherent set of family 
law rules”. Life partners therefore traditionally had to self-regulate the legal 
consequences of their relationship by using the following ordinary legal rules and 
remedies of private law to achieve some measure of protection:1308  
 
a. Law of contract  
Partners can use a contract to achieve some measure of protection against each 
other and third parties. The terms of the contract determine each partner’s rights 
and duties.1309 If the relationship ends and the parties cannot agree on how jointly 
owned assets should be divided, either of them may institute the actio communi 
dividundo, which means the court will order a division it deems fair, or appoint a 
receiver or liquidator to divide the assets.1310 It goes without saying that contract 
law is hardly adequate to deliver justice in family relationships that are often quite 
complex.1311 The basic premise of contract law is that parties negotiate and contract 
on an equal footing. As pointed out by Heaton,1312 the suggestion that partners have 
choice when negotiating domestic and family issues ignores the context and reality 
of South African culture. In many cultures, women are not in a position to insist on 
contracts that adequately regulate their intimate relationships or the patrimonial 
consequences at the breakdown of the relationship. They cannot therefore rely on 




1306 Smith in Heaton (ed) 395; Clark “Families and domestic partnerships” 2002(119)3 SALJ 637. 
1307 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International, Amici Curiae; Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs) 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) par 125. 
1308 Heaton & Kruger 255; Sinclair & Heaton 274; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 206; Heaton “An overview of 
the current legal position regarding heterosexual life partnerships” 2005(68)4 THRHR 665; Smith 
2016(565) De Rebus 37. 
1309 Heaton & Kruger 257. 
1310 Heaton & Kruger 257. 
1311 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 2004(121)4 SALJ 879. 




b. Life partnership agreement 
This is commonly known as a domestic partnership agreement or life partnership 
agreement.  For purposes of this thesis, I will refer to “life partnership agreement” 
to avoid any confusion with the agreements envisaged in the Domestic Partnership 
Bill.1313 Such an agreement can be used by life partners to regulate the rights and 
duties against each other, for example maintenance during the relationship, post-
relationship maintenance, ownership of property owned before the relationship 
started and ownership of property acquired during the relationship.1314 There was 
previously some uncertainty whether such an agreement is enforceable because it 
could be regarded as contra bonos mores, but in view of the increasing recognition 
of life partnerships, this is clearly an outdated argument.1315 The general rule in our 
law is that the contract is only binding between the partners,1316 but where the 
parties agreed to maintain each other (or one party to maintain the other), and the 
party who is liable for the support is killed by a third party, the common law action 
for damages for loss of support is available to the surviving partner.1317 Although our 
law provides for life partnership agreements, a contractually valid life partnership 
agreement may still on the death of one of the parties be found to be an invalid and 
unenforceable pactum successorium.1318 The latter is an agreement in terms of 
which the parties regulate the devolution of their estates after the death of either or 
both of them.1319 South African law does not recognise pacta successoria or 
contracts in which the parties try to regulate the devolution of an estate, unless such 
contracts are contained in an antenuptial contract.1320 A detailed discussion of pacta 
successoria falls outside the scope of this thesis, but I would suggest that the 
possibility of an unenforceable agreement, together with the criticism levelled 
 
1313 See 5.3.4 for a discussion of this Bill. 
1314 Heaton & Kruger 259. 
1315 Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T); Heaton & Kruger 260; Heaton 2005(68)4 THRHR 666. 
1316 Heaton & Kruger 259. 
1317 Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 (6) SA 377 (SCA). 
1318 Schwellnus “The legal position of cohabitees in the South African law” 1995(16) Obiter 151. 
1319 McAlpine v McAlpine 1997 (1) SA 736 (A). 




above in relation to contracts, make this an equally unreliable mode of protection 
for life partners. 
 
c. Universal partnership  
Life partners can enter into an agreement in terms of which they determine each 
party’s share of, and contribution to, the partnership.1321 As an agreement is 
involved, the normal rules of contact apply, for example the parties must have 
capacity to contract and have the intention of entering into an agreement.1322 On 
termination of the relationship, the partnership terminates and the rules that apply 
to partnerships will apply unless the parties have agreed differently. In the absence 
of an agreement, partnership assets will therefore be divided according to the 
respective contributions by the parties. If it is not possible to prove the 
contributions, the assets will be divided equally.1323 If, however, parties agreed on 
the proportion in which they will hold the assets during the existence of the 
partnership, the assets will on dissolution be divided accordingly.1324 While such an 
agreement does provide protection for the parties, it will only be a real mode of 
protection if the parties contract on equal footing. 
 
d. Wills 
Wills can be used for partners to nominate each other as the heir to their respective 
estates. A will is, however, a voluntary, unilateral expression of a person’s wishes, 
and it cannot be relied on by the other partner in a relationship as a measure for 
protection, as it may be amended at any time without the other partner’s 




1321 V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 (1) SA 613 (O); Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) S 451 (T); Butters v Mncora 
2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Heaton 2005(68)4 THRHR 665. 
1322 Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 (1) SA 322 (C); Heaton & Kruger 259. 
1323 Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 (1) SA 952 (C); V (also known as L) v De Wet 1953 (1) SA 613 (O). 




e. Unjustified enrichment  
Unjustified enrichment occurs when one person’s estate has been increased at the 
expense of another person’s estate and there is no sufficient legal ground to retain 
such increase.1325 Our law does not yet recognise a general enrichment claim.1326 In 
certain circumstances a person whose partner has been enriched at the expense of 
that person can institute an enrichment claim, but it seems that this remedy is of 
limited use to life partners.1327 
 
Since the dawn of the new constitutional era in 1994, several Acts have been amended 
to confer spousal benefits on life partners and several court decisions have extended 
further benefits to life partners, albeit mainly to same-sex partners.1328 Du Toit1329 refers 
to the central theme of these judicial and legislative developments as being the 
foundational values of equality and human dignity in the Bill of Rights. He also refers to 
four sub-themes that underlie these developments, namely: 
• Extending protection to particularly vulnerable groups in society; 
• Ending the historical marginalisation of certain groups in society; 
• Legal recognition of relationships other than a civil marriage and the equal 
treatment of such relationships; 
• The need for the law to accommodate the diversity in the South African society. 
 
While the judicial and legislative intervention is welcome, piecemeal extension of rights 
and duties to life partners is clearly not desirable.1330 To expect life partners to rely on 
contracts and wills to protect themselves could imply that they are responsible for their 
own protection,1331 which is in contrast with the view expressed by the Constitutional 
 
1325 Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified enrichment. A casebook (2008) 3. 
1326 Heaton & Kruger 260; Sinclair & Heaton 278; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 217. 
1327 South African Law Reform Commission Report on domestic partnerships Project 118 Pretoria, 2006 
123. 
1328 Heaton & Kruger 255; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 209. 
1329 2009(126)3 SALJ 481-482. 
1330 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 209.  




Court1332 that there is a need for legislative reform. This comment by the Constitutional 
Court echoed an earlier statement in Dawood1333 that families come in many shapes and 
sizes and that care should be taken not to entrench some form of family at the expense 
of other forms. The court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Home Affairs1334 also mentioned1335 that marriage is only one form of life partnership. 
 
As mentioned before, life partnerships can operate between same-sex and heterosexual 
life partners. Our law has not extended the same treatment to these different 
relationships – as Smith1336 points out, the judiciary has approached the development of 
protection for life partners “on either side of a fault-line drawn by the sexual 
orientation” of the life partners. It is therefore necessary to analyse the limited 
legislative and judicial recognition that has been afforded to these relationships 
separately. 
 
5.3.2.1    Same-sex life partners 
5.3.2.1.1 Legislative development 
Some Acts afford protection to same-sex life partners. A few examples include: 
• The EDA includes in the definition1337 of “spouse” a person in a same-sex union 
which the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service Act is satisfied is 
intended to be permanent; 
• The Pension Funds Act1338 incudes a permanent life partner in the definition of 
“spouse”;1339 
 
1332 Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) 526. 
1333 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) pars 31-32. 
1334 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
1335 At par 36. 
1336 “Intestate succession and surviving heterosexual life partners: Using the jurist’s ‘laboratory’ to resolve 
the ostensible impasse that exists after Volks v Robinson” 2016(133)2 SALJ 288. 
1337 Section 1. 
1338 24 of 1956. 




• The ITA includes in the definition1340 of “spouse” a partner in a same-sex union 
intended to be permanent.1341 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Judicial development 
The lack of complete legislative protection of same-sex relationships inevitably led to 
constitutional attack in light of the provisions of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 
1993) regarding the right to equal protection of the law in section 8(1) and the 
prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in terms of section 8(2). Since 
the advent of the Bill of Rights (as contained in chapter 2 of the “final” Constitution 
enacted on 4 February 1997) there have been several court cases in which the legal 
position has been challenged. 
 
Although National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs1342 
does not pertain to maintenance, it is important in the context of this thesis as it was 
the first case to provide a platform for same-sex couples to approach the courts for an 
order declaring statutory provisions and common law rules as unfair discrimination 
against them.1343 The court held1344 that withholding the benefits of the (now repealed) 
Aliens Control Act1345 applicable to the “spouse” of a South African resident from same-
sex life partners unfairly discriminated against them, as it violated their constitutional 
rights to dignity and equality. 
 
 
1340 Section 1. 
1341 This definition has operated since 8 January 2016. Prior to this date the definition referred to a 
partner in a same-sex union that the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service was 
satisfied was permanent.  
1342 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
1343 De Vos & Barnard “Same-sex marriage, civil unions and domestic partnerships in South Africa: critical 
reflections on an ongoing saga” 2007(124)4 SALJ 824; Smith 2016(133)2 SALJ 291. 
1344 At par 97. 




In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund1346 the court extended the common law action for 
damages for loss of support to a surviving same-sex life partner whose deceased same-
sex life partner had undertaken to maintain him. 
 
In Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton1347 the applicant asked the court to declare the omission 
from section 1(a) and (d) of the ISA1348 of the phrase “or a member of a permanent 
same-sex life partnership” inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, and to read 
that phrase into the relevant sections. He also asked the court to declare the definition 
of “survivor” in section 1 of the MSSA inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid and 
to declare that the definition should be read as including “or the surviving partner in a 
permanent same-sex life partnership dissolved by death”. He also requested a 
declaration that the omission from sections 2(1), 2(3)(b), 2(3)(d), 3(a) and 3(c) of the 
MSSA of the words “or a member of a permanent same-sex life partnership” was 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid and that those sections should be read as 
if the stated words appeared in them. He claimed to have been in a same-sex life 
partnership with his deceased partner. The respondent, however, contended that the 
applicant and the deceased had not been same-sex life partners. The court postponed 
the application for the hearing of oral evidence regarding the dispute of fact as to 
whether the applicant had indeed been in a same-sex life partnership. The applicant 
submitted that this issue should stand over for later determination and asked the court 
to proceed to rule on the allegation of unconstitutionality of the Acts referred to. The 
court, however, held that it could not decide the allegation of unconstitutionality 
without reference to the factual dispute. It accordingly postponed the application to a 
later date for the hearing of oral evidence so that the issue of whether the applicant and 
the deceased had indeed been same-sex partners in a permanent life partnership could 
be resolved. It is not clear whether or not such a hearing ever occurred, as no further 
reference to the case is to be found in reported or unreported case law.  
 
1346 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA). 
1347 2005 (3) SA 141 (C). 




In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of 
Home Affairs1349 (“Fourie”) two lesbian women asked the Constitutional Court for an 
order that the law recognise their right to marry, and an order that the Minister of 
Home Affairs and the Director General register their marriage in terms of the Marriage 
Act. Although this case did not deal with maintenance, it is relevant to this discussion as 
it led to important legislative development. This case was the culmination of a long 
judicial route followed by the applicants through the (then) Transvaal Provincial Division 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal (then Appellate Division).1350 The majority judgment 
held1351 that the failure of the common law and Marriage Act to provide the means for 
same-sex couples to enjoy the same status, entitlement and responsibilities given to 
heterosexual couples through marriage, was an unjustifiable violation of their 
constitutional rights in section 9(1) and 9(3) of the Constitution to equal protection of 
the law and to not be discriminated against unfairly. This failure is also an unjustifiable 
violation of their right to dignity as provided for in section 10 of the Constitution.1352 The 
majority held1353 that the common law definition of marriage was inconsistent with the 
Constitution and therefore invalid. It suspended this declaration of invalidity for twelve 
months to allow Parliament to correct the defect. If Parliament failed to do so, the 
words “or spouse” would automatically be read into section 30(1) of the Marriage 
Act.1354 The Minister of Home Affairs and Director General were ordered to pay the 
costs of the respondents in the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional 
Court. The minority judgment by O’Regan J agreed1355 with the main order, but not with 
the suspension. She held1356 that the order should have immediate prospective effect as 
this would protect the constitutional rights of same-sex partners without precluding 
Parliament from finding a solution. 
 
1349 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC). 
1350 Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs [2005] 1 All SA 273 (SCA). 
1351 At 398. 
1352 At 399. 
1353 At 415. 
1354 At 414. 
1355 At 415. 




The legislature responded by promulgating the CUA on 30 November 2006. This Act 
applies to same-sex and heterosexual couples and, broadly speaking, confers the 
consequences of a civil marriage on a civil union.1357 
 
Before the coming into operation of the CUA, the Pretoria High Court in Gory v 
Kolver1358 was asked to consider the constitutionality of section 1(1) of the ISA. The 
applicant, Mr Gory, was the surviving partner of a same-sex life partnership. His partner, 
Mr Brooks, had died intestate and the executor of Mr Brooks’ estate regarded his 
parents as his intestate heirs. Mr Gory challenged this and claimed that he was the sole 
intestate heir of the estate due to his relationship with the deceased. The High Court 
found that Mr Gory and the deceased had indeed been in a permanent same-sex life 
partnership and had undertaken reciprocal duties of support. It declared the omission in 
section 1(1) of the ISA of the words “or partner in a permanent same-sex life 
partnership in which the parties have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” 
inconsistent with the Constitution as it unfairly discriminated on the basis of sexual 
orientation by not affording same-sex relationships the same protection as heterosexual 
marriages.1359 It made an order that those words had to be read into the specific 
section. The court also made an order that the order of unconstitutionality and reading-
in would have no effect on any acts performed in respect of the administration of any 
intestate estate which had formally been wound up by the time the order was granted. 
 
The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court1360 (“Gory”) for the order of 
unconstitutionality to be confirmed. An appeal to intervene in the matter was made by 
a certain Ms Starke and her three sisters. Their late brother was alleged to have been in 
a permanent same-sex life partnership at the time of his death and his alleged partner 
claimed that he was the sole intestate heir of the deceased estate. The sisters disputed 
 
1357 See 1.2.5. 
1358 [2006] 2 All SA 640 (T). 
1359 At 648. 




the permanency of the relationship and claimed that they were the intestate heirs. They 
accordingly asked the court for leave to intervene on the basis that they would be 
prejudiced should the High Court order in Gory v Kolver be confirmed, as they would be 
deprived of their vested rights as intestate heirs of their late brother’s estate. They 
suggested that reading-in was not the appropriate remedy and that whatever order the 
court made, should apply only to intestate estates of persons who die after the order 
was made. The court agreed that they had a direct and substantial interest in the 
application as their rights as intestate heirs would cease if the High Court order in Gory v 
Kolver was confirmed. 
 
Turning to the constitutionality of section 1(1) of the ISA, the court held1361 that the 
section conferred intestate succession rights on surviving heterosexual spouses but 
denied those rights to same-sex life partners who were (at the time) prohibited from 
legally marrying. This amounted to a violation of the equality clause1362 in the 
Constitution as it discriminated on the grounds of sexual orientation. In terms of section 
9(5) of the Constitution, such discrimination is presumed to be unfair, unless the 
contrary is established. The court could find no justification for any limitation of Mr 
Gory’s right to equality and dignity1363 and accordingly confirmed1364 the High Court 
finding that section 1(1) of the ISA was unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
It then considered what the appropriate remedy should be. After considering the 
submissions by all parties, it held1365 that it was the task of the legislature to enact 
legislation which effectively deals with all aspects of the different types of marital and 
non-marital domestic partnerships. The primary responsibility of the Constitutional 
Court was to cure “the existing and historical” unconstitutionality of section 1(1) of the 
 
1361 At 258. 
1362 Section 9(3). 
1363 At 259. 
1364 At 259. 




ISA, and this required a reading-in order.1366 It accordingly confirmed1367 the reading-in 
order granted by the High Court. The court held1368 specifically that the piecemeal 
protection that had been conferred on same-sex partners would continue to apply until 
the legislature expressly intervened. 
 
As far as the question of retroactivity raised by the Starke sisters was concerned, the 
court mentioned1369 that this was the first case that dealt with the recognition of 
entitlements of permanent same-sex life partners in which the effect was to deprive 
third parties of vested claims. The court explained1370 that section 2 of the Constitution 
(the so-called “supremacy clause”) provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the Republic and all law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. A consequence of 
section 2(1) is that all legislation already in existence when the Constitution took effect 
would continue in force until it was amended or repealed, but only to the extent that it 
was consistent with the Constitution. This means that a pre-existing law or provision of a 
law which was unconstitutional became invalid the moment the Constitution came into 
effect.1371  If a court therefore, after the introduction of the Constitution, made an order 
of unconstitutionality, it simply declared invalid what was already invalidated by the 
Constitution. An unconstitutional law could therefore be invalidated by the Interim 
Constitution with effect from 27 April 1994, even though the applicant’s course of 
action only arose after the 1996 Constitution came into effect on 4 February 1997.1372 In 
terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, a court considering a constitutional 
matter “must” declare a law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid 
to the extent of its unconstitutionality. The court “may”, however, in terms of section 
172(1)(b)(i) limit the retroactive effect of its declaration if the interests of justice and 
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1367 At 263. 
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equity require this.1373 The court held1374 that it would not be just and equitable to deny 
Mr Gory constitutional relief by making its order of invalidity of section 1(1) prospective, 
despite the fact that the declaration would impact on the interests of third parties such 
as Mr Brooks’ parents. The court, however, did not agree1375 with the way in which the 
High Court had framed the order of retroactivity as it felt that it went too far. It 
accordingly held1376 that the order of unconstitutionality and reading-in “will not 
invalidate any transfer of ownership prior to the date of this order of any property 
pursuant to the distribution of the residue of an estate, unless it is established that 
when such transfer was effected, the transferee was on notice that the property in 
question was subject to a legal challenge on the grounds upon which the applicant 
brought the present application”. It also held that if “serious administrative or practical 
problems”1377 are experienced, any interested person may approach the court for a 
variation of the order.  
  
As Picarra1378 points out, the court’s confirmation is not surprising in light of its earlier 
decisions.1379 It is, however, interesting as the contextual landscape in which the ruling 
was made was very different from that which operated when the other decisions were 
made – at the time of the other decisions, same-sex life partners were unable to marry 
legally, but Gory was heard after the ruling in Fourie, which imposed a duty on 
Parliament to remedy the defects in the Marriage Act and the common law which 
precluded same-sex couples from marrying, by 1 December 2006. As the ruling in Fourie 
provided that the words “or spouse” would be read into section 30(1) of the Marriage 
Act after the words “or husband”, failing legislative intervention, Picarra suggests this 
meant that within a few weeks from the Gory decision on 23 November 2006, same-sex 
couples would be able to “marry”, either because of legislation allowing it or as a result 
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1374 At 267. 
1375 At 267. 
1376 At 277. 
1377 At 277. 
1378 “Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC)” 2007(23)3 SAJHR 564.  




of the reading-in order. They would therefore be entitled to the same succession rights 
relating to intestacy as surviving married partners, should they choose to marry. 
 
Wood-Bodley1380 is also of the opinion that the ruling is unsurprising. He agrees1381 with 
the court’s finding that the declaration of invalidity would not apply to a completed 
transfer of property to an heir who was not aware that the constitutional validity of 
section 1(1) was being challenged. He does, however, comment1382 that the suggestion 
that any interested person who experiences serious administrative or practical problems 
could approach the court for a variation of the order, raises questions about the 
progress the surviving partner must have made in asserting his or her claim to inherit in 
order to be protected.  
 
It is interesting to note that the court in Gory ordered1383 the Minister of Justice, who 
was one of the respondents, to pay the costs of Mr Gory and the executor. The court 
voiced its dissatisfaction at the failure of the state to enact “comprehensive legislation” 
that accommodated same-sex partnerships in a constitutionally acceptable manner, 
which failure compelled Mr Gory to bring the application. The court indeed held1384 that 
the state has an ongoing constitutional obligation to “respect, protect, provide and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights” by amending or replacing legislation that violates 
constitutional rights and that justice and equity require that the Minister should pay the 
costs.1385 
 
Duplan v Loubser1386 was decided after the coming into operation of the CUA. In this 
case, the applicant sought an order declaring that he was entitled to inherit from his 
 
1380 “Intestate succession and gay and lesbian couples” 2008(125)1 SALJ 48. 
1381 2008(125)1 SALJ 51. 
1382 2008(125)1 SALJ 51. 
1383 At 277. 
1384 At 276. 
1385 At 176. See also Wood-Bodley 2008(125)1 SALJ 51. 





deceased partner’s intestate estate. The deceased died without descendants or adopted 
children or parents. The respondent was the only surviving sibling of the deceased and 
accordingly stood to inherit the entire deceased estate in terms of the provisions of the 
ISA. The parties had been in a same-sex life partnership for twelve years and had 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support. They had not solemnised or registered their 
partnership in terms of the CUA. The applicant relied on the judgment in Gory and 
submitted that he was the spouse of the deceased and therefore entitled to inherit, 
despite not having solemnised and registered the relationship as a civil union. The 
executor maintained that only a spouse in a marriage or partnership solemnised and 
registered as a civil union is entitled to inherit. As the applicant was not such a spouse, 
he could not inherit. The court explained1387 that our common and statutory law before, 
and in some instances after, the Constitution distinguished between married and 
unmarried people by extending certain benefits to married people but not to unmarried 
people. The purpose of the CUA is to give same-sex partners the choice to enter into a 
formal relationship recognised by law, which enjoys the same status, privileges and 
responsibilities enjoyed by heterosexual couples who enter into marriage. The Act does 
not, however, materially alter the distinction between married and unmarried 
people.1388 It also does not alter the position of heterosexual couples who choose not to 
solemnise and register their relationship.1389 The court considered the judgment in Gory 
and suggested1390 that it was aimed at protecting same-sex life partners who had 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support, as there was no legislation recognising same-
sex marriages at the time of the judgment. The CUA had however changed that position 
and same-sex civil unions are now recognised as equivalent to heterosexual 
marriages.1391 This recognition however only applies to marriages and civil partnerships 
which are solemnised and registered under the CUA. The court held1392 that the order in 
 
1387 At par 9. 
1388 At par 9. 
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Gory was intended to include same-sex life partners who undertook reciprocal duties of 
support until section 1(1) of the ISA was amended to exclude them from the ambit of 
this Act. Parliament removed the impediment on same-sex marriages by introducing the 
CUA – this cured the unconstitutionality relating to same-sex marriages, but not of 
section 1(1) of the ISA. The reading-in order had therefore not run its course, as section 
1(1) has not yet been amended.1393 The court noted1394 that the stare decisis doctrine 
precluded it from deviating from the reading-in order of the words as decided in Gory. 
This doctrine requires lower courts to follow the decisions of higher courts in the judicial 
hierarchy in order to ensure “predictability, reliability, uniformity, equality, certainty 
and convenience”.1395 The court noted1396 that a deviation from a higher court’s decision 
is possible in instances where a provision that has been declared unconstitutional is 
subsequently amended by the legislature and the amendment leads to a material 
change. This is, however, only possible if the amendment to the statute or the new 
statute that is implemented to remove the constitutional complaint is not open to 
attack.1397 The court accordingly held1398 that the reading-in order in Gory still applied 
and declared the applicant the only intestate heir of the deceased.  
 
The brother of the deceased applied directly to the Constitutional Court for leave to 
appeal.1399 He argued that the High Court had incorrectly confined itself it to the stare 
decisis principle and had failed to appreciate the power the legislature has to amend the 
law and substitute decisions of the Constitutional Court. He further submitted that the 
decision in Gory was an interim measure designed to apply only until the underlying 
mischief was resolved by Parliament. According to his contention, the mischief to be 
addressed was the inability of permanent same-sex partners to enter into a legally 
 
1393 At par 19. 
1394 At par 20. 
1395 Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality 2014 (6) SA 592 CC at par 54. 
1396 At par 21.  
1397 This was also pointed out in Gory v Kolver at par 30. 
1398 At par 25. 
1399 Laubscher v Duplan 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC). The High Court case refers to the deceased and his brother 
as “Loubser” whereas the Constitutional Court case refers to them as “Laubscher”. No explanation is 




recognised union, and he submitted that section 13(2)(b) of the CUA addresses this 
mischief, as its effect is that same-sex partners who enter into a civil union under the 
Act are automatically included as “spouses” in the definition in section 1(1) of the 
ISA.1400 As the mischief had been addressed, it followed that the CUA repealed the order 
in Gory. He also suggested that the interpretational maxim cessante ratione legis cessat 
ipsa lex (once the reason for a law falls away, the laws itself ceases to exist) implied that 
section 13(2)(b) had replaced the law created by the reading-in order.  
 
The respondent rejected the contention of the applicant. He contended that the Gory 
order was not intended as an interim measure and that it would apply until Parliament 
repealed or amended it. He disagreed with the reliance on the cessante ratione legis 
cessat ipsa lex principle as he contended that the purpose of Gory was to enable 
surviving same-sex partners to inherit from each other despite the fact that they were 
not “married”. This purpose had not fallen away as the CUA only extended protection to 
partners who have entered into a civil union.  
 
The Commission for Gender Equality joined the case as Amicus Curiae (friend of the 
court). They contended that there were no sound policy reasons to undo the protection 
that Gory provided, specifically as, after more than a decade since the judgment, the 
legislature had yet to amend the wording of section 1(1) of the ISA to bring it in line with 
the decision in Gory. They submitted that the order in Gory better gives effect to “the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” because it clearly indicates that the 
Constitutional Court does not prefer one type of family relationship over another. 
 
The Constitutional Court (“Duplan”) granted1401 the applicant leave to appeal directly to 
that court and proceeded to consider the following aspects: 
a. Whether the reading-in order in Gory was meant as an interim measure; 
 
1400 This section provides that any reference in an Act (other than the Marriage Act and the Customary 
Marriages Act) to husband, wife or spouse includes a civil union partner. 




b. The interplay between the order in Gory and the CUA; 
c. Whether the principles stemming from Volks v Robinson1402 (“Volks”) were 
applicable to the matter. 
All the judges concurred in the outcome, but two different judgments were given. Mbha 
AJ, who delivered the judgment of the majority, explained the different judgments by 
noting1403 that cases similar to this one often gave rise to viable interpretative 
differences and this case was no exception. 
 
Mbha AJ disagreed1404 with the applicant’s contention that the order in Gory had fallen 
away with the enactment of the CUA. He referred to the statement made in Gory1405 
that, once legislation enabling same-sex couples to enter into a civil union with the same 
consequences as a marriage, was enacted “there would [then] appear to be no good 
reason for distinguishing between unmarried heterosexual couples and unmarried 
same-sex couples in respect of intestate succession”. The court in Gory nevertheless 
chose to use the remedy of reading-in, leading to the assumption that it acknowledged 
that the pending legislation would not necessarily amend section 1(1) of the ISA.1406 The 
court in Gory furthermore stated1407 that the reading-in order would be of indefinite 
duration, but subject to amendment or repeal by Parliament. Mbha AJ considered1408 
the meaning of “interim”, which is defined1409 as “[i]n the meantime; meanwhile; 
temporary; between”, and suggested1410 that there was no indication that “interim” 
refers to a shorter, rather than a longer, period. The judge further held1411 that the non-
amendment of section 1(1) of the ISA did not change the interim nature of the order 
 
1402 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
1403 At par 20. 
1404 At par 22. 
1405 At 262. 
1406 At 23. 
1407 At 262. 
1408 At par 24. 
1409 Black’s law dictionary 6 ed at 562. 
1410 At par 24. 




and the order in Gory accordingly remained in place until the legislature chose to amend 
it.  
 
Mbha AJ considered1412 two different approaches in dealing with the interplay between 
Gory and the CUA. The interpretative approach requires interpreting section 1(1) of the 
ISA as amended by Gory and assessing whether the CUA had specifically amended this 
section.  The judge held1413 that this was not the case and that there was no reason why 
the CUA and the position created by Gory could not co-exist. The contextual approach 
requires assessing whether the CUA addressed the mischief that the reading-in order in 
Gory aimed to address. The judge referred1414 to the statement1415 in Gory that if 
Parliament either failed to implement legislation before the deadline set in Fourie or if it 
did enact legislation giving same-sex couples the same status, benefits and 
responsibilities as heterosexual couples, the effect of a reading-in order would be that 
section 1(1) of the ISA would apply to all spouses who “marry”, and also to permanent 
same-sex life partners who have undertaken reciprocal duties of support but who fail to 
“marry” under the new dispensation. According to Mbha AJ,1416 this led to the 
conclusion that, as the CUA did give same-sex couples who enter into “marriage” the 
same status and benefits as opposite sex couples, a specific amendment of section 1(1) 
of the ISA was still required to remove the reading-in order. The CUA therefore did not 
cure the mischief that the reading-in order aimed to cure.1417 The effect of Gory was to 
include all permanent same-sex partners in the ambit of section 1(1), whereas the CUA 
brought only registered civil union partners into the ambit of section 1(1).1418 The judge 
agreed1419 with the respondent’s submission that the applicant’s reliance on the 
cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex principle was ill-founded as the mischief 
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contemplated by the order in Fourie was the inability of same-sex partners to marry, 
whereas the mischief in Gory was the inability of same-sex partners to inherit on 
intestacy. The reading-in order in Gory therefore did not fall away when the CUA was 
enacted.1420 Froneman J, who delivered the concurring judgment, was of the opinion1421 
that the mischief Gory was asked to remedy was the inability of same-sex life partners 
to enter into a legally valid marriage. His view is based on the statement1422 in Gory that 
the inability of same-sex life partners to marry amounts to discrimination on the listed 
ground of sexual orientation. According to his judgment, as this inability had been 
removed by the CUA, it followed that the mischief had been addressed.1423  
 
Both judgments considered the principles stemming from the decision in Volks. Mbha AJ 
held1424 that Volks dealt with the right of a permanent life partner to claim maintenance 
from a deceased estate in terms of the MSSA, and could therefore be distinguished from 
the Duplan matter as the latter deals with the right to benefit on intestacy in terms of 
section 1(1) of the ISA. Maintenance and intestate succession are very different systems 
aimed at addressing different needs and therefore require different considerations.1425 
The cases could therefore be distinguished both on the facts and the legal mechanisms 
used to consider the matter and the court was therefore not obliged to follow the 
decision in Volks.1426 Mbha AJ specifically stated1427 that Volks “continues to apply with 
full precedential force within the context of maintenance of surviving spouses”. 
Froneman J disagreed1428 with the emphasis placed on the difference between 
maintenance and intestate succession and suggested1429 that it does not make sense to 
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suggest that the “choice” principle referred to in Volks1430 should apply in the context of 
maintenance but not in the context of intestate succession. He nevertheless agreed1431 
that the court was not obliged to follow the decision in Volks as it does not adequately 
reflect the present social context by its apparent moral preference for marriage.1432 As it 
is an established principle that a previous decision of the Constitutional Court can be 
departed from if the decision was clearly wrong, the creation in Volks of another form of 
unfair discrimination meant that the court in Duplan could depart from the decision.1433   
 
Both judgments concluded1434 that unmarried same-sex partners who had undertaken 
reciprocal duties of support were entitled to protection. The majority held1435 that such 
partners constituted a new category of beneficiary for purpose of section 1(1) of the ISA 
and they would continue to enjoy the protection given to them in terms of Gory, at least 
until the legislature specifically amended section 1(1) of the ISA. Froneman J opted1436 
to interpret section 13(2)(b) of the CUA in a way that least infringes the fundamental 
right to equality in the Bill of Rights and suggested that unmarried same-sex and 
heterosexual partners who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support were not 
excluded on a literal reading of the section and therefore “remain entitled to inherit 
from the intestate estate” of the deceased partner. I fail to understand the reference to 
heterosexual life partners, as they did not prior to this judgment have the right to 
intestate succession – for that matter, they still do not have that right. I have to assume 
that this is an error and that the judge meant to refer to same-sex partners only. 
 
 
1430 See 5.3.2.2.2. The “choice principle” essentially refers to the principle applied by the court that parties 
who had the legal option to get married and chose not to do so, could not claim benefits that were 
extended to a married couple. 
1431 At par 84. 
1432 At par 82. 
1433 At par 86. 
1434 At pars 70 and 87. 
1435 At par 55. 




Heaton and Kruger1437 point out that the Constitutional Court in Gory, knowing that the 
right of same-sex partners to marry was imminent, indicated that the commencement 
of such legislation would not alter the rights and benefits that the Constitutional Court 
had already extended to same-sex life partners in the decisions that preceded the 
legislation. That means that same-sex couples who did not enter into a civil union would 
still be able to claim the protection enjoyed in terms of legislation and judgments before 
the CUA came into operation and, based on this, it would appear that the decision in 
Duplan is correct.1438 
 
There is no court case dealing specifically with the MSSA in relation to same-sex life 
partners. The question arises whether the protection extended to them by Gory (albeit 
in relation to intestate succession) will also apply in the context of the MSSA or whether 
the promulgation of the CUA means that the courts will place same-sex partners who 
have not entered into a civil union on the same footing as heterosexual life partners 
who have chosen not to marry. This question is further discussed in 5.3.3 below.   
 
5.3.2.2    Heterosexual life partners 
5.3.2.2.1 Legislative development 
Although there was traditionally no impediment to heterosexual partners marrying, 
several Acts have since 1994 expressly extended the same treatment to them as to 
spouse, for example: 
• The Insolvency Act1439 includes a heterosexual life partner in the definition1440 of 
“spouse”; 
• The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act1441 enables 
someone living with an employee as “wife and husband” and who is wholly or 
 
1437 South African family law 267. 
1438 South African family law 267; Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 215. 
1439 24 of 1936. 
1440 Section 2. 




partially dependent on that employee, to claim compensation as the employee’s 
dependant if the employee is killed in the course of his or her employment; 
• The EDA1442 includes in the definition1443 of “spouse” a person in a heterosexual 
union which the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service Act is 
satisfied is intended to be permanent; 
• The Pension Funds Act1444 incudes a permanent life partner in the definition1445 
of “spouse”; 
• The ITA includes in the definition1446 of “spouse” a partner in a heterosexual 
union intended to be permanent; 
• The Maintenance Act1447 applies to the legal duty of any person to maintain 
another person, irrespective of the nature of the relationship that gives rise to 
the duty of support;1448 
• The Medical Schemes Act1449 defines1450 a “dependant” as including a life 
partner. 
 
5.3.2.2.2 Judicial development 
There have been several cases since 1994 dealing with the common law action for 
damages for loss of support, where the courts have extended this particular remedy to 
heterosexual life partners. In Paixão v Road Accident Fund1451 the plaintiff sued the Road 
Accident Fund for loss of maintenance and support following the death of her partner 
with whom she had lived. The evidence indicated that the partner had supported her 
and her children. The court found that she had not established a legally binding 
agreement that entitled her to support. Her partner therefore had no legal obligation 
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1443 Section 1. 
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and she accordingly could not claim loss of support and maintenance. The decision was 
taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal,1452 which held that a contractual 
undertaking to support suffices. The court overturned the decision of the court a quo 
and held that there was a tacit agreement which established a reciprocal duty of 
support worthy of legal protection. The action for damages for loss of support is, 
however, a very specific remedy, which is not dependent on a legally enforceable duty 
to support1453 and this duty of support is not dependent on the existence of a valid 
marriage.1454 It cannot be regarded as a spousal benefit and this case therefore cannot 
be seen as a general approach by our courts towards extending spousal benefits to 
heterosexual life partners. 
 
Despite the limited legislative recognition of heterosexual life partners, our courts have 
been unwilling to extend spousal benefits to them. To date, only two cases dealing with 
the issue of heterosexual cohabitation in the context of the MSSA have been reported. 
In Robinson v Volks1455 the applicant had been a partner in a permanent life partnership 
with a Mr Shandling for about sixteen years. The couple had never married and it was 
common cause that there was no legal obstacle to a marriage. Following the death of 
Mr Shandling, Mrs Robinson submitted a claim for maintenance against the deceased 
estate in terms of the MSSA as she averred that she was not able to provide for her own 
reasonable maintenance needs. The executor of the estate rejected her claim on the 
basis that she was not a “survivor" as contemplated by the MSSA. She applied to the 
court for an order declaring that she was entitled to lodge a claim for maintenance 
 
1452 Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 (6) SA 377 (SCA). 
1453 See also the discussion of Amod (born Peer) v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission 
for Gender Equality Intervening) [1999] 4 All SA 421 (A) in 5.2.3.1. 
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Road Accident Fund unreported, case number 9098/07 [2009] ZAGPHC, judgment delivered on 3 
February 2009; Verheem v Road Accident Fund 2012 (2) SA 409 (GNP);  Heaton & Kruger 262; Didishe 
“Legal recognition for non-nuclear families: support for unmarried heterosexual partners” 2012(526) 
De Rebus 26 at 29; Smith & Heaton “Extension of the dependant’s action to heterosexual life partners 
after Volks v Robinson and the coming into operation of the Civil Union Act – thus far and no 
further?” 2012(75)3 THRHR 479; Smith 2016(133)2 SALJ 296. 




against the estate, alternatively declaring that the MSSA was unconstitutional and 
invalid as it did not include a person in a permanent life partnership. The court noted1456 
the significant difference between a marriage and a permanent life partnership and 
referred specifically to the fact that a marriage has legal significance as soon as the 
marriage ceremony is concluded. In contrast to this, a life partnership has no such 
immediate legal significance and it is not possible to make a determination of the nature 
of the relationship at the outset of the relationship. The court referred1457 to 
Goldblatt1458 who lists1459 the criteria to determine whether a life partnership exists and 
held that the presence of such criteria can only be established after a lengthy period of 
time. The court held1460 that, as the criteria did exist in this case, Mrs Robinson had been 
discriminated against based on her marital status. As the discrimination is on a 
particular ground, it is presumed to be unfair, unless there is some justification for the 
discrimination. The court could find no such justification and concluded that Mrs 
Robinson’s constitutional right to equality and dignity had been unfairly prejudiced. It 
held in particular that domestic partnerships form a significant part of South African 
family law and stated:1461 
“[T]o ignore them [ie, domestic partners] and to impose a particular religious view on their world is to 
undermine the dignity of difference and to render the guarantee of equality somewhat illusory insofar 
as a significant percentage of the population is concerned.” 
 
The court accordingly ordered1462 that the omission from the definition of “survivor” in 
section 1 of the MSSA of the words “and includes the surviving partners of a life 
 
1456 At 70. 
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partnership” is unconstitutional and invalid and it ordered a reading-in of those words. 
It also ordered1463 that the following be read into section 1: 
“‘Spouse’ for purposes of this Act shall include a person in a permanent life partnership; ‘Marriage’ for  
purposes of this Act shall include a permanent life partnership.” 
 
The executor of Mr Shandling’s estate appealed to the Constitutional Court1464  against 
the order and Mrs Robinson simultaneously sought confirmation of the declaration of 
invalidity. A majority of seven judges upheld the appeal with three judges dissenting. 
The majority judgment was written by Skweyiya J and a separate concurring judgment 
was written by Ngcobo J. Sachs J wrote a dissenting judgment and Mokgoro and 
O’Regan JJ wrote a joint dissenting judgment. Due to the different views of the separate 
judgments, it is necessary to discuss them all. 
 
The majority judgment by Skweyiya J gave a brief explanation1465 of the history of the 
MSSA and stated that its purpose is to provide for the reasonable maintenance needs of 
parties to a marriage dissolved by death. The aim is to extend an invariable consequence 
of marriage beyond the death of one of the parties in order to deal with the perceived 
unfairness that arises from the fact that, at common law, the maintenance obligations 
of the parties to a marriage ceased at death. It therefore merely seeks to pass that 
obligation to the estate of a deceased partner and nothing more.1466 The majority’s 
conclusion1467 was that “survivor” in the MSSA was not capable of being interpreted as 
anything other than a survivor of a marriage recognised either by law or a religion and 
that heterosexual cohabitants could not be included in the ambit of “survivor”, as that 
would unduly strain the word and would be inconsistent with the context.1468  
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The majority then considered1469 the argument that the exclusion of heterosexual life 
partners violates their right to equality, leading to unfair discrimination. Without giving 
any reasons, Skweyiya J held1470 that he is prepared to accept that it does amount to 
discrimination based on marital status. In deciding whether such discrimination is unfair, 
it is important to consider the differences between married people and unmarried 
people. The Constitution does not provide for a right to marry and have a family, but it 
does recognise marriage as an institution.1471 There are also several examples where 
recognition has been given to the importance of marriage and family as social 
institutions in our society, for example Daniels v Daniels; Mackay v Mackay;1472 Belfort v 
Belfort1473 and Dawood.1474 Because of this recognition of marriage, our law may 
distinguish between married and unmarried people and may in appropriate 
circumstances extend benefits to married people without also extending them to 
unmarried people.1475 In a marriage, the rights of spouses are largely determined by the 
law – where parties cohabit, their rights are mainly determined by agreement between 
them. One such example is the duty of support that arises as a result of the operation of 
law in a marriage, but it will only arise between cohabiting couples if they agree to it. 
Couples who choose to marry do so cognisant of the legal obligations that arise on 
conclusion of the marriage as a result of the operation of law without the need for any 
further agreement.1476 This includes obligations which extend beyond the term of the 
marriage or beyond death. The Constitution does not require that any obligation be 
placed on the estate of a deceased person if the law did not impose such obligation 
during the deceased’s lifetime. It is therefore not unfair to distinguish between survivors 
of marriages and survivors of heterosexual life partnerships. To impose a duty on an 
estate where no such duty existed by operation of law during the lifetime of the 
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deceased would be “incongruous, unfair, irrational and untenable”.1477 The majority also 
referred to the argument that Mrs Robinson’s right to dignity had been violated, but 
held1478 that this was not so – she was not being told that her dignity was worth less 
than that of a married person, but rather that for maintenance purposes there was a 
fundamental difference between her relationship and a marriage. The majority 
accordingly upheld1479 the appeal and did not confirm the High Court order. 
 
Ngcobo J in the main agreed with the view of the rest of the majority. He also 
referred1480 to the fact that the law does not legally preclude heterosexual life partners 
from entering into marriage – all it does is to regulate the rights and duties of those 
heterosexual life partners who do choose marriage as the institution to govern their 
relationship. Their “entitlement to protection” under the MSSA therefore depends on 
their decision to marry or not.1481 He agreed1482 that, although the MSSA denies the 
surviving partners of a permanent life partnership the protection it gives to surviving 
spouses, it could not be said that the MSSA fundamentally impairs the right to dignity or 
the sense of equal worth of life partners who choose not to marry. He therefore 
concluded1483 that the discrimination against such life partners is not unfair. 
 
The dissenting judgment by Mokgoro J and O’Regan J also referred1484 to marriage as an 
important social institution with extensive legal consequences. While marriage often 
results in the establishment of a family, the reality is that not every family is founded on 
a marriage recognised as such in our legal system.1485 Members of such other families, 
however, play the same role as members of families founded on marriage.1486 The 
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constitutional values therefore require that families established outside civilly 
recognised marriage should not be subject to unfair discrimination.1487 If a law regulates 
the consequences of a permanent life partnership differently from those of a marriage, 
that law will be prima facie discriminatory.1488 The question then is whether the 
discrimination is unfair. The minority held1489 that, should such discrimination not be 
unfair, the inevitable outcome will be that marriage remains privileged, which will not 
serve the constitutional purpose of section 9(3) of the Constitution which prohibits 
unfair discrimination based on (inter alia) marital status. Cohabiting partners are a 
vulnerable group and excluding them from the operation of the MSSA could have a 
grave impact and would constitute unfair discrimination.1490 The next determination is 
whether the unfair discrimination is reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution.1491 The purpose of the MSSA is to alter the common law rule that a 
surviving spouse has no right to maintenance after the death of the other spouse, and 
there is no reason why this purpose cannot be achieved by including surviving partners 
of cohabitation relationships in which mutual duties of support have been 
undertaken.1492 The judges accordingly found1493 that there is no justification for the 
unfair discrimination. They suggested1494 that the unconstitutionality in section 2(1) of 
the MSSA could be remedied by reading into the definition “and including the surviving 
partners of a permanent heterosexual life partnership terminated by the death of one 
partner in which the parties undertook reciprocal duties of support and in circumstances 
where the surviving partner has not received an equitable share in the deceased 
partner’s estate” (emphasis added). They ordered1495 that the omission of the words 
referred to above was unconstitutional and ordered1496 the reading-in of the words. 
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They also confirmed1497 the High Court order that the omission of the definitions of 
“spouse” and “marriage” were unconstitutional and invalid and ordered that the 
abovementioned words be read in as requested. They, however, suspended the order 
for two years to enable the legislature to cure the constitutional defects in the Act. 
Failing such cure, the order of invalidity would have no effect on the validity of any acts 
performed in the administration of a deceased estate finally wound up by the date on 
which the order of invalidity came into effect.1498 It should be noted that, despite the 
order, the judges found1499 on the facts that Mrs Robinson was adequately provided for 
in Mr Shandling’s will and that she was not entitled to any further relief from the court. 
The dissenting judgment by Sachs J emphasised1500 that the fairness of the Act should be 
assessed within the framework of family law, rather than the narrow confines of 
matrimonial law. He considered the socio-legal context of patriarchy and poverty1501 
and the move from marriage law to family law.1502 He referred1503 specifically to the 
Discussion Paper1504 issued by the South African Law Reform Commission on domestic 
partnerships, which clearly indicates the need for legal regulation to address disputes 
arising from cohabitation relationships. The judge suggested1505 that we should move 
away from the definitional argument that extends rights only to those who comply with 
the current definition of marriage to a functional argument that advocates a 
reconsideration of how marriage is defined in light of the changes to marriage over 
time. The judge referred1506 to several laws that have recognised domestic partnerships 
since 1994 and concluded1507 that the changes to society make it necessary to establish 
a new legal landscape consistent with the values of diversity, tolerance of difference and 
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concern for human dignity as expressed in the Constitution. He found1508 that the 
“blanket nature” of the exclusivity principle resulted in unfair discrimination in conflict 
with section 9(3) of the Constitution. He then considered whether there was any 
justification of the principle of exclusivity and noted1509 that there could be two possible 
justifications: 
• The burden of proof – he found1510 that this was not “insuperable” and that any 
difficulties in determining whether a life partnership existed should relate rather 
to the remedy than the actual existence of a partnership; 
• Departing from the exclusivity principle may undermine the institution of 
marriage – while acknowledging1511 that marriage has to be privileged, he found 
no reason for it to be exclusive.  
The judge accordingly found1512 that the continued blanket exclusion of domestic 
partnerships from the ambit of the MSSA, despite the degree of commitment shown to 
the family by the survivor, cannot be justified and that the MSSA is invalid to that 
extent. He agreed1513 that the order of unconstitutionality be suspended for two years 
to give Parliament time to remedy the defect. He also found that, on the facts, Mrs 
Robinson did not have any right to claim because reasonable provision had been made 
for her in terms of Mr Shandling’s will. 
 
This judgment raises some issues of concern. I find the conclusion in the dissenting 
judgments that the words “... and in circumstances where the surviving partner has not 
received an equitable share in the deceased partner’s estate” (emphasis added) should 
form part of the definition disconcerting. The basis of the judgment is that unmarried 
couples should be protected if they take on the duty of support that automatically 
applies to couples who marry. Why then should there be a further requirement that the 
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protection will only apply in the absence of an equitable share of the deceased partner’s 
estate? This is, after all, not a requirement for married couples. Smith1514 agrees that 
these words would add an additional criterion which is not imposed on a surviving 
spouse and suggests1515 that these words are in any event redundant as the MSSA 
already contains the necessary measures in section 3 to ensure that the survivor’s claim 
will be assessed based on his or her means and needs. Cooke also questions1516 why the 
judges limited the suggested relief to circumstances where the survivor did not receive 
an equitable distribution from the partner’s estate. 
 
This case understandably sparked a lot of comments. Criticism has been levelled at the 
majority for not recognising that there was indeed a contractual duty of support 
between the parties.1517 Smith1518 criticises the court’s view that there is no reciprocal 
duty of support where only one party earns an income. He notes1519 that there is no 
requirement that both partners should factually contribute towards reciprocal 
maintenance on a continual basis – what is required is a commitment in this respect, 
which then results in a reciprocal duty of support based on a contract. From the facts of 
the case, it was clear that there was a reciprocal duty of support between the 
parties.1520 Cooke1521 criticises the dissenting judgments for the suggestion that Mrs 
Robinson was not entitled to relief because she had been provided for in Mr Shandling’s 
will. As Cooke indicates,1522 the dissenting judges did not even consider whether Mrs 
Robinson was in need of reasonable maintenance and simply accepted that the 
 
1514 Unpublished LLD thesis, University of the Free State (2009) 257. 
1515 At 256. 
1516 2005(122)3 SALJ 547. 
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partnerships” 2006(123)4 SALJ 626,643 who shares this view. 
1521 2005(122)3 SALJ 555. 




inheritance rendered her sufficiently provided for. Cooke suggests1523 that the finding in 
the majority decision of Skweyiya J that Mrs Robinson’s right to dignity had not been 
infringed implies that a person who chooses not to get married when he or she has the 
option to do so, must live with the consequences of such a choice.1524 She suggests1525 
that the majority judgment was formalistic in distinguishing between marriage and life 
partnerships,1526 whereas the dissenting judgment of Mokgoro J and O’Regan J is more 
nuanced and looks at the function of the relationship rather than the formalistic nature 
thereof. She questions1527 the majority’s failure to consider the equality jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, the vulnerability of life partners,1528 and the impact of the 
discrimination on them.1529 She also criticises1530 the fact that the majority judgment 
failed to find that the exclusion of life partners from the ambit of the MSSA would have 
an impact on their dignity. She opines1531 that the majority failed to give sufficiently 
convincing reasons for the decision it reached. Their main justification was that 
marriage should be protected and that people’s autonomy should not be undermined. 
She suggests1532 that it is difficult to see how the recognition of life partnerships as an 
alternative to marriage would threaten the protection of marriage. While 
acknowledging the merits of the autonomy argument, she suggests1533 that it does not 
take into account the varied reasons why life partners do not marry and assumes that all 
life partners who have not married have deliberately and consciously chosen not to do 
so. The autonomy argument is especially pertinent in South Africa where ignorance of 
the law, poverty and gender inequality may all render the exercise of real choice 
academic.1534 Smith1535 agrees with this view and suggests that the option to marry 
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often exists in theory only. He is of the view1536 that the majority judgment fails to 
appreciate the social context and practical realities that relate to choice, namely 
unequal power relations based on gender and, often, ignorance of the consequences of 
not formalising a relationship. Goldblatt1537 echoes this and suggests that the theory of 
choice should be considered within the context of South Africa’s divergent society. 
Heaton and Kruger1538 also refer to the majority judgment’s failure to grasp the context 
within which choices are made.  
 
Cooke criticises1539 the “deference to the legislature” displayed by all the judges. Section 
39(2) of the Constitution mandates the Constitutional Court to develop the common law 
and to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and she is of the 
opinion that the court should have intervened, possibly by way of a discretionary case-
by-case remedy. She concludes1540 by saying that the court missed an opportunity to 
remedy the situation of heterosexual life partners and this regrettably leaves them in a 
position of great vulnerability.   
 
Domingo1541 also criticises1542 the majority judgment for failing to consider the “shifting 
nature” of marriage and family life within the greater social context in South Africa. She 
expresses surprise1543 that the court acknowledged the plight of vulnerable women in 
life partnerships,1544 but despite having the opportunity to protect them, chose to pass 
the problem to the legislature. Didishe1545 points out that the decision highlights the 
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clear conflict of values in society – on the one hand there is the entrenched value of 
marriage and on the other the values of equality and equal protection of the law. 
 
Lind1546 suggests1547 that a big part of the problem in the judgment was that the social 
world has moved on to acknowledge the prevalence of cohabitation without marriage, 
but the rules of the law have not kept pace with these changes. He suggests1548 that the 
court simply relied on the fact that the duty of support applied only to marriages and 
failed to consider whether such exclusivity remains legitimate in view of South Africa’s 
constitutional transformation. He argues1549 that the majority’s view that the law is clear 
and unassailable is open to debate as he is not convinced that people necessarily know 
that cohabitation does not result in a legal maintenance obligation. He refers1550 to 
research1551 done in the United Kingdom in which it was found that people in life 
partnerships1552 believed that similar consequences to marriage apply to their 
relationships, and suggests1553 that there is no reason to think that people in South 
Africa do not hold the same beliefs. He suggests1554 that a part of the problem could be 
that the Bill of Rights provides that people will be protected from discrimination on the 
ground of marital status and this could have added to the incorrect belief that life 
partnerships have the same legal consequences as marriage. I would agree with Lind in 
this regard and suggest that the average lay person is of the opinion that a life 
partnership results in certain legal consequences. Lind suggests1555 that the court missed 
the opportunity to extend the support obligation to life partnerships and other family 
structures. He specifically criticises1556 the court’s insistence that there is no legal duty 
 
1546 2005(1) Acta Juridica 108. 
1547 At 111. 
1548 At 114. 
1549 At 115. 
1550 At 116. 
1551 Barlow et al “Just a piece of paper? Marriage and cohabitation in Britain” in Park et al (eds) British 
social attitudes The 18th Report (2001) 29-57. 
1552 Lind uses the term ‘cohabiting relationships’. 
1553 At 116. 
1554 At 116. 
1555 At 115. 




of support between life partners without considering whether this duty of support 
should not perhaps be reframed. He refers1557 to the “choice” argument and questions 
why the fact that a person had factually supported another for a number of years should 
not be seen as the exercise of a choice by an individual undertaking a support 
obligation. Considering the autonomy argument the court used, he refers1558 to the fact 
that the majority had placed some emphasises on the evidence given by the executor 
that Mr Shandling had expressly indicated that he never wanted to marry again. Mrs 
Robinson, in contrast, indicated that it was her wish to marry. Based on this, it would 
seem that the parties had conflicting wishes. Lind suggests1559 that such a conflict can be 
overcome by honouring the autonomy expressed in the conduct of the parties – if a 
functional family relationship can be found to exist, it should be easy to construe a legal 
support obligation from the circumstances. He argues1560 that, even if a person 
expressly refuses to undertake a duty of support, it would be just to ignore this if the 
facts show that the person had for a considerable period of time factually provided 
support to another person. He concludes1561 that the courts should develop the 
common law duty of support to provide for family support where there are actual 
relationships of dependence. 
 
Smith1562 suggests that, while the dissenting judgment of Sachs J is by far the better one, 
it is also not flawless. He feels that the judge could have dwelled more on his brief 
statement1563 that he could see “little reason in fairness” why an agreed duty of support 
should not survive the death of a partner and that he could have made a finding that 
there was indeed a factual reciprocal duty of support between Mrs Robinson and Mr 
Shandling, which required protection. Smith1564 very eloquently sums up the effect of 
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the judgment in Volks – as much as the judgment in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs1565 provided the platform for the greater 
recognition of same-sex life partnerships,1566 the judgment in Volks appears to have 
“shut and bolted the judicial door” on heterosexual life partnerships.1567 This apparent 
distinction requires further investigation. 
 
In a recent case, Bwanya v Master of the High Court, Cape Town,1568 the application of 
the MSSA in the context of heterosexual life partners was again placed before the court. 
The applicant had lodged claims in terms of the ISA and the MSSA against the estate of 
her deceased life partner, but the executor rejected the claims and the applicant 
approached the court for an order declaring section 1(1) of the ISA and the definitions of 
“survivor”, “spouse” and “marriage” in section 1 of the MSSA unconstitutional and 
invalid insofar as they exclude partners in a permanent opposite-sex life partnership. 
The court went into quite some detail when considering the claim in respect of the 
ISA,1569 but in relation to the claim against the MSSA it merely held1570 that the principle 
of stare decisis meant that it was bound by the decision of the Constitutional court in 
Volks.  
 
5.3.3 The application of the MSSA to heterosexual and same-sex life partners  
 
The decision in Gory was rendered one week before the CUA was enacted, at a time 
when same-sex partners did not have the option to formalise their relationship. There 
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was a common assumption1571 that the differentiation between the treatment of same-
sex and heterosexual life partners would fall away once the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage was removed. In fact, the court in Gory stated1572 that “[o]nce [the 
impediment to same-sex marriages] is removed, then there would appear to be no good 
reason for distinguishing between unmarried heterosexual couples and unmarried 
same-sex couples in respect of intestate succession”. The court, however, also made the 
following statement:1573 
“Any change in the law pursuant to Fourie will not necessarily amend those statutes into which words 
have already been read by this Court so as to give effect to the constitutional rights of gay and lesbian 
people to equality and dignity. In the absence of legislation amending the relevant statutes, the effect 
of these statutes or decisions of this Court in cases like National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs, Satchwell, Du Toit and J v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 
will not change. The same applies to the numerous other statutory provisions that expressly afford 
recognition to permanent same-sex life partnerships.” 
 
While the law did change pursuant to Fourie with the promulgation of the CUA,  the 
latter Act does not contain any amendment to the statutes that had already been the 
subject of reading-in orders, nor does it in any other way limit the protection provided 
by the reading-in orders. This raises the question whether the previous extension of 
protection to same-sex life partners did in fact fall away.1574 Many legal scholars1575 
were of the view that the protection extended to same-sex partners by Gory would 
continue to apply until the relevant statutes were amended. Same-sex life partners who 
 
1571 See, for example, Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 212; Coetzee Bester and Louw “Domestic partners and 
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failed to enter into a civil union would therefore still be able to claim spousal benefits 
that were extended to them prior to the CUA, even though they now had the option of 
formalising their relationship.1576 Although the order in Volks related to the right to a 
claim under the MSSA, it was assumed by some writers that the order extended to all 
spousal benefits,1577 which meant that heterosexual life partners would also remain 
excluded from the benefits of the ISA, even if they could prove that they had 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support.1578 This is in contrast to the position of same-
sex couples after the Gory decision, which led to the view1579 that same-sex life partners 
are entitled to more protection than their heterosexual counterparts.  
 
The constitutional rights of equality before the law, equal protection and benefit of the 
law means that heterosexual and same-sex partners who have not entered into 
marriage or a civil union should be treated the same.1580 If they are not treated alike, 
the spirit of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is being undermined. Smith1581 is of 
the view that different treatment amounts to unfair discrimination against heterosexual 
partners on the basis of both marital status and sexual orientation. Quoting Minister of 
Finance v Van Heerden,1582 he refers1583 to this as a “new pattern […] of disadvantage as 
a (presumably unintended) residual by-product of earlier case law in which 
constitutional remedies have been employed to broaden the ambit of a (pre-1994) piece 
of legislation”. He suggests1584 that a future court would be constitutionally obliged to 
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extend the right to inherit on intestacy to heterosexual partners who satisfy the 
“threshold criteria” of a reciprocal duty of support referred to for same-sex partners in 
Gory. 
 
Some writers1585 argue that preferential treatment of same-sex partners is justified 
because the ongoing prevalence of homophobia in our society suggests that there is no 
substantive equality for such partners. Ntlama1586 argues that the preferential 
treatment of same-sex partners is acceptable because the CUA does not give sufficient 
recognition to the status of same-sex couples – their right to equal access to marriage is 
limited because the Marriage Act still applies only to heterosexual partners. While this is 
a valid point, I would argue that this is not an impediment. The CUA specifically 
provides1587 that the result of a civil union is that the legal consequences of a marriage 
in terms of the Marriage Act will apply to the union. That means that same-sex partners 
who have entered into a civil union are protected by the CUA and their union will have 
the same legal protection as that of a marriage in terms of the Marriage Act, despite the 
fact that they are precluded from entering into a marriage under the Marriage Act. 
Wood-Bodley1588 contends that homophobia is ongoing in South Africa, despite the 
enactment of the CUA, and this could suggest that the ongoing differentiation between 
heterosexual and same-sex life partners is permitted. De Ru1589 echoes Wood-Bodley’s 
reference1590 to the continuing homophobia in our society and suggests1591 that this may 
imply that same-sex partners are still disadvantaged and require protection. She 
refers1592 to section 9(2) of the Constitution which provides that legislative and other 
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measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, may be taken to promote the achievement of 
equality. She argues1593 that the retention of spousal benefits for permanent same-sex 
life partners by means of statutory provisions and judicial developments might qualify as 
“measures” aimed at achieving substantive equality.  
 
I cannot agree with those writers that suggest that the ongoing differentiation is 
acceptable. I would concede that, despite legislative intervention, there still is ongoing 
homophobia in our society – not necessarily in society as a whole, but certainly in some 
parts thereof. This could imply that, despite being able to legally formalise their 
relationship, some same-sex partners still find it practically impossible to do so. I do not, 
however, believe that this is sufficient reason to extend rights and protection to them, 
but to deny the same rights and protection to heterosexual partners who have not 
formalised their relationship. As Goldblatt1594 points out, the idea that all people who 
enter into family arrangements are on an equal footing, is flawed. I agree with Smith1595 
that it cannot simply be assumed that parties who fail to formalise their relationship 
even if they have the choice to do so, have made a mutual decision in this regard. As he 
points out,1596 such an assumption ignores the social context and practical realities such 
as “unequal and gendered power relations”. This view has been echoed by several other 
writers.1597  
 
If it is therefore accepted that there is differentiation between same-sex life partners 
and heterosexual life partners and that it is not acceptable, what is the solution? Heaton 
and Kruger1598 suggest that until legislation is passed to regulate equality, the solution 
would be to extend the protection given to same-sex life partners to heterosexual 
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partners, rather than take away the protection from same-sex partners. Kruuse1599 
refers to the fact that, even amongst other cohabitants, there is also still inequality in 
respect of cohabitants in South Africa where family roles remain “profoundly gendered 
spaces”. She also suggests1600 that the protection extended to same-sex couples be 
retained and similar protection extended to heterosexual life partners.  
 
There are, however, some legal scholars1601 who suggest that the ratio in Volks was 
limited to claims under the MSSA, which means that MSSA claims by same-sex partners 
are not yet permitted in our law and they are therefore treated the same as their 
heterosexual counterparts. This view is premised on the ratio in Volks that partners who 
have a choice to, but do not, formalise their relationship, cannot claim the protection 
provided by the law. As the CUA gives same-sex life partners the legal avenue to 
formalise their relationship, those who do not, cannot claim the protection that was 
extended by Gory at a time when formalisation of the relationship was not legally 
possible.  
 
In a recent article, Smith1602 suggests1603 that the decision in Duplan casts doubts on the 
views previously held by many scholars, himself included, as to the broad impact of 
Volks.1604 He refers to the question raised earlier whether the promulgation of the CUA 
legislation did not perhaps have the effect that the decision in Gory would no longer 
apply as there was no longer a need to extend protection to same-sex partners. The 
applicant in Duplan contended that, as the CUA gave same-sex partners the choice to 
marry, the decision in Volks should also apply to same-sex couples who choose not to 
marry so that they are prevented from inheriting under the ISA. The court, however, 
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Law Service (Service Issue 73, 2020 LexisNexis) at R36). 
1602 “Have we read Volks wrong all along? Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 624 (CC)” 2018(81)1 THRHR 149. 
1603 At 150. 




found that the two cases were distinguishable on a few points, one being that Volks 
dealt with inheritance claims whereas Duplan dealt with maintenance claims. 
Maintenance and intestate succession are different systems meant to address different 
needs.1605 The court accordingly held1606 that “Volks continues to apply with full 
precedential force within the context of maintenance of surviving spouses”.  
 
Smith concludes1607 that Duplan has provided clarity that Gory will continue to apply to 
same-sex life partners who bring claims under the ISA, but heterosexual life partners are 
still excluded from this benefit pending a successful constitutional challenge. The 
decision in Bwanya v Master of the High Court, Cape Town1608 is such a constitutional 
challenge, but it has yet to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court.1609 I think it is 
unlikely that the Constitutional court will not confirm the judgment, but until that 
happens, heterosexual life partners cannot inherit from each other on intestacy.  
 
As far as claims under the MSSA is concerned, it has now been settled by Duplan that 
the decision in Volks will also apply to same-sex life partners who choose not to enter 
into a civil union, and they are therefore also excluded from the benefits of the MSSA. 
There accordingly no longer seems to be any differentiation between same-sex and 
heterosexual partners in the context of maintenance claims, but the question of course 
remains why both sets of couples should be excluded from the ambit of the MSSA, 
especially if they can prove that there are reciprocal duties of support. As the minority 
judgment in Duplan pointed out,1610 this is “residual unfair discrimination” that cannot 
be allowed to stand.  
 
 
1605 At par 48. 
1606 At par 50. 
1607 2018(81)1 THRHR 160. 
1608 [2020] ZAWCHC 111. 
1609 Section 172(2)(a). 




The above discussion illustrates that the decision in Gory will most likely not facilitate a 
claim under the MSSA by a same-sex life partner, but it also shows that there is still 
some uncertainty regarding the legal position of MSSA claims by same-sex life partners. 
It is also clear from the majority judgment in Duplan that a “stimulating and persuasive” 
argument has been made for a court to overturn Volks in future. I submit that the 
uncertainty could be addressed by the legislature expressly catering for MSSA claims by 
surviving life partners by providing a definition that applies irrespective of whether they 
were involved in a same-sex or heterosexual life partnership. 
 
5.3.4 Pending legislative development 
 
The relative lack of legal recognition of cohabitants prompted the South African Law 
Reform Commission to conduct research in this regard. The result was the publication of 
a Discussion Paper1611 in 2003. The document contained suggestions for the future 
recognition of domestic partnerships and the public was invited to comment. In 2006 
the Commission issued a Report,1612 and as a result of this, a chapter dealing with 
“domestic partnerships” was included in the first Civil Union Bill1613 published in August 
2006. The chapter was later removed from the Bill and a separate Draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill, 20081614 was published in January 2008. 
 
The purpose of the Bill is described as providing for the legal regulation of domestic 
partnerships, the enforcement of the legal consequences of domestic partnerships, and 
matters incidental thereto. The preamble sets the scene for the contents of the Bill and 
points out that section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. It further notes that 
there is no legal recognition or protection for opposite-sex couples in permanent 
 
1611 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 Domestic partnerships Project 118 
Pretoria, 2003. 
1612 South African Law Reform Commission Report on domestic partnerships Project 118 Pretoria, 2006. 
1613 26 of 2006. 




domestic relationships. A “domestic partnership” is defined1615 as a registered or 
unregistered domestic partnership between two persons eighteen years or older and 
includes a former domestic partnership. A “domestic partner” is defined as a partner in 
a domestic partnership and includes a former domestic partner. 
The objectives of the Bill are stated1616 as being to ensure the rights of equality and 
dignity of partners in domestic partnerships and to reform family law to comply with the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The objectives are to be achieved through: 
• Recognition of the legal status of domestic partners; 
• Regulation of their respective rights and obligations; 
• Protection of their interests, as well as those of interested third parties when the 
partnership terminates; 
• Provision for the final determination of the financial relationship between the 
domestic partners and between them and interested parties on termination of 
the partnership. 
 
The Bill distinguishes between registered and unregistered domestic partnerships.  
 
A. Registered domestic partnerships 
The South African Law Reform Commission in its Report1617 mentioned that the 
registered domestic partnership would serve as a “proper alternative” to marriage 
and that it would give the parties rights that are enforceable against third parties. 
That means that the duties inherent in the consortium omnis vitae, such as the legal 
duty of support, will also apply to registered domestic partners.1618 The Bill indeed 
provides that the result of a registered domestic partnership is that a reciprocal duty 
of support arises between the partners in accordance with their financial means and 
 
1615 Clause 1. 
1616 Clause 2. 
1617 Report on domestic partnerships Project 118 320. 




needs;1619 that they both have the right to occupy the family home, regardless of 
which partner owns or rents it;1620 and that one partner may not dispose of joint 
property unless the other partner has given written consent.1621 In contrast to a civil 
marriage, the default matrimonial property regime of community of property does 
not apply to domestic partnerships,1622 but the partners may enter into an 
agreement to regulate the financial matters during the partnership.1623 Provision is 
made that a court can set aside the agreement if it is satisfied that serious injustice 
will be caused if the agreement is given effect to.1624 
 
A registered domestic partnership will terminate on the death of one or both of the 
partners, by mutual agreement, or if a court orders termination thereof.1625 If the 
partnership is terminated by death, a death certificate constitutes prima facie proof 
that is has ended.1626 The Bill makes specific provision for maintenance after death 
and provides that a reference to “spouse” in the MSSA must be construed as 
including a registered domestic partner.1627 The MSSA does not actually define 
“spouse”, as the only definition in this regard is “survivor”, which is defined as: 
“the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death, and includes a spouse of a customary 
marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage contracted by her husband in the customary 
marriage to another woman on or after 1 January 1929 (the date of commencement of sections 
22 and 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), but before 2 December 1988 
(the date of commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, 
1988 (Act 3 of 1988)).” 
 
This definition has been effective since 2009 – before that, the definition simply 
referred to a spouse in a marriage dissolved by death. The Domestic Partnerships Bill 
 
1619 Clause 9. 
1620 Clause 11. 
1621 Clause 10. 
1622 Clause 7. 
1623 Clause 7(3). 
1624 Clause 8(2) and (3). 
1625 Clause 12(1). 
1626 Clause 12(2). 




was published in 2008, when the “simplified” definition of survivor in the MSSA 
applied and the provision in clause 19 of the Bill that a reference to “spouse” in the 
MSSA must be construed as including a registered domestic partner must be seen in 
that context. The provision in section 19 is supposed to give legal certainty,1628 but as 
a result of the amplified definition of “survivor”, some uncertainty could arise. I 
would therefore suggest that, should the Domestic Partnerships Bill become law, the 
definition of “survivor” in the MSSA should also be amended to include “and a 
domestic partner in a registered domestic partnership as provided for in the 
Domestic Partnerships Act …”. 
 
The Bill also provides1629 that a reference to “spouse” in the ISA must be interpreted 
to include a registered domestic partner. 
 
In Du Plessis v The Road Accident Fund1630 the Supreme Court of Appeal extended the 
common law action for damages for loss of support to a surviving same-sex life 
partner in a permanent life partnership where the partners had contractually 
undertaken to maintain one another. The court expressly left open the question 
whether the common law should be extended to also extend this to opposite sex 
partners. The Supreme Court of Appeal answered the question in the affirmative in 
Paixão v Road Accident Fund1631 and the Domestic Partnerships Bill proposes to bring 
further certainty in this regard as it provides1632 that partners in a registered 
partnership are deemed to be spouses in a legally valid marriage for the purposes of 
claiming damages in a delictual claim. The Bill also provides1633 that a partner will be 
a dependant for purposes of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
 
1628 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) 225. 
1629 Clause 20. 
1630 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA). 
1631 2012 (6) SA 377 (SCA). 
1632 Clause 21(1) and (2). 




Diseases Act.1634 This specific provision is necessary as the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act provides that someone living with an 
employee as “wife and husband”, and who is wholly or partially dependent on the 
particular employee, is entitled to claim compensation as the employee’s dependant 
if the employee is killed in the course of employment. This provision includes 
heterosexual partners in a permanent life partnership but not same-sex life partners.  
A registered domestic partnership can also be terminated by agreement between the 
parties.1635 They can provide in the agreement for the division of property, 
maintenance after termination, arrangements in respect of the family home and any 
other matter relevant to the financial consequences of the termination. In the 
absence of an agreement regarding maintenance, the court may make an order it 
deems just and equitable.1636 The court must have regard to certain factors when 
deciding whether to order the payment of maintenance and the amount and nature 
thereof, namely: 
• The respective contributions of each partner to the registered domestic 
partnership; 
• The existing and prospective means of each partner; 
• The respective earning capacity, future financial needs and obligations of 
each partner; 
• The age of the respective partners; 
• The duration of the partnership; 
• The standard of living of the partners prior to the terminations; 
• Any other factor which the court feels should be included. 
 
It is interesting to note that these factors are almost identical to the factors listed in 
section 3 of the MSSA. The one difference is that the Bill includes the respective 
contributions of each partner to the partnership. This is probably understandable in 
 
1634 130 of 1993. 
1635 Clause 14. 




view of the reference to the relationship being regarded as a partnership – although 
it is not a partnership in the strict sense and the requirements for a partnership need 
not be present, one of the requirements of a partnership is that each party must 
contribute to it.  
 
B. Unregistered domestic partnerships 
The Bill envisages a judicial discretion model for these partnerships, which means 
that legal status is not automatically attached to these partnerships.1637 The Bill 
provides1638 that the partners can apply to the court for an order relating to 
maintenance, intestate succession or property division.  
 
Where one of the domestic partners dies, the surviving partner may apply to court 
for an order for the provision of his or her reasonable maintenance needs, from the 
estate of the deceased partner, until his or her death, remarriage or registration of 
another registered domestic partnership, insofar as he or she is not able to provide 
therefore from his or her own means and earnings.1639 This wording is similar to 
section 2(1) of the MSSA, with the necessary change in wording as required by the 
context of unregistered domestic partnerships. Clause 30 provides for the factors the 
court may consider when determining reasonable maintenance needs and is largely 
similar to section 3 of the MSSA, with the following differences: 
• Clause 30 does not refer to the subsistence of the partnership 
• It provides for the existence and circumstances of multiple relationships 
between the deceased and an unregistered domestic partner and between 
the deceased and a customary spouse. 
 
 
1637 Smith in Heaton (ed) 467. 
1638 Clause 26. 




As with the MSSA, the Bill provides1640 that the surviving partner’s claim for 
maintenance will have the same order of preference in respect of other claims as 
that of a dependent child. If, however, there are competing claims, the court may 
make an order that is just and equitable with reference to all the relevant 
circumstances of the partnership.1641 This arrangement seems to be more equitable 
than the provision in section 2(3)(b) of the MSSA which provides that the claims will 
be reduced proportionately.  
 
The executor has the same power1642 as in section 2(3)(d) of the MSSA to enter into 
an agreement with the surviving partner and the heirs or legatees. 
 
The surviving partner may apply for an order that he or she may inherit the intestate 
estate of his or her deceased partner.1643 If the order is granted and the deceased 
partner is survived by a domestic partner and descendants, the partner will inherit1644 
a child’s share or so much as does not exceed the amount fixed from time to time.1645 
 
If the partners did not agree on the division of their joint property or the separate 
property of each of them, either or both may apply to the court for an order that the 
court deems just and equitable.1646 
 
At this stage it is not clear when the Bill will eventually be enacted or what the final 
version will entail. Until this happens, or until our courts extend the protection of the 
MSSA also to heterosexual life partners who have not entered into a civil union or 
 
1640 Clause 29(3)(a). 
1641 Clause 29(3)(b). 
1642 Clause 29(3)(e). 
1643 Clause 31(1). 
1644 Clause 31(2). 
1645 This amount is currently R250 000: section 1(1)(c)(i) of the ISA read with Regulations 920 and 921 in 
Government Gazette 38238, 24 November 2014.   




marriage, a party to a heterosexual life partnership will not be able to claim 
maintenance from the deceased estate of his or her partner in terms of the MSSA.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
While our law has made significant strides in extending to other relationships the 
benefits that traditionally applied only to marriages solemnised in terms of the Marriage 
Act, further development is required as far as same-sex and heterosexual life 
partnerships are concerned. It is evident from the discussion in this chapter that the 
treatment of such relationships by the judiciary is not aligned with the principles 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  
 
In the previous chapter, reference1647 was made to the two-legged approach suggested 
in Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane (sic)1648 to a maintenance claim in 
terms of the MSSA. The court held that the first question is whether the claimant is 
legally entitled to a claim for maintenance against the estate1649 and indicated that this 
question would be answered in the affirmative if the claimant was married to the 
deceased and the marriage existed at the time of the deceased’s death. It is evident 
from the discussion in this chapter that the claim is not limited to persons who are 
married in terms of the Marriage Act and that the executor of a deceased estate must 
look much wider than the existence of such a marriage when determining whether the 
claimant can fulfil the first leg of the two-legged enquiry. The executor must have a 
detailed knowledge of family law to enable him or her to determine whether the MSSA 
will apply to the relationship of the deceased and the claimant. It is clear from the 
discussion in 5.3.3 that the legal position pertaining to MSSA claims by same-sex 
partners who have not entered into a civil union is still uncertain. While I argue 
 
1647 At 4.4.1. 
1648 Unreported, case number 53514/2012 [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013. 




above1650 that the judgment in Gory could probably extend to claims by same-sex 
partners in terms of the MSSA, it appears from the decision in Duplan that the more 
likely legal position is that the ratio in Volks will also apply to same-sex partners who 
chose not to enter into a civil union. This lack of legal certainty means that the executor 
will be forced to make a decision in this regard. This aspect and the challenges it brings 









COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POSITION IN ENGLAND 
AND NEW ZEALAND 
  
6.1  Introduction 
 
While the law in South Africa pertaining to the maintenance of a spouse after the death 
of the other spouse has clearly developed in a manner that is reflective of the diverse 
culture and society in the country, it might be useful to consider how legal systems in 
other jurisdictions deal with the maintenance of a spouse after the death of the other 
spouse. I have considered two jurisdictions, namely England and New Zealand.  
 
The South African law of succession is based more on Roman-Dutch law than English 
law, but an investigation of the law in England offers good insights into how a first-world 
country deals with the maintenance of surviving spouses. New Zealand to a large extent 
inherited English statutes and common law when it was colonised in 1840.1651 It was the 
first common law country that gave the court discretion to intervene in the 
testamentary wishes of a deceased person if he or she did not make adequate provision 
for the maintenance and support of his or her spouse or children.1652 The legal 
development in New Zealand also had an impact on England and the Family Protection 
Act1653 in New Zealand was the impetus for similar legislation in England.1654 The country 
has a history of traditional law versus civil law, which could offer interesting insights for 
our position in South Africa. New Zealand provides a closer comparison to South Africa, 
as matrimonial property law applies on death in New Zealand, whereas it does not in 
England. As is the case in South Africa, family provision in New Zealand is available in 
 
1651 Peart “Towards a concept of family property in New Zealand” 1996(10)2 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 105. 
1652 Peart “New Zealand Report on new developments in succession law” 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law, http://www.ejcl.org/142/art142-3.pdf (last accessed 3 July 2017). 
1653 1955 No 88. See 6.3.3 for a discussion of the Act. 
1654 Peart & Borkowski “Provision for adult children on death – the lesson from New Zealand” 2000(12)4 




addition to whatever relationship property rights the surviving spouse has. New Zealand 
also has a wider view of eligible relationships than England, and this allows for 
comparison with the wider meaning given to “spouse” in the MSSA. I will attempt to 
show that the courts in New Zealand exercise their discretion under the relevant 






The principle of freedom of testation has always been a cornerstone of English law.1655 
As expressed in Vaughan v Marquis of Headfort1656 the law provides that “… every 
testator, in disposing of his property, is at liberty to adopt his own nonsense”. In 
Boughton v Knight1657 the court held as follows: 
“By the law of England everyone is left free to choose the person upon whom he will bestow his 
property after death entirely unfettered in the selection he may think proper to make. He may 
disinherit, either wholly or partially, his children, and leave his property to strangers to gratify his 
spite, or to charities to gratify his pride, and we must give effect to his will, however much we may 
condemn the course he has pursued.” 
 
 
1655 Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 461; Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17; Parry & Kerridge The law 
of succession (2016) 183; Miller 1980(1) Acta Juridica 54; Oldham “Financial obligations within the 
family – aspects of intergenerational maintenance and succession in England and France” 2001(60)1 
The Cambridge Law Journal 150; Sloan “The concept of coupledom in succession law” 2011(70)3 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 623; Douglas, Woodward, Humphrey & Mills “Enduring love – attitudes to 
family and inheritance law in England and Wales” (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 248; Douglas 
“Family provision and family practices – the discretionary regime of the Inheritance Act of England 
and Wales” 2014(4)2 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 226, 
http://opo.iisj.ncl.index.php/osls/issue/view/32 (last accessed 4 July 2017); Purkis “Forcing the issue” 
2017(166)7716 New Law Journal https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/forcing-issue (last 
accessed 18 January 2018). 
1656 (1840) 10 Sim 639. 




For purposes of this thesis I will consider the position in England since 1938, when the 
principle of complete freedom of testation changed1658 with the promulgation of the 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the “IFPA”).1659 The 
IFPA provided that a court would under certain circumstances have the power to 
declare a person’s testamentary dispositions invalid and replace them with dispositions 
that the court approves of.1660 The principle of freedom of testation theoretically still 
existed, but it could be interfered with by the court, as succinctly explained by the court 
in In re Brownbridge:1661  
“The Act did not throw upon a testator a duty to make provision for dependants. It only gave the 
Court a right to interfere if it came to the conclusion that the dispositions which were made were 
unwarranted.” 
 
It is important to note that the IFPA merely gave the court the discretion to grant 
maintenance – it did not give any dependant of the testator a right to maintenance.1662 
 
The IFPA allowed claims against the estate of a deceased person by certain family 
members. The scope of the IFPA was limited – claims would only be allowed where the 
deceased had died leaving a will, and only four categories of applicant were provided 
for: the surviving spouse, an unmarried or incapacitated daughter, an infant son, and an 
incapacitated son.1663 The IFPA allowed for provision to be made for the applicant’s 
maintenance, typically by way of periodical payments only, which payments would 
cease when the dependency ended. 1664   
 
 
1658 Parry & Kerridge 183. 
1659 This Act was based on the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900, passed in New Zealand in 1900. 
1660 Re Joslin [1941] 1 All ER 302. 
1661 [1942] 193 L.T. Jour 185. 
1662 Re Catmull [1943] 2 All ER 115; Miller 1980(1) Acta Juridica 56. 
1663 Parry & Kerridge 184. 




It appears that the IFPA gave rise to many problems1665 and several pieces of legislation 
amending it followed: 
• The Intestate Estates Act 19521666 extended the application of the IFPA to 
persons who died completely intestate; 
• The Family Provision Act 19661667 provided that the court could also grant 
maintenance under the IFPA by way of a lump sum;  
• The Family Law Reform Act 1969 extended the protection of the IFPA to 
illegitimate children born to a person who died after 1 January 1970 by including 
these children as dependants who could apply for maintenance in terms of the 
IFPA; 
• The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 19701668 provided that a 
surviving spouse who had bona fide entered into a void marriage with a 
testator, was also included as a dependant for purposes of the IFPA. 
 
Despite all these developments and legislative extension, the crux of the IFPA remained, 
namely that no person had an entitlement to maintenance, and that the granting of 
maintenance was entirely at the discretion of the court.1669 The court in Re Joslin1670 
expressed this as follows: 
“The jurisdiction under this Act is one which it is extremely difficult for the court to administer. The 
judge is put in a most unhappy position in cases of this kind. However, it is a discretion, and it is a 
discretion which the court must exercise judicially… .”  
 
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) 
substantially revised the legal position relating to provision for the family.1671 This Act 
 
1665 Jordaan Unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa (1987) 112. 
1666 The Intestate Estates Act applied to persons who died between 1 January 1953 and 31 December 
1966. 
1667 Most of the sections of this Act came into operation on 1 January 1967. Two provisions came into 
operation at later dates.   
1668 Effective from 1 January 1971. 
1669 Re Catmull [1943] 2 All ER 115. 
1670 [1941] 1 All ER 302 at 305.  




implemented recommendations made by the Law Commission.1672 The most important 
changes the 1975 Act brought to the legislative landscape were to add to the classes of 
applicants, to increase and amend the standard of provision for spouses, to add to the 
orders a court can make, to add to the property out of which financial provision can be 
ordered and to include anti-avoidance provisions.1673 The 1975 Act is still applicable 
today and regulates the position relating to maintenance for the family. 
 
6.2.2 The 1975 Act 
 
The preamble to the 1975 Act provides that its objective is “to make fresh provision for 
empowering the court to make orders for the making out of the estate of a deceased 
person of provision for the spouse, former spouse, child, child of the family or 
dependant of that person; and for matters connected therewith.”  
 
The Law Commission1674 had previously considered a system of fixed legal rights of 
inheritance, ie “forced heirship” rules as applied in many civil law jurisdictions, but 
instead decided upon a flexible system of family provision.1675 While freedom of 
testation remains one of the basic principles of English law1676  and the spouse and 
children do not have a right to inherit a certain portion of their spouse or parent’s 
estate,1677 a person’s freedom to leave his or her estate to whomever he or she pleases 
is circumscribed by the 1975 Act, as it empowers the court to order that financial 
provision be made out of the person’s estate for certain categories of dependants.1678 In 
Gill v Woodall1679 the court held as follows: 
 
1672 Family law: second report on family property. Family provisions on death (1974) Law Com No 61 HC 
324. 
1673 Parry & Kerridge 184. 
1674 Working Paper 42, paras 0.36-0.41 and 4.69-4.72. 
1675 Family Law: First report on family property. A new approach. (1973) Law Com No 52 HC 274.  
1676 Jones “The future of forced heirship” October 2014 STEP Journal 76. 
1677 As opposed to the legitimate portion that applies in most civil law legal systems. 
1678 Sloan 2011(70)3 The Cambridge Law Journal 629.  




“Subject to statutes such as the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the law in 
this country permits people to leave their assets as they see fit, and experience of human nature 
generally, and of wills in particular, demonstrates that peoples’ wishes can be unexpected, 
inexplicable, unfair and even improper.” 
 
Miller1680 suggests that the certainty inherent in a rigid system of legal rights to inherit 
(ie forced heirship) is outweighed by the advantage of justice being applied in those 
individual cases that require it. Douglas1681 also supports a discretionary regime and 
suggests that such a regime, rather than a system of forced heirship, fits an approach to 
succession which focuses on the individual merits of a claim, as it allows the court to 
focus on the facts of the case. The rationale underlying the discretionary regime is to 
remedy hardship rather than uphold justice and it allows for individualised outcomes 
rather than ‘entitlement’ or certainty.1682 
 
The 1975 Act applies to persons who died after 1 April 1976 and who were domiciled in 
England and Wales.1683 It does not impose any limitation on the applicant’s domicilium 
or residency.1684 It enables a person who regards him- or herself as unfairly treated by a 
deceased, either under a will or through the operation of the intestacy rules, to make a 
claim under the 1975 Act, provided he or she fits the eligibility criteria.1685 An 
application may be made to the Chancery Division or the Family Division of the High 




1680 1980(1) Acta Juridica 58. 
1681 2014(4)2 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 227. 
1682 2014 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 4(2) 227. 
1683 Section 1(1). 
1684 Witkowska v Kaminski [2006] EWHC 1940 (Ch); Miller “Developments in family provision on death” 
Family Law Week http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed103 (last accessed 20 January 
2018). 
1685 Green “The Englishwoman’s castle: inheritance and private property today” 1988(51)2 Modern Law 
Review [online] 187-209 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1988.tb01751.x/pdf 
(last accessed 3 July 2017). 




6.2.2.1 Eligible applicants 
Any of the defined categories of persons may apply to court for an order on the ground 
that the disposition to the applicant under the deceased’s will or in terms of the laws of 
intestacy, or a combination of the will and the law of intestacy, does not make 
reasonable provision for the applicant.1687 The first step in determining whether a 
person is eligible to make a claim under the 1975 Act is therefore to determine if he or 
she falls within the defined categories of persons who may claim.  
 
The following categories of persons are listed:1688  
• The spouse or civil partner of the deceased.1689 This category includes a judicially 
separated spouse and a party to a voidable marriage which has not been 
annulled.1690 It also includes a party to a polygamous marriage.1691 A person who 
in good faith entered into a void marriage with the deceased also falls into this 
category, provided the person did not enter into a later marriage with a third 
party;1692 
 
• A former spouse or former civil partner of the deceased who has not entered 
into a subsequent marriage or civil partnership.1693 “Former spouse” is 
defined1694 as a person whose marriage with the deceased was, during the 
lifetime of the deceased, either dissolved or annulled by a decree of divorce or a 
decree of nullity of marriage granted under the law of any part of the British 
Islands, or dissolved or annulled in any country or territory outside the British 
Islands by a divorce or annulment which is entitled to be recognised as valid by 
 
1687 Section 1(1). 
1688 Section 1(1). 
1689 Section 1(1)(a). Civil partners were added by the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
1690 Parry & Kerridge 200. 
1691 Re Sehota [1987] 1 WLR 1506; Parry & Kerridge 200. 
1692 Parry & Kerridge 200. 
1693 Section 1(1)(b). 




the law of England and Wales. “Former civil partner” is defined1695 as a person 
whose civil partnership with the deceased was, during the lifetime of the 
deceased, either dissolved or annulled by an order made under the law of any 
part of the British Islands, or dissolved or annulled in any country or territory 
outside the British Islands by a dissolution or annulment which is entitled to be 
recognised as valid by the law of England and Wales; 
 
• A child of the deceased.1696 This includes a child conceived but not yet born (“en 
ventre sa mére”), an “illegitimate” child (ie a child born of unmarried parents) 
and a child adopted by the deceased;1697 
 
• Any person (not being a child of the deceased) who was treated by the deceased 
as a child of the family in relation to a marriage or civil partnership to which the 
deceased was at any time a party;1698 
 
• Any person (not included in the categories above) who immediately before the 
death of the deceased was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the 
deceased.1699 A person shall be treated as having been maintained by the 
deceased, either wholly or partly, if the deceased was making a substantial 
contribution in money or money’s worth towards the reasonable needs of that 
person and such contribution was otherwise than for full valuable 
consideration.1700 An application under this section is made on the basis of 
dependency;1701 therefore it is not limited to relatives of the deceased or 
 
1695 Section 25. 
1696 Section 1(1)(c). 
1697 Section 25(1). 
1698 Section 1(1)(d). 
1699 Section 1(1)(e). 
1700 Section 1(3); Re Beaumont [1980] Ch 444; Douglas 2014(4)2 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 229. 





members of his or her household.1702 It could, for example, be brought by the 
sister,1703 a mistress,1704 a common law wife,1705 parent1706 and even a friend1707 
of the deceased. In Graham v Murphy1708 the applicant and the deceased had 
cohabited for eighteen years and for a substantial part of that time it was in 
houses owned by the deceased. The applicant applied for reasonable provision 
from the deceased’s estate on the basis that he had lived in the deceased’s 
house and had cared for her. The court held that he was to be regarded as a 
dependant and awarded him sufficient funds to enable him to partly fund the 
purchase of a house. In Jelley v Iliffe1709 the requirement of dependency was 
considered. The applicant was a widower who had moved in and lived with the 
deceased in a house owned by her for a number of years. The applicant applied 
under the 1975 Act for provision as her dependant. The court held that a 
determination of whether he was dependent on the deceased required a 
comparison of what he and the deceased had each contributed – if there was 
any indication that the deceased had been the greatest contributor, it would 
point to dependency on the applicant’s side and the matter should go to trial. If, 
however, the evidence was that the applicant had made the biggest 
contribution, or if it was clear that their respective contributions were equal, no 
dependency existed, and the application should be struck as it was bound to fail. 
The court pointed out1710 that this comparison between what the respective 
parties had contributed is not an easy exercise and entails the making of moral 
or value judgements as it required balancing “imponderables”, such as 
companionship and other services, with contributions of money or 
 
1702 Parry & Kerridge 216. 
1703 Re Viner (Deceased) [1978] CLY 3091; Re Wilkinson [1978] 1 All ER 221. 
1704 Malone v Harrison [1979] 1 WLR 1353. 
1705 Re C (1979) 123 SJ 35; Harrington v Gill [1983] 4 FLR 265; Bishop v Plumley [1991] WLR 582. 
1706 Oldham 2001(60)1 The Cambridge Law Journal 151. 
1707 Rees v Newberry and the Institute of Cancer Research [1998] 1 FLR 1041. 
1708 [1997] 1 FLR 860.  
1709 [1981] Fam 128. 




accommodation. The court held1711 that it should consider each case on its own 
merits and apply common sense to determine whether the applicant can be 
regarded as a dependant.1712 This category of dependant is useful for an 
applicant who applies, but fails, on the basis of cohabitation, as he or she might 
still be able to prove that the deceased maintained him or her and thereby 
qualify as a dependant;1713 
 
• A person who for the entire period of two years ending immediately before the 
date on which the deceased died,1714 was living in the same household as the 
deceased as the husband or wife1715 or civil partner1716 of the deceased. The 
reference to living as the husband or wife or civil partner implies that all aspects 
of the relationship must be considered so that it can be established whether the 
applicant and deceased had lived as spouses or civil partners. In Re Watson 
(Deceased)1717 the court held that the test is whether “a reasonable person with 
normal perceptions” would consider that the parties were living together as 
husband and wife, but it also cautioned1718 that “the multifarious nature of 
marital relationships” should not be ignored in the process. It appears that the 
fact that one of the parties was still in a subsisting marriage or civil partnership 
to a third party is not necessarily relevant when assessing the application.1719 In 
Swetenham v Walkley & Bryce1720 the applicant and the deceased had been 
partners for 30 years at the time of his death, but did not have an intimate 
 
1711 At 141. 
1712 See also Re B [2000] 2 WLR 929 CA (Civ Div). 
1713 Churchill v Roach [2002] EWHC 3230 (Ch); Sloan 2011(70)3 The Cambridge Law Journal 629. 
1714 For an interpretation of this requirement refer to Re Watson (Deceased) [1999] 1 FLR 878; Re Gully v 
Dix [2004] EWCA Civ 139; Witkowska v Kaminski [2006] EWHC 1940 (Ch). 
1715 Section 1(1)(ba) read with 1(1A). This section was inserted by the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 
and applies where the deceased died on or after 1 January 1996. 
1716 Section 1(1)(ba) read with 1(1B). This section was inserted by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and has 
applied since 5 December 2005. 
1717 [1999] 1 FLR 878 at 883. 
1718 See also Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ 2169; Ghaidan v Mendoza 
[2004] UKHL 30; Baynes v Hedger [2008] WTLR 1719. 
1719 Churchill v Roach [2002] EWHC 3230 (Ch); Sloan 2011(70)3 The Cambridge Law Journal 634. 




relationship and also did not share their financial resources in a formal way. The 
deceased had a separate property, although he spent every day with the 
applicant at her house and apparently also stayed over many nights. He died 
intestate and the applicant brought a claim under the 1975 Act against his estate 
on the basis that they had lived together as husband and wife in the same 
household for at least the last two years before his death. In assessing the 
situation, the court referred to several other cases1721 that considered this 
particular issue and noted that most of these cases found that each case is fact 
sensitive and needs to be considered on its own merits. The court found that, 
although they did not share their finances, the applicant and deceased acted for 
all intents and purposes as husband and wife and their actions amounted to a 
“communal pot”. The court found that they had lived together as husband and 
wife in the same household for the purposes of the 1975 Act and made an award 
which was designed to enable the applicant to purchase a care plan to cover her 
care needs. In Patel v Vigh1722 the applicant and the deceased had been a couple 
for 24 years but had never married. Ms Vigh died intestate, leaving two children 
from a previous relationship. The court held that on the evidence presented, the 
applicant qualified as a cohabitee in terms of section 1(1)(ba) of the 1975 Act as 
the couple had been in a relationship immediately before the death of the 
deceased as required in section 1(1A), despite the fact that the deceased had 
spent the last two months of her life in hospital, where she died. Parry and 
Kerridge1723 suggest that it would probably be easier for a judge to decide that 
an applicant is a cohabitant if the deceased left nobody else who has a strong 
claim to the estate. They question why a cohabitant who was not dependent on 
 
1721 Re Watson (Deceased) [1990] 3 FCR 595; Pounder v London Underground Limits [1995] PIQR 217; 
Churchill v Roach [2002] EWHC 3230 (Ch); Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; Gully v Dix 
[2004] WTLR 331; Kotke v Saffarini [2005] EWCA Civ 221. 
1722 [2013] EWHC 3403 (Ch). 




the deceased should be considered deserving to receive a part of the deceased’s 
estate.1724 
 
Although the categories of persons who qualify to claim under the 1975 Act are clearly 
linked to the traditional idea of “family”, it has been suggested1725 that the introduction 
of dependence as a criterion allows the law to reflect an understanding of family based 
on how people have behaved towards each other and the duties they owe to each 
other, rather than merely their position within a (formal) family structure. This is 
specifically evident in the inclusion of persons who were maintained by the deceased – 
while the other categories of persons largely fit the traditional concept of “family”, this 
category implies that any person who was maintained by the deceased to any extent, 
may apply for maintenance.  
 
For purposes of this thesis I will concentrate only on the position of the spouse or civil 
partner, a person who lived with the deceased as a spouse or civil partner and a person 
who was dependent on the deceased, as those categories of persons are relevant when 
considering the position of the spouse in terms of the MSSA.  
 
Once a person has established that he or she is eligible to claim under the 1975 Act, the 
court must follow a two-stage exercise.1726 The first step is to determine whether 
reasonable financial provision was made for the applicant in the deceased’s will, in 
terms of the laws of intestacy, or in terms of a combination of the will and the laws of 
intestacy.1727 The test to determine this is objective,1728 which means it must be 
 
1724 The law of succession (2014) 222. See also Swetenham v Walkley & Bryce [2014] WTLR 845; Gordon v 
Legister [2014] WLTR 1675. 
1725 Douglas 2014(4)2 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 228. 
1726 Lilleyman v Lilleyman [2012] EWHC 821 (Ch); Martin v Williams [2017] EWHC 491 (Ch); Parry  & 
Kerridge 192; Borkowski “Re Hancock (Deceased) and Espinosa v Bourke Moral obligation and family 
provision” 1999(11)3 Child and Family Law Quarterly 307; Douglas 2014(4)2 Oñati Socio-legal series 
(online) 232; Jordaan Unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa (1987) 127. 
1727 Section 2(1); Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 474-475, 494-495; Re Fullard [1982] Fam 42, 46, 50; 
Rajabally v Rajabally [1987] 2 FLR 390; Hanbury v Hanbury [1999] 2 FLR 255. 




answered from the viewpoint of the court and not the viewpoint of the applicant.1729 
Parry and Kerridge1730 note that this first stage involves a “value” judgement by the 
court. Should it be found that reasonable financial provision was not made, the second 
step is to determine whether, and to what extent, the court should exercise the powers 
granted by the 1975 Act.1731 In contrast to the first stage, this is a question of 
discretion.1732 
 
6.2.2.2 Reasonable financial provision 
The basis of a claim under the 1975 Act is that the deceased failed to make reasonable 
financial provision for the applicant.1733 It is evident from the wording of section 3 that 
the benchmark for what is reasonable depends on the nature of the relationship 
between the deceased and the applicant. Parry and Kerridge1734 refer to two standards: 
“the surviving spouse standard” and “the maintenance standard”. 
 
The “surviving spouse standard” applies where the applicant is the spouse or civil 
partner of, or person who had bona fide entered into a void marriage with, the 
deceased. In such an instance, reasonable financial provision means such financial 
provision as it would be reasonable to receive taking all the circumstances into 
consideration, regardless of whether such provision is actually required for the 
applicant’s maintenance.1735 This is a much wider approach than under the 1938 Act, 
which simply provided for reasonable provision for the maintenance of the spouse.1736 
 
1729 Re Goodwin [1969] 1 Ch 283, 287; Re Shanahan [1972] Fam 1, 8; Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 
474-475, 488-489; Parry & Kerridge 192. 
1730 The law of succession 193. 
1731 Sections 2(1) and 3(1). 
1732 Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 487; Re Besterman [1984] 3 WLR 280 CA; Parry & Kerridge 193. 
1733 Sections 1(1) and 2(1); Rajabally v Rajabally [1987] 2 FLR 390. 
1734 The law of succession 189. 
1735 Section 1(2)(a) and 1(2)(aa); Davis v Davis [1993] 1 FLR 54 CA; Singer v Isaac [2001] WTLR 1045 
http://www.lawteacher.net/cases/family-law/financial-matters-on-death.php (last accessed 4 
January 2017); Reed “Inheritance Act claims after White & Miller” Family Law Week 
        http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed548 (last accessed 5 January 2017). 





The Law Commission’s justification for this new standard was that the surviving spouse’s 
claim should be at least equal to the claim of a divorced spouse.1737  
 
The “maintenance standard” applies where the applicant is any other person in the 
listed categories. In such an instance, reasonable provision is limited to what is required 
for the maintenance of the person.1738 Maintenance has been described1739 as provision 
which will, directly or indirectly, enable the applicant to cover the costs of daily living, ie 
“to meet recurring living expenses of an income nature”.1740 It is more than just 
provision for the bare necessities of life1741 but less than “anything desired for his 
general benefit or welfare”. In Negus v Bahouse1742 the deceased and the applicant had 
lived together for eight years. The deceased was also survived by adult children from 
two previous marriages. He made a will shortly before he started cohabiting with the 
applicant and never changed it. The will made no provision for the applicant. The court 
considered the lifestyle enjoyed by the couple, the age of the applicant, the length of 
time they spent as a couple and the factual evidence that the deceased had provided 
financially for her. It found that she was entitled to an award which would give her a 
reasonable degree of financial security. In Webster v Webster1743 the applicant had 
cohabited with the deceased for 26 years. The court considered the meaning of 
“maintenance” in the context of a cohabitant and referred to Re Coventry (Deceased)1744 
where it was mentioned that maintenance would in all cases depend on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, that the meaning ascribed to the term should not 
be too limited and that the court should find a balance between “just enough to enable 
 
1737 Parry & Kerridge 189; Family Law: Second Report on Family Property. Family Provision on Death Law 
Com. No 61 HC 274 paras 12-18, 26-30; Jordaan Unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa 
(1987) 125. 
1738 Section 1(2)(b); Miller Family Law Week http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed103 (last 
accessed 20 January 2018). 
1739  Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 461, 485; Parry & Kerridge 190. 
1740 Re Dennis (Deceased) [1981] 2 All ER 140; Re Jennings (Deceased) [1994] Ch 286, 297-298; Oldham 
2001(60)1 The Cambridge Law Journal 151. 
1741  Re E [1966] 1 WLR 709, 715; Re Coventry (Deceased) [1980] Ch 461, 485, 494. 
1742 [2007] EWHC 2628 (Ch). 
1743 [2008] EWHC 31 (Ch). 




a person to get by” and “anything which may be regarded as reasonably desirable for 
the general benefit or welfare”. In Cattle v Evans1745 the applicant and the deceased had 
been in a relationship for many years and were engaged. The applicant applied under 
the 1975 Act for an order awarding her a property in Wales and cash. The court held 
that, as she had lived with the deceased for the last five years, she fell within the 
provisions of section 1(1)(ba) of the 1975 Act. The court found that it was reasonable for 
her to require to be housed in a property and continue to receive rental from her own 
property, but that it was not reasonable for her to own the property in which she could 
live. It quantified her housing needs and ordered that a property be purchased in trust 
for the deceased’s sons subject to her right of occupation. I find this case significant for 
the court’s finding that it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to occupy her 
existing property as that would leave her without an income. I suggest that the court 
made a very practical order, which is very different from the way in which our courts 
have placed the emphasis on giving the spouse funds to pay for his or her needs, rather 
than to consider giving him or her a place to live.  
 
Douglas1746 suggests that the standard for an applicant other than the spouse or civil 
partner is different because a spouse or civil partner would usually expect to inherit 
from the deceased spouse or civil partner’s estate. I find this suggestion problematic. 
English law does not give spouses an automatic right to share in each other’s property. I 
would, therefore, submit that it would be difficult to determine what a spouse or civil 
partner could reasonably have expected to inherit where the deceased died with a will. 
Where there was no will, the position is a bit clearer as the laws of intestacy1747 provide 
that a spouse or civil partner will inherit a certain portion of the intestate estate – much 
the same as is provided for by the ISA in South Africa.  
 
 
1745 [2011] EWHC 945 (Ch). 
1746 2014 Oñati Socio-legal series 4(2) 233. 
1747 Administration of Estates Act 1925. The details of the intestate laws are not relevant for purposes of 




It is interesting to note that section 3(5) provides that the court shall have regard to the 
facts “as known by the court at the date of the hearing”. This means that the 
circumstances at the date of execution of a deceased person’s will or at the date of his 
or death will not be the determining factor1748 and the court can take into account 
events that took place after the death of the deceased spouse but before the date of 
the hearing.1749 I suggest that this is a practical and correct approach as it allows the 
court to take into consideration anything that might have significantly impacted on the 
spouse’s situation since the death of the other spouse. Assume, for example, that at the 
time of death reasonable provision has been made for the surviving spouse, but some 
time thereafter (while the administration of the estate is still ongoing) he or she is faced 
with an event that depletes all or most of his or her resources. If he or she then 
approaches the court for an order for reasonable provision, it would be problematic if 
the court was precluded from taking into account the fact that the applicant’s 
circumstances have changed dramatically. Conversely, if reasonable provision had not 
been made at the time of death, but the spouse thereafter received a large windfall 
such as an inheritance or lottery winning, surely that is something that the court should 
consider when dealing with an application? While there could in certain circumstances 
be merit in limiting the consideration to the time of death, especially if the applicant’s 
own negligence or intent resulted in the change in his or her situation, I would argue 
that this provision has little or no practical impact. The 1975 Act provides that the court 
shall consider the financial resources and financial needs of the applicant, as it is at the 
time of the application and likely to be in the foreseeable future,1750 as well as “any 
other matter, including the conduct of the applicant”.1751 I believe that these provisions 
would be sufficient to allow the court to determine what weight it will apply to any 
events occurring after the death of the deceased but before lodging of the claim. 
 
 
1748 http://www.lawteacher.net/cases/family-law/financial-matters-on-death.php (last accessed 4 January   
       2017). 
1749 Parry & Kerridge 192. 
1750 Section 3(1)(a). 




In exercising its discretion, the court must consider certain guidelines1752 – some of 
these are general and relate to every application, whereas some are specified for 
different categories of applicants:1753 
• The financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to 
have in the foreseeable future.1754 The court shall take into account not just the 
applicant’s current earnings,1755 but also his or her earning capacity.1756 The 
applicant’s financial resources include his or her capital assets such as 
immovable property, shares and investments.1757 Parry and Kerridge1758 point 
out though that it would not be correct to treat the applicant’s home as 
expendable capital which must be used to maintain him or her.1759 It seems that 
a similar approach is followed by South African courts – in Feldman v Oshry1760  
the court held that it would expose the applicant to risk and insecurity if she was 
required to sell her property in order to have funds to maintain herself. In his 
discussion of the case, Sonnekus1761 also mentions that, although he does not 
propose that the applicant should be compelled to sell her property, it could not 
be disregarded when determining her resources, as she could mortgage the 
property in order to obtain funds for her maintenance.  
 
The English courts will take into consideration any pension or state aid received 
by the applicant.1762 It appears that the reference to resources which a person is 
likely to have in the foreseeable future include an inheritance the person is likely 
 
1752 Section 3. 
1753 Parry & Kerridge 194. 
1754 Section 3(1)(1)(a). 
1755 Re Ducksbury (Deceased) [1966] 1 WLR 1226; Malone v Harrison [1979] 1 WLR 1364; Parry & Kerridge 
195. 
1756 Section 3(b). 
1757 Cattle v Evans [2011] EWHC 945 (Ch); Parry & Kerridge 195. 
1758 The law of succession 195. 
1759 See also Malone v Harrison [1979] 1 WLR 1353. 
1760 2009 (6) SA 454 (KZD) 
1761 2010-4 TSAR 817. 
1762 Re Catmull [1943] 2 All ER 115; Re Charman [1951] 2 TLR 1095; Re E [1966] 1 WLR 709; Re Clayton 




to receive.1763 I find this problematic. There are many different aspects to an 
expected inheritance that could result in it not materialising – the person leaving 
the inheritance has to die, the will has to stay unchanged, the will has to be valid, 
the intended recipient has to be alive and the size of the estate and inheritance 
needs to remain such that the inheritance can be quantified. I would therefore 
submit that an inheritance that the applicant is likely to receive should not be 
taken into consideration when determining the financial resources of the 
applicant.  
 
When considering the financial needs of any person, the court shall take into 
account his or her financial obligations and responsibilities.1764 In Re Barron v 
Woodhead1765 the wife died, leaving nothing in her will to her husband. At the 
time of her death the spouses were separated but had not commenced divorce 
proceedings. The deceased left most of her estate to her two children from a 
previous marriage. The husband brought a claim under the 1975 Act for 
reasonable provision out of her estate. The court took into consideration the fact 
that, before the wife died, the husband was bankrupt and had accordingly 
transferred assets to her in order to avoid his creditors; 
 
• The financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an 
order under the 1975 Act has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;1766 
 
• The financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the 
deceased estate has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future.1767 A 
“beneficiary” is defined1768 as a person who under the will of the deceased or 
 
1763 Morgan v Morgan [1977] Fam 122; Parry & Kerridge 195. 
1764 Section 3(6). 
1765 [2008] EWHC 810 (Ch). 
1766 Section 3(1)(b). 
1767 Section 3(1)(c). 




under the law relating to intestacy is beneficially interested in the estate or 
would be so interested if an order had not been made under the 1975 Act, and a 
person who has received any sum of money or other property which is treated 
as part of the intestate estate of the deceased in terms of section 8(1) and (2), or 
who would have received that sum or other property if an order had not been 
made under this Act. Section 8(1) deals with the situation where a person has in 
terms of the provisions of “any enactment” nominated another person to 
receive a sum of money or other property on his or her death. Section 8(2) 
applies to a sum of money or property received by another person as a donatio 
mortis causa made by a deceased person. Both sections provide that such sum of 
money or property (after deduction of capital transfer tax), shall for purposes of 
this Act be treated as part of the net estate of the deceased; 
 
• Any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards the 
applicant or any other applicant, or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the 
deceased.1769 It appears that the reference to obligations and responsibilities 
includes moral obligations;1770  
 
• The size and nature of the net estate of the deceased.1771 “Net estate” includes 
any property which the deceased had the power to dispose of by his or her will, 
less the funeral, testamentary and administration expenses, debts and liabilities. 
It also includes any property in respect of which the deceased could exercise a 
general power of appointment and any sum of money or property which is 
treated as part of the net estate in terms of the provisions of sections 8(1) or (2), 
 
1769 Section 3(1)(d). 
1770 Re Hancock (Deceased) [1998] 2 FLR 346; Espinosa v Bourke [1999] 1 FLR 747; Borkowski 1999(11)3 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 307, 310; Jordaan Unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa 
(1987) 129. 




9, 10 or 11.1772 I referred to the provisions of section 8(1) and (2) above. Sections 
9, 10 and 11 deal with situations where: 
o a deceased person was immediately before his or her death entitled to the 
joint tenancy1773 of any property;1774 
o the deceased made a disposition of assets for less than full valuable 
consideration to another person less than six years before the deceased’s 
death with the intention of defeating an application for financial 
provision;1775 
o the deceased made a contract in terms of which he or she agreed to leave in 
his or her will a sum of money of other property to any person with the 
intention of defeating an application for financial provision, and full valuable 
consideration for the contract was not given or promised.1776  
In the situations mentioned above the assets will, subject to certain 
requirements, be treated as part of the net estate of the deceased for purposes 
of the 1975 Act; 
 
• Any physical or mental disability of any applicant or any beneficiary of the estate 
of the deceased.1777 The presence of a disability may give rise to an obligation on 
the deceased’s part and, where there is already an obligation, it might increase 
the extent of the obligation.1778 Jordaan1779 suggests (and I agree) that a 
disability affects both the extent of the moral obligation of the deceased and the 
extent of the financial needs of the disabled person; 
 
 
1772 Section 25. 
1773 Joint tenancy is similar to co-ownership in South African law. 
1774 Section 9. 
1775 Section 10. 
1776 Section 11. 
1777 Section 3(1)(f). 
1778 Re Pointer (No 1) [1941] Ch 60 Ch D; Re Andrews [1955] 1 WLR 1105; Millward v Shenton [1972] 1 WLR 
71; Parry & Kerridge 198. 




• Any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, 
which the court regards as relevant in the circumstances of the case.1780 Parry 
and Kerridge1781 note that the reference to “any other person” includes the 
deceased.1782 The English courts have, for example, considered the conduct of 
the applicant in relation to the deceased and specifically whether she was a good 
and loving wife.1783 The reference to “any other matter” is similar to section 3 of 
the MSSA which, in addition to the stated list of factors to be considered, also 
refers to “any other factor”. As mentioned in the discussion of the development 
of the MSSA,1784 the Law Commission in South Africa suggested that a moral 
judgement should be avoided when determining a claim under the MSSA, as the 
MSSA is premised on the survivor’s right to support under certain circumstances 
rather than his or her moral right to share in the deceased spouse’s estate. I 
interpret this as meaning that the conduct of the application should not form 
part of the consideration. For purposes of the 1975 Act, the conduct of the 
applicant or any other person may also be relevant when assessing some of the 
other guidelines, such as the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities or the 
applicant’s contribution to the welfare of the family.1785 The conduct of the 
deceased may be relevant when determining the reasonable provision that the 
applicant should receive.1786 
 
• Where the applicant was the spouse, civil partner, former spouse or former civil 
partner of the deceased, the court shall, in addition to the general guidelines 
mentioned above, also have regard to several other factors: 
 
1780 Section 3(1)(g). 
1781 The law of succession 199. 
1782 See, for example, Re Thornley [1969] 1 WLR 1037. 
1783 Re Borthwick (No 2) [1949] 1 All ER 472 Ch D; Re Morris [1967] CLY 4114; Re Blanch [1967] 1 WLR 987; 
Re Thornley [1969] 1 WLR 1037; Re Snoek (1983) 13 Fam Law 18. 
1784 See 4.4.2. 
1785 H v H (Family provision: remarriage) [1975] 2 WLR 124 Fam Div; Re Snoek (Deceased) (1983) 13 Fam 
Law 18; Parish v Sharman [2001] WTLR 593; Parry & Kerridge 204. 




o the age of the applicant; 
o the duration of the marriage or civil partnership;1787 
o the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the 
deceased, including any contribution made by looking after the home or 
caring for the family.1788 This aspect has been the subject of several court 
cases. In Re Snoek1789 the husband died, leaving a small estate. He made no 
provision for his wife and left his entire estate to his children. His wife 
claimed the entire estate as “reasonable provision” for herself under the 
1975 Act. The court balanced the evidence given of her conduct towards the 
deceased with her earlier work in homemaking and raising the children and 
awarded her a cash amount from the estate, in addition to shares which the 
children had to give her from their own legacies. In Iqbal v Ahmed1790 the 
deceased and his wife had been married for 22 years. The wife was entirely 
dependent on the deceased for financial support. The deceased had made a 
will in which he left the ownership of the marital home to his son from a 
previous marriage and the right to occupy it rent-free to his widow, but he 
stipulated that she would be responsible for all expenses and repairs relating 
to the house. The house needed extensive repairs, which the widow was 
unable to afford. The will contained no other provision for the widow and the 
deceased had in fact left a document in which he stated that she had not 
been a loving and caring wife and had verbally and physically abused him. 
The court of first instance found that the widow had virtually no earning 
capacity and that, contrary to the deceased’s contention, she had in fact 
cared for the deceased when he was ill and throughout the entire marriage. 
It awarded her a half share in the property rather than the right to occupy 
 
1787 Re Pugh [1943] Ch 387; Campbell v Campbell [1976] 3 WLR 572 Fam Div; Foley v Foley [1981] 3 WLR 
284; Re Krubert [1996] 3 WLR 959 CA (Civ Div); Adams v Lewis [2001] WTLR 493; Fielden v Cunliffe 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1508. 
1788 Section 3(2) and (2A). H v H (Family provision: remarriage) [1975] 2 WLR 124 Fam Div; Re Rowlands 
[1984] 5 FLR 813 CA (Civ Div). 
1789 [1983] Fam Law 18. 




the property. The matter was taken on appeal, but the Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision; 
o the provision that the applicant spouse might reasonably have expected to 
receive if, on the day on which the deceased died, the marriage had been 
terminated by divorce rather than death.1791 This guideline only applies to 
current (ie not former) spouses and civil partners. Parry and Kerridge1792 
refer to this as the “imaginary divorce” guideline. This guideline has been 
criticised1793 for ignoring the essential difference between divorce 
proceedings and family provision proceedings, namely that in the latter one 
party is deceased and therefore no longer has future needs or earnings. 
Reed1794 also points out that where a marriage ends in divorce, consideration 
should be given to the finances of two living parties, whereas in death only 
one party’s needs have to be considered. The court has a wide discretion in a 
divorce situation to redistribute the ownership of assets between the 
spouses in order to make reasonable provision. One example where the 
court took this into consideration was in In re Bunning,1795 where the court 
calculated the maximum provision the widow would have been entitled to in 
matrimonial proceedings and then proceeded to award her almost double 
that amount. Douglas1796 points out that the court’s approach in a divorce 
has changed in recent years from an award limited to satisfying the 
reasonable requirements to the satisfaction of need, compensation for 
relationship-generated disadvantage and sharing of the marital assets.1797 
She suggests1798 that this, coupled with the fact that the 1975 Act provides 
that the provision is not limited to maintenance, appears to reflect the need 
 
1791 Section 3(2). 
1792 The law of succession 202. 
1793 Parry & Kerridge 202. 
1794 “Inheritance Act claims after White & Miller” http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed548. 
1795 [1984] Ch 480. 
1796 2014 Oñati Socio-legal series (online) 4(2) 234. 
1797 White v White [2001] 1 AC 596; Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24. 




for a spouse to be given “recognition” in inheritance law. I find it difficult to 
reconcile the concept of sharing of marital assets on divorce with the 
provision in the 1975 Act for “reasonable” provision for the spouse or civil 
partner. The imaginary divorce guideline is not decisive and does not 
prescribe a minimum and maximum provision for the applicant.1799 In 
Kusminow v Barclays Bank1800 the husband died, leaving a wife and no 
children. His will provided for his entire estate to devolve on his niece and 
nephew who were living in poverty in Russia. The wife’s only resource was a 
retirement pension and a small amount of savings. She applied for 
reasonable provision under the 1975 Act. The court applied the “divorce 
test” as provided for in section 3(2) and found that she was in need of 
reasonable provision, but that the heirs were also in need. The court deemed 
it reasonable to award slightly less than half of the joint assets of the estate 
to the wife. In Re Besterman1801 the deceased left most of his large estate to 
a university and only a small income to his wife. Referring to the “divorce 
cross-check”, the court mentioned that in a divorce action the court 
attempts, as far as it is practicable and just, to put the parties in the same 
financial position as they would have been had the marriage not broken 
down. The court emphasised1802 that where the application is for provision 
under the 1975 Act, the result from the divorce cross-check exercise is 
merely one factor that the court has regard to – the overriding consideration 
remains what is reasonable in the circumstances. In Re Krubert1803 the 
deceased provided in his will that his wife would inherit his personal assets, a 
small lump sum, and the right to remain in the house owned by him for the 
rest of her lifetime. The residue of his estate, including the house, was left to 
trustees with a life interest to his wife. The wife applied for provision under 
 
1799 Re Bunning [1984] Ch 480; Parry & Kerridge 202. 
1800 [1989] Fam Law 66. 
1801 [1984] 3 WLR 280 CA. 
1802 At 458, 469. 




the 1975 Act. The court of first instance ordered that the house and most of 
the residue go to the wife absolutely, but the Court of Appeal held that, 
although the “surviving spouse” standard rather than the “maintenance” 
standard should be applied, the wife had not shown any financial need 
justifying an absolute interest in the house. It accordingly partly reversed the 
previous order and ordered that the wife would have a life interest in the 
house and inherit the rest of the estate absolutely. The court confirmed the 
approach in Re Besterman that the divorce provision is merely one factor to 
be considered. In P v G (Family Provision: Relevance of Divorce Provision)1804 
the parties had been married for approximately twenty years when the 
husband died. He was also survived by two children from his first marriage. 
The deceased left a will in terms of which he established a number of 
discretionary trusts from his sizeable estate. The wife brought an application 
in terms of the 1975 Act. The judge commented that, although the 1975 Act 
provides that a comparison should be made to the position the survivor 
would have been in had the marriage been ended by divorce, this 
comparison was artificial. The court considered what the widow required for 
a comfortable old age and compared the resultant amount with what the 
children stood to receive in order to be satisfied that nobody would be 
prejudiced. In Fielden v Cunliffe1805 the deceased died a year after he married 
Ms Cunliffe, leaving an estate of approximately £1,4 million. The deceased 
died without children. He left a will that was expressed to be in 
contemplation of the marriage to Ms Cunliffe (which means that it was not 
revoked by the marriage),1806 leaving his estate to discretionary trusts for the 
benefit of Ms Cunliffe, various family members, friends and employees. Ms 
Cunliffe preferred a definite share of the estate over provision to be decided 
at the discretion of the trustees and brought a claim under the 1975 Act. The 
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court of first instance awarded a lump sum to her, but the executors of the 
estate appealed. The Court of Appeal referred to the approach followed 
when considering claims for financial provision and property adjustment in 
proceedings between divorced former spouses and held that the correct 
judicial approach is to apply the statutory provisions to the facts of each case 
in order to reach a result which is fair and non-discriminatory.1807 The court 
emphasised that there is a big difference between a marriage that ends as a 
result of the death of one of the spouses, and a marriage that ends in 
divorce, as the latter involves a conscious decision by at least one of the 
parties and results in two living parties who each have their own resources, 
needs and responsibilities.1808 The principle of freedom of testation on the 
other hand dictates that a person is free to leave his estate to whomever he 
pleases, subject only to the statutory obligation to make reasonable financial 
provision for his widow.1809 The court considered several factors, such as the 
size of the net estate, Ms Cunliffe’s age, the duration of the marriage, Ms 
Cunliffe’s reasonable housing and financial needs and her financial resources. 
It found that the brevity of the marriage and the fact that Ms Cunliffe’s 
contribution to the family wealth was minimal, supported a departure from 
an equal division and accordingly awarded just less than half of the estate to 
her. As Reed1810 points out, the message of the case is that where the 
marriage was of short duration, the courts will be more generous towards 
the surviving spouse who claims under the 1975 Act than to the divorcing 
spouse. This seems to suggest that, as it was not the fault of the survivor that 
the marriage ended, the brevity of the marriage should not be regarded as a 
negative factor. In Elizabeth Adams v Julian James Lewis (Administrator of the 
 
1807 This approach was first adopted in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, a case dealing with divorce. 
1808 [2006] 1 FLR 431 at [30]. 
1809 [2006] 1 FLR 431 at [21]. 
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Estate of Frank Adams deceased)1811 the applicant had been married to the 
deceased for 54 years and they had twelve children. The deceased left the 
household goods, his personal effects and a small cash legacy to his wife. She 
contended that this was not reasonable and asked for the family home to be 
awarded to her. The court agreed that the will did not make reasonable 
financial provision for her considering the duration of the marriage and the 
contribution she had made by raising twelve children and looking after the 
deceased and the family home. It found that, although the amount that a 
spouse would receive on divorce is one of several factors to consider, it is a 
very important factor. It accordingly awarded the family home to the 
applicant but halved her cash legacy. The court mentioned that in a family 
provision claim, the spouse may get more than would have been the case on 
divorce, especially where the estate was small. In Lilleyman v Lilleyman1812 
the applicant had been married to the deceased for a little over two years. 
Both spouses had been married previously, and the deceased had two sons 
from his earlier marriage. His estate was worth approximately £6 million, the 
bulk of which comprised shareholdings in three private companies. In his will 
he left some of his personal belongings to the applicant, as well as the right 
of occupation of the former matrimonial home and a holiday home, subject 
to her paying all costs in respect of the matrimonial home and keeping it 
repaired and insured. He had also set up a small annuity for his wife. The 
residue of his estate, including the ownership of the aforementioned 
properties, was left to his sons. The wife’s own assets amounted to 
approximately £400 000 and an income of £11 000 per annum. The wife 
averred that reasonable provision had not been made for her and asked that 
a substantial share of the matrimonial home be given to her. The court 
referred to the two-stage exercise imposed by the 1975 Act1813 and noted 
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that the first step is to ascertain whether the will made reasonable provision 
for the applicant. If it is found that it does not, the second step is to 
determine whether, and to what extent, the court should exercise its powers 
to grant such provision. The court dealt extensively with the “divorce cross-
check” provided for in section 3(2). It mentioned that the fundamental 
principle is that marriage is recognised as being essentially an equal 
partnership. On the breakdown of the marriage the division of available 
property should therefore be conducted on the basis of fairness and non-
discrimination, although this does not necessarily mean that the assets 
should be divided equally. The first goal is to meet the parties’ financial 
needs. If there are assets left over after this, any prospective economic 
disparity between the parties that arises from the way in which they had 
conducted their marriage must be compensated for. This part of the exercise 
would typically result in the wife being compensated for her role as 
caregiver. Should there still be property available after this exercise, the 
court would consider sharing it between the parties, especially if it is 
matrimonial property or “fruits of the partnership”. Referring to the duration 
of the marriage, the court held that a short marriage, although as much a 
partnership of equals as a longer marriage, will have an impact on the 
quantum of the financial fruits of the partnership and will accordingly 
become relevant when considering the sharing of assets. The court cited with 
approval the finding in P v G (Family Provision: Relevance of Divorce 
Provision)1814 that the divorce cross-check does not impose a floor or ceiling 
in relation to the available relief under the 1975 Act and is simply one of the 
factors that must be considered in each particular case. The court then 
considered the matter at hand and found without hesitation that the will did 
not make reasonable provision for the applicant. It applied all the factors in 
the 1975 Act to the facts of the case and found that the applicant’s financial 
 




needs amounted to a housing requirement and an income shortfall. It held 
that an amount of approximately £500 000 would provide her with 
reasonable financial security, including accommodation, and would reflect a 
fair application of the divorce cross-check. The fairest way of achieving this 
would be to transfer the family home, as well as the holiday home or, if she 
elected, a lump sum representing the agreed market value of the holiday 
home, to her in addition to the bequests left to her in the will.  
 
• Where the application is made by a person who had during the two years prior 
to death lived with the deceased as a spouse or civil partner, the court shall 
consider the same factors as for a spouse, civil partner, former spouse or former 
civil partner,1815 except that the imaginary divorce guideline is not relevant.1816 
This effectively means that, where the cohabitant and deceased had been 
cohabitating for a period of two years or more, the cohabitant has an automatic 
right to claim regardless of whether he or she was financially dependent on the 
deceased. If the cohabitation period was less than two years, the cohabitant 
applicant does not have an automatic right and will have to prove that he or she 
was financially dependent on the deceased. Douglas1817 suggests that it is much 
harder to determine reasonable provision in the context of cohabitants because, 
although the relationship between the parties was “marriage-like”, the 1975 Act 
limits the court to considering what is reasonable in the context of maintenance. 
The Law Commission1818 initially indicated that the cohabitant’s claim should not 
be limited to maintenance but rather that the same criterion should apply as for 
a spouse or civil partner, ie “such financial provision as it would be reasonable in 
all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive, whether or not that 
 
1815  Section 3(2A). 
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provision is required for the applicant’s maintenance”. This proposal was, 
however, not implemented;1819  
 
• Where the application is brought by a person who was being maintained by the 
deceased, the court shall also have regard to the extent to which, and the basis 
upon which, the deceased assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the 
applicant and to the length of time for which the deceased discharged that 
responsibility.1820 No minimum period of dependency is prescribed.1821 
 
There is no indication in the 1975 Act that any particular factor in section 3 should be 
more important and carry a higher weighting that any other factor.1822 The section 
simply empowers the court to consider the circumstances of the deceased, the 
applicant and the other beneficiaries to the estate in order to assess whether the 
applicant’s circumstances should carry more weight than the testator’s freedom of 
testation. A good example of how all the factors in section 3 were considered by the 
court against the facts of the case can be found in Re Barron v Woodhead.1823 The court 
found that the principal concern was the fact that the husband was about to be evicted 
from the house in which he was living and that he was therefore in need of financial 
provision. It accordingly ordered that the husband would have a life interest in 
£100 000, which amount was to be used to purchase a flat or house for him as agreed 
between the parties to the application. He would be permitted to live there rent free for 
the rest of his life, but would be responsible for all utilities (“outgoings”). Should the 
house cost less than £100 000, the balance would be invested to generate income which 
would be paid to the husband for the rest of his life. The court also awarded a lump sum 
 
1819 Report: Intestacy and family provision claims on death (2001) Law Com No 331 HC 1674 (online)  
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of £25 000 to the husband to assist him with the costs of moving to this new property 
and to cover future expenses. I find the order clear and unambiguous and very practical 
considering the circumstances of the case. 
 
6.2.2.3 Orders the court may make 
Once the court has determined that reasonable provision had not been made by the 
deceased, it must determine what, if any, order it can make to ensure that such 
reasonable provision is granted to the applicant. An order for provision can only be 
made out of the net estate of the deceased.1824  
 
“Net estate” is widely defined.1825 Some assets or property are always included in the 
net estate, for example property which the deceased had the power to dispose of in 
terms of a will, property in respect of which the deceased held a general power of 
appointment and certain assets earmarked by the deceased to devolve on another 
person under a statutory nomination or a donatio mortis causa. In addition, certain 
property might be included in the deceased’s net estate if the court orders 
accordingly.1826 This includes the deceased’s severable share in property held in joint 
tenancy.1827 The court also has the power1828 to address instances where the deceased 
during his or her lifetime disposed of property to others and/or decreased the debts and 
liabilities payable to his or her estate in an attempt to evade a family provision order. In 
such an instance the court can compel the “donee” to provide money or other property 
so that financial provision can be made for the applicant. Although the 1975 Act does 
not place any minimum limit on the value of the net estate, it can generally be accepted 
 
1824 Section 2. 
1825 Section 25. 
1826 Sections 9, 10, 11, 25. 
1827 Re Crawford (1983) 4 FLR 273; Jessop v Jessop [1992] 1 FLR 591; Murphy v Holland (also known as 
Murphy v Murphy) [2004] 1 FCR 1; Dingmar v Dingmar [2007] Ch 109; Miller Family Law Week 
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that a large estate will translate into more financial provision for the applicant than a 
small estate would.1829 
  
The 1975 Act sets out1830 the powers of the court to make maintenance orders. It 
provides1831 that, if the court is satisfied that the disposition of the deceased’s estate in 
terms of his or her will or the intestacy law (or a combination thereof) does not provide 
reasonable financial provision for the applicant, it may make any of the following orders: 
• Periodical payments to the applicant out of the net estate of the deceased for 
such time as specified.1832 Such an order may provide for: 
o payments of a specified amount;1833  
o payments equal to a specified portion of the income of the net estate;1834 
o payments equal to the income of such part of the net estate as the court 
directs should be set aside or appropriated for this purpose;1835  
o any other way to determine the amount of the payments.1836 
The order may specify which part of the net estate shall be set aside to generate 
the income from which the payment must be made, limited to that part of the 
net estate as is sufficient, at the date of the order, to produce the income 
required to make the payment.1837 Parry and Kerridge1838 suggest that an order 
for periodical payments usually provides that the payments will start from the 
death of the deceased and terminate on the death of the applicant.1839 The court 
has the power to vary or discharge an order for periodical payments, to suspend 
any provision of it temporarily, and to revive the operation of any such 
 
1829 Re Inns [1947] Ch 576; Re Borthwick (No 2) [1949] 1 All ER 472 Ch D; Malone v Harrison [1979] 1 WLR 
1353; Re Besterman [1984] 3 WLR 280 CA; Parry & Kerridge 197. 
1830 Section 2. 
1831 Section 2(1). 
1832 Section 2(1)(a). 
1833 Section 2(2)(a). 
1834 Section 2(2)(b). 
1835 Section 2(2)(c). 
1836 Section 2(2); Re Blanch [1967] 1 WLR 987. 
1837 Section 2(3). 
1838 The law of succession 226. 




suspended provision.1840 Where an order for periodical payments is granted to a 
spouse where the marriage is subject to a decree of judicial separation, a civil 
partner where the civil partnership is subject to a separation order, or a former 
spouse or former civil partner of the deceased, the order shall cease to have 
effect when the applicant enters into a subsequent marriage or civil 
partnership;1841 
 
• A lump sum payment.1842 The order may provide that the lump sum be paid in 
instalments.1843 In contrast to the power of the court to vary an order for 
periodical payments in terms of section 2(1)(a), the court may not vary the 
amount of the lump sum,1844 and its only power is to vary the number of 
instalments payable, the amount of any instalments and the date on which an 
instalment becomes payable.1845 As Parry and Kerridge1846 indicate, a lump sum 
may be the only practical order when dealing with a small estate; 
 
• The transfer to the applicant of certain specified property in the estate of the 
deceased.1847 Parry and Kerridge1848 suggest that that such an order may be the 
most appropriate to avoid a situation where an order for a lump sum would 
necessitate reducing a portion of the estate to cash;1849  
 
 
1840 Section 6(1). 
1841 Section 19. 
1842 Section 2(1)(b). 
1843 Section 7(1). 
1844 Section 7; Re Besterman [1984] 3 WLR 280 CA. 
1845 Section 7(2). 
1846 The law of succession 227. 
1847 Section 2(1)(c). 
1848 The law of succession 227. 
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• An order that certain specified property of the estate be settled for the benefit 
of the applicant;1850  
 
• An order that property of the deceased estate be used to acquire other property 
specified in the order and that such acquired property be transferred to the 
applicant or applied for his or her benefit;1851 
 
• An order varying the terms of an ante- or post-nuptial settlement made between 
the parties to a marriage to which the deceased was one of the parties, for the 
benefit of the surviving spouse, child of the marriage or a person treated as a 
child of the family in relation to that marriage;1852   
 
• An order varying any settlement made during the subsistence of a civil 
partnership of the deceased, or in anticipation of such civil partnership of the 
deceased, for the benefit of the surviving civil partner, a child of both civil 
partners, or a person treated as a child of the family in relation to that civil 
partnership;1853  
 
• The court may include in any of the aforementioned orders such “consequential 
and supplemental” provisions as it deems necessary or expedient in order to give 
effect to the order, or to ensure that the order operates fairly between 
beneficiaries of the deceased estate.1854 It is specifically provided1855 that the 
court may order any person who holds property of the net estate of the 
deceased to make such payment or transfer such property to the applicant.1856 
 
1850 Section 2(1)(d); Harrington v Gill [1983] 4 FLR 265; Hanbury v Hanbury [1999] 2 FLR 255. 
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The court may also vary the disposition of the deceased’s estate, whether in 
terms of a will or the law relating to intestacy, or a combination thereof, in such 
manner as the court thinks fair and reasonable considering the circumstances of 
the case and the provisions of the order.1857 The court may furthermore confer 
the powers the court deems necessary or expedient on trustees who hold 
property that is the subject of an order.1858  
 
An important provision1859 in the 1975 Act allows the court to make an interim order for 
maintenance where the court is not yet able to determine the order to be made in 
terms of section 2. In order to qualify for an interim order for maintenance, the court 
must be satisfied that the applicant is in immediate need of financial assistance,1860 that 
it is not yet possible to determine what final order (if any) should be made, and that 
there is property in the estate of the deceased that is, or can be made, available to meet 
the applicant’s needs.1861 If the court is so satisfied, it may order the payment of a lump 
sum or more than one sum at intervals the court deems reasonable.1862 The court may 
make such order subject to any conditions or restrictions it deems necessary.1863 When 
considering the need for an interim order, the court is empowered to consider the same 
factors under section 3 as it will consider under the application, subject to the urgency 
of the matter.1864 When the court then later makes an order under section 2, it may 
provide that any sum paid to the applicant in terms of an interim order shall be treated 
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6.2.2.4 Time limit for application 
An application must be made no later than six months from the date on which a grant of 
probate or letters of administration for the deceased estate were first taken out.1866 The 
court does, however, have a wide power to extend this time limit1867 if the applicant can 
prove that it is just and proper for the court to do so.1868 
 
Where an applicant brings an application to court, there is no specific rule that provides 
that the personal representative of the estate must preserve the net estate until the 
outcome of the application is known.1869 This does, of course, make it difficult for the 
personal representative to establish when payment may be made to the heirs of the 
estate. Parry and Kerridge1870 suggest that payment may be made if the interested 




Parry and Kerridge1872 refer to the rising number of family provision disputes in recent 
years and suggest that it is a result of uncertainty in the family provision system. I agree 
with their comment1873 that there is a real need for a system that has clear rules in order 
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6.3  New Zealand 
 
6.3.1  General 
 
New Zealand adheres to the principle of freedom of testation1874 but this freedom is 
curtailed by certain statutes: 
• The Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act1875 gives the court the power to 
compensate an applicant if the deceased failed to fulfil a promise to reward the 
applicant for service rendered to the deceased; 
• The Family Protection Act1876 (hereinafter referred to as the “FPA”) gives the 
court the discretion to override a deceased person’s will or the rules of intestacy 
in order to provide for the maintenance and support of family members of the 
deceased from his or her estate; 
• The Property (Relationships) Act1877 (hereinafter referred to as the “PRA”) gives 
certain categories of persons the right to apply for the division of “relationship 
property”. 
• The Family Proceedings Act1878 provides1879 that a Family Court may order a 
spouse, civil partner or de facto partner, or the personal representative of such 
spouse or partner, to pay maintenance to the other spouse or partner. The 
maintenance will usually be by way of a periodical sum for such term as the 
court finds fit but limited to the life of the other party. The court is also 
 
1874 Hunter v Hunter (1987) 8 NSWLR 573; Grainer “Is family protection a question of moral duty?” 
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empowered to order the payment of a lump sum for this purpose, either instead 
of, or in addition to, the periodical payments.1880 
 
For purpose of this thesis I will concentrate on the PRA and FPA as these Acts are the 
most relevant in the context of a maintenance claim by a surviving spouse or partner 
and serve as comparative model for the South African position. I will also briefly 





The PRA provides for the redistribution of property between parties in a marital-type 
relationship when the relationship ends.1881 It initially applied only when the marriage 
ended in divorce, while the Matrimonial Property Act1882 applied when the marriage 
ended in death.1883 In 2001 the New Zealand Parliament amended the Matrimonial 
Property Act to extend the redistribution of property to marriages ending in death.1884 
Parliament also adopted the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act.1885 This Act 
repealed the Matrimonial Property Act and inserted a new part1886 into the PRA that 
applies when a spouse dies.  
 
The purpose of the PRA is described1887 as: 
• To reform the law relating to the property of married couples, civil union 
couples, and couples who live together in a de facto relationship; 
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• To recognise the equal contribution of husband and wife to the marriage 
partnership, of civil union partners to the civil union, and of de facto partners to 
the de facto relationship; 
• To provide for a just division of the relationship property between the spouses or 
partners when their relationship ends by separation or death, and in certain 
other circumstances, while taking account of the interests of any children of the 
marriage or children of the civil union or children of the de facto relationship. 
 
The premise of the PRA is that marriage is a partnership and that it is presumed that 
both spouses contribute equally, albeit it in different ways.1888 Certain principles1889 
apply to guide the achievement of the purpose of the FPA, namely that: 
• The equal status of men and women must be maintained and enhanced; 
• All forms of contribution to the marriage, civil union or de facto relationship 
must be treated equally; 
• A just division of relationship property considers the economic advantages or 
disadvantages to the spouses or partners arising from the marriage, civil union or 
de facto relationship or from the ending of such marriage, civil union or de facto 
relationship; 
• Questions arising under the PRA should be dealt with as inexpensively, simply 
and speedily as is just. 
 
6.3.2.1 Eligible applicants 
The PRA applies essentially to married couples, civil union couples and couples who live 
together in a de facto relationship.1890  
 
 
1888 Long title Matrimonial Property Act 1976; Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 366. 
1889 Section 1N. 
1890 Section 1M. Civil union partners and de facto partners were included by the Property (Relationships) 




The PRA defines1891 a marriage as including a marriage that is void, a marriage that ends 
by a legal process inside or outside New Zealand while both spouses are alive, or a 
marriage that ends with the death of one spouse, whether in or outside New Zealand. 
The terms “husband”, “wife” and “spouse” have a corresponding meaning.1892 A 
marriage is regarded as having ended if the parties cease to live together as husband 
and wife, the marriage is dissolved, or one of the parties dies.1893 The same rules apply 
to a civil union.1894  
 
A de facto partner is defined1895 as a person who has a de facto relationship with 
another person. A de facto relationship is defined1896 as a relationship between two 
persons, whether man and woman, man and man or woman and woman, who are both 
eighteen years and older, live together as a couple and are not married to, or in a civil 
union with, one another.1897 The circumstances to be taken into consideration to 
determine whether two persons live together as a couple are the same as those 
provided in the FPA.1898 It is interesting to note that the PRA provides1899 that where a 
marriage or civil union was immediately preceded by a de facto relationship between 
the spouses or civil union partners, such de facto relationship must be treated as if it 
were part of the marriage or civil union. The same rule applies where a civil union is 
preceded by a marriage and where a marriage was immediately preceded by a civil 
union.1900 These provisions are important as the application of the PRA differs 
depending on the length of the marriage or civil union – special rules apply if the 
marriage or civil union lasted less than three years.1901 In the case of de facto 
 
1891 Section 2A(1). 
1892 Section 2A(1). 
1893 Section 2A(2). 
1894 Section 2AB. 
1895 Section 2C. 
1896 Section 2D. 
1897 This is the same definition as is used in the FPA. 
1898 See 6.3.2.1. 
1899 Section 2B; 2BAA. 
1900 Section 2BA. 




relationships, the PRA usually does not apply if the partners have lived together for less 
than three years, although certain exceptions are made.1902 The general rule is that the 
couple’s property is to be divided equally between them.1903 The inclusion of de facto 
partnerships, however, opens the possibility of more than one surviving partner. The 
Family Proceedings Act1904 provides1905 that spouses who want to apply for a divorce 
must wait two years before they can do so. This opens the possibility of a person dying 
with a de facto partner, but still being legally married. Should this happen, each 
surviving party may select one of the available options.1906 
 
6.3.2.2 Division of relationship property 
The PRA applies to immovable property situated in New Zealand,1907 but not to Maori 
land.1908  
 
The PRA also applies to movable property in New Zealand, or situated elsewhere if one 
of the spouses or partners is domiciled in New Zealand at the time of death, at the time 
of the application, or at the time when the parties entered into an agreement regarding 
the division of the property.1909  
 
The basis of the PRA as outlined in section 1M is to provide for a just division of 
“relationship property”. This term is exhaustively defined1910 in the Act and has the 
meaning ascribed to it.1911 It essentially refers to assets produced by, or closely 
associated with, the relationship, such as: 
 
1902 Section 85(3); Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8. 
1903 Section 1C(3). 
1904 1980 No 49. 
1905 Section 39. 
1906 Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 9. 
1907 Section 7(1). 
1908 Section 6. See 3.4 for more details on Maori land. 
1909 Section 7(2). 
1910 Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 367. 




• The family home, regardless of when it was acquired;1912 
• Family chattels, regardless of when they were acquired1913 – chattels include 
household furniture, tools, garden effects, motor vehicles, caravans, boats and 
even household pets.1914 It does not include chattels used solely or primarily for 
business purposes, money or heirlooms;1915 
• Property owned jointly or in common in equal shares;1916 
• All property owned by either party immediately before the marriage, civil union 
or de facto relationship if acquired in contemplation of such marriage, civil union 
or de facto relationship and intended for the common use or common benefit of 
both parties;1917 
• Subject to certain exceptions,1918 all property acquired by either party after the 
start of the marriage, civil union or de facto relationship – in Thompson v 
Thompson,1919 for example, the court held that a restraint of trade payment 
made to the husband was relationship property;1920 
• Property acquired after the start of the marriage, civil union or de facto 
relationship for the common use or benefit of both parties, if it was acquired out 
of property owned by either party before the marriage, civil union or de facto 
relationship or out of the proceeds of any disposition of property owned before 
the marriage, civil union or de facto relationship;1921 
 
1912 Section 8(1)(a). 
1913 Section 8(1)(b). 
1914 Section 2. 
1915 Section 2. 
1916 Section 8(1)(c). New Zealand follows the English doctrine of joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Joint 
tenants own the asset as a whole. When one of them dies, the other continues to own the asset and 
it does not form part of the first-dying party’s estate. Property held as tenants in common means that 
each party owns a portion of the asset and their respective shares form part of their estates on death: 
see Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 7 fn 37. 
1917 Section 8(1)(d); Sloss v Sloss [1989] 3 NZLR 31; Brophy v Brophy (1992) 9 FRNZ 468 (HC). 
1918 Section 8(1)(e). 
1919 [2015] NZFLR 150. 
1920 Henaghan & Ballantyne “Recent changes to the division of relationship property in New Zealand: a 
new way forward” 2015 International Survey of Family Law 232-233. 




• The portion of a life policy that is attributable to the relationship,1922 
insurance,1923 or pension scheme;1924 
• The income and gains from the proceeds of a disposition of, and increase in, the 
value of the property mentioned above.1925 
 
Property acquired by way of succession (ie inheritance), survivorship (ie as joint owner 
of the property) or gift from a third party, or as the beneficiary of a trust settled by a 
third party is excluded from relationship property,1926 unless it has become so 
intermingled with the relationship property that it is impracticable or unreasonable to 
regard it as separate property.1927 Property which is not relationship property is 
regarded as separate property of the spouse or partner and is retained by its owner.1928 
This includes increases in the value of separate property, unless the increase is a result 
of the application of relationship property or the actions of the non-owner spouse or 
partner.1929 Property acquired by one spouse or partner by way of a gift from the other 
spouse or partner is separate property unless it is used for the benefit of both.1930 
 
When one party dies, the entire estate and anything acquired by the estate after death 
is presumed to be relationship property.1931 Anyone who wants to challenge this bears 
the onus of proving that it is separate property.1932 There is a view1933 that this 
presumption favours the surviving spouse or partner, because disproving the status of 
 
1922 Section 8(1)(g). 
1923 Section 8(1)(h). 
1924 Section 8(1)(i). 
1925 Section 8(1)(l). 
1926 Section 10(1); Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8. 
1927 Section 10(2). 
1928 Section 10(2) read with 9(1). 
1929 Section 9A; Palmer v Palmer (1981) 5 MPC 116; Walsh v Walsh (1984) 1 FRNZ 262; Nation v Nation 
[2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA); Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 8. 
1930 Section 10(3). 
1931 Sections 81, 82. 
1932 Section 81(2). 




the property will depend on knowledge of the details of the assets, which is quite likely 
known only to the spouse or partner. 
 
Misconduct on the part of either party may affect the division of relationship property if 
the misconduct was gross and palpable and significantly affected the extent or value of 
the relationship property.1934  
 
The parties to any relationship may bypass the application of the PRA by entering into 
an agreement about the division of their property.1935 It is interesting to note that the 
PRA effectively forces parties to obtain independent legal advice before signing an 
agreement – it provides1936 that an agreement will be void if this (and some other 
prerequisites) did not happen.1937 
 
6.3.2.3 The available options 
The basic structure of the PRA as it applies on death is that the surviving spouse, civil 
partner or de facto partner has a choice between two options.1938 Whichever option is 
elected takes priority over the rights of beneficiaries in a will or in terms of intestacy and 
over claims under the FPA or Testamentary Promises Act.1939 The options are: 
 
• Option A is an election for an application under the PRA for division of the 
relationship property.1940  
 
When the spouse or partner makes a decision in favour of option A, he or she 
forfeits the right to an inheritance in terms of the will or rules of intestacy.1941 
 
1934 Section 18A. 
1935 Section 21. 
1936 Section 21F. 
1937 See also Wells v Wells [2006] NZFLR 870 (HC). 
1938 Section 61. 
1939 Section 78; Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 370; Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law 12. 




Any bequest in the will to the spouse or partner is treated as having been 
revoked and the spouse or partner is treated as having predeceased the 
deceased.1942 The same applies to any entitlement in terms of intestacy under 
the Administration Act, ie the surviving spouse or partner is treated as having 
been predeceased.1943 All of this is, however, subject to the proviso that the will 
may express a contrary intention or the court may permit the spouse or partner 
to also take all or some of the bequests in the will or in terms of intestacy if it is 
satisfied that it is necessary to avoid injustice.1944 According to Peart,1945 
anecdotal evidence suggests that few testators provide to the contrary in their 
wills and forfeiture of the provisions in the will is therefore the norm where 
option A is chosen.  
 
If option A is selected, the court may make such order regarding the division of 
relationship property as it deems just.1946 The general rule1947 is that the parties 
share equally in the family home, family chattels and any other relationship 
property, but the court may divide the assets according to the contribution each 
party made to the marriage, civil union or de facto relationship if it feels that 
there are extenuating circumstances that make equal sharing “repugnant to 
justice”.1948 It appears1949 that it is difficult in practice to satisfy the criteria for 
this exception, which difficulty is enhanced by the fact that one of the parties to 
the relationship is deceased. 
 
 
1941 Section 76; Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 370. 
1942 Section 76(1); B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC); De Muth v Lee [2005] NZFLR 281 (FC); Peart 
2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 9. 
1943 Section 76(3); B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC). 
1944 Section 77; B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC). 
1945 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 9.  
1946 Section 25(1) read with section 88. 
1947 Section 11. 
1948 Section 13.  
1949 See, for example, Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97; Wilson v Wilson [1991] 1 NZLR 687; Williams v 




Where a de facto relationship of short duration ends in death, the surviving de 
facto partner generally has no entitlement under the PRA.1950 “Short duration” is 
defined1951 as having lasted less than three years or where the court deems it 
just in the circumstances to treat a relationship lasting more than three years as 
being of short duration. If, however, the court is satisfied that there is a child of 
the relationship1952 or one of the parties made a substantial contribution to the 
relationship, and failure to make an order would result in serious injustice,1953 
the court may order the division of the relationship property, but the division 
will not be equal and will be determined in accordance with the contribution 
made by each of the partners to the partnership.1954 This is in stark contrast to 
the position where a marriage or civil union of short duration ends in death, 
where the relationship property is shared equally, unless the court considers this 
to be unjust.1955 I interpret this to mean that, even where one spouse or civil 
partner’s contribution was clearly much greater than the other party’s 
contribution, the relationship property may still be shared equally. I agree with 
Peart1956 that the failure to extend the rationale that applies to marriage and civil 
unions on death (ie that division should be equal unless this would lead to 
injustice) to de facto partners amounts to discrimination against de facto 
relationships.   
 
• Option B is an election to not apply under the PRA and to rather receive the 
inheritance from the deceased’s will or in terms of the rules of intestacy.1957 It is 
 
1950 Section 85(3). 
1951 Section 2E. 
1952 The PRA defines a “child of the de facto relationship” widely – it includes any child, whether or not a 
child of either party, who was a member of the family of the partners at the date of death of one of 
the partners. 
1953 Section 85(3). 
1954 Section 85(4); Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 6. 
1955 Section 85(1) and (2). 
1956 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 11. 




also the default option if the surviving spouse, civil partner or de facto partner 
fails to make an election within the required time frame.1958 
 
If option B is chosen, or where the surviving spouse, civil partner or de facto 
partner is treated as having chosen this option, the PRA essentially does not 
apply. The surviving spouse or partner retains any assets owned or acquired by 
survivorship and the estate is distributed in terms of the will of the deceased 
spouse or partners or in terms of the intestacy rules.1959  
 
It is important to note that the PRA specifically provides1960 that a surviving spouse or 
partner who brings an application under the PRA is not precluded from also making an 
application under the FPA.1961 This means that a surviving spouse or partner who feels 
that the entitlement in terms of option A under the PRA is inadequate may pursue an 
application for further provision under the FPA. The spouse or partner may even choose 
to bring an application for permission to take the inheritance in terms of the PRA as well 
as provision from the estate under the FPA.1962 In B v Adams1963 the widow successfully 
applied for her inheritance and for further provision under the FPA. 
 
As indicated earlier,1964 the inclusion of de facto partnerships in the application of the 
PRA opens the possibility of more than one surviving partner. Each surviving partner will 
have the choice of the available options.1965 If one party chooses option A and the other 
 
1958 Section 68; Sanders v Trustees Executor and Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd (2004) 26 FRNZ 202; Public 
Trust v Nicholas (2005) 24 FRNZ 360. 
1959 Section 95. There are a few provisions of the PRA that do apply in such an instance, but they are not 
relevant for purposes of this thesis. 
1960 Section 57. 
1961 B v Adams (2005) 25 FRNZ 778 (FC); De Muth v Lee [2005] NZFLR 281 (FC); EM v SL [2005] NZFLR 281; 
Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 370. 
1962 Section 77. 
1963 (2005) 25 FRNZ 778. 
1964 See 6.3.2.1. 




option B, the process could be relatively straightforward.1966 Where both parties select 
option A, the relationship property of the successive relationships are divided in 
chronological order.1967 If the relationships were at some stage contemporaneous, the 
relationship property claims must as far as possible be settled from the assets 
attributable to the particular relationship. To the extent that this is not possible, the 
property must be divided according to the contribution made by each relationship to 
the acquisition of the property.1968 
 
6.3.2.4 Orders the court may make 
Once an election has been made, the choice is irrevocable.1969 The court may, however, 
under certain circumstances set aside the chosen option if it is satisfied that it would be 
unjust in all the circumstances to enforce the chosen option.1970 I will not discuss this 
aspect as it is not relevant to the topic.  
 
As is the case with the accrual system in South Africa, the parties to a relationship may 
by agreement opt out of the PRA,1971 which might leave the surviving spouse or partner 
without capital on the death of their spouse. The court may set aside an agreement 
entered into between parties if it is satisfied in all the circumstances that giving effect to 
it would cause serious injustice.1972 If an agreement is set aside, the ordinary rules of 
classification and division apply. 
  
 
1966 See Chapman as administrator ad colligenda bona of the estate of EP v HP & PN unreported, High 
Court Wellington Registry CIV-2007-485-1372, judgment delivered on 2 July 2009, for an example of 
where the widow elected option A and the partner option B. 
1967 Section 52A(2)(a). 
1968 Section 52A(2)(b), 52B(2)(b). 
1969 Section 67. 
1970 Section 69(2)(b); Sanders v Trustees Executor and Agency Company of New Zealand Ltd (2004) 26    
FRNZ 202. 
1971 Section 21H. 
1972 Section 21J; Harrison v Harrison [2005] 2 NZLR 349 (CA). This is similar to the power of the court in 




In deciding whether serious injustice would be caused, the court must consider the 
following:1973 
• The provisions of the agreement; 
• The length of time since the agreement was made; 
• Whether the agreement was unfair or unreasonable at the time it was entered 
into; 
• Whether the terms of the agreement have subsequently become unfair or 
unreasonable in light of any changes in the circumstances since it was entered 
into; 
• The fact that the parties entered into the agreement to get certainty about the 
division of their property; 
• Any other matters the court deems relevant; 
• Whether the estate of the deceased spouse or partner has been wholly or 
partially distributed. 
 
Prior to 2001, the test for setting aside an agreement was to determine whether it 
caused injustice. This apparently led to agreements being set aside too easily, 1974 which 
Peart1975 suggests meant that parties could not rely on the agreement, even if they had 
been properly advised before entering into it.  
 
An interesting provision1976 in the PRA empowers the court to order compensation to a 
disadvantaged party if the actions or inactions of the personal representative of the 
estate or of a spouse or partner led to a material devaluing of the relationship property.  
 
The court has the power to redress economic disparity that applies as a result of the 
division of functions in the marriage or relationship.1977 This provision enables the 
 
1973 Section 21J (4), (5). 
1974 Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 12. 
1975 Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 12. 




economically disadvantaged spouse or partner who has given up his or her career to 
support the other partner, to receive a greater share of the relationship property on 
division.1978 The courts are effectively given an additional discretion to compensate the 
disadvantaged spouse or partner if there are significant economic disparities in the 
parties’ income and living standards1979 and it is evident that these disparities are likely 
to come to the fore when the relationship breaks down and the regime of equal sharing 
cannot address these disparities.1980 The purpose of this section is to place the parties 
on a more equal footing.1981 The applicant must prove not only that significant economic 
disparity in the income and standard of living is likely to occur, but also that this 
disparity is the result of the division of duties and functions in the relationship.1982 In 
assessing any case, the court may have regard to the following factors:1983 
• The likely earning capacity of each party; 
• The responsibilities of each party for the ongoing daily care of any minor or 
dependent child of the relationship; 
• Any other relevant circumstances. 
The wording of the section seems to suggest that a comparison is to be made between 
living persons, and this raises the question whether the section can also apply when one 
of the parties has died. If one takes into consideration the fact that one of the 
underlying principles of the PRA is for the court to regard the economic advantage or 
 
1977 Section 15. 
1978 M v B [2006] 3 NZLR 660 (CA); X v X [Economic disparity] [2010] 1 NZLR 601; Jack v Jack [2014] NZHC 
2502; Williams v Scott [2015] NZFLR 355; Henaghan & Ballantyne “Recent changes to the division of 
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243. 
1979 Cunningham v Cunningham Unreported, HC Auckland CIV-2003-404-2392, judgment delivered on 28 
November 2003. 
1980 Garland “Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act: compensation, substantive equality and empirical 
realities” 2014(3) New Zealand Law Review 358. 
1981  Garland 2014(3) New Zealand Law Review 358. 
1982 De Malmanche v De Malmanche [2002] 2 NZLR 838 (HC); Sullivan v Sullivan [2002] NZFLR 1037 (FC); G 
v G [2003] NZFLR 289 (FC); Nation v Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA); Chong v Speller [2005] NZFLR 400 
(HC); M v B [2006] 3 NZLR 660 (CA); M v M Unreported, FC Wellington FAM-2007-091-767, judgment 
delivered on 23 September 2009; X v X [Economic disparity] [2010] 1 NZLR 601; Garland 2014(3) New 
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disadvantage to the parties arising from their relationship,1984 I would suggest that this 
principle would be defeated if the provisions of section 15 did not apply on death. Even 
if that was not the case, I would suggest that the inclusion of “any other relevant 
circumstances” as a factor that the court may consider to determine if one of the 
spouses is economically disadvantaged, is probably wide enough to include the death of 
the other party. 
 
The PRA contains two sections that could be used where relationship property has been 
disposed of to a trust. Section 44 allows the court to set aside dispositions of 
relationship property if the applicant seeking relief can prove that the party who put the 
property into trust had the intention to defraud the applicant.1985 The court can order 
the person who received the disposition to transfer the property to the applicant, or 
order that person to pay compensation to the applicant. If it is not possible to order 
compensation, the court may order the trustees of the trust to pay all or some of the 
trust income to the disadvantaged party. Section 44C gives the court the power to 
compel a spouse or partner to disclose information about dispositions of relationship 
property made to an inter vivos trust. If such disposition was made after the marriage or 
partnership began and it has the effect of defeating the claim or rights of one of the 
parties, the court can order compensation to that party, which can be satisfied from 
separate or relationship property. All that needs to be proven is that the trust has the 
effect of defeating a claim under the PRA – there is no requirement to provide intention 
to defraud.1986 While the provisions of section 44C apply specifically to dispositions to 
trusts, the remedies are more limited than those that apply in terms of section 44.1987 
The court cannot access the trust assets for purposes of the order.1988 That would mean 
that the court can, for example, not order the trustees to pay capital of the trust to the 
 
1984 See, for example, section 1N(c). 
1985 Henaghan & Ballantyne (2015) International Survey of Family Law 235. 
1986 Clayton v Clayton [2015] NZFLR 233; Henaghan & Ballantyne (2015) International Survey of Family Law 
237. 
1987 Henaghan & Ballantyne (2015) International Survey of Family Law 238. 




disadvantaged party, nor can it order the trustees to invest the capital in such a way 
that it generates income or more income than it already generates. The only power the 
court has is to order one party to pay a specified amount to the disadvantaged party, or 
to order one party to transfer property to the disadvantaged party.1989 I am of the view 
that, despite the limited impact, this is still a useful provision to include in the PRA. In 
South Africa, there is no similar provision and one spouse can effectively move all his or 
her assets to a trust in order to thwart a potential claim by the other spouse in terms of 
the MSSA. 
 
6.3.2.5 Time limit for application 
The election has to be made within certain time frames.1990 The size of the estate 
determines the relevant time frame – if the estate is small, the choice must be made 
within six months after death or after administration of the estate is granted, whichever 
is the later.1991 A “small estate” is defined1992 as an estate that can lawfully be 
distributed without the need for administration to be obtained.1993 In all other cases, 
the choice must be made no later than six months after administration is granted.1994 
The court may extend this period,1995 but only if the application for extension is brought 
before the final distribution of the estate.1996  
 
I find it interesting that the PRA specifically provides1997 that the administrator of the 
estate may not distribute the estate before the expiry of six months after administration 
has been granted or the survivor has chosen an option, whichever occurs first. This 
provision is clearly designed to ensure that the estate is not distributed within the six 
 
1989 Henaghan & Ballantyne (2015) International Survey of Family Law 238. 
1990 Section 62. 
1991 Section 62(1)(a). 
1992 Section 2. 
1993 The Administration Act 1969 No 52 determines that some estates can be administered without the 
need for a grant of administration.  
1994 Section 62(1)(b). 
1995 Section 62(2). 
1996 Section 62(4). 




months after administration is granted to allow the survivor the option to choose how 
he or she wishes to proceed. If the survivor, however, consents in writing or the court 
approves an application, the administrator may distribute the estate within the six-
month period.1998 Should this happen, any part of the estate so distributed will not be 
affected by a subsequent application under the PRA.1999 
 
6.3.2.6 Summary 
Peart2000 suggests that the election given to spouses and partners under the PRA blurs 
the distinction between duty and debt as the PRA forces them to choose between their 
relationship property and their right to inherit. Rights to inherit (succession law) address 
typical private law duties owed by a deceased to his or her close family members, 
whereas entitlement to relationship property addresses the debt owed by a spouse or 
partner to the other spouse or partner based on their respective contributions to the 
relationship.2001 To put it differently, “the relationship property entitlement is earned, 
the inheritance is not”.2002 This raises the question why a spouse or partner cannot by 
right be entitled to both their relationship property and an inheritance.  
 
6.3.3  FPA 
 
The FPA can be traced back to 1900, when it was called the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1900.2003 Although not limiting freedom of testation,2004 the Act was 
an attempt to prevent persons, in particular men, from leaving their estates to non-
family members, thereby leaving their wives and children destitute.2005 It gave the court 
 
1998 Section 71(2). 
1999 Section 74. 
2000 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 13. 
2001 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 13. 
2002 Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 372. 
2003  Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 142. 
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the discretion to override the terms of a will if the testator failed to make adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance and support of his or her wife or husband or 
children, to ensure that those family members did not become destitute and dependent 
on the state.2006 This Act made New Zealand the first common law country to give the 
court the discretion to interfere in a testator’s wishes if adequate provision was not 
available from the estate for the maintenance and support of certain family 
members.2007 The Act gave no guidance as to what “adequate provision” was.2008 In 
1939 the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act was amended to also apply to intestate 
estates.2009 It was renamed the FPA on 1 January 1908. 
 
The preamble of the FPA provides that its purpose is to consolidate and amend certain 
parliamentary enactments relating to claims for maintenance and support out of 
deceased estates. The basis of the FPA is that the court may in its discretion order such 
provision as it deems fit out of the deceased estate for an applicant if it finds that 
inadequate provision is available from the deceased estate for the proper maintenance 
and support of such applicant as a result of the deceased’s will or the intestacy rules.2010 
Peart2011 points out that the original basis of the Act, namely to prevent destitution of 
dependent family members, has changed over time from an emphasis on maintenance 
and support to something much more. This provision is however limited to the extent 
that it is necessary to remedy the breach of the deceased’s moral duty to maintain 
family members.2012 This concept of “moral duty” has been the topic of many writers’ 
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2010 Section 4(1). 
2011 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 364. 
2012 Plimmer v Plimmer (1906) 9 GLR 10, 24; Rowe v Lewis [1907] 26 NZLR 769, 772; Wylie v Wylie (2003) 
23 FRNZ 156 (CA); Hammond 2013(30)3 Thomas M Cooley Law Review 273; Community Law 





criticism. The 1900 Act made no mention of this duty.2013 The courts developed the 
concept of “moral duty” which gives them the opportunity to consider ethics and 
contemporary social attitudes when considering a claim under the FPA.2014 By the time 
In re Allardice: Allardice v Allardice2015 was decided, the view that it was the court’s duty 
to ascertain if the testator breached a moral duty, was firmly in place.2016 
 
6.3.3.1 Eligible applicants 
In terms of the FPA the following persons may apply for maintenance from the deceased 
estate: 
• The spouse or civil union partner;2017 
• A de facto partner who was living in a de facto relationship with the deceased at 
the time of his or her death;2018 
• The children of the deceased;2019 
• Grandchildren of the deceased alive at the time of his or her death;2020 
• Stepchildren of the deceased who were being maintained wholly or partly by the 
deceased, or who were legally entitled to be maintained wholly or partly by the 
deceased immediately before his or her death;2021 
• A parent of the deceased (but only in certain circumstances).2022 




you-die/claims-by-family-members-under-the-family-protection-act/ (last accessed 24 November 
2019). 
2013 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 144.  
2014 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 144. 
2015 [1910] 29 NZLR 959. 
2016 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 145. 
2017 Section 3(1)(a). Civil union partners are included in terms of the Relationships (Statutory References) 
Act 2005 No 3. 
2018 Section 3(1)(aa). De facto partners are included in terms of the Family Protection Amendment Act 
2001 No 8. 
2019 Section 3(1)(b). 
2020 Section 3(1)(c). 
2021 Section 3(1)(d). 




The inclusion of de facto partners in a de facto relationship as a separate category to 
spouses and civil union partners suggests that these relationships do not have the legal 
status of a marriage or civil union but are nonetheless entitled to protection. The FPA 
defines2023 “de facto partner” and “de facto relationship” as having the meaning given to 
it by section 2 of the PRA. The latter Act defines2024 a de facto partner in relation to 
another person as a person who has a de facto relationship with the other person. A de 
facto relationship is defined2025 as a relationship between two persons, whether man 
and woman, man and man or woman and woman, who are both eighteen years or 
older, live together as a couple, and who are not married to, or in a civil union with, one 
another. In order to determine whether two people live together as a couple, all the 
circumstances of the relationship are to be considered, including any of the following 
which are relevant in a particular case:2026 
• The duration of the relationship – this factor is important as the court does not have 
the power to make an order in terms of the FPA if the relationship was of short 
duration, as defined in the PRA,2027 unless it is satisfied that there is a child of the de 
facto relationship or that the de facto partner made a substantial contribution to the 
de facto relationship and that the failure to make an order would result in serious 
injustice to the de facto partner. It has been said2028 that this last requirement 
means that the applicant must show that the deceased had a moral duty to provide 
for the applicant; 
• The nature and extent of a common residence; 
 
2023 Section 2(1). 
2024 Section 2C. 
2025  Section 2D. 
2026  Section 2D(2). 
2027  Section 2E of the PRA defines a relationship of short duration as one where the parties lived together 
for less than three years or where they lived together for three years and longer but the court 
considers it just in the circumstances to treat the relationship as one of short duration.  
2028 Claims under the Family Protection Act 1955 http://www.communitylaw.org.za/community-law-
manual/chapter-18-wills/challenging-a-will?#c5295; Paul “Family Protection Act 1955” 
http://www.wynnwilliams.co.nz/wynnwilliams/media/Articles/Family-Protection-Act-1955.pdf (last 




• Whether or not they are or have been in a sexual relationship. This factor is, 
however, not a prerequisite to establishing a de facto relationship;2029 
• The degree of financial dependence or interdependence between them, and any 
arrangements between them for financial support; 
• The ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
• The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
• The care and support of children; 
• The performance of household duties; 
• The reputation and public aspects of the relationship. 
The FPA provides2030 that, when determining whether two persons live together as a 
couple, it is not necessary to make a finding on any of the abovementioned matters and 
the court may therefore have regard to such matters and attach such weight to any 
matter as it deems appropriate in the circumstances of the case.  
 
6.3.3.2 Adequate provision 
The FPA refers to “adequate provision” for the “proper maintenance and support” of 
the applicant, but contains no definition of these concepts, nor are any guidelines 
provided to assist with determining this.2031 As Peart2032 points out, there is no clarity as 
to what would constitute adequate provision in the context of proper support and 
maintenance. The earlier cases approached the question from the point of view that the 
purpose of the Act was to ensure that the maintenance burden fell on the family and 
not the state. The duty was limited to adequate provision during the lifetime of the 
applicant.2033  
 
2029 Scragg v Scott [2006] NZFLR 1076 (HC). This case concerned an application under the PRA, but the 
definition for “de facto” partner in the PRA is also used for purposes of the FPA; Sloan 2011(70)3 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 645. 
2030 Section 2D(3). 
2031 Grainer 1994(4)2 Victoria University Law Review 144. 
2032 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 21. 
2033 In re Rush Rush v Rush [1901] 20 NZLR 249; Plimmer v Plimmer (1906) 9 GLR 10, 24; In re Allardice: 
Allardice v Allardice [1910] 29 NZLR 959; In re Allen (deceased), Allen v Manchester [1922] NZLR 218; 




The only semblance of a guideline is contained in section 11, which provides that there 
is no restriction on the evidence the court may consider when assessing a claim. The 
court may, for example, accept hearsay evidence.2034 The section does, however, 
specifically empower the court to take into consideration the deceased’s reasons, as far 
as they are ascertainable, for making the specific dispositions in the will, or for not 
providing for the applicant. As Grainer2035 points out though, testators often do not 
provide any explanation for including (or excluding) certain provisions in their wills, 
therefore I question the practical value of this inclusion in the Act. 
 
It appears2036 that the court will consider the following when assessing a claim under the 
FPA: 
• Whether anything has been left to the applicant; 
• The deceased’s opinions and wishes; 
• The applicant’s age, state of health, ability to earn a living and current financial 
situation; 
• The size of the estate; 
• The character and conduct of the applicant, including the relationship between 
the applicant and deceased;2037 
• The moral duty of the deceased to provide for others;2038 
• Whether any other person has a legal or moral duty to maintain the applicant; 
• Any change in the circumstances after the testator’s death. 
 
2034 Grainer 1994)24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 150 fn 63. 
2035 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 150. 
2036 In re Harrison (Deceased) Thomson v Harrison [1962] NZLR 6, 14; Community Law Organisation 
“Claims by family members under the Family Protection Act” 
https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-10-wills/challenges-to-your-will-after-
you-die/claims-by-family-members-under-the-family-protection-act/ (last accessed 24 November 
2019). 
2037 In re Green (Deceased) Zukerman v Public Trustee [1951] NZLR 135; Re Ward (deceased) Drysdale v 
Ward [1964] NZLR 929; Re Muirhead unreported, High Court Christchurch Registry M307/91, 
judgment delivered on 30 July 1992; Peart 1994(1) New Zealand Recent Law Review 200. 




This relative lack of guidance in the FPA has resulted in the current approach where a 
strong emphasis is placed on the moral duty of the testator.2039 In Williams v Aucutt2040 
the court held that it was “a matter of judgement in all the circumstances of the 
particular case”. In Re Leonard2041 the court held that “[e]ach case in a sense calls for the 
making of a value judgement”. Peart2042 suggests that practice indicates that this 
judgement call makes it very difficult for testators to determine whether or not their 
wishes will withstand a challenge. 
 
Peart and Borkowski2043 suggest that the courts have given a wide interpretation to the 
phrase “proper maintenance and support”, which has allowed the courts to attach a lot 
of significance to the family bond. The general approach is that the applicant must show 
that the deceased had a moral duty to provide for the proper support and maintenance 
of the applicant, and that he or she had breached such duty, either by not making any 
provision, or by not making adequate provision.2044 The emphasis on the breach of a 
moral duty indicates a shift from dependence of the applicant on the testator to the 
existence of a legal maintenance obligation by the testator towards the applicant. An 
applicant under the FPA will therefore not succeed unless he or she can prove a moral 
duty that has been breached.2045 The applicant’s moral entitlement is determined at the 
time of the deceased’s death, but the court will take into consideration any subsequent 
changes when determining the quantum of the award.2046   
 
 
2039 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Law Review 145. 
2040 [2000] 2 NZLR 479. 
2041 [1985] 2 NZLR 88. 
2042 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 376; 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 2. 
2043 2000(12)4 Child and Family Law Quarterly 333. 
2044 Community Law Organisation “Claims by family members under the Family Protection Act” 
https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-10-wills/challenges-to-your-will-after-
you-die/claims-by-family-members-under-the-family-protection-act/ (last accessed 24 November 
2019); Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 145. 
2045 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 145. 
2046 In re McGregor (deceased) McGregor v Beattie [1961] NZLR 1077; Re Field unreported, High Court 




The question then arises as to what proper maintenance and support is. According to 
Paul,2047 maintenance has been treated by the court as meaning financial need, whereas 
support has a wider interpretation and refers to intangibles such as “sustaining, 
providing comfort, belonging to a family and of having been an important part to the 
overall life of the deceased”. This approach is evident in In re Allardice: Allardice v 
Allardice,2048 In re Allen (deceased), Allen v Manchester,2049 and Re Z (deceased).2050 
While I do not intend discussing claims by children of the deceased, it is worth 
mentioning that the approach for such claims initially was purely dependency-based and 
it was understood that the Act’s primary objective was to benefit those who would be 
able to claim maintenance from the testator if he or she was alive.2051 As a result, claims 
would usually only succeed if the children were young and financially dependent. Adult 
children initially could only succeed if they were entitled to support during their parent’s 
lifetime.2052 Over time, though, the courts became more liberal in their approach and 
adult children could succeed if they could prove that they were unable to support 
themselves in a style that represented their station in life.2053 This changed in the early 
1900s when the courts started focusing on the concept of the moral duty owed by the 
deceased to the applicant.2054 This also impacted the position of the widow as the courts 
now considered financial need in a broad sense and no longer focused solely on pure 
 
2047 “Family Protection Act 1955” http://www.wynnwilliams.co.nz/wynnwilliams/media/Articles/Family-
Protection-Act-1955.pdf. 
2048 [1910] 29 NZLR 959. 
2049 [1922] NZLR 218. 
2050 [1979] 2 NZLR 495. 
2051 In re Rush Rush v Rush [1901] 20 NZLR 249; Handley v Walker [1903] 22 NZLR 933; Wilkinson v 
Wilkinson [1904] 24 NZLR 156. 
2052 Handley v Walker [1903] 22 NZLR 932; Munt v Findlay [1905] 25 NZLR 488; Re Green (Deceased) 
(1911) 13 GLR 477. 
2053 In re Allardice: Allardice v Allardice [1910] 29 NZLR 959; Pulleng v Public Trustee [1922] NZLR 1022; In 
re Wakelin (Deceased) Copeland v Wakelin [1927] NZLR 846; Peart 1994(1) New Zealand Recent Law 
Review 203; Peart 1996(10)2 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 110. 
2054 In re Allardice: Allardice v Allardice [1910] 29 NZLR 959; Peart 1994(1) New Zealand Recent Law 




dependence. It meant that widows could receive provision to allow them to continue 
with the lifestyle they had enjoyed during the marriage.2055 
 
Financial need continued to be the prerequisite for claims under the FPA2056 until the 
mid-1970s when the courts started being more liberal in their interpretation of financial 
need and the type of awards they were prepared to make.2057 Capital awards were 
being made more often2058 and the courts were even prepared to award annuities that 
would continue after the widow remarried.2059 Awards were no longer restricted to 
cover pure maintenance needs for the necessities of life. In Williams v Aucutt2060 the 
court stated more than once that it would amend the will only to the extent required to 
remedy the breach of the testator’s moral duty. It held that the test is whether 
adequate provision has been made for the proper maintenance and support of the 
applicant. The court further held2061 that support is a wider concept than maintenance 
and means “sustaining, providing comfort” as defined in a dictionary. In the context of 
children, this would include recognition of belonging to the family and having been a 
part of the overall life of the deceased.2062 It therefore is a wider concept than financial 
provision to meet an economic need and contingencies.2063 In Wylie v Wylie2064 the 
court applied this principle also in relation to claims by surviving spouses and partners. If 
we compare this approach to the way in which South African courts approach the 
concept of “maintenance”, it would appear that the MSSA has a much narrower focus 
 
2055 Peart 1994(1) New Zealand Recent Law Review 199; Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law 20. 
2056 Grainer 1994(24)2 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 145. 
2057 In re Harrison (Deceased) Thomson v Harrison [1962] NZLR 6; Peart 1996(10)2 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 110. 
2058 For example, Re Wilson (deceased) [1973] 2 NZLR 359 (CA). 
2059 Re Z (deceased) [1979] 2 NZLR 495. 
2060 [2000] 2 NZLR 479. This case dealt with a claim by an adult child, but gives a good indication of the 
approach of the court. 
2061 At 479 par [52]. 
2062 At 479 par [52]. 
2063 See also Auckland City Mission v Brown [2002] 2 NZFLR 650; Henry v Henry [2007] NZFLR 640. 




and limits the provision to actual maintenance without taking into consideration factors 
such as the family bond or the need to provide comfort. 
 
Moral and ethical considerations therefore influence the amount of maintenance 
awarded.2065 Seen in this context, support would include a parent recognising his or her 
child in some way or another in his or her will. Peart2066 suggests that the way in which 
the court had in earlier years interfered with the testator’s will, changed the FPA from a 
provision of maintenance to a system of forced heirship, even though the provision of 
maintenance was still in the court’s discretion. This has led to much criticism and several 
reviews by the Law Commission,2067 especially in relation to adult children who were not 
in financial need. Although these reviews did not lead to changes in the FPA, three 
landmark decisions2068 followed that reflect the Court of Appeal’s move away from a 
liberal approach to one that is less interfering.2069 In all three cases, the Court of Appeal 
held that a less interventionist approach was required. None of these cases, however, 
restricted maintenance to the bare necessities of life and, in fact, all the cases 
reaffirmed the importance of recognition of the family bond. It appears that some cases 
were decided merely on the basis of a family relationship.2070 Although these cases refer 
specifically to the obligation of a parent towards a child, the underlying premise is the 
family bond, and I suggest that it is important to note the court’s approach, as the same 
considerations would apply to obligations between spouses and partners. Peart2071 
 
2065 Pulleng v Public Trustee [1922] NZLR 1022; In re Cavanagh [1930] NZLR 376; In re Harrison (Deceased) 
Thomson v Harrison [1962] NZLR 6; Peart & Borkowski 2000(12)4 Child and Family Law Quarterly 336. 
2066 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 20. 
2067 For example, “Report of the Working group on matrimonial property and family protection (1988)”; 
Preliminary paper 24 “Succession law: testamentary claims (1996)”; Report 39 “Succession law; a 
succession (adjustment) Act 1998”. 
2068 Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479; Auckland City Mission v Brown [2002] 2 NZLR 650; Henry v Henry 
[2007] NZFLR 640. 
2069 Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 21. 
2070 Re Beedham unreported, High Court Dunedin Registry CP A3/83, judgment delivered on 27 February 
1990; Re Owen; Owen v Bradley unreported, High Court Blenheim Registry CP 33/88, judgment 
delivered on 20 March 1990; Re Wright unreported, High Court Rotorua Registry M100/88, judgment 
delivered on 13 February 1992; Harrington v Public Trustee unreported, High Court Dunedin Registry 
CP 49/91, judgment delivered on 21 August 1992. 




suggests that the change in the judicial approach to claims under the FPA has enhanced 
testamentary freedom to some extent as it reverses the expansive approach that had 
developed towards the end of the twentieth century. 
 
6.3.3.3 Orders the court may make 
When making an order, the court may attach such conditions as it deems fit.2072 It may 
also refuse to make an order in favour of any person if it is of the opinion that the 
person’s character or conduct is or has been such as to disentitle him or her to benefit 
from an order.2073 The court may order the payment of a lump sum or periodical or 
other payments.2074 The court also has the power to order that any amount specified in 
the order be set aside out of the estate and held in trust as a class fund for the benefit 
of two or more persons specified in the order.2075 The trustee may then at his or her 
discretion, but subject to the directions given and conditions imposed by the court, 
apply the income and capital towards the maintenance or education of any one or more 
of those persons.2076 
 
Where the court has ordered periodical payments or the setting aside of an amount as a 
class fund, it has the power to enquire at any subsequent date whether the person who 
is intended to receive this benefit is still alive and/or whether he or she is in a position 
to adequately provide for his or her own maintenance and support or whether the 
provision in terms of the order is still adequate.2077 It may increase or reduce the 
provision made or discharge, vary or suspend the order, or make any other order it 




2072 Section 5(1). 
2073 Section 5(1). 
2074 Section 5(2). 
2075 Section 6(1). 
2076 Section 6(2). 
2077 Section 12(1). 




6.3.3.4 Time limit for application 
The FPA imposes certain time limits on applications.2079 An application may only be 
heard if it is brought before the expiration of twelve months from the date of the grant 
of administration in the estate.2080 If the application is brought on behalf of a person not 
of full age or mental capacity, this period is extended to two years.2081 Both these 
provisions are, however, subject to the proviso that the final distribution of the estate 
has not yet been made.2082 In terms of the Administration Act,2083 which governs the 
administration of deceased estates, an administrator may distribute the estate six 
months after the date of grant of probate. This effectively leaves the applicant under 
the FPA with a limited time frame within which to lodge the claim. 
 
It appears that most claims lodged in terms of the FPA are by the surviving spouse or 
partner and the children of the deceased.2084 Peart2085 mentions that the basis for 
awards by the court as laid down in section 4 has remained substantively unchanged 
throughout the existence of the FPA, but the way in which the court has approached the 
discretion given to it, has changed.  
 
6.3.3.5 Summary 
The message from these decisions is that the judges should not use the FPA to do what 
they regard as fair in the circumstances, but should rather interfere only where the 
applicant has proven that the deceased breached his or her moral duty and failed to 
 
2079 Section 9(1). 
2080 Section 9(2)(b). 
2081 Section 9(2)(a).  
2082 Community Law Organisation “Claims by family members under the Family Protection Act” 
https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-10-wills/challenges-to-your-will-after-
you-die/claims-by-family-members-under-the-family-protection-act/ (last accessed 24 November 
2019); Paul “Family Protection Act 1955”  
        http://www.wynnwilliams.co.nz/wynnwilliams/media/Articles/Family-Protection-Act-1955.pdf. 
2083 1969 No 52. 
2084 Peart 1994(1) New Zealand Recent Law Review 197; Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law 16. 




make adequate provision for the proper support and maintenance of the applicant.2086 
Peart2087 suggests that the high number of successful appeals since the Williams 
decision indicates that there is no workable formula. Although the more conservative 
approach by the courts shows more respect for testamentary freedom, the confusion 
surrounding its application means that there is no certainty that a testator’s wishes will 
withstand a challenge and it therefore cannot be said that testamentary freedom has 
been fully restored.2088 
 
6.3.4 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act  
 
As mentioned in 6.3.2.2, the PRA does not apply to Maori land. The abovementioned 
Act defines Maori land as land declared to be held in accordance with Maori custom.2089 
Generally speaking, Maori land is not owned by individuals, but held by a tribal 
community with blood connections to the land.2090 Maori custom dictates that the 
property shall remain in the bloodline, which means that a spouse or partner of a 
person who holds Maori land cannot apply for division of the land under the PRA, and 
can at most acquire a life interest in the land when the person who held the land, dies. 
The life interest could be the right to occupy the land or to receive income from the 
deceased’s interest in the land.2091  
 
These principles have some parallels to the way in which the customary law of 
succession in South Africa dealt with land. The RCLSA, however, aims to abolish the 
customary rule of primogeniture in as far as it applies to the law of succession, and I will 
 
2086 Paul “Family Provision Act 1955”        
http://www.wynnwilliams.co.nz/wynnwilliams/media/Articles/Family-Protection-Act-1955.pdf. 
2087 Peart 2008(37)4 Common Law World Review 376; Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law 22. 
2088 Peart 1996(10)2 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 117; Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law 22. 
2089 Section 6. 
2090 Peart 2010(14.2) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (October 2010) 8. 









It is evident from the aforegoing discussion that England and New Zealand have had to 
deal with drastically changing social landscapes in which new forms of family life have to 
be accommodated. Both countries have introduced provisions to address the changing 
concept of what constitutes a family and both countries acknowledge that family 
obligations and commitment must be honoured. Both countries also acknowledge that 
the law should provide financial support for certain individuals after the death of a 
family member. This resonates with the approach taken by South African law, although 
it should be noted that England and New Zealand have recognised these obligations and 
commitments for much longer than South Africa.  
 
What is different though when compared to the legal position in South Africa, is the way 
in which England and New Zealand have chosen to address these issues. There are 
several differences between the English and New Zealand statutes and the MSSA, the 
major ones in my opinion being:  
• The express recognition given in English and New Zealand statutes to a person 
who was in a life partnership with the deceased; 
• The different maintenance standard applied in England to the spouse and civil 
partner, which could result in financial provision that exceeds what is actually 
required for maintenance; 
• The express inclusion in the English statute of the contribution made by the 
applicant to the welfare of the deceased’s family and the similar provision in the 
PRA which gives the court the power to redress economic disparity to assist an 
economically a disadvantaged spouse or partner who has given up a career to 




• The express inclusion in the English statute of the types of orders that a court 
may make; 
• The defined time limits within which a claim may be brought in England and New 
Zealand; 
• The wide approach taken by New Zealand courts to the concept of maintenance 
and support; 
• The provision in the PRA that relationship property disposed of to a trust may 
under certain circumstances be taken into account when considering a claim. 
• The role played by the court in assessing claims for maintenance or provision 
 
Based on my experience of determining maintenance claims, I submit that the most 
fundamental difference is that the legislation applicable in England and New Zealand 
takes the decision as to the entitlement and quantum of maintenance of the surviving 
spouse (as one of the eligible family members) out of the hands of the executor and 
places the responsibility squarely on the courts. I do acknowledge that, while this 
undoubtedly makes the role of the executor in the context of maintenance claims much 
easier than that of the executor in terms of the MSSA, it does add an additional layer of 
costs to the process. The time limitations allowed for the applications, however, provide 
certainty to the applicant, the executor and the heirs – something that is sorely lacking 
from the MSSA.  
 
It appears that the English and New Zealand legislation is quite some way ahead of 
South Africa when determining the spousal duty of support. The legislation in both 
countries is much clearer in providing the court (as the responsible decision maker) with 
the necessary guidelines and criteria in order to make a decision regarding reasonable 
maintenance for the surviving spouse. As indicated in chapter 4, it seems that 
reasonable maintenance in South Africa is still construed narrowly to relate to actual 
financial requirements of the survivor, which is in stark contrast to the concept of 




I will investigate the possibility of similar legislation in South Africa, the resultant costs 





            CHAPTER 7 
THE MSSA IN PRACTICE 
 
7.1      Introduction 
 
Although most of the chapters in this thesis have focused on the provisions of the MSSA 
and case law pertaining to it, the aim and emphasis of this thesis2092 is to determine and 
analyse how the MSSA is implemented at a practical level. The focus in this chapter is 
therefore on the way in which the executor deals with maintenance claims in terms of 
the MSSA.  
 
This thesis was prompted partly by informal discussions over several years with several 
role players in the administration of deceased estates, which revealed that the handling 
of a maintenance claim in terms of the MSSA is an area of concern, mainly due to the 
lack of practical guidance provided by the MSSA, text books and court cases. 
 
This research therefore includes an empirical element of interviews conducted with 
several categories of persons who are involved in claims by surviving spouses under the 
MSSA. Most of the interviews were conducted by way of an electronic questionnaire, 
but some were done by way of personal face-to-face or telephonic interviews. I 
obtained permission from all the interviewees to disclose their identities and other 
personal information, and to quote and attribute their observations. 
 
My aim with the questionnaire and interviews was to gauge whether the average estate 
practitioner feels comfortable that the MSSA provides the executor with the necessary 
assistance and guidance to consider and decide a maintenance claim lodged against a 
deceased estate. I therefore approached different role players. In South Africa, I 
interviewed estates officers, attorneys who have assisted claimants with the lodging of 
 




claims, and the Master of the High Court who oversees the administration of deceased 
estates. I also approached practitioners in New Zealand and England with some 
questions relating to the relevant legislation2093 applicable in their countries. 
 
7.2        Interviews – participants 
 
7.2.1 Estates officers in South Africa 
 
I designed an electronic survey2094 after analysing the MSSA and noting the areas that 
my own experience and informal discussions with estates officers have indicated as 
problematic. This survey was sent to estates officers2095  involved in the administration 
of deceased estates to determine the practical difficulties (if any) faced by them when 
dealing with maintenance claims in terms of the MSSA.   
 
I utilised the website of The Fiduciary Institute of Southern Africa (FISA)2096 to identify 
names and contact details of individuals who are involved in the administration of 
deceased estates. The members’ database on the FISA website is accessible to the 
general public, but I also advised the chairperson and chief executive officer of my 
intended use of the database. The estates officers selected are employees of major trust 
companies, for example Nedgroup Trust (Pty) Limited, Sanlam Trust Limited, Standard 
Trust Limited, First Trust Limited, ABSA Trust Limited and Sentinel Trust, firms of 
attorneys, other financial services companies, and individuals who offer administration 
of estates as a service.  
 
 
2093 See 6.2.2 and 6.3 for more details on the legislation. 
2094 I engaged the services of Dr Liezel Korf, www.liezelkorf.co.za (last accessed 21 December 2018), an 
expert in the field of empirical research and drafting of questionnaires, to assist me with the 
questions for the interviews/questionnaires. The survey is attached as Appendix A to this thesis.  
2095  The term “estates officers” is used as a synonym for “executors”. 




The survey was sent to a total of 166 individuals whose profiles reflect that they are 
involved with deceased estates. 69 of these individuals are employed by major trust 
companies, while the others are employed by firms of attorneys, accountants or 
financial institutions, or are self-employed. Of the 166 individuals to whom the survey 
was sent, 48 responded. Eighteen of these respondents are employed by trust 
companies, and the balance by smaller financial services institutions, firms of attorneys, 
or are self-employed. Of the 48 who responded, seven indicated that they either do not 
administer estates, or have not had any experience of claims under the MSSA. The 
remaining 41 responded to most of the questions and formed the core sample of the 
interviews.  
 
I submit that this small sample of respondents probably does not render the results of 
the survey statistically reliable, but it has provided me with the relevant information to 
obtain insight in how executors deal with claims under the MSSA.  
 
7.2.2 Attorneys/advisors in South Africa 
 
I conducted interviews with three advisors known to me who have assisted clients (ie 
surviving spouses) with the lodging of maintenance claims against deceased estates. The 
purpose of these interviews was to consider the claim from the perspective of the 
surviving spouse to see whether there are any practical obstacles faced by the spouse 
when formulating and lodging the claim with the executor of the deceased estate. The 
reason for this approach is to determine to what extent, if any, the experience of the 
surviving spouse can inform the guidance required by the executor and, if so, to assess 
whether there are alternative ways to handle the maintenance claims to the benefit of 







7.2.3 Master of the High Court 
 
The administration of deceased estates in South Africa is done under the supervision of 
the Master of the High Court.2097 The executor of a deceased estate must lodge the 
liquidation and distribution account with the Master of the High Court2098 and I was 
therefore hoping to obtain information from the Master of the High Court about the 
average number of maintenance claims lodged in terms of the MSSA on an annual basis, 
and the incidence of objections lodged by surviving spouses or heirs of estates where a 
maintenance claim was lodged and accepted or denied by the executor.  
 
7.2.4 Practitioners in England and New Zealand  
 
In my analysis of the legal position in England and New Zealand it became apparent that 
the position of the executor in those countries when dealing with maintenance claims 
against deceased estates is very different from the position of the executor in South 
Africa. This is mainly because the legislation in those countries provides that the court, 
and not the executor, considers and determines the claim. While the legislation and 
court cases appear to contain the necessary guidelines, I wanted to ascertain from 
practitioners in those jurisdictions whether that is indeed the case or whether there are 
practical problems which stem from the legislation.  I specifically wanted to determine 
whether the involvement of the courts causes any delays in the administration process 
and whether the cost of court proceedings is a limiting factor.  
 
I used the website2099 of The Society of Estate and Trust Practitioners (STEP), a global 
professional association for practitioners who specialise in family inheritance and 
succession planning, to access their members’ directory for details of individuals who 
 
2097 Abrie et al 81. 
2098 Section 35 of the Estates Act. 





deal with contentious estates, estate planning, family law, wills and administration of 
deceased estates.  
 
I identified 48 practitioners in England whose profiles on the STEP directory reflect that 
they may deal with the matters referred to above and sent some questions to them. Of 
the 48 practitioners to whom the questions were sent, two advised that they had no 
experience of maintenance claims and therefore could not assist. Only two other 
practitioners responded. While this lack of response means that the answers are not 
representative of the average practitioner’s experience, it does give some insight into 
the practical process in England.  
 
I identified 29 practitioners in New Zealand whose profiles on the STEP website 
directory reflect that they may deal with the matters referred to above and sent some 
questions to them. One recipient advised that she had no experience of maintenance 
claims and therefore could not assist. Only one recipient responded to some of the 
questions. I also approached the Ministry of Justice as I was advised by one of the 
practitioners that they might be able to assist with relevant information. 
 
7.3       Interviews – contents 
 
7.3.1 Estates officers in South Africa 
 
The questions posed to the recipients of the electronic survey and face-to-face 
interviews were broadly aimed at determining the following aspects: 
• Their overall experience in dealing with estates;  
• Their experience of dealing with claims under the MSSA; 
• Their views regarding the guidance given by the MSSA; and 





Most of the questions presented the respondents with three to five possible responses, 
from which they could choose one option or all applicable options. Some of the 
questions asked the respondent to indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how easy or difficult he 
or she finds it to apply certain aspects of the MSSA. The respondents were also asked to 
indicate from a list of possible options who they feel is best suited to consider a claim 
under the MSSA. I will deal with each question separately by indicating the question and 
the responses. 
 
Number of years administering estates 
The purpose of the question was to establish whether the respondents have sufficient 
experience to inform their responses to the questions and/or comments about the 
MSSA. The respondents were presented with a few options from which to select their 
level of experience. 
 
One respondent has less than five years’ experience, four have between five and ten 
years’ experience and 36 have more than ten years’ experience.  
 
The responses indicate that the pool of respondents has sufficient experience in dealing 
with estates to be able to give an informed response to the questions.  
 
Number of claims considered under the MSSA  
The purpose of the question was to establish whether the respondents have sufficient 
experience to inform their comments about the MSSA, but also to lead into the next 
question relating to the regularity with which estates officers have to deal with claims. 
The respondents were asked to select the number of claims they have considered from 





Fifteen respondents have considered less than five claims, nine respondents have 
considered between five and ten claims and seventeen respondents have considered 
more than ten claims.  
 
Although, on average, the respondents have considered less than ten claims, this result 
must be seen in the context of the regularity with which claims are lodged.  
 
The regularity with which claims are lodged 
The purpose of the question was to determine how often estates officers deal with 
claims under the MSSA. The respondents were asked to choose the most appropriate 
answer from several options.  
 
Three respondents indicated that a claim is lodged in one in every ten estates, two 
indicated in one in every 20 estates, ten indicated in one in every 30 estates, twelve 
indicated in one in every 50 estates and twelve respondents indicated that claims are 
lodged in less than one in every 50 estates.  
 
These responses indicate that the incidence of a claim under the MSSA is not all that 
high, which probably explains why most of the respondents have considered fewer than 
ten claims, as is evident from the previous question. 
 
Whether the claim has any impact on the time frame of the administration process 
The purpose of the question was to determine the practical impact of a claim on the 
administration process. The respondents were provided with different options from 
which to choose the most appropriate answer. 
 
Four respondents indicated that the claim has no impact on the administration process. 
Five respondents indicated that the process was delayed by up to three months, and 28 




These responses correspond with my experience of dealing with MSSA claims and 
indicate that the lodging of a claim does have a significant impact on the time it takes to 
administer a deceased estate.  
 
How the average maintenance claim was settled 
The purpose of the question was specifically to determine whether estates officers 
consider options other than a lump sum payment for settlement of the claim. The 
respondents were asked to select the relevant response from a range of options. 
 
Most of the respondents indicated that they have settled maintenance claims by way of 
cash lump sum payments or a combination of cash lump sum payments and transfer of 
estate assets. Twenty four respondents have settled the claim by a lump sum cash 
payment only, and thirteen used a combination of a cash payment and transfer of 
estate assets. Four respondents indicated that they have used a combination of a cash 
payment and periodic maintenance payable to the claimant, while only one respondent 
indicated that claims have been settled by way of periodic maintenance to the claimant. 
 
These answers confirm my observation that most claims are settled by way of a cash 
payment, or by way of a cash payment and transfer of estate assets. This is despite the 
fact that maintenance claims traditionally are regarded as periodical,2100 and are 
supposed to cover the claimant only for a determined period.2101 This issue was 
addressed in Oshry v Feldman2102 where the court held that, although there are practical 
and policy concerns in respect of a lump sum award, such an award might in certain 
circumstances be the most suitable method to settle a claim. I do not dispute that in 
some instances a lump sum award is appropriate, but would argue that in most cases 
 
2100 See 4.4.3. 
2101 Sonnekus 2010-4 TSAR 820. 





the spirit of the MSSA requires that the claim be settled by way of ongoing payments 
until the surviving spouse no longer requires maintenance. 
 
Whether the respondent has ever completely refused a maintenance claim 
The purpose of the question was to determine whether executors apply their mind 
when considering claims. 
 
Eighteen respondents indicated that they have completely refused a claim under the 
MSSA.  
 
The responses indicate that executors do properly consider the claim and do not simply 
accept it as a valid claim without investigation. 
 
The reason for refusing the claim 
The purpose of the question was to determine the reasons an executor would consider 
as appropriate to refuse a claim. The respondents were asked to select all appropriate 
reasons from a list of options.2103  
 
Nine respondents indicated that the survivor could not prove inability to provide for his 
or her own maintenance needs. One respondent did not choose this option but 
indicated under “Other reasons” that a claim was refused because the survivor inherited 
from the deceased and received the proceeds of a life assurance policy. In my view, this 
response is the same as saying the survivor could not prove inability to provide for his or 
her own means. Six respondents indicated that the survivor could not provide sufficient 
information about his or her own means and earnings, and three indicated that the 
estate had insufficient funds to accommodate the claim.2104 I am of the view that a lack 
of sufficient funds in the estate (after the claims of creditors have been settled) is not a 
 
2103 See 8.2.1.5 for an explanation for the inclusion of a claim by a heterosexual life partner only. 
2104 The reference to “insufficient funds” refers to the available funds after creditors had been settled. The 




reason to reject a claim – if the executor is satisfied that the claim is for reasonable 
maintenance needs, but the amount claimed exceeds the available funds in the estate 
(after settlement of creditors’ claims), the claim has to be accepted, but at a lower 
quantum. One respondent refused the claim because it was lodged by a heterosexual 
life partner of the deceased. Four respondents indicated that they had refused claims 
for other reasons, with one respondent indicating that the refusal was because the 
claim was not calculated by an actuary. I find this problematic as the MSSA makes no 
reference to an actuarial calculation being a requirement for a claim. 
 
The responses indicate that executors are giving sufficient consideration to the claims. 
 
Whether the respondent has ever accepted a claim for a lesser amount than claimed 
The purpose of this question was to determine whether an executor who is of the view 
that the amount of the claim is inflated or unrealistic, would accept it at a lower value 
than lodged, or would simply refuse the claim. The respondents had to choose “yes” or 
“no” as the answer and could provide additional comments. 
 
Twenty nine respondents indicated that they have accepted a claim for a lesser amount 
than claimed and nine indicated that they had not.  
 
These responses indicate that most executors properly consider the claim and do not 
simply reject a claim if they are of the opinion that the amount of the claim is not 
reasonable.  
 
Whether an objection in terms of section 35(7) of the Estates Act has ever been lodged 
against a decision made by the respondent 
The purpose of the question was to determine the extent to which dissatisfied claimants 
or heirs pursue their unhappiness by lodging an objection against the liquidation and 




Sixteen respondents indicated that an objection had been lodged against a decision 
made by them and 24 indicated it had not.  
 
In my experience of administering estates, objections against estates are not lodged all 
that often, and I am of the view that these responses reflect that experience.  
 
Whether the respondent has ever entered into an agreement with the surviving 
spouse and heirs of the estate as envisaged in section 2(3)(d) of the MSSA  
The purpose of this question was to determine whether executors make use of the only 
mechanism for settlement provided by the MSSA. 
Twenty six respondents indicated that they had not entered into an agreement, 
whereas thirteen had entered into an agreement.  
I believe that an agreement is a realistic, practical solution to determine the way in 
which a MSSA claim is settled, but my experience indicates that this happens very rarely, 
and these responses confirm that view. 
 
The party or parties who initiated or suggested an agreement (if entered into) 
The purpose of the question was to determine the extent to which the executor actively 
suggests an agreement as a settlement option. The respondents were given a list of 
options to choose from. 
 
It appears that most of the agreements were initiated by the executor – nine 
respondents indicated this, whereas three indicated that the heirs had initiated it and 
three indicated that it had been initiated by the spouse and heirs.  
 
These responses confirm my own experience that an agreement is seldom initiated by 
the spouse and heirs. I have only experienced one instance where the surviving spouse 





The level of guidance given to the executor by the MSSA to assess the reasonable 
maintenance needs of the surviving spouse 
This question forms the crux of the survey, as it is intended to determine whether the 
average estates officer feels that the MSSA gives sufficient guidance to enable him or 
her to consider a claim. The respondents were provided with three options from which 
they could choose the appropriate responses. 
 
Most of the respondents (30) indicated that the MSSA does give some guidance, but 
that it is not sufficient. Eight respondents were of the view that the MSSA provided no 
guidance at all, while three indicated that it gives sufficient guidance. 
These responses correspond with my experience of considering claims under the MSSA 
and reinforce my view that the MSSA in its current format is not appropriate and should 
be reconsidered. 
 
The nature of the guidance that should be in the MSSA (This question was addressed 
to those respondents who indicated that the MSSA gave no, or not enough, guidance.) 
The purpose of the question was to determine what guidance is required or desired by 
executors who deal with the MSSA on a practical level. The respondents were provided 
with three options from which they could choose the appropriate responses. 
 
Seventeen respondents indicated that they require more guidance to determine the 
survivor’s reasonable maintenance needs and seventeen indicated that more guidance 
was required to determine the survivor’s standard of living during the marriage. 34 
Respondents indicated that they needed more guidance to determine the survivor’s 
existing and expected means, earning capacity and financial needs and obligations. 
 
These responses confirm my experience that the major concern amongst executors is 





The purpose of the following four questions was to determine which of the factors 
provided by the MSSA is regarded by executors as the most problematic to consider. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the level of difficulty on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 
being very difficult and 10 being very easy.   
 
How easy or difficult the respondent finds it to determine the standard of living of the 
survivor during the subsistence of the marriage 
The average was 3.2.  
 
The average response indicates that most respondents find this factor difficult to apply 
and this confirms my experience. 
 
How easy or difficult the respondent finds it to determine expected means and 
earning capacity of the survivor 
The average was 3.7.  
 
The average response indicates that most respondents find this factor difficult to apply 
and this confirms my experience. 
 
How easy or difficult the respondent finds it to determine the financial needs and 
obligations of the survivor 
The average was 4.5.  
 
The average response indicates that most respondents find this factor difficult to apply, 
although it is evidently slightly less problematic than the previous two factors. This 






How easy or difficult the respondent finds it to assess whether certain needs typically 
claimed for as part of a maintenance claim are reasonable 
The average result is reflected next to each item. 
• Food and cleaning products – 4.7 
• Vehicle maintenance and petrol – 5.1 
• Hairdresser – 4.6 
• Cosmetics – 4 
• Subscriptions to magazines – 4.8 
• Subscriptions to DSTV/Showmax/Netflix – 5.7 
• Entertainment – 3.9 
• Donations – 4.2 
• Holiday costs – 3.8 
• Telephone and cell phone costs – 5.5 
• Garden services, pool services, domestic cleaning services – 5.5 
• Gym contract – 5.4 
 
It would appear from these results that the average estates officer finds it more difficult 
to assess whether amounts claimed by the surviving spouse for “non-necessities” such 
as cosmetics, entertainment, holidays and donations are reasonable. This confirms my 
experience, as the executor essentially is forced to make a subjective or moral 
judgement as to whether such items are reasonable when determining maintenance. It 
is my contention that this places an unacceptable burden on the executor.   
 
The level of comfort with the responsibility placed on the executor by section 3 of the 
MSSA to consider “any other factor” when assessing reasonable maintenance needs 
The purpose of the question was to determine whether my view that section 3 places an 
obligation on the executor, without giving him or her guidance for the fulfilment 





Fifteen respondents indicated that they are comfortable making this assessment, 
although one of them indicated that this is only because he expects the claim to be 
calculated by an actuary, from whom he then takes his guidance. Twenty six 
respondents indicated that they were not comfortable with this responsibility. 
 
These responses resonate to some extent with my own view that most executors would 
be uncomfortable with the responsibility placed on them by the MSSA. 
 
What the respondent would typically consider as “any other factor” when applying 
section 3 
The purpose of the question was to determine the factors that executors take into 
consideration. The respondents were provided with four options from which they could 
select all appropriate responses. The number of respondents who selected the option is 
reflected next to the relevant option. 
 
• Whether the spouses were living together or were separated at the time of death – 
35 
• Whether the survivor has family members who can assist him/her – seventeen 
• Whether the survivor is the parent of the residual heirs – 23  
• The financial situation of the residual heirs – nineteen 
 
I find it interesting that most respondents regard the living arrangements of the spouses 
as a factor to consider. In my view, this implies that a subjective, moral element is 
introduced into the consideration. This is contrary to the view of the South African Law 
Commission2105 that the basis for maintenance reform should be spouses’ legal duty to 
support each other, and not the surviving spouse’s moral right to share in the deceased 
estate. While I understand that the spouses’ living arrangements might be relevant 
 
2105 Report Review of the law of succession: the introduction of a legitimate portion or the granting of a 




when determining the extent to which the survivor would require maintenance, I 
believe a consideration of the survivor’s existing means will provide the necessary 
information and that it is not necessary or relevant to determine whether the spouses 
were living together at the time of death.   
 
The most appropriate party to consider a maintenance claim 
The purpose of the question was to determine whether the respondents are of the view 
that the executor is best placed to consider the claim, or whether the claim should 
rather be assessed by the Master of the High Court or a court of law. They were 
specifically asked to disregard practicalities such as cost and time when considering this 
question. 
 
Fifteen respondents indicated that they regard the executor as best placed to consider a 
claim, three indicated that the Master is in the best position and 27 suggested that a 
court of law is best placed to consider the claim.  
 
In view of the relative lack of practical guidance given by the MSSA, I would agree that a 
court is best placed to consider a claim under the MSSA, but only if factors such as cost 
and time are disregarded.  
 
Additional comments 
The respondents were invited to add any additional comments they felt appropriate and 
eleven elected to do so. Their comments range from general remarks about the 
instances where claims are lodged, to specific comments about the best way in which to 
consider the claim.  The comments can broadly be summarised as follows: 
• One respondent2106 indicated that the lack of guidance in the MSSA results in the 
acceptance of the claim being left to someone's interpretation of what a normal 
standard of living should be; 
 




• One respondent2107 commented that the MSSA should not leave “spouse” and 
“marriage” to the interpretation of the executor and should rather provide 
guidance regarding which surviving partner is entitled to claim benefits under 
the Act. The same respondent also suggested that the MSSA is inadequate 
insofar as it deals with the factors that should be considered when determining 
the amount of reasonable maintenance. I agree that it would be prudent for the 
MSSA to be amended to include the definition as amplified by case law; 
 
• Most of the optional comments relate to the fact that an executor does not have 
enough knowledge and know-how to compute a MSSA claim and that an 
actuarial calculation should be provided in support of the claim. One 
respondent2108 indicated that he leaves it “to the experts (actuary) to assist and 
if there is then any further dispute I would leave it up to a court of law to give a 
verdict. I think that takes the onus/responsibility/liability off our shoulders to a 
large extent”. Another respondent2109 suggested that a calculation by an actuary 
is the most practical option, “as they are specialists in taking the relevant factors 
into account”.  One respondent2110 indicated that an MSSA claim would be 
considered only if there was an actuarial calculation. I note these comments and 
agree that an actuarial report would provide the executor with a claim that takes 
into consideration life expectancy and inflation, but I do not agree that an 
actuarial calculation should be a requirement for a successful claim. The reality is 
that an actuary calculates the claim based on the instructions provided to him or 
her. The surviving spouse would therefore typically give the actuary a list of 
current expenses. The actuary’s role would not be to determine whether the 
expenses listed are reasonable, but would be limited to doing a calculation of 
those expenses based on the claimant’s life expectancy and inflation rates. I 
therefore do not believe that the provision of an actuarial claim absolves the 
 
2107 Deon Beachen, director ENSAfrica, e-mail response 20 August 2018. 
2108 Andre du Toit, Rubicon Trust Company Limited, e-mail response 20 August 2018. 
2109 Shayne Ramdhani, operational head KZN estates Sanlam Trust, e-mail response 3 September 2018. 




executor from the obligation placed on him or her in the MSSA to determine the 
reasonable maintenance needs of the surviving spouse. The MSSA does not 
specify the need for an actuarial claim and I submit that an executor cannot 
refuse to consider a claim if it is not supported by an actuarial calculation.  
 
7.3.2 Attorneys/advisors in South Africa 
 
As indicated above, the reason for soliciting the views of attorneys/advisors was to 
ascertain how a claim under the MSSA is approached from the perspective of the 
surviving spouse. While the purpose of this thesis is to examine the position of the 
executor, there might be valuable information gleaned when considering the position of 
the surviving spouse. 
 
One advisor2111 indicated that he considers several aspects to assist him to determine a 
reasonable claim: 
• He compares the survivor’s stated wishes/desires to his or her position during 
the marriage; 
• He considers not what the survivor and his or her deceased spouse had spent 
during their marriage, but what they realistically could or should have spent 
based on their means – as he points out, a spendthrift approach should not be 
encouraged, as it does not reflect reasonableness; 
• The emphasis is on the spouse’s maintenance needs, and items such as 
donations to third parties should not be taken into consideration when 
determining need; 
• He takes cognisance of assets outside the marriage, such as an expected 
inheritance or distribution from a trust. 
Once he has agreed with the survivor as to a reasonable amount of maintenance at the 
time of instituting the claim, he would then refer the matter to the executor to seek 
 




agreement on the amount. If all parties agree, the details would then be provided to an 
actuary to calculate a claim over the life expectancy of the survivor, using the necessary 
inflation rates. I find this approach practical and sensible – as pointed out above, the 
role of the actuary should be limited to calculating the claim over the life expectancy of 
the claimant spouse. It would therefore be a much fairer outcome if the parties agreed 
on the reasonable maintenance needs before the actuary did the necessary calculations.  
The advisor is further of the view that the best solution for settlement of a claim is an 
agreement between all parties in terms of which an agreed amount is paid to a trust, 
from which income is paid to the survivor in lieu of maintenance, until his or her death 
or remarriage, or until his or her circumstances change to the extent that maintenance 
is no longer required. 
 
One attorney2112 indicated that, in his experience, claims under the MSSA were lodged 
more frequently where a second marriage was involved, that is, where the surviving 
spouse was not the biological parent of the deceased’s children, who are usually the 
heirs to the estate. He is of the view that married partners should consider a possible 
claim under the MSSA while doing planning during their lifetime, but is mindful of the 
fact that this does not guarantee that the survivor will not lodge a claim when the 
spouse dies. He regards the “reasonableness” of the claim as the biggest challenge, as 
he agrees that the question should not be what the survivor and the deceased spent 
during the marriage, but rather whether their financial circumstances supported such 
spending habits. He is also of the view that the most practical way of dealing with 
settlement of the claim is to utilise a trust as this will address practical challenges such 
as the survivor’s circumstances changing to such an extent that it impacts on his or her 
stated needs. He acknowledges that a trust is not a perfect solution, as it adds a layer of 
costs,2113 but under the circumstances it seems to be the best option. He stresses the 
 
2112 Johann Jacobs, Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, personal interview 12 February 2019. 




need for a strong, independent trustee who can make objective decisions when dealing 
with requests for maintenance.  
 
Another advisor2114 agreed that most claims under the MSSA are lodged where there is 
a second (or further) marriage and the surviving spouse is not the biological parent or 
family member of the residual heirs. He indicated that his approach to a claim, whether 
as executor or as advisor to the surviving spouse, is as follows: 
• He obtains details of all income and expenses, with supporting documentation; 
• He limits the claim to the survivor’s maintenance needs, and items such as 
donations to third parties will therefore be excluded from the calculation; 
• He then considers the spouse’s stated maintenance needs against his or her 
earning capacity, as well as the capacity of the estate to provide for the 
maintenance needs; 
• When he acts as executor, he would at this stage revert to the claimant with 
further questions to reach a stage where he is satisfied that the maintenance 
needs have been properly substantiated; 
• Once all parties agree on the quantum of the maintenance needs, the claim can 
be calculated over the life expectancy of the surviving spouse, taking inflation 
into account.  
This advisor further indicated that, in his experience, most claims under the MSSA are 
lodged without due consideration of the provisions and guidelines in the Act. He advised 
that he has in a few instances had to refuse a claim instituted by a heterosexual life 
partner of the deceased. In his experience an objection lodged against the maintenance 
claim as reflected in the executor’s liquidation and distribution account seldom 
proceeds to litigation, possibly because of a lack of funds on the part of the objector. 
 
This advisor indicated that, in his, view, periodical maintenance is not a practical 
solution, as the executor is obliged to finalise the administration of the deceased estate 
 




within a reasonable time frame. His view is that the only viable solution for settlement 
of a claim is to utilise a trust, as it addresses the practical challenges brought about by a 
cash lump sum settlement. While the MSSA provides for an agreement, including a 
trust, to be entered into by the parties, his experience is that parties seldom agree to a 
trust, as the surviving spouse usually prefers a cash lump sum payment as settlement of 
the claim. 
 
7.3.3 Master of the High Court 
 
I approached the Acting Chief Master of the High Court, Tessie Bezuidenhout, to 
determine whether the Master of the High Court keeps records of MSSA claims for 
statistical purposes. I specifically asked her whether information was available to 
establish the following: 
• The number of maintenance claims lodged on an annual basis; 
• The incidence of objections lodged by surviving spouses or heirs where a 
maintenance claim was accepted or denied by the executor; 
• Whether there is any discernible difference in the lodging of claims in the 
different Master’s offices (ie whether claims are more frequently lodged in urban 
areas than in rural areas). 
 
Ms Bezuidenhout advised2115 that the Master’s office does not keep data on 
maintenance claims, partly because the executor, and not the Master, has to decide the 
claim. While the Master does have to consider an objection lodged against the 










7.3.4 Practitioners in England and New Zealand 
 
7.3.4.1 England 
The questions posed to the practitioners were designed to obtain information about the 
practical application of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 
As the provisions of this Act for dealing with maintenance claims by surviving spouses 
are so different from the position in South Africa, I focused only on certain aspects and 
the questions were broadly aimed at determining the following: 
• The average time it takes for the courts to hear and decide a claim; 
• The average cost of the process; 
• Whether periodical payments are favoured over lump sum payments; 
• Whether the courts take into consideration assets moved by the deceased to a 
trust before his or her death. 
 
The advisor2116 who responded could not provide any information on the average time 
and costs, but he did advise that the estate would usually be liable for the legal costs 
pertaining to the claim, unless the court deems the claim to be vexatious, in which case 
the courts may direct that the costs be borne by the claimant. 
 
He further indicated that the courts would regard the types of assets (and their level of 
liquidity) when determining whether the claim should be settled by way of a lump sum 
payment or periodical payments. If the court orders periodical payments, the estate 
cannot be closed as assets have to be held in the estate to make these payments. He 
indicated that executors will always prefer a capital lump sum payment for practical 
purposes, but if the assets cannot be realized, periodical payments will have to be 
funded by other means, for example a bank loan. 
 
 




The advisor confirmed that the courts are increasingly “looking through” or ignoring 
attempts by testators to frustrate a claim by a dependant and therefore take cognisance 
of assets moved by the deceased to a trust before his or her death. 
 
7.3.4.2 New Zealand 
The questions posed to the practitioners were designed to obtain information about the 
practical application of the FPA and PRA. The provisions of these Acts for dealing with 
maintenance claims by surviving spouses are also very different from the position in 
South Africa. I therefore limited my focus to certain aspects.  
 
The questions were broadly aimed at determining the following: 
• The average time it takes for the courts to hear and decide a claim; 
• The average cost of the process; 
• Whether periodical payments are favoured over lump sum payments; 
• Whether the courts take into consideration assets moved by the deceased to a 
trust before his or her death (relevant for the PRA only). 
 
One advisor2117 indicated that most FPA claims take two to four years after death to 
reach a court decision. He estimates that the total legal fees, ie the fees for both parties, 
would amount to between $30 000 and $50 000.  In his experience, most claims under 
the FPA are settled by way of a lump sum payment to avoid ongoing payments which 
create extra administration into the future.   
 
I also approached the Ministry of Justice Wellington Family Courts Division to ascertain 
if they could assist with information. Their website2118 indicates that certain information 
could be obtained by way of an official request for information under the Official 
 
2117 Martin Haanen, Castle Trustees Ltd, e-mail communication dated 30 January 2019. 




Information Act.2119 I made the necessary application and received an e-mail2120 
response from the Ministry advising that non-citizens of New Zealand are not entitled to 
make a request under the Official Information Act, but that they would try to assist via 
e-mail correspondence. They referred me to the website of the Ministry for information 
on application fees payable. The Family Court and a High Court both have jurisdiction in 
respect of proceedings under the FPA,2121 and the Family Court has jurisdiction over 
proceedings in terms of the PRA. According to the website,2122 an application at the 
Family Court for an order about relationship property is subject to a fee of $700. For a 
hearing about relationship property, the fees are $906 per half day or part of a half day. 
According to a written response2123 by the Ministry of Justice, an application under 
section 4 of the FPA takes an average of 425 working days to be disposed of by the 
court. Based on a five-day work week, this equates to 85 weeks, or just over 21 months. 
An application in terms of section 88 of the PRA takes an average of 313 working days to 
be determined by the court which, using the same assumption, translates into 62 weeks 




It is unfortunate that the Master of the High Court is not able to assist with information 
regarding MSSA claims, but I do not believe that the information is essential for this 
thesis and the lack of this information will accordingly not have a negative impact on my 
research and analysis of the current position as it relates to the executor. 
 
Although the lack of any meaningful response from practitioners in New Zealand and 
England is disappointing, I remain of the view that this does not detract from the 
 
2119 https://www.justice.govt.nz/about/official-information-act-requests/ (last accessed 30 January 2019). 
2120 E-mail dated 13 March 2019 from the Advisor, Official Correspondence, Communication Services, 
Ministry of Justice. 
2121 Section 3A. 
2122 www.justice.govt.nz/family/about/fees-and-costs/#fees, last accessed 25 March 2019. 





findings of this thesis, as the comparative analysis forms only a small part of the thesis. I 
always envisaged the purpose of the analysis as a tool to see if there are any lessons 
from the position in England and/or New Zealand that can be of assistance when 
assessing a solution for the South African position. The analysis does not, however, form 
a significant part of this thesis and I believe that the discussion of the relevant legislation 
in those jurisdictions and the case law applicable to the legislation has added the 
necessary value to this thesis. I therefore do not believe that the lack of responses has 
any significant bearing on the findings regarding the position of the South African 
executor. The information provided by the Ministry of Justice in New Zealand is of 
assistance as it indicates that the legal process provided for in their legislation results in 
very long delays in the administration of the deceased estate. 
 
The responses received from estates officers and advisors in South Africa have been of 
significant value and have provided me with the relevant information to gauge how 
executors deal with claims under the MSSA. The responses have largely confirmed my 
own experience and views and indicate that reform of the MSSA is required to enable 










There can be no doubt that the philosophy behind the MSSA is sound and that its stated 
objectives,2124 namely to provide the survivor with a claim for maintenance against the 
estate of the deceased spouse in certain circumstances, and to provide for incidental 
matters, are to be applauded. The MSSA provides a mechanism for a survivor to secure 
financial relief from the estate of the deceased spouse if the survivor is not able to 
maintain him- or herself from own resources. The MSSA is therefore particularly useful 
in those instances where the survivor’s inability to maintain him- or herself is 
exacerbated by the death of the spouse who maintained the survivor during the 
marriage. It also provides the heirs of an estate with peace of mind that the survivor’s 
claim for maintenance from the estate will not be based on his or her relationship with 
the deceased, but solely on the extent to which the survivor is factually unable to meet 
his or her own reasonable maintenance needs. In theory, therefore, the MSSA provides 
a valid and successful solution to a survivor. The practical application of the MSSA, 
however, is less successful, as can be seen from the results of the survey in the previous 
chapter.  
 
At the outset of this thesis2125 I indicated that I am of the view that there are certain 
areas of concern when dealing with the application of the MSSA, namely: 
• Practical problems in determining whether the claim by the survivor is 
reasonable;2126 
• The lack of a mechanism to deal with settlement of the claim in the most 
practical manner and the lack of a solution to address the possibility of the 
 
2124 As contained in the preamble of the MSSA. 
2125 See 1.2. 




survivor dying or remarrying before the funds paid to him or her have been 
consumed or of his or her circumstances changing significantly in any other 
manner;2127 
• The application of the MSSA to different relationships.2128 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate and analyse the way in which executors 
and practitioners approach maintenance claims under the MSSA and the practical 
difficulties (if any) they experience in considering and dealing with the claims. What 
follows is a summary of each area of concern and the findings based on my research 
(where applicable). 
 
8.2        Practical problems faced by the executor 
 
8.2.1 Considering the maintenance claim by the survivor to determine whether it is 
reasonable 
 
The MSSA2129 requires the executor of a deceased estate to determine whether a claim 
lodged by the survivor is reasonable.  
 
When a marriage in South Africa ends in divorce, the issue of maintenance is either 
settled by agreement between the parties,2130 or by a maintenance order made by the 
court.2131 The involvement of the court signifies to me that maintenance is regarded as 
an important aspect that needs to be given due attention by experts skilled in applying 
the law to the practical situation. It therefore does not make sense that this onerous 
responsibility is placed on an executor when the marriage ends in death.2132 I submit 
 
2127 At 1.2.3 and 1.2.4. 
2128 At 1.2.5. 
2129 Section 2(c) of the MSSA read with section 3. 
2130  Section 7(1) of the Divorce Act. 
2131  Section 7(2) of the Divorce Act.  




that there are very few, if any, executors who are as qualified or equipped as the court 
is to decide on what could probably be regarded a legal question. 
 
As the MSSA places the responsibility of assessing the reasonableness of the survivor’s 
claim for maintenance on the executor, it would be fair to expect that the MSSA would 
provide the executor with the relevant framework within which to exercise this 
responsibility, and guidance as to how to fulfil the obligation. As can be seen from the 
analysis of the MSSA and the responses to the questions posed to executors, this is, 
however, not the case. The MSSA2133 does list certain factors which the executor must 
take into consideration when determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the 
survivor, but it does not prescribe an order of preference for these factors, nor does it 
guide the executor on how to apply these factors or what weighting (if any) to apply to 
the factors.2134 The executor is therefore forced to make a decision by applying a 
theoretical list of factors to the circumstances of the survivor, without having sufficient 
information on the deceased and his or her lifestyle or standard of living. This makes it 
difficult for the executor to determine whether the survivor's maintenance needs and 
requirements are reasonable in the context of the deceased estate and the survivor’s 
circumstances.    
 
The executor must consider, assess and form an opinion on factors which relate to the 
lifestyle the survivor claims to have enjoyed while the deceased was alive, and the 
lifestyle he or she is expecting to lead. This places an onerous responsibility on the 
executor. The responsibility of deciding whether the survivor’s claimed needs are 
reasonable to some extent requires the making of a moral judgement as the mere 
reference to “reasonable” implies subjectivity and the exercise of a discretion. 
Reasonableness might mean different things to different persons, which means that the 
executor’s assessment is not based on objective criteria. I believe this outcome, where 
 
2133  Section 3 of the MSSA. 




the executor forms a subjective opinion on the survivor’s requirements, is contrary to 
the conclusion reached by the Law Commission (now the Law Reform Commission) in its 
review of the law of succession2135 that any factors necessitating a moral decision 
should be avoided when dealing with the issue of maintenance of the spouse, as the 
question that should be answered is not whether the survivor has a moral right to share 
in the estate of the first-dying spouse, but whether he or she has a factual need for 
support.2136 I submit that it is not possible for an executor to assess whether it is 
reasonable for the survivor to, for example, visit a hairdresser once a week or have an 
expensive gym contract without forming some kind of moral judgement. 
 
The executor is legally vested with the administration of the deceased’s estate.2137 He or 
she represents neither the heirs nor the creditors of the estate,2138 and must therefore 
always act objectively,2139 without favouring one party over another. When dealing with 
any other claim against the deceased estate, the executor will usually be able to rely on 
supporting evidence such as an agreement between the deceased and the claimant, or 
an invoice issued by the claimant. The survivor’s maintenance claim, on the other hand, 
is to a large extent based on the “evidence” of the survivor. Anecdotal evidence2140 
seems to indicate that the maintenance claim is often brought in instances where the 
residual heirs of the estate are the children of the deceased, and the survivor is not the 
biological parent of the children. There are also instances where the heirs are close 
family members of the deceased, such as parents or siblings. Due to the nature of the 
competing claims of the survivor and heirs, it is likely that the parties will disagree as to 
 
2135 South African Law Commission Working Paper 13 Project 22 Review of the law of succession: the 
introduction of a legitimate portion or the granting of a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse 
2003.   
2136 At 28. 
2137 Malcomess v Kuhn 1915 CPD 852; Clarkson v Gelb [1981] 1 All SA 93 (W). See 1.2.1 and 2.3 for a more 
detailed discussion.  
2138 Van den Bergh v Coetzee 201 (4) SA 93 (T); Meyerowitz 12.20. See 1.2.1 and 2.3 for a more detailed 
discussion.  
2139 Reichman v Reichman 2012 (4) SA 423 (GSJ). See 2.3 for a more detailed discussion. 





what constitutes reasonable needs – the survivor will typically want to maximise his or 
her claim and the heirs will want it to be limited as far as possible so that it does not 
impact unnecessarily on their inheritance. It is therefore almost inevitable that one of 
the parties will feel aggrieved by the executor’s decision and bring into question the 
executor’s objectivity when assessing the maintenance claim – the heirs might be 
aggrieved if the executor accepts the survivor’s claim, as it reduces the amount available 
for distribution to them, and the survivor could be aggrieved if the executor rejects his 
or her claim as being unreasonable, or accepts the claim in a lesser amount. 
 
The MSSA envisages a claim for reasonable maintenance. As maintenance relates to an 
ongoing requirement, a claim that adequately addresses the needs of the survivor will 
have to take cognisance of future needs and requirements. This inevitably entails some 
level of guesswork and assumption. I submit that very few survivors are able to prepare 
such a claim. In practice,2141 therefore, the survivor usually engages the services of an 
attorney and/or actuary to accurately calculate the claim taking into account inflation 
and mortality (or life expectancy) tables. Such an exercise can be costly and time 
consuming. This exercise, however, is only part of the process – the executor must still 
consider the claim as presented and decide whether it is reasonable. I submit that few 
individuals without a legal, financial and/or economical background are able to assess 
such a claim. Despite having been in the fiduciary industry for 26 years and having dealt 
with many aspects of succession law and estate planning, I am confident that I do not 
have sufficient knowledge to assess all aspects of an actuarial claim, and I would suggest 
that most of my counterparts are in the same position. From my experience of dealing 
with deceased estates, I have formed the impression that actuarial claims or claims 
calculated by an attorney are accepted by the executor without too many questions 
being asked, as it is assumed that the calculations on which the claims are based are 
accurate. The results of the survey done amongst executors indicate that this 
 




impression is correct, as several respondents2142 indicated that they insist on an 
actuarial claim being lodged or that they will not consider the claim unless an actuarial 
calculation is provided – this despite the fact that the MSSA makes no provision for such 
a claim. 
 
There can be no doubt that an actuarial claim will address all aspects of need on the 
part of the survivor and will accurately allow for future needs taking into account 
inflation and life expectancy, and should therefore be more accurate than when the 
spouse him- or herself calculates the claim. I submit, however, that an actuarial claim 
does not guarantee that the claim is for reasonable maintenance needs as it is not the 
role of the actuary to question the survivor on his or her lifestyle and spending habits. 
The actuary’s role is to use the information provided by the survivor and apply inflation 
rates and mortality tables to do a forward projection to determine the claim amount. If 
the information provided to the actuary is unrealistic or not a true reflection of the 
survivor’s maintenance requirements, the resultant claim will not be a true reflection of 
the survivor’s actual needs. If the executor does not assess the claim and ask questions 
but merely accept it as presented, there is a real possibility that the survivor will be 
favoured over the residual heirs of the estate. I believe that there is a solution to this 
problem – the survivor’s reasonable maintenance needs must first be determined and, 
once an amount has been agreed by the executor and survivor, an actuary can calculate 
the result over the expected lifetime of the survivor to arrive at the claim that is to be 
lodged in terms of the MSSA. If this process is not followed and the executor simply 
accepts the actuarial claim, the executor will not be exercising his or her discretion 
properly. 
 
The MSSA provides2143 that certain factors shall be taken into account when 
determining the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor, but no clarification is 
 
2142 See 7.3.1. 




provided for the rationale behind the inclusion of the factors. There are also no 
guidelines to indicate how the factors should be applied to the facts of the matter. One 
such factor is the amount in the deceased estate that is available for distribution to the 
heirs and legatees.2144 It is not clear why this factor is included. If it is intended to 
suggest that the claim should not exceed a certain percentage of the amount available 
for distribution, this veers dangerously towards the concept of a legitimate portion.2145 
The only assumption I can make is that this factor simply indicates to the executor that 
the claim cannot exceed the amount available for distribution. 
 
Another factor that is specifically mentioned is the duration of the marriage.2146 Once 
again, there is no indication what the executor is supposed to do with this information. 
Is a survivor of a long marriage automatically regarded in a more favourable light than 
one of a short marriage? And what is the direct link between the subsistence of the 
marriage and the reasonable maintenance requirements of the survivor?2147  
 
As indicated earlier,2148 the words “in addition to any other factor which should be taken 
into account” are vague and give the executor no guidance – in fact, I submit that they 
place an onerous responsibility on the executor, as he or she will have to decide 
whether a particular factor is something that “should” be considered. The responses 
from the survey2149 largely reflect the discomfort felt by estate officers in this regard. It 
is for this reason that I suggest omitting this phrase from the proposed version of 





2144 Section 3(a). See 4.4.2 for a more detailed discussion of this factor. 
2145 See 3.4.3 for a more detailed discussion of the legitimate portion. 
2146 Section 3(b). 
2147 See 4.4.2 for a more detailed discussion regarding the duration of the marriage. 
2148 See 4.4.2. 
2149 See 7.3.1. 




8.2.2 Payment of interim maintenance until the claim is accepted 
 
The MSSA contains no provision for payment of maintenance to the survivor in the 
period between the first-dying spouse’s death and acceptance of the maintenance 
claim. My experience of dealing with estates where maintenance claims were lodged 
indicates that the proof and acceptance of such claims is not a quick process and that it 
takes some time before the claim is finalised, and this is also reflected in the responses 
to the survey.2151 A survivor who does not inherit from the deceased or receive any 
other benefit such as pension funds or the proceeds of life assurance could therefore 
potentially be without means until the claim is accepted (assuming that it is).  
 
It is evident when assessing the position in England that the legislature anticipated a 
need for interim maintenance. The 1975 Act allows the court2152 to make an interim 
order for maintenance in the period while the court is still considering whether to make 
an order for maintenance. In order to qualify for an interim order for maintenance, the 
court must be satisfied that the applicant is in immediate need of financial 
assistance,2153 that it is not yet possible to determine what final order (if any) should be 
made, and that there is property in the estate of the deceased which is, or can be made, 
available to meet the applicant’s needs.2154 If the court is so satisfied, it may order the 
payment of a lump sum, or more than one sum at intervals the court deems 
reasonable.2155 The court may make such order subject to any conditions or restrictions 
it deems necessary.2156 When considering the need for an interim order, the court is 
empowered to consider the same factors that it will consider under the application, 
subject to the urgency of the matter.2157 When the court later makes an order for 
 
2151 See 7.3.1. 
2152 Section 5. 
2153 Section 5(1)(a). 
2154 Section 5(1)(b). 
2155 Section 5(1); Re Besterman [1984] 3 WLR 280 CA; Stead v Stead [1985] 6 FLR 16. 
2156 Section 5(1); Re Ralphs [1968] 1 WLR 1522. 




maintenance, it may provide that any sum paid to the applicant in terms of an interim 
order shall be treated as having been paid as part of that later order.  
 
I believe that the lack of provision for interim maintenance is a stumbling block in 
achieving the objectives of the MSSA. There is no practical sense in providing a 
framework for the survivor to have a claim for maintenance if he or she is not in a 
position to fund his or her own maintenance requirements while, for practical 
considerations, the survivor will receive such maintenance only once the claim has been 
accepted, which might well be many months after his or her spouse passed away. While 
I accept that the delay in the estate administration process is not always long, my 
experience and the responses to the survey indicate that in most instances where a 
claim under the MSSA is lodged, the estate administration process is delayed. The case 
law also indicates this. In Oshry v Feldman,2158 for example, the maintenance claim was 
heard in the Supreme Court of Appeal five years after Mr Feldman died and the survivor 
received no maintenance from the estate during that time. 
 
8.2.3 Settlement of the claim 
 
The MSSA does not prescribe the way in which the claim is to be settled, essentially 
leaving it to the executor to decide the most practical settlement method.  
 
The word “maintenance” implies an ongoing, regular commitment.2159 A deceased 
estate, however, has a limited lifespan as a combination of different administration 
processes must be followed to arrive at a point where the creditors’ claims have been 
settled and the estate assets paid or transferred to the heirs. Therefore, the estate 
cannot remain “open” or active for an indefinite period. In fact, the Estates Act 
provides2160 that the executor must frame and lodge a liquidation and distribution 
 
2158 [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA). 
2159 See 4.4.3 for a more detailed discussion. 




account within six months from the date on which Letters of Executorship were issued 
and pay creditors and heirs within two months after the estate became distributable.2161 
These provisions make it clear that the estate cannot remain open indefinitely for the 
payment of regular maintenance instalments to the survivor. In practice, therefore,2162 
most MSSA claims are settled by way of a lump sum payment to the survivor to enable 
the executor to finalise the estate and fulfil his or her duties within the defined time 
frames.  
 
If we assume that most claims are settled by way of a lump sum payment, it should be 
noted that the nature of the assets in the estate often does not allow for quick and easy 
settlement of the claim, and executors are often faced with the dilemma of not having 
sufficient cash in the estate to settle the claim. This necessitates a sale of estate assets 
to generate the cash needed. The following real-life example illustrates this: A will 
provides that the deceased’s immovable property devolves on his surviving spouse, 
subject to the condition that it will devolve on his daughters from a previous marriage 
when the surviving spouse dies. Should the spouse sell the property during her lifetime, 
the proceeds will devolve on the daughters at the time of the sale. The will further 
provides that the residue of the estate devolves on the said daughters. On the face of it, 
there seems to be no problem. The surviving spouse, however, institutes a claim under 
the MSSA as she has hardly any assets of her own and claims that she cannot maintain 
the property and herself. The executor accepts her claim as reasonable. The residue of 
the estate comprises some movable assets and very little cash, resulting in insufficient 
cash and assets to settle the spouse’s maintenance claim. None of the parties are willing 
or able to enter into an agreement. The executor is therefore forced to sell the 
immovable property in order to generate sufficient cash to settle the maintenance 
claim. The net proceeds, after payment of the maintenance claim, devolves on the 
 
2161 Section 35(13). 




residual heirs (the daughters), leaving the spouse without a roof over her head and the 
daughters without the hope of eventually inheriting the property.  
 
Nothing precludes the executor from settling the claim by transferring an estate asset to 
the survivor, rather than paying a cash lump sum to him or her, but this is a viable 
option only if the nature and value of the assets forming part of the residue of the 
estate are such that they can be used for this purpose. Where, for example, the 
deceased held shares or unit trusts, the executor can easily transfer shares or unit trusts 
that are equal in value to the amount of the maintenance claim. Quite often though, the 
main asset in the estate is an immovable property which is worth substantially more 
than the amount of the maintenance claim. This means that the executor will not be 
able to use the property as a means to settle the maintenance claim. In such a scenario, 
the only viable option is for the executor to sell the property to generate the required 
cash. 
 
If any of the parties are unhappy with the claim as accepted by the executor, their only 
option is to lodge an objection with the Master.2163 This process is often unsatisfactory 
and lengthy, as the Master needs to ensure that all parties are given ample opportunity 
to represent their case.2164 The process could take months, with the Master often 
deciding that the matter is a factual dispute which he or she cannot rule on.2165 If this 
happens, the aggrieved party’s only option is to proceed to court for an order setting 
aside the executor’s decision,2166 but this is hardly a practical solution. By this time, 
many months will have passed since the death of the deceased, which will inevitably 
impact on the survivor’s ability to maintain him- or herself. Furthermore, a survivor who 
 
2163  Section 35(7) of the Estates Act. 
2164  Section 35(8) and (9). 
2165 Boon v Boon 1947 (1) PH F73; C P Smaller (Pty) Ltd v The Master 1977 (3) SA 159 (T); Broodryk v Die 
Meester 1991 (4) SA 365 (O); Fey and Whiteford v Serfontein 1993 (2) SA 605 (A); Ferreira v Die 
Meester 2001 (3) SA 365 (O); Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court Polekwane unreported, case 
number 53514/2012) [2013] ZAGPPHC 118, judgment delivered on 16 May 2013; LAWSA vol 31 “Wills 
and succession” 453. 




truly cannot maintain him- or herself will in all probability not have funds to approach 
the court. It is therefore my contention that in most instances, the survivor will accept 
the executor’s decision, even if not entirely satisfied with it, in an attempt to bring the 
matter to finality and to receive settlement of the claim (whether partially or in full). 
 
8.2.4 The lack of a mechanism to govern the remaining funds on the death or 
remarriage of the survivor 
 
Although the MSSA provides that the claim is for reasonable maintenance needs until 
the death or remarriage of the survivor,2167 it is usually impossible to anticipate 
remarriage, and the claim is therefore calculated over the life expectancy of the 
claimant.2168 There is no mechanism in the MSSA to address the situation where the 
survivor dies earlier than anticipated or remarries. This, coupled with the fact that the 
claim is typically settled by way of a cash lump sum payment and/or the transfer of an 
estate asset, could have a material impact on the residual heirs. If the survivor dies 
before the date regarded as the end of his or her life expectancy as indicated in 
mortality tables, the remaining portion of the funds (if any) or the specific asset will 
form part of his or her estate and will devolve on his or her testate or intestate heirs. 
Where the survivor is not the biological parent or close family member of the residual 
heirs of the first-dying spouse, it is probably unlikely that the survivor will include those 
residual heirs in his or her own will. If the survivor remarries, any remaining portion of 
the funds will potentially benefit his or her new spouse. In both instances, the heirs of 
the first-dying spouse are prejudiced as the funds are not utilised as intended by the 
MSSA. 
  
The MSSA2169 gives the executor the power to enter into an agreement with the 
claimant and heirs who have an interest in the agreement, which includes the creation 
 
2167  Section 2(1). 
2168  Mortality tables are used for this purpose. 




of a trust, but this power is seldom exercised. In my experience the claimant is usually 
not prepared to enter into such an agreement and would rather receive a cash lump 
sum or an asset in settlement of his or her claim. This is also borne out by the results of 
the survey.2170 The MSSA also allows for an agreement in terms of which the heirs or 
legatees of the estate agree to take over the obligation to pay maintenance to the 
survivor but taking on such an obligation may have unfavourable tax consequences for 
both parties2171 and is seldom applied in practice.  
 
I am not convinced that the settlement of the maintenance claim by way of a lump sum 
payment or transfer of an asset is in keeping with the objectives of the MSSA and am of 
the opinion that consideration should be given to the claim being addressed by way of 
annuity payments rather than payment of a lump sum. In Feldman v Oshry2172 the court 
referred to the practical difficulty in making periodic payments to the spouse but did not 
indicate any way to deal with this difficulty. I am of the opinion that the only practical 
way of doing this would be to make the creation of a trust mandatory. This is discussed 
further in 8.3.5 below. 
 
The MSSA does not provide for any significant change in the circumstances of the 
survivor (other than death or remarriage.) The residual heirs of the estate may well be 
prejudiced if the survivor receives a maintenance payment based on his or her financial 
situation at the time of the first-dying spouse’s death and then receives a windfall such 
as an inheritance from a third party or winning the lottery. On the opposite side of the 
coin, the survivor may be prejudiced if he or she lives longer than life expectancy tables 
indicate, resulting in insufficient funds for his or her maintenance. Once again, I am of 




2170 See the relevant question in 7.3.1 for more details. 
2171 See 4.4.3 for more details. 




8.2.5 The inconsistent application of the MSSA based on the nature of the relationship               
between the deceased and survivor 
 
The MSSA applies to the survivor of a marriage.2173 
 
A “survivor” is defined2174 as being the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by 
death, and includes a wife in a customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil 
marriage contracted by her customary marriage husband with another woman on or 
after 1 January 1929 but before 2 December 1988.2175 Although the words “spouse” and 
“marriage” are not defined, most marital-type relationships in South Africa enjoy 
protection in terms of the MSSA, even where those relationships do not enjoy legal 
recognition.2176 The following persons therefore also qualify as spouses for purposes of 
the MSSA: 
• Civil union partners – this is because a civil union has the same consequences as 
a civil marriage;2177 
• Parties in a customary marriage entered into after 15 November 2000 which 
complies with the requirements of the RCMA – these customary marriages are 
for all purposes recognised as a marriage;2178 
• The survivor of a monogamous Muslim marriage – this is as a result of case law; 
2179 
• The survivor of a de facto polygynous Muslim marriage – this is also as a result of 
case law.2180 From a legal perspective, there is no constitutionally acceptable 
 
2173 Section 2(1). 
2174 Section 1. 
2175 This definition has applied since 20 September 2010 when section 8 of the RCLSA replaced the 
previous definition of “the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death”.  
2176 See 5.2 for a detailed discussion of religious marriages and 5.3 for a detailed discussion of life 
partnerships.   
2177  Section 13 of the CUA. 
2178  Section 2(2) of the RCMA. 
2179  Daniels v Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (C). 




reason to distinguish between Muslim and Hindu marriages,2181 and it therefore 
follows that our courts will in all likelihood afford a Hindu marriage the same 
recognition and protection as it does a Muslim marriage;2182 
• Certain “discarded” wives of customary marriages dissolved by the later civil 
marriage of the husband qualify for a maintenance claim – provided for in the 
MSSA;2183 
 
Despite the generous extension of the protection of the MSSA to almost all marital-type 
relationships, our courts have, to date, refused to extend the protection to heterosexual 
life partners who do not marry or enter into a civil union.2184 Whilst there is a view that 
the decision in Gory meant that life partners in a same-sex relationship continued to 
qualify as spouses for purposes of the MSSA,2185 it appears that this uncertainty has 
been settled by the recent judgment in Duplan. What does remain evident though is 
that heterosexual and same-sex life partners are not treated the same for purposes of 
the MSSA as they are for purposes of the ISA.2186 In the constitutional era we live in, 
there is no justification for this apparent different treatment, and I predict that it is 
merely a question of time until the Constitutional Court is approached in this regard. 
Until this happens or the legislator amends the MSSA to specifically include life partners, 
the executor needs to be aware that he or she cannot entertain a claim under the MSSA 
brought by a life partner. 
 
I believe that I have in this thesis provided sufficient evidence that the research 
substantiates my view that the abovementioned aspects are indeed areas of concern.  
Although the sample size for the survey was not large, it is evident that most executors 
who were surveyed agree that these areas must be addressed. It needs to be noted that 
 
2181  Heaton South African Family Law 237; Skelton & Carnelley (2010) 202. 
2182  See, for example, Govender v Ragavayah 2009 (3) SA 378 (D). 
2183  Section 1. 
2184  Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
2185 See 5.3.2.1.2 for a discussion of Gory v Kolver and 5.3.3 for a detailed discussion of this topic. 




the questionnaire2187 sent to the survey group was drafted and distributed before I had 
the opportunity to consider the views of Smith2188 regarding the impact of the Duplan 
case on the Volks decision in the context of ISA claims. This explains why the 
questionnaire refers only to a claim by a heterosexual life partner as a reason for the 
executor refusing the claim.2189 I have since reached fresh insights into the more likely 
legal position of life partners and this is reflected in the gender-neutral provision in my 
suggested version of section 1 of the MSSA.  
 
8.3 Possible solutions 
 
While there appears to be more than sufficient material in textbooks, academic journals 
and case law on the theoretical and technical aspects of the MSSA, there is almost no 
material on its practical implementation. The survey and interviews with South African 
executors and practitioners indicate that their general view is that the MSSA itself gives 
insufficient guidance to executors. This, coupled with the lack of material and case law, 
means that practitioners find it difficult to apply the MSSA when assessing a claim for 
maintenance.  
 
The aim of my research was firstly to analyse the practical implementation of the MSSA 
and the challenges faced by the executor when applying its provisions. The second 
objective of the research was to investigate possible solutions to these challenges and 
specifically whether there are viable alternative arrangements for the handling of a 
maintenance claim.2190 During the course of my research, I have concluded that there 
are a few possible solutions. These solutions aim to address different aspects of the 
practical challenges facing the executor. However, they are similar in one respect and 
that is that they all entail an amendment to the MSSA. I believe some solutions are 
 
2187 See Appendix A. 
2188 2018(81)1 THRHR 149. 
2189 I should add that none of the recipients commented on this aspect or indicated that they had refused 
a claim by a same-sex partner, which I submit shows that there is some uncertainty about the legal 
position of same-sex partners. 




more practical and I will discuss them in the order that I perceive to be from the least to 
the most practical and viable.2191 
 
8.3.1  Providing detailed guidelines in the MSSA for determination of the claim  
 
The purpose of this solution is to keep the status quo by placing the obligation to decide 
the claim on the executor, but to give him or her detailed guidelines that will enable an 
objective assessment of the claim. 
 
The benefit of introducing guidelines into the MSSA is that it requires minimal change to 
the MSSA. A further benefit is that it will make the role of the executor easier, as he or 
she will be able to assess the claim against a list of requirements to reach an 
understanding of whether the claim is reasonable. It will therefore theoretically avoid a 
situation where the executor has to make a moral judgement when considering the 
survivor’s claim. 
 
From a purely objective point of view, guidelines will allow the executor to assess a 
maintenance claim by simply considering the facts or details of the claim against a 
“checklist”. In practice though, the reality is that each maintenance claim will be 
different as the specific survivor’s circumstances, as well as those of the estate and the 
heirs, will be different. As it is simply not possible to provide guidelines for all potential 
scenarios and circumstances, it is very likely that the executor will have to deal with 
certain aspects of a claim for which there are no guidelines.  
 
Even if it was possible to provide comprehensive guidelines to assist the executor to 
make a decision regarding the reasonableness of the claim, this solution would not 
 
2191 As indicated in 4.4.2, the concept of “reasonable maintenance” often poses challenges for the 
executor. It is also clear from the discussion in 4.4.8 that the executor could have a conflict of 
interest when dealing with a claim under the MSSA. The proposed legislative amendments in 8.4 deal 




address the issue of the survivor dying or remarrying before the funds paid to him or her 
have been consumed. I also do not believe that a “tick box” or “checklist” approach is 
appropriate when dealing with family law matters. 
I would therefore suggest that this option is not likely to be a viable solution. 
 
8.3.2 Providing that all claims will be determined by a court of law 
 
This solution follows the position in England and New Zealand where the executor plays 
no role in the consideration of the maintenance claim and it is provided that all claims 
are considered by a court of law. It should be noted that the court solution in England 
and New Zealand assumes that all cases go to court, whilst very few do, as most cases 
are settled. The judicial guidance enables parties to understand and give effect to the 
deceased’s duties to family members and especially the surviving spouse, and going to 
court is therefore the default position if the parties cannot agree. The purpose of this 
solution is to have a more structured, legal approach to the adjudication of a 
maintenance claim. 
 
The benefit of this solution is self-explanatory as it removes the responsibility to 
consider the claim from the executor and places it on the court, which is more skilled 
and better equipped to deal with such claims. The court is in a position to probe for 
more detailed information and this should result in a more accurate and reasonable 
claim. 
 
This solution is not, however, without problems. A court process is bound to be costly 
and does not seem the appropriate solution for a survivor who has lodged a claim for 
maintenance because he or she is not able to provide for his or her maintenance needs 
from own means and earnings. As indicated in 8.2.4, the Estates Act allows for a survivor 
to approach the court if he or she is aggrieved by a decision the executor made. The 




reason is quite possibly that the survivors who institute maintenance claims do not have 
the resources to pursue the matter in a court of law. This reality makes the adjudication 
of a maintenance claim by a court of law impractical. This solution could potentially 
work if the survivor was not expected to fund the court proceedings and the costs were 
paid from estate funds. However, this would have negative consequences for the 
residual heirs of the estate, as the cost of the proceedings would have to be paid from 
the residue of the estate, thereby reducing the amount available for distribution to the 
heirs.  
 
Even if this solution could be made financially viable, it is bound to be time-consuming, 
which will delay the administration of the estate even more than the current process 
does. As indicated,2192 the average time for the court in New Zealand to assess an 
application under the FPA is 425 working days and for an application in terms of the PRA 
it is 313 working days. If we assume that it will take more or less the same amount of 
time in South Africa, this delay, coupled with the absence of any provision for interim 
maintenance, will result in serious prejudice to the survivor. It will also prejudice the 
heirs as the settlement of their inheritance will be delayed. 
 
It may be a solution to provide that the assessment of the claim will be done by certain 
courts only, for example the maintenance court. This might reduce costs and the time it 
will take to finalise the process. Although I have not actively researched this aspect as I 
do not believe that a court process is a viable option to pursue, anecdotal evidence 
gathered during my research seems to indicate that all courts in South Africa, including 
the maintenance courts, are already significantly overburdened and it is doubtful 
whether it will have any significant impact to limit the assessment of the claim to certain 
courts only.  
 
 




Furthermore, having a claim under the MSSA assessed by a court of law does not 
provide a mechanism whereby unutilised funds can be claimed back in the event of the 
survivor’s untimely death or remarriage.  
 
It is therefore my contention that this solution is not viable, considering the costs and 
time it will take for a court of law to assess the maintenance claim. 
 
8.3.3    Providing for mediation  
 
The rationale behind mediation is that it provides the parties to a dispute, in this case, 
the executor, survivor and heirs, with a process in terms of which their differing views 
regarding the maintenance claim can be dealt with without having to resort to litigation.  
 
Mediation is a process whereby a mediator assists parties to a dispute to identify their 
disputes, to propose and consider different options to resolve those disputes and to 
reach an agreement which satisfies both parties.2193 The mediator is ideally a neutral 
and impartial third party2194 who does not decide the solution to the parties’ dispute, 
but guides them so that they can arrive at a settlement that they agree on.2195 It is a 
consensual process in which the parties to the dispute themselves make the decision, 
therefore giving them control over the decision.2196  
 
 
2193 De Jong “Mediation and other appropriate forms of alternative dispute resolution upon divorce” in 
Heaton J (ed) The law of divorce and dissolution of life partnerships in South Africa (2014) 582; De 
Jong “Opportunities of mediation in the new Children’s Act 38 of 2005” 2008(71)4 THRHR 631; De 
Jong “A pragmatic look at mediation as an alternative to divorce litigation” 2010-3 TSAR 517; 
Boniface “African-style mediation and western-style divorce and family mediation: reflections for the 
South African context” 2012(15)5 PER/PELJ 378. 
2194 Goldberg “Practical and ethical concerns in alternative dispute resolution in general and family and 
divorce mediation in particular” 1998-4 TSAR 752,758; De Jong 2008(71)4 THRHR 630; De Jong 2010-
3 TSAR 517,518; Boniface 2012(15)5 PER/PELJ 378. 
2195 De Jong 2008(71)4 THRHR 631; De Jong 2010-3 TSAR 517; Boniface 2012(15)5 PER/PELJ 380. 




Mediation is a particularly useful tool in family disputes such as divorce and custody of 
children.2197 One of its major advantages is that it keeps parties out of court,2198 which 
means that the usual cost of litigation is avoided, thereby saving costs.2199 The fee paid 
to the mediator is charged in terms of a fixed tariff set by the Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services and the parties share the fee equally. Based on my research, it 
appears that mediators’ fees range from a few hundred rand to about R1 500 per hour 
(depending on the seniority of the mediator), which means that the cost of an average 
mediation session of a few hours would be between R4 500 and R16 000.2200 This 
compares very favourably with court fees.  
 
Mediation is a simple process that is easily understandable by the parties, so that they 
can fully participate.2201 It is also a flexible process as it is able to accommodate different 
cultural and religious systems or convictions.2202 The process is usually quick, and a 
matter can be resolved in a considerably shorter period than through the traditional 
court process.2203 
 
Mediation is a viable option as it could result in a claim that is acceptable to all parties, 
but it does not provide a mechanism whereby unutilised funds can be claimed back in 




2197 De Jong (2014) 581; Scott-Macnab “Mediation – the procedure of the future” 1989(255) De Rebus 
211,213; De Jong “International trends in family mediation – are we still on track?” 2008(71)3 THRHR 
454; De Jong 2008(71)4 THRHR 630; De Jong 2010-3 TSAR 517. 
2198 De Jong 2008(71)4 THRHR 631; Boniface 2012(15)5 PER/PELJ 380 fn 7. 
2199 De Jong (2014) 604; Boniface 2012(15)(5) PER/PELJ 380 fn 7. 
2200 De Jong (2014) 604; Government Notice 854, published in Government Gazette 38163, 31 October 
2014. 
2201 De Jong “Judicial stamp of approval for divorce and family mediation in South Africa” 2005(68)1 
THRHR 95,97; De Jong 2010-3 TSAR 519. 
2202 Moodley “Mediation: the increasing necessity of incorporating cultural values and systems of 
empowerment” 1994(27)1 CILSA 46-48; Goldberg 1998-4 TSAR 755; De Jong 2010-3 TSAR 519,520; 
Faris An analysis of the theory and principles of alternative dispute resolution Unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of South Africa (1995) 183. 




8.3.4 Providing for settlement of the claim by the imposition of a limited interest in 
favour of the survivor 
 
The purpose of this solution is to ensure that the survivor’s claim is met without having 
to transfer cash or an asset or assets to him or her. 
 
The benefit of this solution is that the survivor’s maintenance needs are addressed, but 
ownership of estate assets is not passed to him or her, thereby ensuring that the 
residual heirs receive their inheritance. The idea behind this solution is therefore to 
benefit all parties. The survivor acquires a limited interest which is designed to provide 
him or her with the required maintenance. The limited interest would typically be a 
usufruct over an estate asset, or the right to income. The asset will devolve on the 
residual heirs, but their ownership will be limited to the extent that the survivor will 
enjoy the fruits of the asset.2204 If the survivor acquires a right to income, the income 
could either be generated by a specific estate asset or assets, or the heirs of the estate 
could agree to pay a certain amount of income to the survivor.  
 
This solution gives some peace of mind to the survivor as he or she is ensured of either a 
place to live in, the right to use an asset or assets and receive income from it, or the 
right to receive income from the heirs. The heirs also benefit as they acquire ownership 
of the asset or assets, albeit that their ownership is limited as they cannot enjoy the 
fruits thereof while the survivor is alive, or they might have to pay income to the 
survivor. 
 
If the usufruct is over immovable property, it gives the survivor the right to live in and 
use the property, but it also gives him or her the right to let the property and receive 
the rental.2205 The survivor could therefore decide to rather live somewhere else and let 
 
2204 Meyerowitz 24.15. 




the immovable property to a third party, which is not ideal from the perspective of the 
owners of the property. I would therefore submit that a usufruct over immovable 
property should only be considered as a solution if the survivor’s maintenance needs are 
limited to accommodation, as it will ensure that the survivor actually resides in the 
property. I would also submit that this solution would only be viable if the heirs and the 
survivor agree on the terms and conditions of the usufruct and these terms benefit both 
the survivor and heirs.  
 
The usufruct will be an asset in the survivor’s estate and will therefore be subject to 
estate duty on his or her death.2206 This is not necessarily an issue as the asset itself 
would in any event have formed part of the survivor’s estate had it been transferred to 
the survivor in settlement of the maintenance claim. 
 
A right to income will typically be created over a particular asset to the extent that the 
income generated by the asset will be paid to the survivor. Alternatively, the heirs can 
take on the responsibility to pay income from their own resources to the survivor. As 
with a usufruct, the survivor’s right to income will be an asset in his or her estate and 
will therefore be subject to estate duty on his or her death.2207 The same comments as 
above would apply. If the heirs themselves take on the responsibility to pay income to 
the survivor, they will not be able to deduct the payment when calculating their income 
tax obligation as it is not an expense incurred in the production of income.2208 
 
This solution ensures that ownership of the assets is vested in the residual heirs, while 
addressing the maintenance needs of the survivor. It therefore provides a solution for 
the scenario where the survivor dies earlier than expected or remarries. It does not, 
however, provide a solution for a scenario where the survivor’s circumstances change 
 
2206 Section 3(2)(a) of the EDA. 
2207 Section 3(2)(a) of the EDA. 




significantly for the better, unless the parties expressly agree that the limited right will 
cease or be re-assessed if that happens.  
 
Although I regard this solution as a viable option, the major disadvantage is that it 
entails ongoing interaction between the survivor and heirs until the survivor dies, as 
they are forced to work together on matters such as who is responsible for maintenance 
and insurance of the property.2209 From the perspective of the survivor this solution is 
not ideal if he or she is looking for a lump sum payment to gain independence from the 
heirs. From the perspective of the heirs it is also not ideal if the relationships with them 
and the survivor is not good. In view of my previous comments about how seldom the 
survivor and heirs agree as to what constitutes reasonable maintenance, I question the 
viability of creating a situation where the parties are forced to have a working 
relationship until the survivor dies. I would therefore not recommend this as a solution, 
except in very specific circumstances.   
  
8.3.5 Providing that the claim will be settled by periodical payments and re-assessed 
on remarriage, death or changed circumstances of the survivor 
 
The purpose of this solution is to ensure that the survivor’s claim is met without having 
to transfer cash or an asset or assets to him or her, and to provide both the survivor and 
the residual heirs with certainty and peace of mind by ensuring that the claim can be re-
assessed on an ongoing basis if necessary.  
 
The benefit of providing for periodical payments is that the survivor’s needs can be re-
assessed on an ongoing basis. The survivor will benefit, as the ongoing payments will 
address any change in his or her circumstances resulting in increased needs or reduced 
means and earnings. The residual heirs will benefit by knowing that the claim could be 
re-assessed if the survivor’s circumstances (including his or her means or earnings) 
 




change to the extent that the claim previously accepted is for an amount in excess of 
the survivor’s re-assessed requirements. As indicated in 8.2.5, although the MSSA 
provides that the claim will relate to the period until the survivor dies or remarries, it is 
not possible to predetermine if or when the survivor might remarry; therefore the claim 
is always calculated on the life expectancy of the survivor. If most claims are settled by 
way of a cash lump sum or transfer of assets, as appears to be the current norm, the 
provision for remarriage is of academic value only – once the lump sum has been paid or 
assets have been transferred to the survivor, unexpended funds cannot be recovered 
when the survivor remarries. If periodical payments are used to settle the claim, this 
concern falls away. 
 
The disadvantage of using periodical payments is that it is not practical to allow for 
periodical payments in a deceased estate as it has a limited lifespan.2210 The executor is 
obliged to finalise the estate as soon as is practically possible and he or she would not 
be able to keep the estate open until the survivor dies or remarries, or until the 
survivor’s need for maintenance falls away. I agree with Sonnekus2211 that the only 
workable solution for this practical challenge is to provide for the creation of a trust, 
where the trustee takes on the responsibility to make payments to the survivor, and to 
re-assess the survivor’s needs on an ongoing basis. It is interesting to note that clause 
2(3)(d) of the Bill on Maintenance of Surviving Spouses2212 provided that the executor 
had “the power to create a trust for the benefit of the survivor in terms of an agreement 
with the survivor and to transfer assets from the deceased estate to the trust, in 
settlement of the claim of the survivor or part thereof”. The MSSA as promulgated, 
however, does not include this provision, but rather provides that the executor has the 
power to enter into an agreement with the survivor and the heirs and legatees having 
an interest in the agreement, including the creation of a trust. I assume that this change 
 
2210 Seidel v Lipschitz unreported, case number 24960/11 [2013] ZAWCHC, judgment delivered on 24 
October 2013 at par 30. 
2211 1990-3 TSAR 506; 2010-3 TSAR 636. 




in wording was intended to clarify that other types of agreements could also be entered 
into, but I believe the original wording as contained in the Bill is clearer and might have 
been a better option as it gives more guidance to the executor.  
 
8.3.5.1 Trusts - general 
The Trust Property Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the “TPCA”)2213 defines2214 a 
trust as “an arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is by 
virtue of a trust instrument2215 made over or bequeathed” inter alia to the trustee to 
administer it for the benefit of the persons identified in the trust instrument.2216  
 
A trust is typically used as an estate planning tool2217 – the trust would be established by 
a person who owns a valuable asset or an asset that is expected to appreciate in value. 
He or she transfers ownership of the asset to the trust, so that appreciation in the value 
of the asset takes place in the trust rather than in the estate of the person, thereby 
resulting in less estate duty in that person’s estate on his or her death.2218 A trust is, 
however, also a very useful tool for other purposes,2219 such as protecting assets2220 or 
protecting persons who do not have the capacity to manage assets (for example a minor 
who does not have contractual capacity or a person with limited financial skills).2221 I 
therefore believe that it can be a very useful tool in the context of a maintenance claim. 
 
 
2213 57 of 1988. 
2214 Section 1. 
2215 A trust instrument is defined in section 1 as a written agreement, testamentary writing or court order 
according to which a trust is created. For purposes of this discussion I will focus only on a written 
agreement, being a trust deed. 
2216 The definition also provides for ownership of the assets to be passed to the beneficiaries, but such an 
arrangement is not relevant for purposes of this discussion and I will focus only on the trust where 
ownership is passed to the trustees.  
2217 Geach Trust law in South Africa (2017) 434; Klopper “Sekere probleme in verband met inter vivos 
trusts en getroude persone” 1990(107)3 SALJ 708. 
2218 CIR v Estate Lazarus 1958 (1) SA 311 (A); CIR v Pretorius 1986 (1) SA 238 (A); Cameron, De Waal and 
Solomon Honore’s South African law of trusts (2018) 17; Geach 434; 463. 
2219 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 16; Geach 433. 
2220 Geach 433; Penny v Estate Penny 1937 EDL 392; Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
2221 Geach 435; Collard v Findlay’s Executors 1907 TS 254; Ex parte Easton 1948 (2) SA 535 (C); Du Plessis v 




8.3.5.2 Trusts - characteristics 
A trust is settled by a person known as the settlor or founder.2222  
 
For a valid trust to be created, the requirements are:  
• the founder must have the intention to create a trust and the intention must be 
shared by the prospective trustee(s)2223 – this is usually evident from the trust 
deed which is signed by the founder and trustees; 
• the intention must be expressed in a way that creates a legal obligation2224 – the 
mere expression of an intention is not sufficient and the founder must either 
pass ownership to a trustee and place an obligation on the trustee to administer 
the property for the trust object, or the founder must accept the obligation to 
ensure that this is done;2225  
• the trust property must be defined with reasonable certainty2226  – this is usually 
done by specifying in the trust deed a donation made by the founder to the 
trust. It is important that the donation is actually made by the founder, or that 
he or she accepts the obligation to divest him- or herself of ownership of the 
specified asset – failing this, it might be questioned whether the trust actually 
came into existence;2227 
• the trust object or purpose must be defined with reasonable certainty2228 – the 
object can be personal, which means that certain named or ascertainable 
persons or classes of persons will benefit,2229 or it can be impersonal,2230 for 
 
2222 Geach 113; I will use the term “founder” in the further discussion.  
2223 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 138; Geach 80. 
2224 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 (4) SA 253 (C); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 7; 159; 
Geach 80; 254. 
2225 Goodricke & Son (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N); Cameron, De Waal and 
Solomon 159-160. 
2226 Ex parte Estate Kemp 1940 WLD 26; Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 (4) SA 253 (C); 
Corbett, Hofmeyr and Kahn 396; Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 168; Geach 90. 
2227 Geach 114. 
2228 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 173; Geach 91; Klopper 1990(107)3 SALJ 705. 
2229 Geach 259. 





example where the trust supports charitable objects or where it is established 
for the benefit of the community at large or a specific sector of the 
community;2231  
• the trust object must be lawful2232 – a trust will not be valid if the object is, for 
example, to fund terrorism or promote racism or gender discrimination. 
 
As indicated above, one of the requirements for a valid trust is that the object must be 
ascertainable. The trust deed by which the trust is created must therefore provide for 
the appointment of beneficiaries.2233 The beneficiaries could either all benefit from 
income and capital,2234 or the trust deed could provide that specific persons benefit 
from the income and other persons from the capital.2235 The trust deed should specify 
whether the trustee is obliged to pay or apply the income to, or for the benefit of, the 
income beneficiary/ies, or whether he or she is empowered to do so in his or her 
discretion.2236 If the trustee is obliged to pay income to a beneficiary, the beneficiary has 
an immediate entitlement to the income2237 and therefore has a vested personal right to 
claim payment of this benefit from the trustee when the income becomes 
distributable.2238 This right to the income is an asset that falls into the beneficiary’s 
estate on death or insolvency.2239 If there is no obligation on the trustee and he or she is 
merely empowered to exercise discretion to decide whether or not to pay income to a 
beneficiary, the beneficiary has a contingent right, which is dependent on the exercise 
 
2231 CIR v Estate Sive 1955 (1) SA 249 (A); Braun v Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
2232 Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1996 (4) SA 253 (C); Peterson v Claassen 2006 (5) SA 191 (C); 
Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 197; Geach 90. 
2233 Harter v Epstein 1953 (1) SA 287 (A); Edmeades, De Kock & Orffer v Die Meester 1975 (3) SA 109 (O); 
Khabola v Ralitabo unreported, case number 5512/2010 [2011] ZAFSHC 62, judgment delivered on 24 
March 2011; Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 175; Geach 93; 253. 
2234 CSARS v Dyefin Textiles (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 606 (N); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 600; Geach 272. 
2235 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 599; Geach 272. 
2236 Geach 264. 
2237 Re Allen Trust 1941 NPD 147; Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 574; Geach 265. 
2238 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 574; Geach 265; Du Toit “The fiduciary office of trustee and the 
protection of contingent trust beneficiaries” 2007(18)3 Stell LR 477. 




of the trustee’s discretion.2240 The beneficiary therefore has merely a spes (hope) that 
the trustee will use income for his or her benefit.2241 Such a contingent right or spes 
does not form an asset in the beneficiary’s estate on death or insolvency.2242 For 
practical purposes, especially where the trust is created to maintain a beneficiary, most 
trust deeds typically empower the trustee to use capital should this be necessary2243 – 
this is to provide for a situation where the trustee wishes to assist a beneficiary, but the 
income of the trust is insufficient for this purpose. A typical example is where a 
beneficiary requires assistance for extraordinary medical expenses or to purchase a 
house or establish a business.2244 
 
The trust deed should also provide for the appointment of a trustee or trustees.2245 The 
trustee of a trust plays a crucial role, as he or she is responsible for managing the affairs 
of the trust by attending to the administration and disposal of trust property according 
to the provisions of the trust deed.2246 Trusteeship is an official position2247 and is 
established by the appointment of a trustee in the trust deed,2248 the acceptance by the 
appointed trustee,2249 and the authorisation of the trustee by the Master of the High 
Court.2250  
 
2240 Burger v CIR 1956 (1) SA 534 (W); Hilda Holt Will Trust v CIR 1992 (4) SA 661 (A); Jowell v Bramwell-
Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W); Webb v Davis 1998 (2) SA 975 (SCA); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 576; 
Geach 265. 
2241 Barnhoorn v Duvenage 1964 (2) SA 486 (A); Welch’s Estate v CIR 1992 (4) SA 661 (A); Cameron, De 
Waal and Solomon 575; Geach 264; Du Toit “The fiduciary office of trustee and the protection of 
contingent trust beneficiaries” 2007(18)3 Stell LR 477. 
2242 Wasserman v Sackstein 1980 (2) SA 536 (O); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 575; Geach 265. 
2243 Ex parte Hulton 1954 (1) SA 460 (C); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 373. 
2244 Geach 274. 
2245 For ease of reference I will use the term “trustee” in the further discussion. It should be noted that a 
trust will not fail for want of a trustee: Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2005 
(2) SA 77 (SCA); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 210. 
2246 Geach 143; Du Toit 2007(18)3 Stell LR 469. 
2247 Hofer v Kevitt 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA); Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) 
SA 77 (SCA); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 14. 
2248 Metequity Ltd v NWN Properties Ltd 1998 (2) SA 554 (T); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 210. 
2249 Marais v Naude 1987 (3) SA 739 (A): Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 247; Du Toit 2007(18)3 Stell LR 
470. The acceptance is typically evidenced by the fact that the trustee signed the trust deed. 
2250 Section 6(1) TPCA; Simplex v Van der Merwe 1996 (1) SA 111 (W); Lupacchini v Minister of Safety and 





A trustee derives his or her powers and duties mainly from the trust instrument,2251 but 
the TPCA and the common law2252 also impose certain duties on a trustee. The trustee 
occupies a fiduciary position2253 and is therefore subject to a fiduciary duty.2254 The key 
focus of this fiduciary duty is the manner in which the trustee administers the trust 
property2255 for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.2256 The trustee must therefore 
conduct his or her administration in utmost good faith and always in the best interest of 
the trust beneficiaries.2257 This common law standard of care is also contained in the 
TPCA, which requires2258 a trustee to act with the care, diligence and skill that can 
reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another.2259 The trustee 
must act honestly and in good faith in relation to the trust and the beneficiaries,2260 and 
must exercise his or her powers in the interest of the beneficiaries and for their 
benefit.2261 The trustee must carry out the terms of the trust deed as far as it is lawful 
and effective under the laws of the place where the administration of the trust takes 
place2262 and must exercise independent discretion in all matters except questions of 
 
2251 Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA); Cameron, De Waal and 
Solomon 251; Geach 145. 
2252 Grobbelaar v Grobbelaar 1959 (4) SA 719 (A); Edmeades, De Kock & Orffer v Die Meester 1975 (3) SA 
109 (O); Geach 145; Klopper 1990(107)3 SALJ 705. 
2253 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 13; De Waal “Die wysiging van ‘n inter vivos trust” 1998-2 TSAR 331; 
Du Toit 2007(18)3 Stell LR 471.  
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law.2263 The trustee must therefore act objectively when dealing with the beneficiaries 
and must try as far as possible to balance the needs of the different beneficiaries.2264 
This means that, unless the trust deed authorises the trustee to distinguish between the 
needs of the different beneficiaries, or unless there is a valid reason for doing so, the 
trustee should as far as possible ensure that beneficiaries are treated equally.2265 It is 
also important that the trustee must avoid any conflict of interest between his or her 
personal interests and those of the beneficiaries.2266 Where the trustee is also a 
beneficiary of the trust, it is inevitable that there might be a conflict of interest and the 
trustee’s actions in such an instance will be even more closely scrutinised to ensure that 
the conflict does not materialise.2267 
 
In terms of the common law, a trust can terminate by operation of law under certain 
circumstances, for example by statute, fulfilment of the object, failure of a beneficiary, 
or destruction of the trust property.2268 Another way is in terms of the provisions in the 
trust deed. The deed should also provide for termination of the trust, which could occur 
on a specified date, the happening of a specified event,2269 or a date to be determined 
by the trustee in his or her discretion.2270 The deed should provide how the remaining 
capital shall devolve on termination2271 – in my experience of reading trust deeds and 
establishing trusts for settlors, most settlors provide that the capital will devolve on the 
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capital beneficiaries in the proportions specified in the trust deed, or on such capital 
beneficiaries, and in such proportions, as the trustee in his or her discretion decides.  
 
8.3.5.3 Using a trust in the context of the MSSA 
I would suggest that a trust could be used as follows when dealing with a claim under 
the MSSA: the executor will consider and assess the maintenance claim as currently 
provided in the MSSA. However, I suggest that this be done as referred to in 8.2.1, 
namely that the executor and survivor agree on the quantum of the survivor’s 
maintenance needs at that time. Once the maintenance needs have been agreed, the 
details can be submitted to an actuary for calculation of the future value of the claim. A 
trust will then be established with the executor acting as settlor or founder. The income 
beneficiary of the trust will be the survivor, and the capital beneficiaries will be the 
residual heirs of the deceased spouse as per the will or the rules of intestacy. Once the 
trust has been established, the trustee has been authorised by the Master, and the 
estate has become distributable,2272 a cash amount, an asset or assets, or a combination 
of cash and an asset or assets, equivalent to the capital value of the maintenance claim, 
will be paid and/or transferred from the estate to the trustee to administer.2273 The 
trustee will be obliged to invest the funds and/or manage the specific assets in such a 
way that it generates the income required for the maintenance needs of the survivor. If 
the asset is an immovable property, the trustee may, depending on the needs of the 
survivor, allow the survivor to live in it, or may enter into a lease agreement with a 
tenant and use the rental on the property towards payment of the survivor’s 
maintenance needs.  
 
As indicated above, the trust deed should either place an obligation on the trustee to 
pay income to an income beneficiary or give the trustee the power to use discretion in 
this regard. I would suggest that for purposes of a maintenance claim under the MSSA, 
 
2272 See 2.5.2.10 for more details on when an estate becomes distributable. 




the trust deed should provide that the trustees shall pay income to the survivor, but the 
quantum of the income payments will be limited to what was agreed when the claim 
was accepted. Therefore, if the trust generates more income than the survivor requires, 
the additional income will be added to the capital and not be paid to the survivor. The 
deed should also provide that the trustee will have the power to access capital in case 
the trust does not generate sufficient income to meet the maintenance requirements of 
the surviving spouse. The trustee and the survivor will have to agree on the frequency of 
payments, but I suggest that in most instances the payment should be done on a 
monthly basis, as this would be the most appropriate way to address the survivor’s 
maintenance needs. It would also align with the basic idea of maintenance being an 
ongoing, regular payment.2274 The trust deed should provide that the trust will 
terminate on the death or remarriage2275 of the survivor and the capital of the trust at 
that time will devolve on the capital beneficiaries in the same proportion as they shared 
in the residue of the deceased spouse’s estate.  
 
It is evident from the discussion above about the role of the trustee that it is very 
important for the effective application of a trust that an appropriate trustee is 
appointed. To avoid a conflict of interest, the important role played by the trustee 
requires that he or she should be an independent party and not also a beneficiary of the 
trust. In my view it would be appropriate for the executor of the deceased spouse’s 
estate to also be the trustee, provided the executor is an independent person or 
organisation. If the executor is an heir of the deceased estate, I would suggest that a 
professional trustee be appointed rather than the heir. 
 
8.3.5.4 Advantages of using a trust 
Using a trust to provide for periodical payments to the survivor will address the situation 
where the survivor’s circumstances change to the extent that his or her maintenance 
 
2274 See 4.4.3 for a discussion on this aspect. 




needs are reduced after the maintenance claim has been accepted. The trust deed 
should provide that the trustee must assess the survivor’s needs on an ongoing basis 
and, should the trustee determine that these needs have changed to the effect that the 
survivor requires less maintenance than initially indicated, the periodical payments will 
be adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, if the trustee assesses that the survivor’s need 
for maintenance has fallen away, the trustee shall cease payments to the survivor until 
he or she may again be in a position where maintenance is required. I would suggest 
that the trust does not terminate if this happens, as the survivor’s needs might change 
again. The maintenance payments will simply be suspended for as long as the survivor 
does not need maintenance, and the trust will only terminate on the survivor’s death or 
remarriage or if he or she renounces the right to income.  
 
In all of the above circumstances, the remaining capital in the trust on death or 
remarriage of the survivor will not form part of his or her estate, but will devolve on the 
capital beneficiaries of the trust, being the residual heirs of the deceased estate. These 
heirs will therefore not be prejudiced if the survivor should remarry or die before the 
date indicated by the life expectancy tables as is the case where a lump sum payment is 
made to the survivor. 
 
From the survivor’s point of view, a trust is a good option as he or she will acquire a 
right to income, which provides certainty that his or her maintenance needs will be 
addressed. As with the case of a limited interest in favour of the survivor, the right to 
income from a trust will be an asset in the survivor’s estate on death for purposes of 
calculating estate duty.2276 The value of the right is, however, linked to the income the 
survivor enjoyed2277 and not to the value of the asset that generated the income, which 
will result in less estate duty than where the asset itself formed part of the survivor’s 
estate.  
 
2276 Section 3(2)(a) of the EDA; Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 697. 





8.3.5.5 Disadvantages of using a trust 
While a trust does address several of the concerns I have raised, it does not address all 
these concerns. One shortcoming is that it does not give the executor any guidelines to 
assess the maintenance claim but, as I have already indicated,2278 I do not believe that it 
is possible to legislate guidelines that will cover all possible scenarios. I would, however, 
suggest that a lack of guidelines could to some extent be addressed by agreement 
between the parties as to the survivor’s current maintenance needs before an actuary is 
approached to calculate the claim over the lifetime of the survivor, and the use of a 
trust to manage ongoing maintenance payments. This should mean that, even if the 
claim as calculated results in an amount that is higher than would objectively be 
necessary for the survivor’s maintenance, the regular payments will be limited to what 
the survivor requires, and any unused capital will remain available for the eventual 
benefit of the residual heirs of the estate.  
 
A trust also does not address the issue of interim maintenance, but I submit that this 
can to some extent be alleviated by the fact that the process of establishing a trust and 
paying funds to the trustee can happen relatively quickly. In addition, I would suggest 
that interim maintenance be addressed by the executor applying section 26 of the 
Estates Act to release funds from the estate to provide for the subsistence of the 
survivor.2279 
 
Another aspect of a trust that could raise concern is fees. In my experience, the cost of 
establishing a trust is typically not that high and should not be cause for concern, but 
the cost of the ongoing administration could be an issue. The role of a trustee is 
onerous2280 and the trustee would therefore expect to be compensated accordingly.2281 
 
2278 See 8.3.1. 
2279 See 2.4.2.2 for more details. 
2280 Geach 429. 




The TPCA provides2282 that a trustee is entitled to the remuneration fixed in the trust 
instrument. According to Cameron, De Waal and Solomon,2283 where a trust instrument 
appoints a professional trustee such as a trust company, accountant or attorney, it is 
implied that the trustee will charge fees in line with what is customarily charged by 
these professions.2284 If the trust instrument neither specifies nor implies a 
remuneration, the trustee may charge a reasonable remuneration.2285 I submit that the 
use of the word “reasonable” implies that each case should be considered on its own 
merits to determine what fees would be reasonable considering the circumstances of 
that particular trust. In my experience trustee fees are typically charged on a time spent 
basis or as a percentage of the assets under management of the trustee. The trustee 
fees will be settled from the trust assets, so it would be important to ensure that these 
fees are factored in when calculating the amount to be settled in the trust. Although the 
cost of administering a trust is a potential negative factor, it needs to be noted that the 
trustee fees should be considerably less than legal fees if the matter was to be heard by 
a court of law. I would in any event agree with Geach2286 that consideration be given to 
fixing the trustee’s fee in the trust deed. 
 
Any discussion about the use of a trust would be incomplete if the taxation of a trust is 
not addressed. The transfer of assets to a trust could result in certain taxes being levied, 
and the trust itself might be subject to tax on the income and capital gains generated by 
the trust.   
 
The Transfer Duty Act2287 provides that transfer duty is payable by any person on the 
value of an immovable property acquired by that person by way of a transaction.2288 The 
 
2282 Section 22. 
2283 At 413. 
2284 See also Griessel v Bankorp Trust Bpk 1990 (2) SA 328 (O). 
2285 Section 22 TPCA. 
2286 Trust law in South Africa 215. 
2287 40 of 1949. 
2288 Section 2(1); CIR v Freddies Consolidated Mines Ltd 1957 (1) SA 306 (A); Ex parte Sellars 1958 (4) SA 54 




reference to “person” includes a trust2289 and the definition of “transaction”2290 is wide 
enough to include the acquisition of an immovable property by a trust. There are several 
exemptions relating to trusts,2291 but the acquisition by a trust of immovable property as 
settlement of a maintenance claim under the MSSA is not an exemption. I suggest that 
such an acquisition should be exempt and base this on the fact that the Transfer Duty 
Act already contains certain exemptions that apply to deceased estates and spouses. An 
immovable property transferred from a deceased estate to an heir or legatee who 
inherits that property in terms of the will of the deceased or the rules of intestacy is 
exempt from transfer duty.2292 Where a surviving or divorced spouse acquires sole 
ownership of the whole or any part of an immovable property registered in the name of 
the deceased or divorced spouse pursuant to the death of the spouse or dissolution of 
the marriage, the acquisition is exempt from transfer duty.2293 I submit that, should a 
trust be accepted as a solution to deal with maintenance claims under the MSSA, the 
exemptions in the Transfer Duty Act should be extended to also include acquisition of an 
immovable property by a trust established to deal with settlement of a claim under the 
MSSA.  
 
The Securities Transfer Tax Act2294 provides2295 for a securities transfer tax to be paid by 
a person to whom shares in a company are transferred, but there are similar 
exemptions2296 as those in the Transfer Duty Act. I would therefore submit that these 
exemptions also be extended as suggested above. 
 
The ITA provides that income tax is payable in respect of taxable income received by or 
accrued to or in favour of a person (other than a company) during a year of 
 
2289 Section 1. 
2290 Section 1. 
2291 Section 9. The details of these exemptions are not relevant for purposes of this discussion. 
2292 Section 9(1)(e). 
2293 Section 9(1)(i). 
2294 25 of 2007. 
2295 Section 2(1). 




assessment.2297 A trust is included in the definition2298 of “person” and is therefore a 
taxpayer in its own right and could be taxed on its income and capital gains. The 
taxation of income and capital gains generated by a trust depends on how the trustee 
applies the income and gains.2299  
• where income has during a tax year been received by, or accrued to, a trust for 
the immediate or future benefit of an ascertained beneficiary with a vested right 
to that amount during that year, the income shall be deemed to accrue to the 
beneficiary and will accordingly be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary.2300 The 
ITA does not define “vested right”, but there are several judgments in this 
regard.2301 For purposes of this discussion it suffices to say that a vested right 
applies when a beneficiary is entitled to income in terms of the trust instrument. 
It also applies where the trustee has a discretion to apply income for the benefit 
of a beneficiary and exercises that discretion in the year that the income is 
received by, or accrues to, the trust;2302 
• any income that is not so derived shall be taxed in the trust;2303 
• the aforementioned principles are, however, subject to certain anti-avoidance 
rules.2304 The most important rule in the context of a trust is the one that 
provides that where a person had made a donation, settlement or other 
disposition2305 which is subject to a stipulation or condition to the effect that the 
beneficiary thereof shall not receive the income or some portion thereof until 
the happening of some event, so much of the income that accrued in 
consequence of the donation, settlement or other disposition, that would have 
 
2297 Section 5(1)(c). 
2298 Section 1. 
2299 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 659. 
2300 Section 25B(1). 
2301 For example, ITC 799 (1954) 20 SATC 222; ITC 1328 (1981) 43 SATC 56; Hilda Holt Will Trust v CIR 1992 
(4) SA 661 (A); ITC 1570 (1994) 56 SATC 120. 
2302 Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 660. 
2303 Section 25B(1); Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 665. 
2304 Section 7. 
2305 The words “settlement or other disposition” are to be construed in line with “donation” and therefore 
also refers to a disposition that has an element of gratuity or liberality: Ovenstone v SIR 1980 (2) SA 




been received by the beneficiary was it not for the stipulation or condition, shall 
be taxed in the hands of the person who made the donation, settlement or other 
disposition until such time as the event happens.2306 This section typically applies 
where a person has made a donation, interest-free or low interest loan to a trust 
and the trust receives income without passing such income on to the 
beneficiaries. Our courts2307 have ruled that the making of an interest-free or low 
interest loan constitutes a continuing donation to the borrower which confers a 
benefit upon such borrower. The courts have also ruled that the exercise by 
trustees of the discretionary right to pass income to a beneficiary is the 
happening of an event as referred to in section 7(5). Therefore, if the trustees do 
not pass a decision to pass the income to the beneficiaries, the income will be 
taxed in the hands of the person who made the donation, interest-free or low 
interest loan.2308  
The current rate at which a trust’s taxable income is taxed is 45%, which is equivalent to 
the highest marginal rate paid by individuals.2309  
 
The Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains the provisions relating to taxation of capital 
gains. The same principles apply as for income tax: 
• where a resident beneficiary has, or acquires, a vested right in and to a capital 
gain resulting from the disposal of a trust asset, the gain will be taxed in the 
beneficiary’s hands;2310 
• where there is no such vested right, the gain will be taxed in the trust;2311 The 
taxable gain included in the taxable income of the trust is equal to 80% of the 
net capital gain;2312  
 
2306 Section 7(5).  
2307 CIR v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 (A); CSARS v Woulidge 2002 (1) SA 68 (SCA); CSARS v Brummeria 
Renaissance (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA). 
2308 Hulett v CIR 1944 NPD 263; ITC 1033 (1962) 24 SATC 729; Cameron, De Waal and Solomon 670. 
2309 Schedule 1 Rates and Monetary Amounts and Amendments of Revenues Laws Act 21 of 2019. 
2310 Par 80. 




• the aforementioned provisions are also subject to the provision that, where a 
person had made a donation, settlement or other disposition which is subject to 
a stipulation or condition to the effect that the beneficiary thereof shall not 
receive the capital gain or some portion thereof until the happening of some 
event, so much of the capital gain that accrued in consequence of the donation, 
settlement or other disposition, that would have been received by the 
beneficiary was it not for the stipulation or condition, shall be taxed in the hands 
of the person who made the donation, settlement or other disposition until such 
time as the event happens.2313 
 
In terms of the changes to the MSSA I propose, the executor of the first-dying spouse’s 
deceased estate, in his or her capacity as such, shall be the settlor of the trust. The 
question arises whether the settlement of the maintenance claim into the trust could be 
regarded as a settlement or other disposition as envisaged in the ITA. It is evident that 
the settlement by the executor will not be done as an act of generosity or liberality on 
the part of the executor, but rather as a way to facilitate payment of a creditor’s claim. I 
would therefore suggest that the principle established in Welch’s Estate v CSARS2314 that 
funds that are settled upon a trust established for the purpose of settling the settlor’s 
maintenance obligations to his or her family is not a gratuitous disposal and therefore 
does not qualify as a donation, should also apply in this case. As indicated, the terms of 
the trust deed should provide that the trustee shall be obliged to pay income to the 
survivor. As a result, the survivor shall be entitled to income from the trust, albeit that 
the quantum of the income will be limited to his or her proven needs. This would ensure 
that the majority, if not all, of the income and/or capital gains used by the trustee to 
fund the maintenance needs of the survivor will be taxed in the hands of the survivor 
and not the trust. The survivor will therefore have an additional tax obligation, but he or 
 
2312 Par 10(1)(c) Eighth Schedule of the ITA. A natural person’s taxable capital gain is equal to forty percent 
of the net capital gain: par 10(1)(a) Eighth Schedule of the ITA. 
2313 Par 70. 




she would in any event have been liable for the income and capital gains generated by 
these assets had the claim been settled by way of a lump sum payment, or the transfer 
of assets. I therefore do not regard taxation as a reason to not pursue the trust as the 
most suitable solution to settle a claim under the MSSA. 
 
8.4 Proposed amendments to the MSSA 
 
I undertook this research to establish whether my experience in applying the MSSA to 
actual scenarios is indeed how others in the fiduciary industry also experience it. I 
believe that I have demonstrated that there are indeed several practical challenges that 
an executor must deal with when assessing and settling a claim under the MSSA, and 
that most executors find this problematic. 
 
Having established that there are challenges, this thesis would be incomplete if I did not 
also offer a solution. The solutions discussed in 8.3 are intended as measures to be 
applied in the absence of agreement between the survivor and heirs. These solutions 
are all potentially viable, but to different degrees, as most of them address only some 
areas of concern, and in some instances they create further issues, for example taxation, 
possible strained relationships between the survivor and heirs, additional costs, and 
delays in the estate administration process. I believe that the solution is to utilise a trust 
as a vehicle to receive the settlement of the maintenance claim, whether by way of a 
cash payment or the transfer of assets, and to fund the maintenance requirements of 
the survivor. As indicated, a trust is by no means a perfect solution to the concerns I 
have raised regarding the practical application of the MSSA, but I submit that it is the 
most appropriate solution as it addresses most of the concerns raised.  
 
A trust as a solution will, however, not be effective if it remains a voluntary option as 
currently provided for in the MSSA, and I am therefore of the view that the only way to 




agreement between the survivor and the heirs and/or legatees. This would entail 
amending the MSSA to provide for the mandatory creation of a trust in such a scenario. I 
have attempted to rewrite the MSSA to incorporate this change and certain others that I 
suggest would make the application of the MSSA easier for the executor. I would 
suggest retaining the MSSA in a largely unchanged format but adding some provisions to 
address some of the issues I have raised. (As mentioned in 8.2.1 above, the only 
deletion that I would suggest is the reference to “in addition to any other factor which 
should be taken into account” from section 3 of the current Act). The text that follows 
contains my suggested amendments, that are underlined for ease of reference. 
 
 
  MAINTENANCE OF SURVIVING SPOUSES ACT 27 of 1990 
 
ACT 
To provide the surviving spouse or life partner in certain circumstances with a claim for 
maintenance against the estate of the deceased spouse or life partner, and to provide for 
incidental matters. 
1.  Definitions —In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates— 
 “court” means a court as defined in section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 
No. 66 of 1965); 
 “executor” means an executor as defined in section 1 of the Administration of Estates Act, 
1965, or any person who liquidates and distributes an estate on the instructions of the 
Master; 
“life partnership” means a life partnership entered into between same-sex or heterosexual 
partners in which they have undertaken reciprocal duties of support, and “life partner” shall 
be construed accordingly; 
 “marriage” includes a marriage recognised in terms of the laws of the Republic and a union 
recognized as a marriage in accordance with the tenets of any religion, and “remarriage” 
shall be construed accordingly; 




 “own means” includes any money or property or other financial benefit accruing to the 
survivor in terms of the matrimonial property law or the law of succession or otherwise at 
the death of the deceased spouse; 
“reasonable maintenance needs” means so much as is required to provide for actual 
financial needs;  
“survivor” means the survivor of a marriage or life partnership dissolved by death, and 
includes a spouse of a customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil marriage contracted 
by her husband in the customary marriage to another woman on or after 1 January 1929 (the 
date of commencement of sections 22 and 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 
38 of 1927)), but before 2 December 1988 (the date of commencement of the Marriage and 
Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, 1988 (Act No. 3 of 1988)) and “spouse” shall be 
construed accordingly; 
“trust” means a trust as contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of “trust” in section 1 
of the Trust Property Control Act, 1988 (Act 57 of 1988). 
 
2.   Claim for maintenance against estate of deceased spouse or life partner 
      (1)  If a marriage or life partnership is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act 
the survivor shall have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the 
provision of his reasonable maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so far as 
he is not able to provide therefor from his own means and earnings. 
      (2)  The survivor shall, in respect of a claim for maintenance, not have a right of recourse 
against any person to whom money or property has been paid, delivered or transferred 
in terms of section 34 (11) or 35 (12) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 
66 of 1965), or pursuant to an instruction of the Master in terms of section 18 (3) or 25 
(1) (a) (ii) of that Act. 
      (3)  (a) The proof and disposal of a claim for maintenance of the survivor shall, subject to 
paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the 
Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965). 
                    (b) The claim for maintenance of the survivor shall have the same order of preference in 
respect of other claims against the estate of the deceased spouse as a claim for 
maintenance of a dependent child of the deceased spouse has or would have against 
the estate if there were such a claim, and, if the claim of the survivor and that of a 
dependent child compete with each other, those claims shall, if necessary, be 
reduced proportionately. 
             (c)  In the event of a conflict between the interests of the survivor in his capacity as 
claimant against the estate of the deceased spouse and the interests in his capacity 
as guardian of a minor dependent child of the deceased spouse, or in his capacity as 
executor of the estate of the deceased spouse, the Master shall refer the claim for 
maintenance to the maintenance court. 
             (d)  The executor of the estate of a deceased spouse shall have the power to enter into 




agreement, including the creation of a trust, and in terms of the agreement to 
transfer assets of the deceased estate, or a right in the assets, to the survivor or the 
trust, or to impose an obligation on an heir or legatee, in settlement of the claim of 
the survivor or part thereof. 
            (e) In the absence of an agreement in terms of paragraph (d), the executor shall establish 
a trust for the benefit of the survivor and shall transfer assets from the estate of the 
deceased spouse to the trust, in settlement of the claim of the survivor or part 
thereof. The trust shall be settled on the terms and provisions provided in paragraph 
(f). 
             (f) The deed of the trust established in terms of paragraph (e) shall provide as follows: 
 (i) The executor shall be the settlor of the trust; 
 (ii) The survivor shall be the income beneficiary of the trust; 
 
 (iii) The residual heirs, whether in terms of a will or on intestacy, of the estate of the 
deceased shall be the capital beneficiaries of the trust;   
 
 (iv) The survivor shall be entitled to income from the trust, but the income shall be 
limited to so much as was agreed to represent his reasonable maintenance needs 
at the time the claim was lodged against the estate of the deceased spouse; 
 
(v) The trustee shall be empowered to use capital of the trust should the income 
generated by the trust be insufficient to meet the ongoing maintenance needs of 
the survivor.  
 
(vi) The trustee shall be empowered to re-assess the ongoing maintenance needs of 
the survivor at regular intervals and shall be entitled to suspend payment of 
regular maintenance if, in the trustee’s discretion, the survivor is able to meet his 
reasonable maintenance needs from his own means and earnings; 
 
(vii) The trust shall terminate on the remarriage or death of the survivor or when the 
survivor irrevocably renounces his right to income envisaged under sub-paragraph 
(iv); 
 
(viii) On termination of the trust, the capital of the trust shall devolve on the capital 
beneficiaries in the same proportion as they are heirs to the residue of the estate 
of the deceased spouse. 
 
 
3.  Determination of reasonable maintenance needs 
 
      In the determination of the reasonable maintenance needs of the survivor, the following 
factors shall be taken into account: 





(b)  The existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and obligations of the 
survivor and the subsistence of the marriage; 
 
(c) The standard of living of the survivor during the subsistence of the marriage and his      
age at the death of the deceased spouse; 
 
(d) The contribution made by the survivor to the welfare of the family of the deceased,         





It is evident from the research contained in this thesis that the provision of maintenance 
for a survivor after the death of his or her spouse has been a topic of concern for many 
years. It took 35 years of legislative process to address this and to provide a statute, the 
MSSA, in this regard. Since being promulgated in 1990, the MSSA, has remained largely 
unchanged. 2315 I believe that it is time for a review. 
 
The research in this thesis has identified and highlighted the practical problems an 
executor has to deal with when applying the MSSA. Although there have been several 
developments in this area of the law, particularly in relation to who is eligible to claim as 
a survivor, it is evident that further development in this regard is necessary to ensure 
that the MSSA properly serves the purpose for which it was developed. I hope that this 
thesis, and specifically the proposed amendments to the MSSA, will provide a practical 
solution to executors when dealing with an MSSA claim and add value to the body of 
knowledge available to executors on this topic, so that claims under the MSSA can be 












For how many years have you administered estates? 
1.       Less than 5   
2.       5-10   
3.       More than 10   
How many claims under The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act (MSSA) on average have you had to consider?  
1.       Less than 5   
2.       5-10   
3.       More than 10   
Based on your experience, how often are maintenance claims under the MSSA lodged against an estate?  
1.       1 in 10 estates   
2.       1 in 20 estates   
3.       1 in 30 estates   
4.       1 in 50 estates   
5.       Less than 1 in 50 estates   
Based on your experience, what impact does the lodging of a maintenance claim have on the administration process?  
1.       No impact at all   
2.       The administration process is delayed by up to 3 months   
3.       The administration process is delayed by 3 months or more   
How was the average maintenance claim accepted by you settled?  
1.       Cash lump sum   
2.       Periodic maintenance   
3.       Cash lump sum for a portion of the claim and periodic maintenance for the balance   
4.       Transfer of estate asset/s   
5.       Cash lump sum for a portion of the claim and transfer of asset/s for the balance   
Have you ever completely refused a maintenance claim?  
1.       Yes   




If you have answered “yes” to the previous question, indicate the reason for refusing the claim  
1.       The survivor could not prove inability to provide for his/her own maintenance needs   
2.       The survivor could not provide sufficient information about his/her own means and earnings   
3.       The estate did not have sufficient funds to cover the claim   
4.       The claim was lodged by a heterosexual life partner of the deceased   
5.       Other reasons   
Have you ever accepted a maintenance claim for a lesser amount than the amount claimed by the surviving spouse?  
1.       Yes   
2.       No   
3.       Additional comments   
Has an objection in terms of section 35(7) of the Administration of Estates Act ever been lodged against a decision you 
took about a maintenance claim?  
1.       Yes   
2.       No   
Have you ever entered into an agreement with the surviving spouse and heirs of the estate as envisaged in section 
2(3)(d) of the MSSA?  
1.       Yes   
2.       No   
If you answered “yes” to the previous question, by whom was the agreement initiated or suggested? 
1.       The executor   
2.       The surviving spouse   
3.       The heirs   
4.       The surviving spouse and heirs together   
In your opinion, what level of guidance does the MSSA give the executor to assess the reasonable maintenance needs of 
the surviving spouse?  
1.       No guidance   
2.       Some guidance but not enough   
3.       Sufficient guidance   
If you chose “No guidance” or “Some guidance but not enough” in the previous question, indicate the nature of the 
guidance you would like to see in the MSSA – tick all the appropriate options 
1.       To determine the survivor’s reasonable maintenance needs   




3.       To determine the survivor’s existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and obligations    
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult do you find it to determine 
the standard of living of the survivor during the subsistence of the marriage? 
Insert number in column to the right   
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult do you find it to determine 
expected means and earning capacity of the survivor? 
Insert number in column to the right   
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult do you find it to determine 
the financial needs and obligations of the survivor? 
Insert number in column to the right   
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being very difficult and 10 being very easy, how easy or difficult do you find it to assess 
whether the following needs typically claimed for as part of a maintenance claim are reasonable?  
Insert number next to each item in column to the right    
1.       Food and cleaning products   
2.       Vehicle maintenance and petrol   
3.       Hairdresser   
4.       Cosmetics   
5.       Subscriptions to magazines   
6.       Subscriptions to DSTV/Showmax/Netflix   
7.       Entertainment   
8.       Donations   
9.       Holiday costs   
10.   Telephone and cellphone costs   
11.   Garden services, pool services, domestic cleaning services   
12.   Gym contract   
Section 3 of the MSSA provides that the executor shall take into account certain specified factors “in addition to any 
other factor which should be taken into account” when assessing reasonable maintenance needs.  Do you feel 
comfortable with the responsibility placed on the executor to consider “any other factor”? 
Yes   
No   
What would you typically consider as “any other factor”? Tick all the appropriate options. 
1.       Whether the spouses were living together or were separated at the time of death   




3.       Whether the survivor is the parent of the residual heirs   
4.       The financial situation of the residual heirs   
The MSSA provides that a maintenance claim shall be dealt with by the executor. Regardless of practicalities such as cost 
and time, who do you think is most suited to consider a maintenance claim? 
1.       The executor   
2.       The Master   
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